that he was not chargeable with interest before the date of the certificate.-Blogg v. Johnson, Law Rep. 2 Ch. 225.

3. An executor who has distributed his testator's assets under the Act 22 & 23 Vic. c. 35, will have the same protection as if he had administered the estate under a decree of the court of chancery; and a bill against him as executor will be dismissed, though he has retained legacies as trustee, after appropriating them for the benefit of his cestuis que trust.Clegg v. Rowland, Law Rep. 3 Eq. 368.

See ADMINISTRATION, 1; CONVERSION; LIMITATIONS, STATUTE of, 1.

EXTRADITION.

In proceeding under the Extradition Acts, held (1), that original depositions taken before the Act 29 & 30 Vic. c. 121, if authenticated as that act requires, are admissible in evidence; (2) that the French warrant for the apprehension of an accused person need not be signed by a magistrate; and (3) that one condemned par contumace in France continues to be an accused person, and liable to be given up to the French government.-In re Coppin, Law Rep. 2 Ch. 47.

FALSE PRETENCES.

A conviction for obtaining a chattel by false pretences is good, though the chattel is not in existence when the pretence is made, if its subsequent delivery is directly connected with the false pretence; and whether there is such direct connection is for the jury.-The Queen v. Mortin, Law Rep. 1 C. C. 56. FAMILY ARRANGEMENT.-See CONTRACT, 3. FI. FA.-See EXECUTION.

FIXTURES.

1. Trade fixtures affixed to freehold premises, after a mortgage, by the mortgagor and his partner, occupying the premises for the purposes of their trade, pass to the mortgagee.Cullwick v. Swindell, Law Rep. 3 Eq. 249.

2. A testator, who was tenant for life of an estate, on which he had built and furnished a house (an old one having fallen into decay), bequeathed all the tapestry, marbles, statues, pictures with their frames and glasses, which should be in or about the house at his death, and of which he had power to dispose, to A., the remainder-man, for life, and then to B. after A.'s death. Held, that tapestry, pictures in panels, frames filled with satin and attached to the walls, and also statues, vases, and stone garden seats, essentially part of the architectural design, however fastened, were fixtures, and could not be removed; but that glasses and pictures, not in panels, passed under the will to

B. Held, further, that articles bought by the testator, but fixed by A. after his death, passed under the will.-D'Eyncourt v. Gregory, Law Rep. 3 Eq. 382.

FOREIGN COURT.

The court of a foreign country, in which a person died domiciled, decided that A. was entitled to inherit the deceased's personal property. Held, that the probate court was bound by this judgment as to the status of A., and therefore had rightly admitted him to contest a will, set up as made by the deceased, disposing of property in England.-Dogiioni v. Crispin, Law Rep. 1 H. L. 301. FORFEITURE.

A. was entitled to a life interest in an annuity, subject to forfeiture if he should compound with his creditors, or charge, assign, or by way of anticipation dispose of, the annuity, or till anything should happen whereby it should vest or become liable to be vested in another. A., being indebted to B., in pursuance of an agreement with B., gave a written order to the trustees to pay the annuity, as it should become due, to B., who was to apply it partly in payment of interest and of reduction of the debt. Held, that, though an agreement with B. that the order should be revokable 'was alleged, yet that A.'s interest was forfeited.-Oldham v. Oldham, Law Rep. 3 Eq. 404.

See LEASE, 4.

FRAUDS, STATute of.

A written contract was made for the sale of goods, to be delivered within a specified time. Before the time for delivery, the parties agreed orally to extend the time for delivery. Held, that the oral agreement was not good, under § 17 of the Statute of Frauds, and could not operate as a rescission of the written contract, which might therefore be enforced.-Noble v. Ward, Law Rep. 2 Ex. 135.

FREIGHT.

By a charter party it was agreed that a ship should sail to B., load a cargo of cotton, proceed with it to L., and "deliver the same on being paid freight at “17s. per ton of 50 cubic feet delivered, the freight to be paid on delivery." The ship took at B. a cargo of cotton, which, previously to being loaded, had, as usual, been subjected to high pressure. On being taken from the ship, the cotton naturally expanded considerably; and the shipper brought an action, claiming freight on the measurement of the cotton when delivered. At the trial, a custom of the B. trade was proved to pay freight for cotton under such a charter party on its measurement when shipped. There

was no evidence that the plaintiff had actual notice of the custom. Held (1), that, apart from the custom, the freight was payable on the measurement when shipped; (2) that evidence of the custom was properly admitted.— Buckle v. Knoop, Law Rep. 2 Ex. 125. GENERAL AVERAGE.-See SHIP, 5.

GUARANTY.

"

A.'s son being indebted to B. & Co. for coals supplied on credit, and B. & Co. refusing to continue the supply unless guaranteed, A. gave this guaranty: In consideration of the credit given by B. & Co. to my son, for coal supplied to him, I hereby hold myself responsible as a guarantee to them for the sum of 1007.; and in default of his payment of any accounts due, I bind myself by this note to pay to B. & Co. whatever may be owing, to an amount not exceeding the sum of 100l." Held, a continuing guaranty (MATTIN, B., dubitante). — Wood v. Priestner, Law Rep. 2 Ex. 66. GUARDIAN.-See ADMINISTRATION, 3. HUSBAND AND WIFE.

1. If real estate is limited to the use of a woman, independently of her husband, and to be disposed of by deed or will as she may think fit, her husband cannot be tenant by the curtesy.-Moore v. Webster, Law Rep. 3 Eq. 267.

2. A married woman, sued as a feme sole, pleaded coverture; but, no evidence being given in support of the plea, a verdict was found against her, and she was arrested on a ca. sa. Held, that she was not entitled to her discharge.-Poole v. Canning, Law Rep. 2 C. P.

241.

See ADMINISTRATION, 3; LIMITATIONS, STATUTE OF, 3.

INCOME.-See WILL, 13.

INDICTMENT.-See LARCENY.
INFANT.-See ADMINISTRATION, 3, 4.
INJUNCTION.

1. A railway company agreed to buy land, and had a clause to that effect inserted in their act; whereupon the landowner withdrew his opposition to the act. They afterwards applied for an act to enable them to abandon the branch which affected the land, and to repeal that clause. Held, that though the court had power to restrain an application to parliament, it was difficult to conceive a case in which it would do so, and that it would not in the present case. Steele v. North Metropolitan Railway Co., Law Rep. 2 Ch. 237.

2. Where, during the litigation, the defendant had continued the building complained of, a mandatory injunction was granted on motion, --Beadel v. Perry, Law Rep. 3 Eq. 435.

See COPYRIGHT; COVENANT, 1, 2; LIGHT, 1, 2; NEW TRIAL, 3; NUISANCE, 2; PATENT, 5; RAILWAY, 2; SPECIFIC PERFORMANCE, 3; WATERCOURSE, 2.

INSURANCE.

1. To ascertain whether there is a constructive total loss of goods lying at a place of distress, the jury must determine whether to carry them on will cost more than their value; and, in determining this, they must not consider the whole cost of transit, but only the excess of cost over what would have been incurred had no peril intervened.-Farnworth v. Hyde, Law Rep. 2 C. P. 204.

2. A shareholder in the Atlantic Telegraph Company was insured by a policy, written on the common form of a marine policy, and containing the following words: "At and from I. to N., the risk to commence at the lading of the cable on board, and to continue until it be laid in one continuous length between I. and N., and until one hundred words shall have been transmitted each way. The ship, &c., goods &c., shall be valued at 2001. on the Atlantic cable, value, say on twenty shares, at 10% per share;" and also, "it is agreed that this policy in addition to all perils and casualties herein specified, shall cover every risk and contingency attending the conveyance and successful laying of the cable." The attempt to lay the cable failed, through its breaking while being hauled in to remedy a defect in insulation; but half the cable was saved. Held, that the policy was not on the cable, but on the insured's interest in the adventure; that such interest was insurable; that the loss was by perils insured against; and that the loss was total.- Wilson v. Jones, Law Rep. 2 Ex. 139.

3. In a policy issued by a mutual insurance society, the amount of premium paid and the rate per cent. were left blank; but in place of the latter, "20 pounds per centum" were added in a separate line. The rules of the society contained nothing limiting the liability of the insurers, but provided that they should make good all losses according to the proportion of their premiums. In an action by the managers for a call against the holder of the policy, held, that whatever the words "20 pounds per centum" might mean, they did not limit the amount for which each member was liable to 20 per cent. on the sum insured by him (BYLES, J., dubitante).-Gray v. Gibson, Law Rep. 2 C. P. 120.

INTEREST.-See EXECUTOR, 2; LIMITATIONS, STATUTE OF, 3; MORTGAGE, 3; PARTNERSHIP.

JURISDICTION.

In a proceeding to recover possession of a house belonging to a parish under 59 Geo. III. c. 12, 24, the jurisdiction of justices is not ousted by a claim of title, as the question of title is necessarily involved in the matter to be determined. Ex parte Vaughan, Law Rep. 2 Q. B. 114.

See EQUITY; INJUNCTION, 1; SERVICE OF PRO

CESS.

JURY.

It is no ground for error, either in fact or law, that the whole of the special jurors struck were not summoned, or that the special jury panel was called over, a tales prayed, and two talesmen sworn on the jury before 10 A,M., the time for which the special jury was summoned. -Irwin v. Grey, Law Rep. 2 H. L. 20.

LACHES.-See LIGHT, 2.

LANDLORD AND TENANT,-See LEASE.
LARCENY.

An indictment under 24 & 25 Vic. c. 96, § 27, for stealing a valuable security, must particularize the kind of security, and any material veriance is fatal.-The Queen v. Lowrie, Law Rep. 1 C. C. 61.

LEASE.

1. In an action by a lessee, on a covenant in the lease to put in repair, against the assignee of the reversion, the defendant pleaded, that, before the assignment, a reasonable time had elapsed, and all things had happened to entitle the lessee to have the covenant performed by the original lessor, Held, a good plea, as there could only be one breach of the covenant to put in repair, and that had occurred before the assignment. Coward v. Gregory, Law Rep. 2 C. P. 153.

2. If a lease contain a covenant by a lessor to put in repair, and a covenant by a lessee to keep in repair, the performance of the former is a condition precedent to requiring the performance of the latter.-Ib.

3. In an action by a lessee on a covenant to keep in repair, the defendant pleaded that the plaintiff had recovered damages against him for a breach of the same covenant, and that the want of repair complained of was only a continuance of the want of repair for which damages were recovered, and further, that the plaintiff did not expend the damages recovered in putting the premises in repair, and that, had he done so, the want of repair now complained of would not have occurred. Held, that the plea was bad, as this was a continuing breach, and the former recovery was no bar, even on equitable grounds, but only went in mitigation of damages.-Ib.

4. A lease, with a clause for re-entry, contained a general covenant by the lessee to keep the premises in repair, and a further covenant that he would, within three months after notice given, repair all defects specified in the notice. The premises being out of repair, the landlord gave the lessee notice to repair, "in accordance with the covenants" of the lease. Before the three months were ended, the landlord brought ejectment. Held, that the notice was not a waiver of the forfeiture incurred by the breach of the general covenant to repair.-Few v. Perkins, Law Rep. 2 Ex. 92.

A.

5. A. let a farm for a term of fourteen years, by a lease containing covenants by the lessees not to assign without license, with a proviso for re-entry, and by the lessor, at the end of the tenancy, to pay for certain things at a valuation. At the end of the term, the lessees continued tenants from year to year on the original terms. They afterwards, by deed, assigned their interest, with their right to be paid for the things at a valuation, to B. B. entered, but was never recognized by A. as tenant. gave the lessees notice to quit, and B. gave A. a similar notice. Held, that B. could not sue A. for the amount of the things at a valuation; on the ground (per MELLER and LUSH, JJ.), that, no new tenancy having been created between B. and A., the mere assignment of the parol tenancy did not pass a right of action on the special stipulation; on the ground (per SHEE, J.), that, as the lessees could not assign without license, they could not transfer any interest in the premises to B.-Elliott v. Johnson, Law Rep. 2 Q. B. 120.

6. By an act passed in 1729, certain estates were limited to successive Earls of Shrewsbury, with power for each succeeding tenant in tail to grant leases of certain length. By another act, in 1803, parts of the estates were conveyed to trustees, freed from all the uses, powers, &c. created by the act of 1720 (except leases theretofore granted), on trust to sell, and invest the purchase money in other lands. The lands thus conveyed were not sold; but, in 1838, the then Earl granted a lease of them. Held, that this lease did not bind a tenant in tail in remainder.-Earl of Shrewsbury v. Keightley, Law Rep. 2 C. P. 130.

7. The owner of a long term agreed to let land for three years, and, when called on by the tenant, to grant him a lease for three years, seven years, or the whole term. The tenant held over the three years, and became bankrupt. His assignee sold his interest in the leasehold. Held, that the option to take a lease was not gone at the end of the three

years, and that this option passed to the assignee as an agreement for a lease, and through him to the purchaser.-Buckland v. Papilon, Law Rep. 2 Ch. 67.

LEGACY.-See ELECTION; WILL, 5, 8, 13.
LEGISLATURE.-See CONTEMPT, 1.

LIGHT.

1. The erection of a building, the height of which above an ancient light is not greater than the distance from the light, will not ordinarily be restrained.-Beadel v. Perry, Law Rep. 3 Eq. 465.

2. Where the plaintiff, having heard in April of an intended building by the defendants which would obstruct his light and air, did not complain till November, during which time the defendants had laid out large sums; and where the plaintiff had also, since bill filed, offered to take a money compensation for the injury, the court, instead of a mandatory injunction to compel the defendants to take down the buildings, directed an inquiry as to damages, under Sir H. Cairns's Act.-Senior v. Pawson, Law Rep. 3 Eq. 330.

3. The 18 & 19 Vic. c. 122, § 83, giving a right to raise any party structure, permitted by the act to be raised, on condition of making good all damage occasioned to the adjoining premises, does not authorize the obstruction of ancient lights.—Crofts v. Haldane, Law Rep.

2 Q. B. 194.

LIMITATIONS, STATUTE OF.

1. Testator devised real estate to a trustee in trust for E. for life, with remainders over, and other real estate to the same trustee for payment of debts. The trustee was also the testator's administrator. Held, that payment, by the trustee, of interest on a specialty debt did not prevent the Statute of Limitations (3 & 4 Wm. IV. c. 42) from running in favor of E.Coope v. Creswell, Law Rep. 2 Ch. 112.

2. After a debt due A. from his son had been barred by the Statute of Limitations, A., his son, and his son's wife, had an interview, at which the interest due was calculated. The son then put his hand into his pocket, as if to get the money to pay it. A. stopped him, and writing a receipt for the interest, gave it to his son's wife, saying he would make her a present of the money, and made an indorsement on the note. No money actually passed. Held (BRAMWELL, B., dissentiente), that this was a sufficient payment to take the debt out of the statute.Maber v. Maber, Law Rep. 2 Ex. 153.

3. The share of a married woman in a fund arising from moneys the proceeds of lands devised on trust for sale, is money payable out

of land," within 3 & 4 Wm. IV. c. 27; and therefore if such share is mortgaged by her and her husband, by deed acknowledged, the mortgagee cannot recover more than six years' arrears of interest.-Bowyer v. Woodman, Law Rep. 3 Eq., 313.

See ADMINISTRATION, 2; TENANT for Life AND REMAINDER-MAN, 2.

REVIEWS.

THE SCIENTIFIC AMERICAN. A weekly journal of practical information, art, science, mechanics, chemistry, and manufactures. New York. $3 per annum.

It has been well said that "a man cannot be a great lawyer who is nothing else. Exclusive devotion to the study and practice of the law tends to acumen rather than breadth, to subtlety rather than strength .... Some other things are to be studied beside the reports and text books" (American Law Review, ii. p. 50), and that which is true as a general principle is true in particular as to the matters treated of in the periodical now before us, and especially so with reference to those of the profession whose lot is cast in the nisi prius arena.

We have all occasionally seen in Court the hopeless mess into which a counsel sometimes gets his case, from an utter inability to underarising in the course of a case involving some stand, much less to explain to others, a point mechanical or chemical knowledge, and in his flounderings "making confusion more confounded." Now, though we do not prescribe a weekly perusal of the Scientific American, as a certain cure for this malady, we are quite sure that an occasional dip into its pages, by way of light reading, or as a change from the more abstruse studies of the profession, would be as pleasant as profitable. For ourselves, we admit a weakness for knowing what is transpiring in the scientific world, and so greet the weekly appearance of our interesting cotemporary with all the more pleasure.

To pretend to give a sketch of the contents of even one number would be beyond our limits. On the first page of Vol. xvII. we see visions of a new photographic apparatus, centrifugal guns, some remarks on the law of trade marks, and at the end of the last number to hand we have an account of the Mons Cenis summit railroad-so our readers will see that they can take their choice of a very considerable variety.

All the most valuable discoveries are delineated and described in its issues, so that, as respects inventions, it may be regarded as an illustrated Repertory, where the inventor may learn what has been done before him in the same field which he is exploring, and where he may bring to the world a knowledge of his own achievements.

The contributors to the Scientific American are among the most eminent scientific practical men of the times.

THE AMERICAN LAW REVIEW. October, 1867. Boston: Little, Brown & Co.

The last number of this admirable publication has been received. The editorials are: an article on "Liability as Partner" (to be continued)—a masterly review of the English cases on the subject and how they are affected by decisions of the United States Courts; and then an article under the heading, Railroad Legislation," which appears to be as much in confusion in America as anywhere else, and according to this article in urgent need of reform. We are next given a sketch of Chief Justice Shaw, for thirty years Chief Justice of the State of Massachusetts, whose name was, "taken for all in all, the first in the judicial annals of his State," and if the review of his life and judicial career be faith'ful, he must in reality have been fully as able and respected as common report has made him.

Mr. Jeaffreson's "Bcok about Lawyers" is given due meed of praise, as we hope will more fully appear hereafter, if we can find space for a transcript of the review of it.

We have also the reports of some important cases, a continuation of the Digest of the English Law Reports (and as to this we again desire to acknowledge the assistance we derive from it); then a selected digest of state reports, containing many cases of especial interest in this country; then book notices, a list of new law books published in England and America since July, 1867; and to conclude, a continuation of the summary of events.

An increased circulation of this Review amongst the profession of the Dominion would testify to their discrimination.

GENERAL CORRESPONDENCE.

TO THE EDITORS OF THE LAW JOURNAL. Fees to counsel in matters in the Bankrupt Court.

It is a matter of some importance to legal practitioners, to know what counsel fees can or ought to be taxed in matters in the Bankrupt Court. I had occasion not long since to have a bill of costs taxed by the clerk of the County Court of the County of York, in an insolvency matter. I had been acting for an opposing creditor for two years. The opposition was very arduous--the case one of the most complicated in Canada West, and the indebtedness of the insolvent over $200,000. The claim I supported was $16,000. At the final argument, at this final application of the insolvent for a discharge, I occupied parts of several days in arguing the case, and parts of several days in listening to arguments of counsel. One would have supposed that in such a case, if in any, full counsel fees should have been allowed. The case came before the junior judge of the County of York, now acting, to say what counsel fees should be allowed, and whether Superior Court counsel fees or those taxed in the County Court, should be the rule in this and in all similar The junior judge deguided by the County

cases in bankruptcy. cided that he must be Court tariff of fees to counsel, and that he could not give a counsel fee exceeding $14 for all the arguments I have alluded to, to the creditor's counsel. In other words, that a case involving great research into facts and documents, as well as into law cases, and occupying as much time as several trials at the assizes, requiring comments on evidence taken, must be looked on as one coming within the County Court tariff; and that he had no power to go beyond that tariff. The question is then-is this view of the judge right. I submit with all respect for the judge, that he is wrong.

This decision shows how necessary it is that great care should be taken in these decisions by County Court Judges, and that they should not forget when settling costs that they were once practising lawyers themselves, and that the labourer is worty of his hire, the practitioner quite as much as the judge, and that the amount of that hire should be proportioned