Page images
PDF
EPUB

1838.-The Skinners Company v. The Irish Society.

was better to reserve the common property for the general purposes of the plantation, than to make division of its whole income, and resort to taxation and levies to defray the expenses which might from time to time be required.

[*640]

*It is clear that the general operation of the plantation was not completed at the time when the distribution of lands was made to the companies. It was indeed strongly urged in argument, that the general operation, although not then complete, was not long afterwards, or at all events was very long since, completed, and that thereupon, if not before, and in consequence thereof, the Society became mere trustees for the companies but I do not think that this court has jurisdiction to determine the question whether the general operation of the plantation has been completed or not, and if it had, it does not appear to me that there is any satisfactory evidence on the subject, or any thing to show that operations materially affecting many important objects of the plantation and requiring expense may not still have to be performed; and if such should be the case, it does not appear to me that this court has, on the application of the plaintiffs, jurisdiction to inquire or give directions about such operations.

And on the whole, the question is reduced to that which was made on the motion for the payment of money into court, and for a receiver, whether, upon the settlement made in the north of Ireland, by virtue of the charter of King James the First, under which the towns of Londonderry and Coleraine were founded, and a large tract of country granted by the Crown to the Irish Society, the terms of the grant simply constituted the Irish Society ordinary trustees for the benefit of the companies of London, or whether the grant was coupled with certain public purposes and public trusts, independently of the private benefit of the companies.

After having considered the charter of King Charles II., and

the charter of King James I., and the several circum[*641] stances in evidence in this cause, which preceded "and accompanied the grant of the charter of King James, and having read all the documents produced in this cause, to some only of which, though at the expense of so much time, I have

1838. The Skinners Company v. The Irish Society.

but shortly adverted, and having also considered the conduct of the parties under the charter for so long a series of years, I am of opinion that the powers granted to the Society, and the trusts reposed in them, were, in part, of a general and public nature, independent of the private benefit of the companies of London, and were intended by the Crown to benefit Ireland and the city of London, by connecting the city of Londonderry and the town of Coleraine, and a considerable Irish district with the city of London, and to promote the general purposes of the plantation, not only by securing the performance of the conditions imposed on ordinary undertakers, but also by the exercise of powers, and the performance of trusts, not within the scope of those conditions.

The charter of Charles II. expressly recites, that the property not actually divided was retained for the general operation of the plantation; and considering that the powers given to the Irish Society for the general operation of the plantation were of a general and public or political nature, that the property remaining vested in the Society is applicable towards such general operation, and that the companies of London, though interested in any surplus which may remain after the general purposes are answered, are not entitled to control the exercise of the powers which are given for general and public purposes,-I do not think that this court has jurisdiction, upon the application of the companies, to determine upon the propriety of the expenditure which has been made. It must not be inferred that I approve of some of the items of expense which were commented upon in the argument. I express no opinion upon the subject, *think- [*642] ing that the Society have a discretion, which, though controllable elsewhere, and in another manner, is not to be controlled in this court upon such a bill as this.

And upon the whole I think that the bill must be dismissed with costs as against the Irish Society, the city of London, and the Attorney General: without costs as against the other companies, unless it shall appear that any of the companies have opposed the claim of the plaintiffs.

[blocks in formation]
[blocks in formation]

2. A testator gave large legacies out of his
"surplus capital." By the decree special
accounts and inquiries were directed; but
the master was unable to take the accounts,
by reason of the non-production of the
books. He found, however, on the imper-
fect evidence before him, large sums due
to the testator, and large partnership as-
sets, which however varied in each of his
three reports: he also found that the ex-
ecutors might, with due diligence, &c,
have possessed themselves, out of the part-
nership property, of sufficient to pay the
two legacies. The court, however, was of
opinion, that there was no reason for think-
ing that the testator's surplus capital could,
if at all, have been realized without putting
an end to the business, which the execu.
tors, under the circumstances, were not
bound to do; that though the executors had
not fully or properly performed their duty,
still it was more a matter of conjecture
than of proof what the assets and liabilities
were; that the results were not accurate
or approaching to accuracy, and that it had
not been satisfactorily made out, either that
there were partnership assets, out of which
the legacies could have been recovered or
secured, nor that the assets were such as
to make it impracticable for the executors
to obtain payment of the legacies. The

court, in this state of things, declined to
charge the executors. Rowley v. Adams,
395

See DECREE, 2.

ACQUIESCENCE.

1. A feme covert was entitled to a reversion-
ary interest in a sum of money vested in
her husband and another as trustees. By
deed, expressed to be made between the
tenant for life of the one part, and the trus,
tees (including the husband) of the other
part, the tenant for life, who alone execu-
ted the deed, declared that the trustees
should hold the fund on certain modified
trusts, whereby the wife's reversionary in-
terest was made subject to her power of
appointment by deed or will. The wife
died, leaving her husband surviving, having
appointed the reversionary interest away
from her husband. The husband after.
wards died, and the reversionary interest
subsequently came into possession. The
court considered, that, under the circum-
stances, the husband ought to be deemed to
have acquiesced in the arrangement, and
accepted the trusts for the benefit of the
wife's appointees; and held, that the ap-
pointees of the wife were entitled as against
the representatives of the husband. In-
man v. Whitley,

337

2. Trustees, after acquiescence, restrained
from legal proceedings against the tenant
for life to recover the title deeds, and re-
ceive the rents. Deaton v. Denton, 389.

ADMINISTRATION SUIT.

1. A person at his death was member of a
banking company established under the 7
G. 4, c. 46, and subject to its liabilities.
After the expiration of three years, a suit
was instituted for the administration of his
estate, and the common decree was made
for taking an account of his debts. Persons
who were creditors of the banking company
at the testator's death claimed before the
master. Held, that their claims did not
come within the scope of the decree;
secondly, that their claims were barred by
the lapse of three years; and, thirdly, that
the proper way of bringing their claims be-
fore the court was by petition, and not by
exception. Barker v. Buttress, 134

[blocks in formation]
[blocks in formation]

2. A testator bequeathed an annuity of 500!.
a year to his daughter for life, and directed
an investment in the funds for securing it,
and after her decease, he directed the "an-
nuity" should go as his daughter should
by will appoint, and in default, the "an.
nuity" should be applied towards the main-
tenance of her children till twenty-one, and
then the "principal sum" to the children,
with a gift over" of the said principal sum
of money." Held, that the daughter had
the power of appointing the principal sum.
Samuda v. Lousada,
243

« PreviousContinue »