her godchild four double and not forty-one single shares), held inadmissible; but the specific legatees were allowed to take their bequests out of the original shares.-Millard v. Bailey, Law Rep. 1 Eq. 378.

8. A testator bequeathed as follows,-"The pink coupons are for £3,666: send those to I. & S. [brokers]; and he is to pay to E. T. £2,500, the rest to G for B and E.," and died, Sept. 13, 1864. Pink certificates for £3,666 13s. 4d. railway stock, were found. On Nov. 2, 1864, an administrator was appointed: but the stock was not sold till Nov. 22, 1865; and, meanwhile, a dividend had accrued. Held, that the gift to E. T. was a specific legacy; and that E. T. was entitled to a share of dividend accruing on that portion of the stock, which, at the testator's death, would have been needed to realize £2,500.—Jeffery's Trusts, Law Rep. 2 Eq. 68.

See ACCRUER, 2; HUSBAND AND WIFE, 3; LEGATEE; MAINTENANCE; SEPARATE USE; VESTED INTEREST, 2; WILL.

LEGATEE.

1. Pecuniary legatees are entitled to stand in the place of the vendor against an estate purchased and devised by the testator, the purchase-money for which, paid after the testator's death, exhausts his personal estate.-Lord Lilford v. Keck, Law Rep. 1 Eq. 347.

2. Legatees are entitled to costs out of a residuary fund in court, which is insufficient to pay the legacies charged thereon.-Jarman's Trusts, Law Rep. 1 Eq. 71.

3. In an administration suit by a residuary legatee, other residuary legatees, having liberty to attend the proceedings, were allowed between them one set of the costs of attending the taking of the accounts, as the plaintiff and the accounting defendant employed the same solicitor.Daubney v. Leake, Law Rep. 1 Eq. 495.

See RELEASE.

LIGHT.

1. The erection of a building will not be restrained as obstructing an ancient light, unless the obstruction is such as to materially interfere with the ordinary occupations of life.Clarke v. Clarke, Law Rep. 1 Ch. 16.

2. In a suit for obstruction of ancient lights, the court below decreed that the plaintiff was entitled to sufficient light for his business, without any material diminution of his former use; and directed an inquiry whether any alteration in the defendant's building-design was proper, to prevent the interference with the plaintiff's right; and, in the mean time, restrained the defendant from building above a given height.

Held, on appeal, that the defendant should have been enjoined from erecting any building so as to obstruct the plaintiff's lights, as the same were enjoyed previously to the defendant's acts. -Yates v. Jack, Law Rep. 1 Ch. 295. LIMITATIONS, Statute of.

1. Payment, by an executor, of interest on a specialty debt will prevent the statute of limitations (3 & 4 Wm. IV. c. 42, § 5) running in favour of a devisee of realty.-Coope v. Cresswell, Law Rep. 2 Eq. 106.

2. The 31 Eliz. c. 5, § 5, limiting actions on penalties to a year, applies to a suit by one for himself alone, as well as though he sued as an informer qui tam.-Dyer v. Best, Law Rep. 1 Ex. 152.

See MORTGAGE, 4, 5; SOLICITOR, 5. MAINTENANCE.

Testator bequeathed to his son a legacy of £6,000, contingently on his attaining twenty

A prisoner who plugged the feed-pipe and displayed other parts of an engine, so that it was made temporarily useless, and would have exploded unless the obstruction had been discovered and with some labour removed, was properly found guilty of damaging the engine with intent to render is useless.--The Queen v. Fisher, Law Rep. 1 C. C. 7. MARRIAGE.

1. A marriage contracted in a country where polygamy is lawful, between a man and a woman who profess a faith which allows polygamy, is not a marriage as understood in Christendom; and, though valid by the lex loci, and though both parties were single and competent to contract marriage, the English matrimonial court will not recognize it as a valid marriage, in a suit by one of the parties for dissolution of marriage on the ground of the other's adultery. -Hyde v. Woodmansee, Law Rep. 1 P. & D. 130.

2. On a suit by a man for dissolution of marriage, evidence that the man and his alleged wife, residing at S., had left S. together, saying that they intended to get married at G.; that,

they returned to S., saying they had been married at G.; that, on the day they left S., there was an entry of the marriage in a book at G., signed by the man; and that, after their return to S., they lived there many years as husband and wife,--held, in the absence of better evidence, sufficient proof of the marriage.-Patrickson v. Patrickson, Law Rep. 1 P. & D. 86.

See CONFLICT OF LAWS, 1; HUSBAND AND WIFE. MARRIAGE SETTLEMENT.-See DEED, 3; FRAUDS, STATUTE OF; HUSBAND AND WIFE; POWER, 4, 5, 6.

MASTER AND SERVANT.

1. The plaintiff was employed by a railway company to do any carpenter's work for its general purposes. He was on a scaffolding at work on a shed close to the railway, when some porters, in the company's service, carelessly shifted an engine on a turn table, so that it struck the scaffold, and the plaintiff was thrown down and injured. Held, that the company was not liable.-Morgan v. Vale of Health Rail. way Co., Law Rep. 1 Q. B. 149.

2. The plaintiff was employed by a railway company as a labourer in loading a pick-up train" with materials left by plate-layers on the line. It was part of his engagement that he should be carried by the train from B. (where he resided, and whence the train started) to the spot at which his work for the day was to be done, and be brought back to B. at the end of each day. While he was returning to B., after his day's work, the train on which he was, by the negligence of the guard in charge, came into collision with another train; and the plaintiff was injured. Held, that the company was not liable.-Tunney v. Midland Railway Co., Law Rep. 1 C. P. 291

3. A workman, who had contracted to serve a master for two years, absented himself from service, was convicted under 4 Geo. IV. c. 34, § 2, and committed. The imprisonment expired before the end of the two years; but he refused to return to service. Held, that he had committed a fresh offence, and could be again committed, although he bonâ fide thought that he could not be compelled to return after imprisonment.-Unwin v. Clarke, Law Rep. 1 Q. B.

417.

4. To an action of covenant for not teaching an apprentice, it is a good plea, that the apprentice would not be taught, and by his wilful acts prevented the master from teaching him.-Raymond v. Minton, Law Rep. 1 Ex. 244.

See EMBEZZLEMENT; LANDLORD AND TENANT, 3.

MISTAKE.-See TENANT FOR LIFE AND REMAINDER MAN, 3.

MORTGAGE.

1. A mortgagee, who, holding promissory notes of the mortgagor as collateral security, has transferred the mortgage without the notes, will be enjoined against suing at law on the notes, pending a suit by the mortgagor to redeem and settle the equities of the parties.-Walker v. Jones, Law Rep. 1 P. C. 50.

2. A mortgagor and his two incumbrancers by deed conveyed the mortgaged estates to trustees, to keep down the interest, and to accumulate the surplus rent, and apply them in payment of the principal, with a final trust for the mortgagor, and declared that nothing in the deed should derogate from the rights of the encumbrancers, and that, after they were paid off, the trusts of the deed should cease. Held, that a subsequent judgment creditor of the mortgagor could maintain a bill against all parties to the deed, and have the accounts taken under the deed from the time of filing the bill, without offering to redeem.--Jefferys v. Dickson, Law Rep. 1 Ch. 183.

3. When a mortgagee on hearing that his son-in-law, the mortgagor, is about to sell the mortgaged property (a house occupied by the mortgagor) to pay the debt, wrote that he might continue to live there without paying any rent, the mortgagor may redeem, on payment of the principal with interest from the last day on which interest fell due, before the mortgagee's death.-- Yeomans v. Williams, Law Rep. 1 Eq. 184.

4. A sum of money, settled on members of a family, was invested on a mortgage of a trust term of the family estates. In 1829, on a resettlement of the estates, the subsistence of the term and charge was acknowledged. No interest having in the mean time been paid, an arrangement was executed in 1851, by which the tenant for life, under the re-settlement of 1829, acknowledged the term and charge, and paid interest thereon. The tenant in tail, an infant, was not a party. Held, that as against the tenant in tail, the term and charge were subsisting, and the statute of limitations did not apply.-Lawton v. Ford, Law Rep. 2 Eq. 97. See PRODUCTION OF DOCUMENTS, 2, 3; SOLICI TOR, 5.

MORTMAIN.-See DEED, 2, 5.
NEGLIGENCE.

1. A railway was crossed by a public footway on a level, protected by gates on each side. There was no watchman, and the view of the line was obstructed from one of the gates; but,

on the level of the line, it could be seen three hundred yards. A woman, approaching the line through that gate, was detained by a luggage train; and, immediately on its passing, crossed the line, and was run down by a train coming on the further line of rails. Held, that there was no evidence of negligence on the part of the company, and that a verdict against them should be set aside.-Stubley v. London & N. W. Railway Co., Law Rep. 1 Ex. 13.

2. At the crossing of a railway on a level by a public way, at which there were gates across the carriage way, and a style for passengers, a foot passenger, while crossing the railway diagonally, with head bent down, was run over by a train. The gates on one side of the line were partly open, contrary to the provisions of statutes and the railway rules for the safety of carriage traffic. No gatekeeper was present, though no traffic was passing across, and a train was over due. The court refused to set aside a verdict against the railway company for the injury.-Stapley v. London, Brighton, and S. Coast Railway Co., Law Rep. 1 Ex.

21.

3. A railway was crossed by a public road diagonally, and also at the same spot nearly at right angles by a private way. There was a gate across both the public and private ways, under the control of the railway company. The plaintiff with his cart, one evening about dark, being on the private way, the gate being nearly closed, hailed the company's gatekeeper from the opposite side of the railway, to know if the line was clear; and the gatekeeper answered, "Yes; come on." The plaintiff proceeded, and was run into by a train. Held, that though 8 Vic. c. 20, § 47, in terms merely imposed the duty on the company to keep the gates closed across a public road, except when carriages, &c., shall have to cross, yet the duty was im. plied of using proper caution in opening them; and that, as the plaintiff could not get across the railway without passing through the public gate, the gatekeeper should either have opened or refused to open the gate; that what he said was equivalent to opening the gate; and that the defendants were liable.-Lunt v. London & N. W. Railway Co. Law Rep. 1 Q. B. 277.

4. The staircase, leading from a railway sta tion, was about six feet wide, had a wall on each side, but no hand-rail; and had, on the edge of each step, a strip of brass, originally roughened, but now, from constant use, worn and slippery. The plaintiff, a frequent passenger by the rail. way, while ascending the stairs, slipped, fell, and was injured. In an action against the company for negligence in not providing a reason

ably safe staircase, two witnesses gave as their opinion, that the staircase was unsafe; and one of them (a builder) suggested that brass nosings were improper; that lead would have been better, as less slippery; and that there should have been a hand-rail. Held, no evidence of negligence for the jury.—Crafter v. Metropo litan Railway Co., Law Rep. 1 C. P. 300.

5. On the premises of the defendant, a sugar refiner, was a hole on a level with the floor, used for raising sugar to the different stories, and necessary to the defendant's business. When in use, it was necessary that the hole should be unfenced; when not in use, it might, without injury to the business, have been fenced, Whether it was usual to fence similar places, when not in actual use, did not appear. The plaintiff being on the premises on lawful business, in the course of fulfilling a contract in which his employer and the defendant both had an interest, without negligence on his part, fell through the hole, and was injured. Held, that the defendant was liable.-Indermaur v. Dames, Law Rep. 1 C. P. 274.

6. The plaintiff, in passing along a highway at night, was injured by falling into a “hoist hole," within fourteen inches of the way and unfenced. The hole formed part of an unfinished warehouse, one floor of which the defendants were permitted to occupy while a lease was preparing, and was used by them in raising goods. Held, that the defendants were liable.— Hadley v. Taylor, Law Rep. 1 C. P. 53.

7. The defendant exposed in a public place for sale, unfenced and without superintendence, a machine which could be set in motion by any passer-by. A boy, four years old, by direction of his brother, seven years old, placed his fingers in the machine, while another boy was turning the handle, and his fingers were crushed. Held, that no action could be maintained for the injury.-Mangan v. Atterton, Law Rep.

1 Ex. 239.

See CARRIER, 7; MASTER AND SERVANT, 1, 2. NEW TRIAL.-See DAMAGES, 2; JURISDICTION, 3. NUISANCE.

1. A prescriptive right of draining into a stream, to the injury of the plaintiff, can be acquired, if at all, only by the continuance of a perceptible amount of injury for twenty years. - Goldsmid v. Tunbridge Wells Improvement Commissioners, Law Rep. 1 Ch. 349.

2. Injunction granted to restrain the discharge of sewage of a town into a stream, when the sewage injuriously affected the water, and had done so for many years; and the pollution of the water perceptibly increased as new

houses were built in the town-Goldsmid v. Tunbridge Wells Improvement Commissioners, Law Rep. 1 Eq. 161; S. C. on appeal, Law Rep.

1 Ch. 349.

3. An injunction was granted restraining a local board of health from permitting sewage to pass through drains under their control into a river, to the injury of a miller residing below the outfall of the drains. The company did not stop the flow of the sewage, but alleged that they had not yet discovered means of deodorizing it; that obedience to the injunction would be practically impossible, without stopping the sewage of the town; that there had been no wilful default; and that a sequestration would be useless, as the property of the Board was public property. Held, that there had been a contempt, and sequestration was ordered to issue.-Spokes v. Banbury Board of Health, Law Rep. 1 Eq. 42.

4. A canal company, empowered by its act of incorporation to take water from a stream, then pure, but since become polluted, had been with its lessees (whose lease was about to expire), indicted for a nuisance, in allowing the foul water to stagnate in their canal; and judg ment had been entered against the lessees, who had appealed. To an information against the company and their lessees, the company admitted the polluted state of the water, but insisted on their right to draw it, however foul; and said they should probably continue to draw it on the expiration of the lease. Held, that the appeal pending at law was not a bar to an injunction; that it was no answer to say that the company did not pollute the water, as they could draw it or not, as they pleased; nor to say that the informants might be left to their legal remedies; nor to say that a worse nuisance would be created in the stream; nor to say that the lessees were the active offenders, inasmuch as the company had set up their rights in the answer and injunction was granted to commence after eight months.-Attorney Genera! v. Proprietors of the Bradford Canal, Law Rep. 2 Eq. 71.

5. In an injunction to restrain the pollution of a stream, it is proper to insert the words, "to the injury of the plaintiff."-Linwood v. Stowmarket Co., Law Rep. 1 Eq. 77.

6. If a judgment at law has been obtained for a nuisance affecting real estate, and substantial damages given, an injunction will almost of course be granted to prevent the continuance of the nuisance. —Tipping v. St. Helen's Smelt ing Company, Law Rep. 1 Ch. 66.

PAROL EVIDENCE, See CARRIER, 6; LEGACY, 7; WILL, 6.

PARTICULARS.

In an action on a life policy, the defendant having pleaded, that the proposals declared that the life insured had not had symptoms of certain diseases, or any other complaint, whereas he had had symptoms of disease of the stomach, the court ordered particulars of the symptoms delivered.-Marshall v. Emperor Assurance Society Law Rep. 1 Q. B. 35. See PATENT. 5, 6.

(To be continued.)

GENERAL CORRESPONDENCE.

Articled Clerks-Admission.

TO THE EDITORS OF THE LAW JOURNAL. GENTLEMEN,—I was articled in July, 1863, and consequently would go up for admission in Trinity term, 1868. Would the Law Society, having as I understand abolished Trinity Term, allow me to go up for admission in Easter Term in that year? I have myself come to the conclusion that they would, from a few remarks of yours in the Law Journal of 1865, page 192.

It would be too bad to throw a great number of us back for four or five months. An early answer will oblige several

LAW STUDENTS.

[Our information leads us to think that such a conclusion is incorrect. The Benchers have in this case no discretion, and cannot, as they can in some cases, permit a clerk to go up for examination before his time is out, and even when they can exercise their powers in favor of the student, he cannot be sworn in until his time is fully up. You could not therefore, unless we are misinformed, go up either for examination or admission until Michaelmas Term.-EDS. L. J.]

Appointment of Official Assignees. TO THE EDITORS OF THE LAW JOURNAL. GENTLEMEN,-Just before the publication of your article in the last issue of the U. C. Law Journal, a question of some importance upon the subject referred to, came up, as questions do very frequently arise, upon which I should like to see some discussion in your Journal.

The creditors prosecuting a compulsory proceeding by attachment in insolvency, applied to the judge of the County Court here, under the 13th sub-section of the 3rd section of the Insolvent Act of 1864, for an order appointing