at the time of shipment, which described the manganese as of a certain weight, but contained in print the words, "weight, contents and value unknown." All the manganese shipped was delivered to the plaintiff, the assignee, for full value of the bill, but it was found short of the weight stated in the bill. In an action to recover damages for non-delivery of the full weight, held, that the defendants were not bound by the signature of their agents for a greater quantity than was actually shipped. Semble, that the printed words controlled the statement of weight,-Jessel v. Bath, Law Rep. 2 Ex. 267.

See SHIP, 1, 2; STOPPAGE IN TRANSITU. BILLS AND NOTES.

A bank gave A, the following letter addressed to him: "You are hereby authorized to draw on this hank to the extent of £15,000, and such drafts I undertake duly to honor on presentation. This credit will remain in force for twelve months from its date, and parties negotiating bills under it are requested to indorse the particulars on the back hereof." A. drew bills under this letter to the amount of £6,000, and indorsed them to the plaintiff, who duly indorsed particulars on the letter. The bank was afterwards wound up, and A. was indebted to it to an amount exceeding what was due on the bills. Held, that whatever might be the effect of the letter of credit at law, in equity the plaintiff could prove against the bank for the amount due on the bills, without regard to the state of accounts between the bank and A. -In re Agra & Masterman's Bank, Law Rep. 2 Ch. 391.

See TRUST, 2.

BLASPHEMY.-See ILLEGAL CONTRACT, BOND.-See SURETY.

CAPITAL.-See ANNUITY,

CARRIER.

1. A carrier of passengers for hire is not bound at his peril to provide a carriage roadworthy at the commencement of the journey; and he is not liable for injuries to a passenger caused by a defect in the carriage, if the defect were such that it could be neither guarded against in the process of construction nor discovered by subsequent examination. Per Mellor and Lush, JJ. (Blackburn, J., dissentiente), the carrier must provide at his peril a carriage in fact reasonably sufficient, and is liable for the consequences of a latent defect.-Readhead v. Midland Railway Co., Law Rep. 2 Q. B. 412.

2. By statute, railway companies are bound to carry children under three years without. charge, and children between three and twelve

at half price. A woman, carrying her child three years and two months old, bought a ticket for herself on the defendants' railway, but none for the child. No question was asked as to the child's age, and the mother had no intention to defraud the company. The child was injured by the negligence of the defendants' servants. Held, that he could recover against the defendants.-Austin v. Great Western Railway Co., Law Rep. 2 Q. B. 442.

3. A commercial traveller delivered a parcel of samples to a common carrier to be carried to A., but did not state the contents of the parcel, nor the purpose for which it was required. By the carrier's negligence, the parcel was delayed, and the traveller spent three days at A., unemployed, waiting for it. Held, in an action against the carrier for negligence, that the hotel expenses of the traveller while so waiting were too remote, and could not be recovered. - Woodger v. Great Western Railway Co., Law Rep. 2 C. P. 318.

4. A contract by a railway company to carry cattle, signed by the party sending them, provided thus: (1) The owner undertakes all risks of loading, unloading and carriage, whether arising from the default of the company's servants, or from defect in the station, or other places of loading or unloading, or of the carriage in which the cattle may be loaded or conveyed, or from any other cause whatever." (2) "The company will grant free passes to persons having the care of cattle, as an inducement to the owners to send proper persons with them." Held, that the first provision was unreasonable, and so void by 17 & 18 Vic. c. 31, §7; and that it was not made reasonable by the owner taking advantage of the second provision.-Rooth v. N. E. Railway Co., Law Rep. 2 C. P. 173.

5. A contract by a railway company to carry goods by a given train, which ordinarily arrives at a particular hour, does not amount to a warranty that it will so arrive, though the company's servants know that the sender's object requires that it should so arrive.-Lord v. Midland Railway Co., Law Rep. 2 C. P. 339. CHARITY.

It being impossible, from the decrease in value of the property of a school founded in the reign of Henry VIII., to carry out the system of gratuitous education sanctioned by a scheme in 1849, the court, regarding the founder's manifest intention not to make a school for the poor only, but to establish a liberal system of education, allowed the admission of boys beyond the number of free scholars, on pay

ment of fees; but (differing from Wood, V. C.) directed that all the scholars, paying and free, should be considered as equally on the foundation, and that there should be no competitive examination for admission as free scholars.— Manchester School Case, Law Rep. 2 Ch. 497. See MORTMAIN.

COLLISION.-See ADMIRALTY, 1; SHIP, 3.
COMMON CARRIER.-See CARRIER.

COMPANY.-See EQUITY PLEADING AND PRACTICE, 3;
HUSBAND AND WIFE, 1; MARSHALLING OF
ASSETS; MISREPRESENTATION, 1; PRINCIPAL
AND AGENT, 1.

COMPOSITION DEED.

1. In a former action by the plaintiff against the defendant, the defendant pleaded the general issue, but afterwards withdrew his plea, on the plaintiff's agreeing not to sign judgment before May 8th. On May 7th, the defendant registered a composition deed under the Bankrupt Act, 1861, § 192, but did not plead it to the action. On the 8th, the plaintiff signed judgment. In an action on the judgment, held, that the defendant could avail himself of the deed, because (1) he had not had sufficient opportunity to plead it in the former action; Whether, if he had had the opportunity and power to plead the deed to the former action, he could now avail himself of it, quære.-Braun v. Weller, Law Rep. 2 Ex. 183.

2. The plaintiff having issued execution, the defendant's attorney notified the sheriff's offi cer, who consented to withdraw only on the attorney's undertaking for the debt and costs. When the undertaking was given, the deed was in fact registered. The defendant having paid the sheriff the amount of the undertaking under protest, and the sheriff having paid it into court, held, on the defendant's motion, that the defendant was entitled to the money.Milner v. Rawlings, Law Rep. 2 Ex. 249. CONCEALMENT.-See MISREPRESENTATION. CONDITION-See AWARD, 2, 7; SALE. CONFLICT OF LAWS.-See FOREIGN COURT. CONTRACT.

A contract is not binding on the party proposing it till its acceptance by the other party has been communicated to him or his agent.Hebb's Case, Law Rep. 4 Eq. 9.

See BILL OF LADING; BILLS AND NOTES; CARRIER, 4, 5; FRAUDS, STATUTE OF; HUSBAND AND WIFE, 1, 2; ILLEGAL CONTRACT; MISTAKE; SALE; SPECIFIC PERFORMANCE, CONVERSION.-See MORTMAIN, 2; PROBATE PRACTICE, 1.

CONVICTION.

The 11 & 12 Vic. c. 43, § 25, provides, that, when justices of the peace shall "adjudge the defendant to be imprisoned, and such defendant shall then be in prison, undergoing imprisonment on a conviction, or any other offence," the justices may "award that the imprisonment for such subsequent offence shall commence at the expiration of the imprisonment to which such defendant shall have been previously sentenced." Held, that, when a defendant is convicted at one time of several distinct offences, the justices have power to award that the imprisonment under one or more of the convictions shall commence at the expiration of the sentences previously pronounced.-The Queen v. Cutbush, Law Rep. 2 Q. B. 379. See AUTRRFOIS CONVICT

2. The plaintiff, being clerk of the London Coal Market, was in the habit of publishing annually, by authority of the corporation, statistical returns, extracted from the corporation books in his custody, of all coal imported into London: these returns were supplied to subscribers at 31. 3s. a year. The defendant published a work giving the mineral statistics of the United Kingdom during preceding years, at a cost of 28. 6d., and introduced therein the returns published by the plaintiff for the preceding nine years, such returns forming about one-third of the defendant's book. The source from which this information was derived was prominently acknowledged. On bill for an injunction, held, that the result in such cases is the true test of the act; and full acknowledgment, and the absence of dishonest intention, will not excuse the appropriation, if the effect of it is of necessity to injure and supersede the sale of the original work, and that the plaintiff was entitled to an injunction.-Scott v. Stanford, Law Rep. 3 Eq. 718.

3. By the International Copyright Act, 7 Vic. c. 12, § 6, no author of any musical composition first published abroad shall be entitled to the benefit of the act, unless the title of the musical composition and the name of the author or composer are registered in England. N. composed and published an opera in full score at Berlin, and, after his death, B. arranged the score of the whole opera for the piano-forte; also the overture for the piano, and the whole opera pour le piano seul. In registering these

arrangements, N.'s name was inserted as composer. Held, that the arrangements for the piano-forte were independent musical compositions, of which B., not N., was the composer, and the entry was invalid.--Wood v. Boosey, Law Rep. 2 Q. B. 340. CORPORATION.-See COMPANY. CORPUS. See ANNUITY.

COVENANT.-See AWARD, 2; HUSBAND AND WIFE, 3;

LANDLORD AND TENANT, 2, 3.

CRIMINAL LAW.-See AUTREFOIS CONVICT; CONVICTION; EMBEZZLEMENT; FELONY.

CRUELTY.

To establish a charge of cruelty, actual violence of such character as to endanger personal health or safety, or the reasonable apprehension of such violence, must be proved. The ground of the court's interference is the wife's safety, and the impossibility of her fulfilling the duties of matrimony in a state of dread.Milford v. Milford, Law Rep. 1 P. & D. 295. DAMAGES.

See ADMIRALTY, 2; CARRIER, 3; EQUITY, 2; FRAUDS, STATUTE OF, 1; LANDLORD AND TENANT, 2.

DESERTION.

Desertion held to commence not when the husband and wife ceased to cohabit, but when the husband made up his mind to abandon his wife and live with another woman.-Gatehouse v. Gatehouse, Law Rep. 1 P. & D. 331. DEVISE.

A will made before the Wills Act was to this effect: "As touching my worldly estate, I give and bequeath to my wife, whom I likewise make sole executrix, all my lands and tenements, by her freely to be possessed and enjoyed, together with all my houses and household goods, deeds and moveable effects; all my children to be educated and settled in business according to my wife's discretion." Held, that the last clause indicated an intention that the wife should take such an estate as would enable her to carry out the testator's wishes, and that therefore she took the fee.-Lloyd v. Jackson, (Exch. Ch.) Law Rep. 2 Q. B. 269.

See LEGACY; MORTMAIN, 2, 3; POWER; WILL, 5-8.

DISCOVERY.-See EQUITY PLEADING AND PRACTICE,
1; PRODUCTION OF DOCUMENTS, 1.
DIVORCE.-See CRUELTY; DESERTION; NULLITY OF
MARRIAGE.

EASEMENT.-See WATERCOURSE.
EMBEZZLEMENT.

A married woman having been adjudged bankrupt on her own petition, in which she described herself as a widow, was afterwards

convicted of having embezzled her property. Held, that the conviction was wrong, as the property was her husband's. The Queen v. Robinson, Law Rep. 1 C. C. 80.

EQUITY.

1. Semble, a bill in equity lies to enforce a right of stoppage in transitu.—Schotsmans v. Lancashire and Yorkshire Railway Co., Law Rep. 2 Ch. 332.

2. A. filed a bill against B. for the cancellation of bills of exchange drawn by B. and accepted by A., in part performance of a contract, of which B. failed to perform on his part, and for an injunction to restrain B. from parting with or suing on the bills; and, pending the suit, A. commenced an action against B. for damage for breach of the contract. Held, that A. was not obliged to elect whether he would proceed at law or in equity.-Anglo-Danubian Co. v. Rogerson, Law Rep. 4 Eq. 3.

See BILLS AND NOTES; MISTAKE, EQUITY PLEADING AND PRACTICE.

1. Demurrer allowed to a bill brought by "The United States of America," on the ground that a foreign State is not entitled to sue in a court of equity without putting forward some public officer on whom process may be served, and who can be called on to give discovery on a cross bill.-United States of America v. WagLaw Rep. 3 Eq. 724.

ner,

2. A legatee, defendant to an administration suit instituted by executors, can allege in his answer and prove by evidence a case of wilful default against the executors; and if he does not do so, but after an administration decree files a bill against the executors, such bill is a supplemental bill, in the nature of a bill of review, and cannot be filed without leave of court.-Harvey v. Bradley, Law Rep. 4 Eq. 13

3. The plaintiff filed a bill, on behalf of himself and the other shareholders, against the company and other persons, impeaching certain transactions on the ground of fraud. The defendants' answer was excepted to for insufficiency; and, while the exceptions were pending, the defendants moved to take the bill off the file or to stay proceedings. At the hearing of the motion, it appeared that the plaintiff had lost money by speculating in the shares of the company, and that he owned only five shares, which he had purchased solely for the purpose of qualifying himself to bring the suit and of being bought off. Held, that, at that stage of the cause, the defendants not having sufficiently denied the charges of fraud, mala fides of the plaintiff in filing the bill was no ground for

taking it off the file.-Seaton v. Grant, Law Rep. 2 Ch. 459.

4. Money will not be ordered brought into court on motion before decree, unless it appears clearly on the answer to belong to the plaintiff. -Hagell v. Currie, Law Rep. 2 Ch. 449.

See INTERPLEADER; PRODUCTION OF DOCU-
MENTS. 1; VENDOR AND PURCHASER OF REAL
ESTATE, 2.

ESTATE BY IMPLICATION.

A testator gave a sum of stock in trust for a married woman for life, and, after her decease, if she should leave children, on trust for her husband for life; and, after his decease, on trust to divide the same among the children, but, if no child, then on trust, after the decease of husband and wife, to other persons absolutely. The husband survived the wife, but there were no children. Held, that the husband took a life interest by implication. — Blake's Trust, Law Rep. 3 Eq. 799. ESTOPPEL-See BANKRUPTCY, 2. EVIDENCE.

It was the duty of a clerk, who managed a branch business of the plaintiffs, as general merchants, to keep them advised of all business transacted. In discharge of this duty he wrote them a letter, stating that the defendant had sent three boxes to the office, and giving details of the transaction under which they were sent. Held, that this letter was not admissible in evidence against the defendant after the clerk's death, as it was neither a declaration against direct pecuniary interest, nor an entry made in the discharge of a duty to do a particular act and make a record of it.—Smith v. Blakey, Law Rep. 2 Q. B. 826.

See PRODUCTION OF DOCUMENTS; WITNESS. EXECUTION. See COMPOSITION DEED, 2; INTERPLEADER; PRIORITY, 3.

EXECUTOR.--See ADMINISTRATION, 2; PROBATE PRAC

FELONY.

TICE.

The 24 & 25 Vic. c. 94, § 2, which makes it a felony to "counsel or procure any other person to commit a felony," does not apply where such felony is not actually committed.-The Queen v. Gregory, Law Rep. 1 C. C. 77. FOREIGN COURT.

A British ship, mortgaged in England, was sent to New Orleans. There A. & B.. a New Orleans firm, all the members of which were domiciled Englishmen, and all but one resident in England, sued the owner of the ship, and, as the courts of Louisiana do not recognize the rights of mortgagees not in possession, seized

the ship on writs of attachment. The mortgagees then, to prevent the sale of the ship, gave A. & B. bonds for the amounts to be recovered in the actions, on which the ship was released. On bill by the mortgagees to have the holders of the bonds restrained from suing on them, and to have the bonds given up, held, that the court had no jurisdiction to stay proceedings on the bonds, because (1) the court would not have restrained the attachments, as it could not have placed all creditors, foreign and domestic, on the same footing; (2) if it could, the mortgagees should have had the attachments restrained, and not have given bonds; and (3) if the prayer were granted, the courts of New Orleans would never again release an English ship on the bond of a mortgagee.-Liverpool Marine Credit Co. v. Hunter, Law Rep. 4 Eq. 62. FOREIGN STATE.-See EQUITY PLEADING AND PRAC TICE, 1.

1. The defendant contracted in writing to sell the plaintiff five hundred tons of iron, to be delivered by the end of July. The defendant delivered none of the iron by that time, nor up to the February following, when the plaintiff went into the market, and, the price having risen between July and February, he sought to recover, as damages for breach of the contract, the difference between the contract the plaintiff's delay was at the defendant's price and the market price in February. There was evidence from which the jury might infer that request. The jury having found a verdict for the full amount claimed, held, that the evidence went to show, not a new contract, but simply a voluntary forbearance by the plaintiff, at the defendant's request; that the Statute of Frauds, therefore, did not apply, and that the verdict ought to stand.-Ogle v. Earl Vane, Law Rep. 2 Q. B. 275.

2. C., proposing to marry H., wrote a paper beginning, "In the event of a marriage between the undermentioned parties, the following conditions as a basis for a marriage settlement are mutually agreed on." Then followed several sentences, each in this form: "C. to do so and so, H. to have so and so." The name of neither party was subscribed. The paper was handed to H.'s solicitor; but no marriage settlement was ever executed, and there was evidence that its execution was waived. Held (independently of the question of waiver), that there was no contract signed by the parties within the meaning of the Statute of Frauds.-Caton v. Caton, Law Rep, 2 II. L. 127.

FREIGHT.-See INSURANCE; SHIP, 2.
GENERAL WORDS.-See LEGACY, 1.
GUARANTY,

A.'s son being indebted to B. & Co. for coal supplied on credit, and B. & Co. refusing to continue the supply unless guaranteed, A. gave this guaranty: "In consideration of the credit given by B. & Co. to my son, for coal supplied to him, I hereby hold myself responsible as a guarantee to them for the sum of 1007.; and, in default of his payment of any accounts due, I bind myself by this note to pay to B. & Co. whatever may be owing, to an amount not exceeding 1001." Held, a continuing guarantee.— Wood v. Priestner, (Exch. Ch.) Law Rep. 2 Ex.

282.

See SURETY.

GUARDIAN AD LITEM.-See NULLITY OF MARRIAGE, 2.
HIGHWAY.-See NEGLIGENCE, 3.
HOMICIDE.-See AUTREFOIS CONVICT.
HUSBAND AND WIFF.

1. The separate estate of a married woman is bound by her debts, obligations and engagements contracted for herself on the credit of that estate; and whether such obligations were so contracted must be judged by the circumstances of each case. There is nothing in the nature of a joint-stock company, in the absence of any special clauses in its articles of agreement, to prevent a married woman being a shareholder in her own right so as to bind her separate estate.-Mathewman's Case, Law Rep. 3 Eq. 781.

2. A. by will appointed real estate to B., a married woman. By a later will, A. gave all his property to E. The later will was propounded by E., and opposed by D., the heir of A. A compromise was made, the effect of which was that E. gave up his suit, and abandoned all benefit under the later will, in consideration of receiving £15,000 out of the estate. The agreement for a compromise, afterwards

made a rule of court, was signed by E., by C., husband of B. (B. was present in court, though not a party to the suit), for himself and his wife, and by X., D.'s attorney, for D. and B., though without any express authority from B. Held, that though B. had adopted and acted on the agreement, and was enjoying the property under it, E., who knew that B. was a married woman, and could not bind her real estate except in the way prescribed by law, could not enforce the agreement against her.—Nicholl v· Jones, Law Rep. 3 Eq. 696.

3. A marriage settlement contained a covenant, that, if the wife then was, or should during the coverture become, entitled to any property to the value of 400l., for any estate or interest whatever, it should be settled on certain trusts. The wife was then entitled, on her mother's death, to a share in a sum of stock in her own right, and to a further share as next of kin of a deceased brother. The value of the shares together was over 40 l.; but the value of the wife's reversionary interest in them, at the date of the settlement, was less than 400Z. Held, (1) that the share was included in the covenant, as property to which the wife was entitled at the time of her marriage; (2) that the covenant referred to the value of the pro. perty, not to the value of the wife's reversionary interest in it; (3) that, in estimating the value, the aggregate value of the sums must be taken. -In re Mackenzie's Settlement, Law R. 2 Ch. 345. See CRUELTY; DESERTION; EMBEZZLEMENT; NULLITY OF MARRIAGE.

ILLEGAL CONTRACT.

The defendant agreed to let rooms to the plaintiff; afterwards, learning that they were to be used for lectures maintaining that the character of Christ is defective and his teaching misleading, and that the Bible is no more inspired than any other book, he refused to allow the use of the rooms, but did not give this as a reason for the refusal. In an action for breach of contract, held, (1) that the purpose for which the plaintiff intended to use the rooms was blasphemous and illegal, and that the contract could not be enforced at law; (2) that the defendant might justify his refusal on this ground, notwithstanding his having given a different reason.-Cowen v. Milbourn, Law Rep. 2 Ex. 230.

See RAILWAY, 2.

INCOME.-See ANNUITY.

INSANITY.-See NULLITY OF MARRIAGE,
INSURANCE.

Ship-owners insured the chartered freight ular for a voyage. The policy contained the reg