and that his infant heir was bound by his acts, and, under the Trustee Act of 1850, was trustee for the person claiming under the will.-Dewar v. Maitland, Law Rep. 2 Eq. 834.

3. A., having power to appoint a fund, on the marriage of his daughter B. appointed oneseventh to her; and, on the marriage of his daughter C. appointed another one-seventh to her. Afterwards, by deed-poll, without noticing the previous appointments, he gave onesixth of the fund to B., another one-sixth to C., three other sixths to other children, leaving one sixth undisposed of. Held, that the appointments to B. and C., made by the deed. poll, were in substitution for those before made, and raised a case of election. England v. Lavers, Law Rep. 3 Eq. 63. EQUITY PLEADING AND PRACTICE.

1. The United States, suing in an English Court, can only obtain relief subject to the control and pursuant to the rules of the court. Proceedings were therefore stayed in a suit by the United States till an answer should have been put into the defendant's cross-bill; but, held, that the President of the United States had been improperly made a defendant to the cross-bill, as the person to give discovery. Semble, that the bill of the United States should have been demurred to, because no public officer was put forward as representing their interests who could be called on to give discovery upon a cross-bill. Prioleau v. United States, Law Rep. 2 Eq. 659.

2. When a large number of persons have similar legal claims, all depending on the same question, against one, he can, by a bill filed against some, restrain the proceedings of all, till the validity of the claims has been decided. Sheffield Waterworks v. Yeomans, Law Rep. 2 Ch. 8.

3. Interrogatories to the plaintiff may be filed after notice of motion for decree, and filing of the plaintiff's affidavits, and proceedings will be stayed till the plaintiff answers, if there has been no excessive delay. - Brancker v. Carne, Law Rep. 2 Eq. 610.

4. Charges for settling the minutes of orders are allowed, though no minutes are issued.— Reece's Estate, Law Rep. 2 Eq. 609.

5. In administration suits, in which the gross value of the estate amounts to £1,000 when the suit is begun, the higher scale of costs applies.-Reece's Estate, Law Rep. 2 Eq. 609.

6. If the defendant resists in toto a claim a little too large, he must pay the costs up to the hearing.-Jeffryes v. Agra & Masterman's Bank, Law Rep. 2 Eq. 764.

And see different tiles throughout.

ESTOPPEL.-See JUDGMENT.

EVIDENCE.-See APPEAL, 2; DEED, 1; DEPOSITION; DISCOVERY; PRODUCTION OF DOCUMENTS; WILL, 3.

EXECUTION.

Land conveyed to a board of health for the purposes of the Public Health Acts, and used as a reservoir for supplying water to the district, can be taken under a writ of elegit on a judgment obtained against the board in the name of their clerk.- Worral Waterworks Co, v. Lloyd, Law Rep. 1 C. P. 719.

See JUDGMENT; PRACTICE, 5.
EXECUTOR.-See ADMINISTRATION; WILL, 6.
FALSA DEMONSTRATIO.-See WILL, 15.

FOREIGN STATE.-See EQUITY PLEADING AND PRAC-
TICE, 1.

FORGERY-See CONTRACT, 5.

FREIGHT.

1. The consignee of goods, before their arrival, indorsed the bill of lading, but not so as to pass the property, to a wharfinger, in these words: "Deliver to A. or order, looking to him for all freight, without recourse to us." The ship owners accepted the indorsement, and, in pursuance of it, delivered the goods to A. Held, that they could not sue the consignee for freight.-Lewis v. McKee, Law Rep. 2 Ex

37.

2. A charter-party provided that the ship should have a lien on cargo for freight at £3 108. per ton, to be paid on delivery at L. The charterers shipped part of the cargo themselves under a bill of lading from the ship. owners containing this clause: "Freight for the said goods payable in L., as per charterparty;" the charterers, for valuable considera. tion, indorsed this bill of lading to A., who did not know the contents of the charter-party, but understood that freight was £3 10s. per ton. Held, that, as against A., the shipowner had a lien only for the freight due for the goods included in the bill of lading at £3 10s. a ton, and not for the whole chartered freight.-Fry v. Chartered Mercantile Bank of India, Law Rep. 1 C. P. 689.

3. The defendant chartered a vessel of three hundred tons for a voyage from a foreign port home, with a full cargo at 848. per ton; but, he not being able to furnish the cargo, the owners agreed to cancel the charter-party, and to procure another cargo, on the defendant guaranteeing "a sum of £900 gross freight home." The cargo shipped under this agreement fell short of the guaranteed sum by £343. The vessel was lost. Held, that the contract was

broken at the moment of the shipment of the cargo, and therefore the owners could recover the £343, notwithstanding the loss of the vessel. -Carr v. Wallachian Petroleum Co., Law Rep. 1 C. P. 636.

4. The assignee of a particular freight has a claim prior to a registered mortgagee of the ship and of all freight to be earned by her, who was prior in date, but who gave no notice, and took no steps to enforce his mortgage, till the assignee had notified the charterer, and the cargo had been partly discharged.—Brown v. Tanner, Law Rep. 2 Eq. 806.

See CHARTER PARTY; SHIP. GUARDIAN.

The court refused to interfere with the foreign guardian, duly appointed, of subjects of a foreign country, when he wished to remove his wards from England, where they had been sent to be educated, in order to complete their equcation in their own country; the court refused to discharge an order appointing English guardians, but gave the foreign guardian exclusive control of the children. - Nugent v. Vetzera, Law Rep. 2 Eq. 704.

See ADMINISTRATION, 1.

HUSBAND AND WIFE.

1. If a wife has an equity to a settlement out of a fund, the amount settled on her (which, semble, will, in the absence of special circumstances, be half the fund) will be directed to be settled on her and her children, with remainder, in default of issue, to her husband.Spirett v. Willows, Law Rep. 1 Ch. 520.

2. A woman, by an ante-nuptial settlement, assigned all the personal estate to which she might at any time thereafter become entitled in any way whatsoever, on the trusts of the settlement; and her intended husband covenanted to settle any personal estate whatsoever that should devolve on or vest in her. After the marriage, a legacy was given to the wife, with a direction to the executors to pay such part thereof to the wife as she might require for her separate use, independent of her husband, and to be free in all respects from his debts and engagement. Held, that the settlement did not affect such part of the legacy as the wife required to be paid to her on her separate receipt. Mainwaring's Settlement, Law Rep. 2 Eq. 487.

See ALIMONY; ELECTION, 1; SEPARATE ESTATE;
TRUSTEE, 3.

INFANT.-See ELECTION, 1; GUARDIAN.

INJUNCTION.

The court of equity will not refuse an injunction to restrain an action at law merely on the

A. having sued B. for £28, B. paid A. £10 on account of the debt. A. afterwards signed judgment, for default of appearance, for £28 and costs, and issued execution for the amount, under which B. was arrested, and paid the sum demanded. B. having sued A. for maliciously, and without probable cause, signing judgment and issuing execution, held, that while the judgment stood for the full amount, B. was estopped to deny the correctness of the judgment or the execution. Huffer v. Allen, Law Rep. 2 Ex. 15. JURISDICTION.

It being only a question of law arising on a trial that can be stated for the opinion of the court for Crown cases reserved, that court has no jurisdiction if the prisoner has pleaded guilty; and the question is whether the pri soner's act described in the depositions supports the indictment. The Queen v. Clark, Law Rep. 1 C. C. 54. LEASE.

T. took land of R. from R.'s agent, by parol agreement, all parties knowing that the land was to be built on. A ground-rent was fixed. T. laid out £1,800 in building. T., in a subsequent application for other land for building, declared himself willing to take such other land as "tenant at will." This land also was allotted him at a fixed ground-rent. When buildings were erected on R.'s land, those who had so taken the land were entered on the books as tenants. All sides admitted, that, where such takings were made, the tenants would never be disturbed while the ground-rent was paid. When the tenant wished to transfer the land to another, the entry of the name in the agent's book was altered. Often the land was surrendered, and the new tenant accepted, much as in the transfer of a copyhold. The tenancies were very numerous. T. alleged that there was believed to exist, and that R.'s agents had, by their words and conduct, encouraged such belief, a "tenant right tenure" on the estate, and that one who had so taken and built on R.'s land was entitled to demand the grant of

lease for sixty years. Such leases had been granted, but there was no direct evidence of their having been granted on any such claim of right. A railway company, however, being desirous of obtaining some of R.'s land held under parol agreement, on the payment of a ground rent, had refused to purchase unless such leases were granted; they were granted, and then the tenants received compensation. Held (Lord Kingsdown dissenting) that these circumstances did not show the existence of any thing more than a tenancy from year to year, and did not establish any title to compel the grant of a lease. and that, the landlord having brought ejectment against T., equity could neither compel the grant of a lease nor enjoin the ejectment.-Ramsden v. Dyson, Law Rep. 1 H. L. 129. LEGACY.-See WILL. LIBEL.

1. A letter having been written by a churchwarden to the plaintiff, the incumbent, accusing him of allowing books to be sold in the church during service, and of turning the vestry into a cooking room, the correspondence was .published in the defendant's newspaper, with comments on the plaintiff's conduct. Held, that this was a fit matter for public discussion; and that the publication was not libellous, unless the jury thought the language was stronger than the occasion justified.-Kelly v. Tinling, Law Rep. 1 Q. B. 699.

2. The plaintiff sued the defendant for having published in his newspaper a series of gross libels on the plaintiff as incumbent of a church. It appeared, at the trial, that the first libel originated in the plaintiff having preached and published two sermons on the appointment of a Roman Catholic as chaplain to the jail, and the election of a Jew as mayor; that the plaintiff had, soon after the libels had commenced, alluded, in a letter to another newspaper, to the defendant's paper as the "dregs of provincial journalism;" and that he had also published a statement, that some of his opponents had been guilty of subornation of perjury in relation to a charge of assault against him. The verdict was for a farthing damages. Held (by Blackburn and Meller, JJ.; Shee, J., dissenting), that though, on account of the grossness and repetition of the libels, the damages might well have been heavier, the court ought not to set aside the verdict.-Kelly v. Sherlock, Law Rep. 1 Q. B. 686. LUNATIC.

The court found that a lunatic owned certain real estate in fee, and that certain persons were

his heirs. On his death intestate, Held, that the court, sitting in lunacy, would not order the committee of the person to deliver to the heirs the estate which he had taken possession of under an adverse claim, except that part of which he had been put in possession by the court; and that neither he, nor the committee of the estate, nor the latter's solicitor, were liable to account, in lunacy, for rents accrued since the lunatic's death.-In re Butler, Law Rep. 1 Ch. 607.

MALICIOUS PROSECUTION.-See JUDGMENT.
MARRIED WOMAN.-See HUSBAND AND WIFE.
MARSHALLING OF ASSETS.

1. A testator being entitled to real and personal estate absolutely, and having a power of appointment over settled personal estate in favor of his children, after giving certain specific and pecuniary legacies, gave certain pecuniary legacies to the children, and then appointed the settled property, charged with the latter legacies, to a grandchild. He also devised and bequeathed his residuary personal and his real estate, subject to the payment of the legacies given by his will. Held, that the legacies to the children were demonstrative, and to be paid primarily out of the settled property, whether the appointment to the grandchild was good or not.-Disney v. Crosse, Law Rep. 2 Eq. 592.

2. Since the Wills Act, a general pecuniary legatee has a right of marshalling as against the residuary devisee of real estate.-Hensman v. Fryer, Law Rep. 2 Eq. 627.

3. Money borrowed by an intestate on his note, but secured by deposit of title-deeds of real estate, in terms as collateral security, is, by 17 and 18 Vic. c. 113, to be paid out of the real estate.-Coleby v. Coleby, Law Rep. 2 Eq.

803.

4. The heir who has paid the debts and funeral expenses as inatter of bounty cannot afterward claim to be repaid out of the personal estate.-Coleby v. Coleby, Law Rep. 2 Eq. 803. MASTER AND SERVANT.

1. The rule that a master is not liable to a servant for injuries caused by the negligence of a fellow-servant is not affected by the fact, that the servant guilty of negligence is a servant of superior authority, whose lawful orders the other is bound to obey.-Feltham v. England, Law Rep. 2 Q. B. 33.

2. The plaintiff was a porter at a station of the A. Railway Company. The B. Railway Company also used the station; and their servants, while there, were subject to the rules of the A. company, and to the control of their

station master. The plaintiff, while at his usual employment, was injured by the negligence of the defendant's engine driver. Held, that the plaintiff and the engine driver were not fellow servants.-Warburton v. Great Western Railway Co., Law Rep. 2 Ex. 30.

3. By statute, commissioners were to make and maintain a drain and sluice; by the negli gence of their servants, the sluice burst, and the plaintiff's land was damaged. In an action against the commissioners in the name of their clerk, Held, that the commissioners were liable, though they were a public body, discharging a public duty, without reward and without funds.-Coe v. Wise, Law Rep. 1 Q. B. 711.

4. A section of a statute appointing commissioners to make and maintain a drain, provided that if any one should sustain damage, by or in consequence of any act of the commissioners or their servants, the damage should be ascertained by a jury. Held, that the section applied only to damage resulting from acts authorized by the statute; but that, even if it extended to authorised acts, it did not, on a review of the statute, apply to an omission or non-feasance by the commissioners' servants. Quære, whe. ther the section would not oust the jurisdiction of the superior courts in cases to which it applies; semble, that it would. - Coe v. Wise, Law Rep. 1 Q. B. 711.

5. The owner of works carried on for his profit by his servants may be indicted for a public nuisance caused by their acts in carrying on the works, though done without his knowledge, and contrary to his general orders. -The Queen v. Stephens, Law Rep. 1 Q. B. 702. MISTAKE.-See RELEASE. MORTGAGE.

1. The articles of a partnership empowered any partner to dispose of his shares, but gave a right of pre-emption to the others. A partner made an equitable mortgage of his shares, which was assented to by the others, and afterwards sold his shares to A., a co-partner. Held that all the partners were necessary parties to a suit for the foreclosure of the mortgaged shares; that, if A. did not redeem, the other partners might; that, if neither A. nor the other partners redeemed, the mortgagee was entitled to foreclosure, and to an account of the profit made since filing the blll, and of the existing debts and liabilities of the partnership, and to have the share of such debts and liabilities attributable to the mortgaged shares ascertained. Redmayne v. Forster, Law Rep. 2 Eq. 467.

2. A creditor agreed to remit part of the debt, on the debtor's giving him, for the balance, a mortgage, with a proviso, that, if the mortgage debt were not paid within two years, the whole of the original debt should be recovered. The debt was not paid within the two years. Held that the proviso was a penalty against which equity would relieve, and that the mortgagee could recover only the smaller sum.-Thompson v. Hudson, Law Rep. 2 Eq. 612.

3. Property was conveyed to trustees to raise £75,000, and pay off prior mortgagees, whose debts, including arrears of interest, amounted to that sum. The trustees did not raise the £75,000, but allowed A. to pay the prior mortgages, and take transfers of them; and then, in consideration of such payments made a deed, purporting to assign to A. the £75,000 raisable, and to mortgage the property to A. for £75,000. Held, that A. could not charge interest on £75,000, but could only stand as mortgagee for the principal and interest due on the transferred mortgages. Thompson v. Hudson, Law Rep. 2 Eq. 612.

4. A railway company took land, paying money into court, and giving bonds to the owner and his equitable mortgagees. The mortgagees were aware, though without formal notice, of the inquiry into the amount of compensation, but took no part in it. The compensation awarded, which was less than the amount in court, and not sufficient to pay the mortgagees, was transferred to a suit begun by them, and ordered to stand as security. Held, that the mortgagees had no lien on the sum in court, but that they were not bound by the inquiry, and were entitled, in default of payment, to an assignment by the company and landowner of the land.-Martin v. London, Chatham and Dover Railway Co., Law Rep. 1 Ch. 501.

5. Pending a suit for raising portions out of a settled estate, the tenant for life took some of the leases abroad. Afterwards, he brought into court, by its order, all the title deeds and leases. The portions having been raised by mortgage, he applied to have the deeds and leases given up to him. Held, by Knight Bruce, L. J., that they ought not to be delivered to him without the mortgagees' consent. Per Turner, L. J., semble, that they should be delivered to him, on his giving security for their safe custody and production.—Jenner v. Morris, Law Rep. 1 Ch. 603.

See CONTRACT, 4; DEED, 2; FREIGHT, 4;
MARSHALLING OF ASSETS, 3.

NEGLIGENCE.-See DOG, MASTER AND SERVANT, 1-3; SHIP, 1.

REVIEWS.

PARLIAMENTARY GOVERNMENT IN ENGLAND,ITS ORIGIN, DEVELOPMENT, AND PRACTICAL OPERATION. By ALPHEUS TODD.*

(From the Law Times.)

Partly historical, partly legal, this work will claim a place in the general as well as in the professional library. It is not a book of practice; it will not be often referred to for the ordinary business of the office, but it is one of those treatises upon matters so intimately connected with the law-forming its foundations, in fact-which every lawyer who desires to master the science of his profession, to trace its history, and understand the meaning of many things which occur in his daily experience, and of which the form remains while the spirit has fled, will peruse with the profoundest interest and with no small amount of profit.

The first chapter is a masterly sketch of Parliamentary Government as it exists in England, followed by an historical introduction, in which the author traces its growth from the first dawnings of it down to the time of the Revolution of 1688, when the principle of ministerial responsibility was firmly established, William III. being the first really constitutional monarch. Thence to the Reform Bill Mr. Todd follows its fortunes, pointing out the effects of that great measure, by which the real power was transferred from the aristocracy to the middle class, as now it is about to be transferred from the middle class to the working class. The second part of this historical review is devoted to a sketch of the Constitutional annals of the successive administrations in England from 1782 to 1866, giving a brief account of the circumstances attending their appointment, resignation or dismissal, with notices of the various Constitutional questions, and illustrations of ministerial duty or responsibility which arose within that period.

The history concluded, Mr. Todd proceeds to an analysis of the elements out of which Parliamentary Government is constructed. First of these is the Sovereign, whose precise position and office in the machinery of the State is far more subtle and difficult to understand than is supposed by persons who have given but little thought to the subject. Between those who still cherish the notion that there is a divinity that doth hedge a king, and those who look upon the Sovereign as a mere ornament of the State, are the more rational and better informed, who know that the Sovereign has important functions still, which, though they do not directly control the Government, exercise a great indirect influence over the course of legislation, as described by Mr. Bagehot in his very able essay on the

We have already received this valuable work, but the following critique shews that our enconiums upon it are not greater than those which it has received from the English press.

British Constitution contributed to the Fortnightly Review. But nowhere have the rights and duties of the Sovereign, and the connection between the Royal prerogative and Parliament, been so minutely traced and clearly exhibited as in the volume before us. This is not law, it is true, but it is so nearly allied to law that the lawyer who desires to know something more than its technicalities will welcome an instructor who will teach him so much that is useful to know in so pleasant a manner. There is but one fault: Mr. Todd is a Canadian lawyer, and the work was, we believe, written in Canada. He daily witnesses there democracy in practice, and he is not far from its operation on a wider scale in the United States. His experience has taught him to look upon democracy with intense dislike and dread, and in his great anxiety that England should profit by the example, and shun the hideous despotism into which the colonies have lapsed,† he continually interrupts his proper narrative with warnings, which, however valuable in themselves, are out of place in such a work, and savour too much of the leading article. He should have been content with an unimpassioned statement of facts, leaving inferences to the common sense of his readers. this exception the volume is one worthy of all praise, and if in the next edition Mr. Todd will blot out whatever is merely ephemeral, he will have given to historical and philosophical literature a book which the world will not willingly let die. We shall look with interest for the appearance of the second volume.

With

It may fairly be questioned whether, practically, the democratic element is so full of life in this country as it is even in England. This may be rather a startling observation, but under what circumstances, judging from the history of the past few months, could the British Parliament have passed a measure so much the reverse of democratic as our late Municipal Act. We presume that our contemporary by the use of the word "Colonies" (which are said to have lapsed into a "hideous despotism") refers to the United States; if so, true enough, otherwise, simply absurd.

We must in a great measure disagree with our cotemporary; not merely because we, as Canadians (at one with the English nation as to the strength and beauty of a constitutional monarchy) agree with the sentiments of the author. but because the views of any one having the acknowledged ability of Mr. Todd, are especially entitled to weight, and are of great value in themselves, from the study which he has given to this particular branch of his subject-one which, we think, fall legitimately within the scope of the work.

APPOINTMENTS TO OFFICE.

CLERK OF THE CROWN IN CHANCERY. EDWARD JOSEPH LANGEVIN, Esquire, to be Clerk of the Crown in Chancery, in and for the Dominion of Canada. (Gazetted July 13, 1867.)

CORONERS.

JOHN DAVENPORT ANDREWS, of Little Briton, Esquire, M.D., to be an Associate Coronor for the County of Victoria, in the Provrnce of Ontario. (Gazetted July 13, 1867.)

TO CORRESPONDENTS.

ST. LAWRENCE" crowded out, will appear next month.