See PARTNERSHIP, 2; PRODUCTION OF DOCU-' MENTS, 5.

BIGAMY.

On a trial for bigamy, of a man who had lived apart from his first wife, for the seven years preceding the second marriage, the prosecution must prove that during that time he was aware of her existence.-The Queen v. Curgerwen, Law Rep. 1 C. C. 1. BILL OF LADING.

1. A bill of lading on goods, making them deliverable "to order or assigns," was indorsed by the consignor in blank, and deposited with a banker as security for an advance; and, on repayment of the advance, was re-indorsed and delivered back to the assignor. Held, that the consignor could sue the ship-owners for a breach, whether occurring before or after the re-indorsement of the bill of lading.-Short v. Simpson, Law Rep. 1 C. P. 248.

2. If a bill of lading provides that, as soon as the ship is ready to unload the whole or any part of the goods (sixty-five pipes of lemon juice), the consignee is bound to be ready to receive the same from the ship; and, in default, the master may enter the goods, and land or lighter them at the consignee's risk and expense; the contract is divisible, and, if, after part of the goods have been landed by the shipowner, but not before, the consignee offers to receive the remainder, the ship-owner is bound to deliver them to him, unless he has been prejudiced in the delivery of the remainder by the consignee not being ready to receive the whole.- Wilson v. London, Italian and Adriatic Steam Navigation Co., Law Rep. 1 C. P. 61.

See STOPPAGE IN TRANSITU.

BILL OF SALE.

In an affidavit annexed to a bill of sale, a description of the grantor's residence and occupation, to the "best of the belief" of the deponent, is sufficient.—Roe v. Bradshaw, Law Rep. 1 Ex. 106.

BILLS AND NOTES.

1. "On demand, I promise to pay to the trustees of W. Chapel, or their treasurer for the time being, £100," is a good promissory note, as the trustees alone are to be taken as payees, and the treasurer, as their agent, only to re. ceive payment.-Holmes v. Jacques, Law Rep. 1 Q. B. 376.

2. If a bill of exchange is indorsed, payable "in need" at a bank, the bank are agents of the indorsers for payment only, and not agents for notice of dishonor generally.-Leeds Banking Company, Law Rep. 1 Eq. 1.

3. The rule allowing a day for each step in presentation and notice, applies only as between the parties to a bill, and not as between the agent of the holder and the holder, who resides at a distance.-Leeds Banking Company, Law Rep. 1 Eq. 1.

4. Presentation of a bill for payment to an indorser is not per se notice of dishonor by the acceptor.-Leeds Banking Company, Law Rep. 1 Eq. 1.

5. Notice of dishonor, good according to French law, on a bill indorsed in England, payable in France, is good against the indorser, either because the law of the place where the contract is to be executed governs, or because, in general, notice, good according to the law of the place where the note is payable, is such as can reasonably be required, and therefore to be deemed a good notice according to the law of England.-Hirschfeld v. Smith, Law Rep. 1 C. P. 340.

6. A bill of exchange, indorsed in blank to E. S., was by him indorsed in blank, and delivered to H., who changed the blank indorsements to E. S., so that it read thus: "Pay to the order of E. S., at the rate of 25 fr. 75 c. per £1, value received, the sum of 6,437 fr. 50 c. ut retro," and wrote the same words on the face of the bill, purporting to make them part of the acceptor's contract. Held, such a material alteration as to avoid the bill in the plaintiff's hands.-Hirsdfeld v. Smith, Law Rep. 1 C. P.

340.

See MORTGAGE, 1; PRINCIPAL AND AGENT, 1, 2; VARIANCE.

BLOCKADE.

It is not a municipal offence, by the law of nations, for a neutral to trade with a blockaded port.-The Helen, Law Rep. 1 Adm. & Ecc. 1. BOTTOMRY BOND.

Fraud practised by an owner on a mortgagee of a vessel, which might render the voyage illegal, does not invalidate a bottomry bond to a bona fide lender.-The Mary Ann, Law Rep. 1 Adm. & Ecc 13.

BREACH OF PROMISE.-See DAMAGES, 1.
CARRIER.

1. A by-law of the defendants provided, that no passenger should enter a carriage without obtaining a ticket, which would be furnished on payment of the fare, and was to be shown and delivered up on demand. The plaintiff took tickets for himself and servants by a particular train, which was afterwards cut in two, the plaintiff being in the first train with all the tickets. The defendants refused to carry the

servants in the second train, they being unable to show tickets. Held, that the defendants, having contracted with the plaintiff, and delivered to him the tickets, could not justify their refusal under the by-law.-Jennings v. Great N. Railway Co., Law Rep. 1 Q. B. 7.

2. A by-law of a railway company, that no person shall enter a carriage without having paid his fare, and obtained a ticket, which he is to show and deliver upon demand; and that any one, not so showing or producing his ticket, shall pay the fare from the place whence the train originally started, or forfeit not exceeding forty shillings, does not apply to a passenger who has not paid for and obtained a ticket, if he has no intention to defraud the company; and, if it did apply, it would be void under 8 Vic. c. 20, §§ 103, 109.-Dearden v. Townsend, Law Rep. 1 Q. B. 10.

3. The defendants, a railway company, carried on the business of common carriers off their line. They charged an equal rate for carriage on their line between their termini. They also collected at one terminus, carried on their line, and delivered at a place distinct from, and at some distance beyond, their other terminus; and for this they charged an equal through rate. Held, that the carriage beyond the second terminus was not auxiliary to their business as railway carriers, and that the plaintiffs could not deduct the cost of this carriage, and of collection at the first terminus, from the through rate, and have their goods carried between the termini for the difference.-Baxendale v. London & S. W. Railway Co., Law Rep. 1 Ex. 137.

4. If a railway company is forbidden by statute to charge different rates to different persons, and is in the habit of charging on any consignment of goods made to one person, though consisting of distinct parcels, a tonnage weight on the aggregate weight of the whole, the fact that, of goods so consigned to one person, and distinctly addressed to him, some articles had also written conspicuously upon them the names of the persons to whom the consignee intended to deliver them, does not entitle the railway to charge separately for those on which such names were different.-Baxendale v. London & S. W. Railway Co., Law Rep. 1 Ex. 137.

5. The plaintiff having obtained a verdict against the defendants for the amount charged to and paid by him for the carriage of goods more than was charged to others, but the defendants continuing to make the same charges, and receive the same sums as before, the plaintiff brought a new writ, to recover for money paid during a later period; and applied, under

the Common Law Procedure Act, §§ 79, 82, for an injunction to restrain the defendants from charging him otherwise than equally with others. Held, that the court would not exercise their statutory power to grant an injunction.-Sutton v. S. E. Railway Co., Law Rep. 1 Ex. 32.

6. If A. has arranged orally with a railway company to carry cattle for him to E. on their line, and thence, by a connecting line to K.; and has, at the same time, signed, without noticing its contents, a consignment note by which the cattle are directed to be taken to E., parol evidence is admissible to show an agreement to carry on to K., as it only supplements the contract.-Malpas v. London & S. W. Railway Co., Law Rep. 1 C. P. 336.

7. The plaintiff sent goods from M., by the defendants' railway, to his traveller at C., the delivery of which, was, by the defendant's negligence, delayed till the traveller left C., and the profits which would have been derived from a sale at C. were lost. Held, that such profits could not be recovered as damages.— Great W. Railway Co. v. Redmayne, Law Rep. 1 C. P. 329.

8. If a carrier parts with goods to a consignee, after notice of stoppage in transitu, damages can be recovered in equity under Sir H. Cairns's Act.-Schotsmans v. Lancashire & Yorkshire Railway Co., Law Rep. 1 Eq. 349.

9. An entire contract, to carry partly by land and partly by sea, is divisible; and, as to the land journey, the carrier is within the protection of 11 Geo. IV., & 1 Wm. IV. c. 68.— Le Conteur v. London & S. W. Railway Co., Law Rep. 1 Q. B. 54.

CASES OVERRULED AND Doubted.

Goods of Alexander, 29 L. J. (P M & A.) 93. Goods of Hallyburton, Law Rep. 1 P. & D. 90. Marc v. Underhill, 4 B. & S. 566. Wood v. De Mattos, Law Rep. 1 Ex. 91. Willis v. Pluskett, 4 Beav. 208. Sanders's Trusts, Law Rep. 1 Eq. 675. Wythe v. Henniker, 2 My. & K. 635. Lord Lilford v. Keck, Law Rep. 1 Eq. 347. CATTLE.

Driving a van with horses, in which calves are being conveyed to market, is not within a statute which forbids any drover, or other person, from "conducting or driving" any cattle through the streets on Sunday. — Triggs v. Lester, Law Rep. 1 Q. B. 259. CHAMPERTY.

A. having executed a conveyance of real estate to B., which was liable to be set aside on equitable grounds, afterwards made a voluntary settlement of the same on himself for life, re.

mainder to his children as he should appoint; and, in default of appointment, to all his children who should attain twenty-one or marry, in equal shares. Held, that the voluntary settlement was not void on the ground of champerty; that A.'s infant children could maintain a bill, making A. and the trustees of the settlement defendants, to set aside the conveyance to B.-Dickinson v. Burrell, Law Rep. 1 Eq. 337. CHILDREN, CUSTODY OF.-See INFANT, 2. CODICIL.-See WILL.

COMMON CARRIER.-See CARRIER.
COMPANY.

1. If a company is formed for working a patented machine, it is not ultra vires to purchase the patent.—Liefchild's Case, Law Rep. 1 Eq. 231.

2. The promoters of a railway company contracted with a land-owner, a peer of Parliament, to pay him £20,000 personally for his countenance and support in obtaining their act, such sum to be independent of the ordinary payment for land and other usual compensation. After the passing of the act, and formation of the company, the directors ratified the contract. A separate agreement stipulated for the quantity of land to be taken and the amount paid. Held, that the original contract and the ratification by the directors were ultra vires of the company, and could not be enforced against them.-Earl of Shrewsbury v. N. Staffordshire Railway Co., Law Rep. 1 Eq. 593.

3. The deed of settlement of a bank declared that no one should be a transferrer of a share, unless approved by the directors. Held, that the directors must use this power reasonably, and would be controlled in equity.--Robinson v. Chartered Bank, Law Rep. 1 Eq. 32.

4. The power of making contracts in writing, signed by their agents, conferred by 19 & 20 Vic. c. 47, § 41, on companies registered thereunder, is a "right or privilege acquired under" that act, and so is not affected by its repeal by the 25 & 26 Vic. c. 89, which saves such rights or privileges.-Prince v. Prince, Law Rep. 1 Eq. 490.

See PRINCIPAL AND AGENT, 4. CONFIDENTIAL RELATION.

1. It is a principle of equity, that one standing in a confidential relation toward others cannot hold substantial benefits which they may have conferred on him, unless they had competent and independent advice in conferring them; and, in cases to which this principle applies, the age and capacity of the party conferring the benefit are of little importance.-Rhodes v. Bate, Law Rep. 1 Ch. 252.

2. A confidential relation once established will be presumed to continue, in the absence of evidence to the contrary.-Rhodes v. Bate, Law Rep. 1 Ch. 252.

3. A., a nephew of a former trustee of B., being sent by his uncle to advise B., who was twenty-three years old and of extravagant habits, on the settlement of his debts, and to advance him money for that purpose, offered to give him £7,000 for his estate, under which there were coal mines. Pending the negotiations, in which a separate solicitor was employed for B., A. obtained from C., a mining engineer, a valuation of the minerals under the estate at £10,000, which he did not communicate to B.; nor did he suggest to B. to consult a mineral surveyor. B accepted A.'s offer, and died before conveyance. Held, in a bill by B.'s administrator that A.'s purchase could not be sustained.-Tate v. Williamson, Law Rep. 1 Eq 528.

CONFLICT OF LAWS.

1. An English testator devised and bequeathed real and personal estate to A., for life, with remainder, as to the personalty to her children; and, as to the realty, to her first and other sons, lawfully begotten. A., having married in 1830 in England, obtained in Scotland a decree of divorce a vinculo on the ground of her hus band's adultery; he having been induced wi h her connivance to go to Scotland, to bring herself within the jurisdiction of the Scotch courts. A. afterwards married in Scotland, and had two daughters and a son, all born in Scotland during her first husband's lifetime. Held, on petition, that these children were not entitled to either real or personal property under the will.-Wilson's Trusts, Law Rep. 1 Eq. 247.

2. By a settlement in the Scotch form on the marriage of his daughter with a Scotchman, A., an Englishman, covenanted to pay £4,000 for the benefit of his daughter, her husband, and their younger children. The £4,000 was not paid; but, by will made after the daughter's death, A. gave £16,000 between the younger children. Held, that the English doctrine of presumption against double portions was applicable, and that the will operated as a satisfaction of the settlement Campbell v. Campbell, Law Rep. 1 Eq. 383.

3. A testator, domiciled in England, and having real and personal estate both in England and Holland, gave by will to trustees all his property here and abroad. A decree was made in England for the administration of the estate. Afterwards, a child of the testator commenced proceedings in Holland for the administration

of both the real and personal estate there. Held, that the prosecution of these proceedings would be restrained, it not appearing that they could be carried on against the real estate alone.-Hope v. Carnegie, Law Rep. 1 Ch. 320. See BILLS AND NOTES, 5; MARRIAGE, 1. CONSIDERATION.

See DEED, 1; RELEASE; TENANnt for Life and
REMAINDER MAN, 3.

CONTEMPT.-See NUISANCE, 3.
CONTRACT.

1. A. proposed to B. & C., home agents of A.'s foreign consignees, that they should make advances to him against the consignments, and that "the proceeds of sales above the advances" should go in payment of an old debt of B. & C. against A. B. & C. agreed to this by a letter, which,—after saying that there were two ways of making advances, one for A. to draw on B. & C., and take and negotiate their acceptances; the other, for B. & C. to advance cash to A., and draw on him for the amounts, A. to accept, and B. & C. to negotiate--concluded, “and we shall retire that acceptance from proceeds of the sales." A. directed his consignees to remit to B. & C.; and B. & C. drew on A., negotiated his acceptances, and remitted the proceeds to him. Afterwards, B. & C. directed the consignees to remit, not to themselves, but to C. & D., bankers (C. being a partner in both firms,) as a security for advances by C. & D. to B. & C. B. & C. became bankrupt. Held, that C. & D. had notice of the arrangement between A. & B. & C.; and the remittances in the hands of C. & D. were appropriated in equity. first to the payment of A.'s acceptances, and then to the discharge of the old debt.-Steele v. Stuart, Law Rep. 2 Eq. 84.

2. One who would otherwise be entitled to set aside a contract for fraud, cannot do so, if, after discovering the fraud, he has acted in a manner inconsistent with the repudiation of the contract.-Ex parte Briggs, Law Rep. 1 Eq. 483.

3. A contract between the W. Railway Company and other parties provided, that any difference should be referred to T., "if and so long as he should continue the company's principal engineer." The W. Company afterwards became amalgamated with the N. B. Company, under a statute which provided that all contracts should be proceeded with; the N. B. Company being in all respects in such matters substituted for the W. Company. Held, that T., who continued engineer of the W. portion of the railway, but was not principal engineer of the amalgamated railway company, was still

the proper referee.--In re Wansbeck Railway Co., Law Rep. 1 C. P. 269.

4. One who makes a contract for sale or hire, with the knowledge that the other party intends to apply the subject-matter of the contract to an immoral purpose, cannot recover on the contract: it is not necessary that he should expect to be paid out of the proceeds of the immoral act.-Pearce v. Brooks, Law Rep. 1 Ex. 213.

5. On a bill by a bankrupt, who had compounded for eight shillings in the pound, and whose bankruptcy had been annulled, a secret bargain by him to pay one creditor in full, in consideration of his becoming surety for payment of the composition, was set aside with costs.--Wood v. Barker, Law Rep. 1 Eq. 139. See BILL OF LADING, 2; CARRIER 6, 9; COVENANT; FRAUDS, STATUTE OF; LEASE, 2; SPECIFIC PERFORMANCE; TENANT FOR LIFE AND REMAINDERMAN, 3.

CONVICTION.

The certificate of a previous conviction is sufficient, by virtue of 8 & 9 Vict. c. 113, §1, if signed by an officer who purports to have custody of the records, though he is therein described as deputy clerk of the peace of a borough. And the certificate need not aver, that the quarter sessions at which the conviction took place were held by the recorder.-The Queen v. Parsons, Law Rep. 1 C. C. 24. COPYRIGHT.

1. The compiler of a directory, containing information derived from sources common to all, cannot spare himself the labor and expense of original inquiry by adopting the information contained in previous works on the same subject. He must work out the information independently for himself, and can only legitimately use the previous works for the purpose of verification. Kelly v. Morris, Law Rep. 1 Eq. 697.

2. An alien may acquire a copyright, under 5 & 6 Vict. c. 45, in his book published in England while he is residing temporarily in a British colony, although not entitled to a copyright by the laws of that colony's legislature.-Low v. Routledge, Law Rep. 1 Ch. 42.

3. The plaintiff registered under the copyright of Designs Act a piece of cloth having woven on it a chain-work ground, with shaded and bordered six pointed stars arranged in a quincunx. Held, that this was sufficient registration of the entire pattern, as the “design;" but that the whole combination only, and not single parts, though new, were protected.— McCrea v. Ho'dsworth, Law Rep. 1 Q. B. 264. CORPORATION.-See COMPANY.

COSTS.

1. Under a private act providing that commissioners for settling claims might certify costs, and that, in case of difference, costs should be taxed by a master of a superior court of law, according to the rules, and on payment of the fees observed and paid in actions at law, held that the masters taxed as persona designatæ, not as officers of the court, and the court cannot review their taxation.—In re Sheffield Waterworks Act, Law Rep. Ex. 154.

2. The legal representative of a plaintiff in error (the plaintiff below), coming in after the commencement of proceedings in error, is not under the Common Law Procedure Act, 1852, on affirmance of the judgment, liable for the defendant's costs below.-Parker v. Tootal, Law Rep. 1 Ex. 41, 115.

See APPEAL, 1; EQUITY PRACTICE, 7; EXECU-
TOR, 3; LEGATEE, 2, 3; PRODUCTION OF
DOCUMENTS, 7; RAILWAY, 7: VENDOR AND
PURCHASER, 7.

COVENANT.

1. A covenant against building, entered into by a purchaser of land with the vendor (the owner of adjoining lands), his heirs and assigns, for the benefit of said adjoining lands, runs with the land, and may be enforced by a subsequent purchaser of part of such adjoining lands who would sustain substantial injury by its breach, though he has acquiesced in breaches which did not cause substantial injury, and though all persons entitled to the benefit of the covenant do not join in the suit.- Western v. Macdermot, Law Rep. 1 Eq. 499.

2. Defendant A. was the purchaser of premises, part of an estate formerly belonging to the plaintiffs, of which all the purchasers of such parts as were sold had covenanted not to use the premises so purchased as a beer-shop. A. on the 11th of February, without the plaintiffs' consent, but without their interference, opened a beer-shop on the back of his premises, which he leased in June to the co-defendant B., who with his consent, but without that of the plaintiffs, carried on the same business. On the 8th of July, the plaintiffs notified B. to desist. A purchaser of another house on the same estate had also, without consent, but without interference from the plaintiffs, opened a beer-shop at the back of his premises. Held, that there had not been such acquiescence and waiver by the plaintiffs as to preclude them from enforcing the coverant.—Mitchell v. Steward, Law Rep. 1 Eq. 541.

See LEASE, 4, 5; PARTIES, 2.

CRIMINAL LAW.

See AIDING TO ESCAPE; BIGAMY; CONVICTION; DISORDERLY HOUSE; EMBEZZLEMENT; FALSE PRETENCES; INDICTMENT; JURY, 1; MALICIOUS MISCHIEF; MASTER AND Servant, 3; RAPE; RECEIVING STOLEN GOODS; THREATENING TO ACCUSE; WITNESS, 3.

DAMAGES.

1. In an action for breach of promise, if the plaintiff has been seduced by the defendant, it is no misdirection to tell the jury, that, in estimating damages, they may consider the altered social position of the plaintiff in relation to her home and family through the defendants' conduct.-Berry v. Da Costa, Law Rep. 1 C. P.

331.

2. A child of seven years, by his next friend, brought an action, and recovered damages for injuries from the defendant's horse. Nine days after the trial, the child died, and judgment was signed by the next friend. Held, that though the damages were presumably given on the supposition that the child would live, yet the court would not grant a new trial; and that the child's death between verdict and signing judgment was no ground for staying the proceedings.-17 Car. II. c. 8, § 1; and 15 & 16 Vict. c. 76, Kramer v. Waymark, Law Rep. 1 Ex. 241.

See CARRIER, 7, 8; PATENT, 2; TRADE MARK, 2. DECLARATION OF TITLE.

On a bill praying a declaration that a legal estate did not pass by a deed, the court refused to declare the legal right; but decreed that "the court, being of opinion that the estate did not pass, dismiss the bill."-Jenner v. Jenner, Law Rep. 1 Eq. 361.

DEDICATION. See HIGHWAY.

DEED.

1. Though a nominal consideration is expressed in a deed, the real consideration, if not inconsistent with the deed, may be proved aliunde. - Leifchild's Case, Law Rep. 1 Eq.

231.

2. An old man granted real estate, including his dwelling-house, by deed, to trustees for a charity, subject to a lease made by him shortly before to his sister at a pepper-corn rent for twenty years, determinable on the death of himself and of his sister, with whom he continued to reside on the premises, and who was acting in concert with him. Held, that the grant was void under the statute of mortmain. as not conveying bond fide all the grantor's interest. Wickham v. Marquis of Bath, Law Rep. 1 Eq. 17.