trading firm had employed in the conduct of suits pending at the time of bankruptcy, the assignees in bankruptcy are not entitled to a delivery up to them of the papers in the solicitor's possession, subject to their existing lien.In re Moss, Law Rep. 2 Eq. 345.

2. The 23 & 24 Vict. c. 127, § 10, provides, that no one articled to an attorney shall hold any office, or engage in any employment whatever, other than the employment of clerk to such attorney. Held, that an articled clerk had not violated this provision by having been steward of a manor in which his family and himself were interested, the duties being performed by a deputy (with whom he divided the fees), and the clerk having thrice only, during two or three years, with his principal's consent, absented himself to hold courts.-In re Peppercorn, Law Rep. 1 C. P. 473.

See VENDOR AND PURCHASER, 2.

SPECIFIC PERFORMANCE.-See DAMAGES, 3; INJUNCTION; VENDOR AND PURCHASER, 3-5. STATUTE OF FRAUDS.-See FRAUDS, STATUTE OF. STATUTE OF LIMITATIONS,-See LIMITATIONS, STATUTE OF.

STOPPAGE IN Transitu.

On July 12th, W. sold P. eleven skips of cotton twist, then lying at the defendants' station at S., to be delivered for P. at B. station. Three of the skips were delivered on July 22nd, but P., objecting to the weight and quality, declined to take any more. On August 17th, four more were sent to B. station, and an invoice of the eight sent to P., with word that four had been forwarded, and that the other four were at S. station, waiting his orders. P. immediately returned the invoice, and wrote to W. declining to take any more. On September 1st, W. sent an order to S. station, for the defendants to deliver the remaining four skips to P. These were accordingly forwarded to B. station, and taken by P.'s carman to his mill, but were immediately returned by P.'s orders, and the whole eight sent back by him to S. station, to the order of W. They were again returned by W. to B. station; but, P. refusing to have anything to do with them, they remained there till P.'s bankruptcy on October 19th, when W. claimed them. Held, on a special case, stated in an action of trover by P.'s assignee against the defendants, in which the court were to draw inferences of fact, that W. had a right of stoppage in transitu.· ·Bolton v. Lancashire and Yorkshire Railway Co., Law Rep. 1 C. P. 431. SUPPORT.-See EASEMENT.

SURETY-See BOND.

The word "survive," in a will, imports that the person who is to survive must be living at the time of the event he is to survive. Therefore, a gift over in default of children, or remoter issue of A., who should survive A., is not void for remoteness.-Gee v. Liddell, Law Rep. 2 Eq. 341.

See WILL, 6.

TAXES.

The exemption in 38 Geo. III., c. 5, § 25, rendered perpetual by 38 Geo. III., c. 60, § 1), from land tax of "any hospital," applies only to institutions existing when the act was made perpetual; and land previously chargeable is not exempted by becoming crown property.— Colchester v. Kewney, Law Rep. 1 Ex. 368. TENANT IN TAIL.-See DEVISE, 3. TENDER.

An offer to pay under protest is a good tender.-Scott v. Uxbridge & Rickmansworth Railway Co., Law Rep. 1 C. P. 596.

See DETINUE.

TRUSTS AND TRUSTEES.

1. By a post-nuptial settlement, land was conveyed to trustees on trust to pay the rents to W. and his wife during their lives, and, on the death of the survivor, to sell and divide the proceeds amongst all and every the children of W., in such shares and proportions as he should by will appoint. There were seven children living at the date of the settlement, one of whom died before W., who died without executing the power. Held, that the property was vested in all the children liable to be divested by the execution of the power, and that the representatives of the deceased child were entitled to his share. Lambert v. Thwaites, Law Rep. 2 Eq. 151.

2. An order by the master of the rolls, appointing as trustee, under a will, a person of unexceptionable capacity and character, was discharged on the ground that his appointment would be contrary to the wishes of the testator as deduced from the will, and that he was proposed for and has accepted the office with a view of acting in the interests of some only of the objects of the trust, and not as an independent trustee for the benefit of them all; and the purchase of such proposal and acceptance of the trust may be proved by facts which have occurred since the date of the order.-In re Tempest, Law Rep. 1 Ch. 485.

See SEPARATE ESTATE, 2; VENDOR AND PUR-
CHASER, 2.

TURNPIKE.

A., a contractor for supplying forage to the army, delivered to B. hay to be carried to a government store, in performance of A.'s contract, by the terms of which the commissary had a right to reject it on its arrival, if of inferior quality. Held, that the waggon in which B. conveyed the hay was within 3 Geo. IV. c. 126, § 32, exempting from toll any waggon conveying commissariat stores for the use of the army.-London & S. W. Railway Co. v. Reeves, Law Rep. 1 C. P. 580.

VENDOR AND PURCHASER.

1. On a sale by the court of real estate vested in trustees, whose receipt was declared to be a good discharge, in order to divide the proceeds among the beneficiaries, the beneficiaries are not bound to covenant for title.-Cottrell v. Cottrell, Law Rep. 2 Eq. 330.

2. A., one of three trustees, assigned leasehold property held jointly by them to a purchaser, forging the signatures of his co-trustees. A. was a solicitor, and acted for the purchaser. Held, that circumstances affected the purchaser with notice of some trust, and also that he had constructive notice through the knowledge of A.; and further, that he had the legal interest in one-third, but no beneficial interest, and a re-conveyance was ordered.Boursot v. Savage, Law Rep. 2 Eq. 134.

3. The mere assertion by the vendor that he has a good title, on the faith of which the purchaser relies, is not necessarily such a misrepresentation as precludes the vendor's enforcing the contract.-Hume v. Pocock, Law Rep. 1 Ch. 379.

4. The plaintiff agreed to sell the defendant all his estate, right and interest in certain lands, the plaintiff to produce a title from B. (the last owner) to himself. The defendant knew that B. was one of four supposed owners, and was anxious to buy his title, in order to get rid of his opposition to a bill in Parliament. Held, that the defendant could not show, aliunde, that B. had no title, and that specific performance should be decreed.-Hume v. Pocock, Law Rep. 1 Ch. 379.

5. A woman, entitled in fee to a mortgaged estate, proposed to her nephew that she should live with him, and that he should move to a larger house for the purpose, she contributing a yearly sum towards the housekeeping. The nephew agreed, if she would settle the estate, limiting it to him after her death. She agreed, and a settlement was accordingly made, by which the nephew covenanted to indemnify her from all liability under the mortgage, except,

the payment of interest during her life. He moved to a larger house, and they lived together for some time. She afterwards ceased to live with him, and agreed to sell the estate to a purchaser, who filed a bill against aunt and nephew for specific performance. Held, that the nephew's covenant and his expenses incur. red on the faith of the settlement were severally sufficient to support the settlement as made for value, and not voluntary. Semble, that, had the settlement been voluntary, and so void against a purchaser, the nephew would have been a proper party, but could have made out no claim to the purchase-money.-Townsend v. Toker, Law Rep. 1 Ch. 446.

6. A purchaser of land contracted to pay interest on the purchase-money at four per cent. from the time of taking possession till the day appointed for the payment; after that day at five per cent., if the money should not then be paid; and after six months from that day at eight per cent., with a proviso that this should not give the purchaser the right to delay payment on paying such higher interest. The purchaser took possession, but the purchase was not completed for several years, though the delay was not caused by misconduct or negligence of the vendor. Held, that the stipulation for paying higher interest was not a penalty to secure punctual payment, but a separate and distinct contract, which the purchaser was bound to perform. ·Herbert v. Salisbury & Yeovil Railway Co., Law Rep. 2 Eq. 221.

See CONTRACT, 1.

VENUE, CHANGE OF.-See PRACTICE, 1.
VESTED INTEREST.

1. The testator devised real estate to his widow for life, and after her death directed the executors to sell, and divide the proceeds equally between his children, the shares of his sons to be vested in them respectively when they attained twenty-one, and the shares of the daughters to be vested interests when they attained twenty-one or were married. During the minorities of the children, their shares were to be invested and applied for their maintenance. If one or more of the children should die, leaving issue, before the share of each child or children shall become due and payable," the share was to be equally divided "amongst all the issue of such child or children, when such issue shall attain twenty-one," the interest of such child's share to be applied for the maintenance of such issue during minority. A daughter of the testator married and died in the widow's lifetime, leaving an infant child. and having assigned her share. Held, that the

words "due and payable" did not postpone the vesting of the share till the widow's death; and that the daughter's assignee, and not her child, was entitled.-Mendham v. Williams, Law Rep. 2 Eq. 396.

2. Testator made a bequest in trust to pay the proceeds to his widow for life, and after her death to divide the capital between A., B., C. and D.; and, in case any of them should die in his lifetime, and before they should have received any benefit from the aforesaid bequest, the share of the one so dying should be divided among his children. A. survived the testator, but died in the lifetime of the widow. Held, that "and" could not be read "or," and that A.'s share was vested and passed under his will.-Kirkbride's Trusts, Law Rep. 2 Eq. 400. 3. Legacy to A., and in case of his death before the same shall be actually paid or payable to him, then to trustees for his children at twenty-one; and in case no child of A. should acquire a vested interest, then over. Testator appointed his widow and A. executors, and both proved; but A. died three months after testator, before the legacy was paid, leaving a child who died an infant. Held, that the gift over took effect.-Whitman v. Aitken, Law Rep. 2 Eq 414.

VOLUNTARY CONVEYANCE.-See VENDOR AND PUR

1. A mine had, from before the time of living memory, been worked by tin-bounders, according to the custom of Cornwall, which enables any one to mark out a piece of waste ground, the owner of which does not choose to work the mines under it, and work them without the owner's consent, yielding to him a share of the proceeds. The bounders had, from before the time of living memory, used for their works the water of an artificial watercourse arising on the land of another person. The bounders abandoned the mine in 1856, since which the owners had been in possession. Held, on a bill by the owners, that the diversion of the watercourse by the owner of the land in which it rose ought to be restrained, though there was no

privity of estate between the owners and the bounders; for that it ought to be presumed that a right to use the water had been acquired by arrangement with the owners of the mine, as well as with the bounders.-Ivimey v. Stocker, Law Rep. 1 Ch. 396.

2. In Scotland, an encroachment by a building on the bed of a running stream may be enjoined at the suit of the opposite riparian proprietor, without his proving that he has sustained or is likely to sustain damage.Bickett v. Morris, Law Rep. 1 H. L. Sc. 47. WILL.

1. Two wills being propounded, one dated 1855, and one dated 1858, neither being ambiguous on its face, parol evidence was admitted to prove that the former was really executed in 1865.-Reffell v. Reffell, Law Rep. 1 P. & D. 139.

2. The witnesses to a will saw the testator writing something on the will before they signed, but did not see what he wrote, and did not know it was a will. When they signed, they did not see the attestation clause, which contained the testator's signature, or any of the writing on the will, as the testator concealed it by holding a piece of paper over it. There was a full attestation clause in the testator's handwriting. Held, that, as the witnesses had seen the testator write what the court presumed to be his signature, the attestation was sufficient.Smith v. Smith, Law Rep. 1 P. & D. 143.

3. A will contained a reference to executors "hereinafter named," but did not appoint executors. A clause appointing executors was written immediately under the testator's signature. Held, that this reference was not such a reference to the clause appointing executors as to incorporate it, or to justify the admission of parol evidence, that it was written before the will was signed.—Goods of Dallow, Law Rep. 1 P. & D. 189.

4. A testator gave the income of property to my wife A.," and the residue to " my step daughter S.," A.'s daughter. A. had a husband living at the time of the marriage ceremony with the testator, as she then knew, and also at the time of the testator's death. Held, that the gift to A. was void, but the gift to S. was valid. — Wilkinson v. Joughin, Law Rep. 2 Eq. 319.

5. Testator gave his residue among his nephews and nieces living at his death, and by a codicil gave £100 to a grandnephew (his executor), whom he called his nephew. By a second codicil, he declared that the £100 was given him in addition to the share of residue given him by the will, and that he should first receive the £100, and then the share of residue.

Held, that all grandnephews and grandnieces living at testator's death were included in the gift.-Weeds v. Bristow, Law Rep. 2 Eq. 333.

6. Testator gave a fund of realty and personalty, after provision made for debts, testamentary and funeral expenses, and the legacies and annuities before directed, on trust, to divide the same equally between his nephews. He then directed that the property given to his nephews should, on their decease, severally, be divided equally between such of their children as might survive them; and added, " and if either or any of my nephews die before me, or before they shall have actually received what is to go to them under this will, their share shall be divided equally between their children, and, in default of children, equally between my surviving nephews. Held, that all nephews who survived the testator took absolutely, and that the limitation over on death, before actually receiving, was inoperative in law, but might be used to explain the testator's intention.-Martin v. Martin, Law Rep. 2 Eq. 404.

7. One who had bought a leasehold interest, which was assigned to him, and afterwards the reversion in fee, which was conveyed to a trustee for himself, subject to the lease, made the following will: "I appoint my wife my administrator; I give and bequeath to my said wife the whole of my personal property, estate and effects, of and whatsoever kind they may every be." Held, that the term passed under the will as a term in gross, and not attendant on the inheritance, but that the reversion did not pass. -Belaney v. Belaney, Law Rep. 2 Eq. 210.

8. A. bequeathed farming stock which should be in his possession at his death. He became insane, and so remained till he died. Two years before his death, the legatee and his mother, who were named executor and executrix, converted the stock into money, which they deposited in their own and a third person's name at a bank, where it remained till after A.'s death. Held, that there had been no ademption, and the specific legatee was entitled.—Jenkins v. Jones, Law Rep. 2 Eq. 323.

9. Bequest by a single woman, who had gone through the ceremony of marriage with her deceased sister's husband, to her children, "legitimate or otherwise." One child was born before the date of the will, and several after. Held, that the child born before the date of the will took the whole bequest, to the exclusion of those born after.-Howarth v. Mills, Law Rep. 2 Eq. 389.

10. Devise of real estate "to my friends," A., B. and C., on certain trusts. Bequest of

stock to A., B. and C., "my executors herein after named," in trust for M. for life, and then to A., B. and C. in equal shares, "for their own respective absolute use and benefit." Further legacy of £200 "to each of my executors," as an additional acknowledgment" of trouble in execution of will. Appointment of A., B. and C. executors. Held, that A., who had never acted as executor and trustee, was not entitled to share in the bequest of stock.-Slaney v. Watney, Law Rep. 2 Eq. 418.

11. Testator bequeathed life annuities and legacies of money and stock to persons, and legacies of stock to charities, and directed the residue, after payment of debts, annuities, and the pecuniary legacies therein before given, to be accumulated for a certain term, and then divided among the several persons taking pecuniary legacies (including legacies of stock) under his will, or any codicil thereto, in proportion to their original legacies, the legacies of stock being for that purpose estimated at par.

He also directed, that, as part of his estate might not be legally applicable to satisfy bequests to charities, the assets should be marshalled, so that such of the legacies thereby bequeathed as were given to charities might be paid exclusively out of funds legally so applicable.

The will contained a clause excluding annuities from participation: this clause was struck through with a pen, and the cancellation attested by a codicil in the margin, in ordinary testamentary form.

Held, that, though the ordinary rule is, in the absence of evidence of contrary intention, to include annuities in "legacies," yet that here was sufficient evidence of intention to exclude annuities, and that the cancellation of the abovementioned clause did not point to any alteration of intention, or admit the operation of the ordinary rule; and held, further, that the marshalling in favor of charities should be extended to the gifts of residue as well as to the origi. nal legacies.-Gaskin v. Rogers, Law Rep. 2 Eq. 284.

12. If the person liable to pay a legacy is the person entitled to receive it, no question can arise under the Statute of Limitation.-Binns v. Nicols, Law Rep. 2 Eq. 256.

13. A legacy to an infant domiciled abroad may be paid when the infant comes of age by the law of England, or of the domicil, whichever first happens. In the mean time, it must be dealt with in the usual way, as an infant's legacy; though, by the law of the domicil, the infant's guardian is entitled to receive it.Hellmann's Will, Law Rep. 2 Eq. 363.