spiring to cheat F. S. out of his money, gets him to lay a sum of money on a foot-race and prevails with the party to run booty: The Queen v. Orbell, 6 Mod. 42; or a combination to cheat another by making him drunk and defrauding him at cards: State v. Younger, 1 Dev. L. 357; S. C., 17 Am. Dec. 571. In Regina v. Hudson, Bell C. C. 263; S. C., 8 Cox C. C. 353, the same principle was held. In that case the three prisoners were in a public house with the prosecutor; one of them, in concert with the other two, placed a pencase on the table and left the room; whilst out, the other two took out the pen and substituted a pin in its place; on the return of the first one, the other two induced the prosecutor to bet him there was no pen in the case; he did so, and on opening the case another pen dropped out. "Though it be an expedi ent in that conspiracy," said Pollock, C. B., "to induce the man who is cheated to think that he is cheating some one else, that does not prevent those who use that device from being amenable to punishment."

The foregoing cases were all combinations to cheat individuals. There are a number of cases in which the public generally have been affected by the offense. A general charge of conspiracy to cheat a municipal corporation imports an indictable offense, on account of the character of the corporation: State v. Young, 37 N. J. L. 184; and where the directors of a joint-stock bank, knowing it to be in a state of insolvency, issued a balance-sheet showing a profit, and thereupon declaring a dividend of six per cent., and issuing an advertisement asking the public to take shares, upon the faith of their representation that the bank was in a flourishing condition, they are guilty of conspiracy: Regina v. Brown, 7 Cox C. C. 447; and similar conduct was held conspiracy in Regina v. Esdaile, 1 Fost. & F. 213. But in United States v. Britton, Am. L. Reg., Aug. 1883, p. 545; S. C., 2 Sup. Ct. Rep. 531, it was held, that directors of a national bank declaring a dividend, with knowledge of the fact that the bank had made no net profits to pay it, was not con. spiracy, as the declaring of a dividend by an association is not a willful misappropriation of its funds by the individual directors; it being an act done by them as officers, and not as directors. As to the effect of issuing a false prospectus, and when it is not conspiracy, see the interesting case of Regina v. Gurney, 11 Cox C. C. 414. A conspiracy to defraud an incorporated bank of issue, so that the securities for the circulation held by the public are im paired, is an offense of so public a nature as to be indictable at common law: State v. Norton, 3 Zab. 33; so is a conspiracy to manufacture base and spurious indigo, with a fraudulent. intent to sell the same as good and genuine indigo, although no sale is made in pursuance of such conspiracy: Commonwealth v. Judd, 2 Mass. 329; S. C., 3 Am. Dec. 54. See also head "Combination to Raise Price of Commodities or of Government Funds," post

CONSPIRACIES TO EXTORT MONEY.-It is well settled that these conspiracies are indictable; as where the conspirators falsely exhibited a certain indictment against a party for the purpose of extorting money, or offered to suppress a certain indictment if he would give them money for doing so: The King v. Hollingberry, 6 D. & R. 345; S. C., 4 Barn. & Cress. 329; or extort a deed by means of a peace warrant; in such a case, the offense of conspiracy may be made out, although the affidavit to obtain the peace warrant was true; State v. Shooter, 8 Rich. 72; or get money out of a man by conspiring to charge him with a false fact, whether the fact charged was criminal or not: The King v. Rispal, I W. Black. 368; S. C., 3 Burr. 1320; as bastardy: Johnson v. State, 26 N. J. L 13; although the rule would be different if the charge was made bona fide: Heaps v. Dunham, 95 Ill. 583; or obtain money from a master mechanic which he is under no obligation to pay, by inducing his workingmen to leave him, and by deterring others from entering into his employ, or by

threatening to do this, so that he is induced to pay the money demanded, under a reasonable apprehension that he can not carry on his business without yielding to the demand: Carew v. Rutherford, 106 Mass. 1; S. C., 8 Am. Rep. 287. And defendants are also guilty of conspiracy where A., having been bail for D., went, accompanied by B. and C., to the lodgings of D., telling her that B. and C. were officers, who would take her to jail if she did not give him security for his debt, although B. and C. were not officers, and had no authority to take D.; and D. gave A. a number of articles, and signed a paper stating that the articles were deposited with O. for security, and that he might sell them if he was not paid in forty-two days: Bloomfield v. Blake et al., 6 Car. & P. 75.

CONSPIRACY TO ARREST OR MALICIOUSLY PROSECUTE, OR TO CHARGE ONE with Bastardy, Lunacy, OR A CRIME.-The officer, prosecutor, and all other persons concerned may be indicted for a conspiracy to procure criminal process to cause the false imprisonment of a man for improper purposes: Slower v. People, 25 Ill. 70. A police sergeant has no right to arrest a person for an alleged breach of the Sunday law of 1794 without a warrant; and a police magistrate has no right to commit a person for such alleged breach on his refusing to pay an illegal fine therefor; and for doing so a magistrate and sergeant were held to answer on a charge of conspiracy in Commonwealth v. Collins, 12 Rep., N. S., 284. And conspiracy will lie also for a malicious prosecution at the common law: Sydenham v. Keilaway, Cro. Jac. 7; Stewart v. Cooley, 23 Minn. 347; S. C., 23 Am. Rep. 690; but in an action against a prosecutor, a magistrate, and a constable, for conspiring together to arrest and imprison a person without probable cause, evidence that each one acted illegally or maliciously will not support the action without proof that the defendants conspired together to do such acts: Newall v. Jenkins, 26 Pa. St. 159.

Conspiracy to vex and harass a person by having him subjected to an inquisition of lunacy without any probable cause is actionable: Davenport v. Lynch, 6 Jones L. 545; but an action for conspiracy for confining the plaintiff in a lunatic asylum can not be sustained if the defendants conscientiously believe that the plaintiff was deranged and required for his recovery medical treatment under restraint; although the existence of such conspiracy be proved, yet neither the signing of a certificate of lunacy by a physician, nor the receiving and keeping of the plaintiff in the asylum by the officers thereof, nor the serving as a juror on the inquest by which the plaintiff was found a lunatic, but which was afterwards set aside, will render either the physicians, officers of the asylum, or members of the inquest co-conspirators, unless they had knowledge of the existence of the conspiracy, and their several acts were corruptly done in furtherance thereof: Hinchman v. Richie, Bright. 143.

It is also an indictable conspiracy to bring one into disrepute by falsely charging him with being the father of a bastard: The Queen v. Best, 6 Mod. 137; S. C., 2 Ld. Raym. 1167; Leviston v. Lentall, 1 Sid. 68; or for charging one with keeping a bastard child: The King v. Armstrong, 1 Vent. 304; or with being the father of a child likely to be born a bastard: Regina v. Best, 2 Ld. Raym. 1167; S. C., 1 Salk. 174; Johnson v. State, 26 N. J. L. 313; but persons procuring the arrest of a man upon a charge of bastardy can not be charged with conspiracy, if in prosecuting the suit in behalf of the woman interested they honestly believed from her statements that the charge was true and were thereby induced to act in the matter: Heaps v. Dunham, 95 Ill. 583.

There are a number of cases in the books of persons being charged with

conspiracy for combining to charge one with a criminal offense. Such a conspiracy is indictable, and the New Jersey statute, requiring an overt act, does not require the full execution of the conspiracy: State v. Hickling, 41 N. J. L. 208; S. C., 32 Am. Rep. 198. Persons have been indicted for charging one with theft: State v. Cawood, 2 Stew. 360; The Poulterer's Case, 9 Co. 55, and for charging one with concealing stolen goods, without procuring any legal process: Commonwealth v. Tibbetts, 2 Mass. 536; or with fornication, a spiritual offense: Regina v. Best, 2 Ld. Raym. 1167; or with a capital offense: Rex v. Spragg, 2 Burr. 993; and so also persons buying a pretended right to an estate, and then entering into a combination with others to charge the owner with a capital offense in order that his estate might be forfeited, are guilty: Sir Anthony Ashley's Case, 12 Co. 90; but the most flagrant case is that of The King v. Macdaniel, 1 Leach C. C. 44, where persons conspired to accuse one of highway robbery, and procured his conviction and execution in order to obtain the reward allowed for convicting a highway robber.

CONSPIRACIES TO COMMIT CRIMES OR MISDEMEANORS, OR TO INDUCE OTHERS TO COMMIT THEM.-Conspiracies to commit crimes are indictable. Thus a design by two persons by different means to murder a child of which a woman is pregnant is sufficiently proximate to be the subject of a conspiracy: Regina v. Banks, 12 Cox C. C. 393. And conspirators have been held for combining to tar and feather a man: State v. Pulle, 12 Minn. 164; or to commit an assault and battery: Commonwealth v. Putnam, 29 Pa. St. 296; State v. Ripley, 31 Me. 386; or to rob and steal: State v. Sterling, 34 Iowa, 443; Horton v. State, 66 Ga. 690. And a conspiracy to murder, unaccompanied by an intent to rebel or make an insurrection, is within the meaning as well as the words of the act of 1802 (Rev. C. 618), to prevent conspiracy and insurrection among slaves: State v. Tom, a Slave, 2 Dev. L. 569. And a combination to utter forged notes of a foreign bank is indictable: Clary v. Commissioners, 4 Pa. St. 210; as is a conspiracy to defraud the public by means of false pretenses and false writings in the form and similitude of bank notes: Collins v. Commonwealth, 3 Serg. & R. 220; and an agreement to fabricate shares in addition to the limited number of which a joint-stock company, according to its rules, consists, in order to sell them as good shares, notwithstanding any imperfection in the original formation of the company: Rex v. Mott, 2 Car. & P. 521; so, also, a conspiracy to make counterfeit coin is not an infamous crime within the meaning of article 5 of the amendments to the constitution of the United States, and may be prosecuted by indictment: United States v. Burgess, 9 Fed. Rep. 896.

Instances have occurred of persons being indicted for inducing another to commit an offense against the law. People v. Saunders, 25 Mich. 119, is an illustration of this, and there conspirators were held for inducing others to violate the law by a sale of liquor, in order that the conspirators might make profit out of their fears of prosecution. So a conspiracy entered into to induce and procure other persons to do an act prohibited under a penalty by statute is an indictable offense, whether the object was accomplished or not: Hazen v. Commonwealth, 23 Pa. St. 355. And it would be a conspiracy for two or more persons to act in concert (in unlawful measures to enforce the Sunday law, as by inducing a tavern-keeper, by artifice or persuasion, to furnish beer on Sunday: Commonwealth v. Leeds, 9 Phil. 569; and merchants who suspect one of theft, and employ a detective to consort with the suspected party, and to enter into an agreement with him to rob the store, and furnish the detective with the key to facilitate the scheme, are liable: Johnson v. State, 3 Tex. App. 590; but see Knowles v. Peck, 42 Conn. 386; S. C., 19 Am Rep. 542, a case analogous to this in principle.

CONSPIRACIES TO SEDUCE, PROCURE PROSTITUTION, ETC.-These acts have been the subject of conspiracy frequently. Conspiracies to seduce a female are indictable: Smith v. People, 25 Ill. 17; Anderson v. Commonwealth, 5 Rand. 627; as is a conspiracy by false pretenses to procure an infant female to have illicit carnal connection with a man: Regina v. Mears, 2 Den. C. C. 79; or to induce an unmarried girl, seventeen years old, to become a common prostitute: Regina v. Howell, 4 Fost. & F. 160; or a conspiracy by a master, an attorney, and a gentleman, to assign over a female apprentice, by her own consent, for purposes of prostitution: Rex v. Delavel, 3 Burr. 1434. But a mere agreement between a man and a woman to commit adultery or fornication is not conspiracy: Miles v. State, 58 Ala. 390; Shannon v. Commonwealth, 14 Pa. St. 226.

CONSPIRACY TO INDUCE INFANT TO MARRY AGAINST FATHER'S OR GUARDLAN'S CONSENT.-A confederacy to assist a female infant to escape from her father's control with a view to marry her against his will is indictable: Mifflin v. Commonwealth, 5 Watts & S. 461; S. C., 40 Am. Dec. 527; so also is a conspiracy to procure a young lady, then a ward of the court of chancery, to marry defendant; Rex v. Locker, 5 Esp. 107; or to inveigle a young girl from her home, ply her with liquor, and procure the marriage ceremony to be performed between her and one of the defendants: Respublica v. Hevice, 2 Yeates, 114; or to procure a marriage between a gentleman's son and a woman of infamous reputation: The Queen v. Blacket, 7 Mod. 39; or to inveigle a young man, under the age of eighteen, and heir to a considerable estate, out of the custody and government of his father, and seduce him to a disgraceful marriage: The King v. Thorp, 5 Id. 221.

CONSPIRACIES BY OVERSEERS OF POOR TO RID PARISH OF PAUPERS.Conspiracies of this kind have been generally held to be indictable. As where the overseers conspire to marry a pauper settled in their parish to a pauper belonging to another parish, to the relief of their own parish and the burdening of the other: The King v. Edwards, 8 Mod. 321; The King v. Herbert, 2 Keny. 466; Rex v. Watson, 1 Wils. 41; Rex v. Tarrant, 4 Burr. 2106; but a conspiracy to procure a marriage between poor persons of different parishes, for the purpose of exonerating the parish of the woman and charging the other parish, is not an indictable offense, unless the parties were unwilling to marry, or some forcible or fraudulent means of bringing about the marriage were resorted to. A conspiracy to exonerate from the pros pective burden of maintaining a pauper not at the time actually chargeable, and to throw the burden upon another parish by means not in themselves unlawful, is not indictable: The King v. Seward, 3 Nev. & M. 557; and it was also held in Overseers v. Aurand, 10 Watts, 134, that the acts and exertions of the inhabitants of a township to get rid of one who is not but is likely to become chargeable as a pauper, will not render them liable to an action for conspiracy by the township to which he goes.

CONSPIRACIES TO OBSTRUCT OR DEFEAT PUBLIC JUSTICE.-All conspiracies to pervert, obstruct, or defeat the course of public justice in a criminal or civil proceeding are indictable; as where it is accomplished by suppression or fabrication of evidence: State v. De Witt, 2 Hill (S. C.), 282; S. C., 27 Am. Dec. 371; or by impeding an officer in the discharge of his official duty: State v. Noyes, 25 Vt. 415; or by inducing an important witness on the charge of felony to suppress evidence or give false evidence, and by persuading him to abscond or conceal himself: People v. Chase, 16 Barb. 495; or by obtaining a counterfeit bill from the hands of a person to whom it had been uttered, so that it could not be had as evidence upon a criminal prosecution: State v.

Bartlett, 30 Me. 132; or by producing a false certificate in evidence to influence the judgment of the court: King v. Maubey, 6 T. R. 619; or where it is formed for the purpose of preventing a prosecution for felony: Claridge v. Hoare, 14 Ves. 59. So also a conspiracy to assault and beat a justice of the peace and injure him is indictable: State v. Ripley, 31 Me. 386; and also one to raise an insurrection and obstruct the laws: Regina v. Shellard, 9 Car. & P. 277; see also Regina v. Vincent, Id. 9. No overt act is necessary to make up the crime: State v. Ripley, 31 Me. 386. But a combination to ascertain whether a certain party is violating an injunction preventing him from using a certain article, by employing another to call for that article, is not indictable: Knowles v. Peck, 42 Conn. 386; S. C., 19 Am. Rep. 542; compare Johnson v. State, 3 Tex. App. 590.

CONSPIRACIES TO CONTROL WAGES OR WORKMEN.-The subject of conspiracies to control wages or workmen is discussed at length in the note to People v. Fisher, 28 Am. Dec. 501, to which the reader is referred.

COMBINATION TO RAISE PRICE OF COMMODITIES OR of GOVERNMENT FUNds. It is illegal to combine dishonestly to stimulate the price of any marketable commodity; as to raise the price of salt, by a combination among dealers not to sell under a certain price: The King v. Norris, 2 Keny. 300; or to regulate the sale, price, etc., of coal. A "corner," whether to affect the price of articles of commerce or of vendible stocks, by confederation to raise or depress the price and operate on the markets, is a conspiracy: Morris Run Coal Co. v. Barclay Coal Co., 68 Pa. St. 173; and so is a combination to compel a city to pay higher rates for labor and materials than it would if there were no confederation to prevent bidding for the contract for labor and materials: Commonwealth v. Haines, 11 Rep., N. S., 413; but on a motion for a criminal information against two persons for conspiring to raise the price of oil, it must distinctly appear that they combined together, as it is no offense for an individual separately so to endeavor: Rex v. Hilbers, 2 Chit. 163. An agreement between two persons to forestall and control the market for any necessary of life, by the employment of falsehood and displaying "an unmixed motive of mischief, either to the public or an individual," is clearly indictable. But a mere agreement between two persons to purchase on their joint account, with a view to profit upon the resale, is not indictable, although the effect of such purchase may be to advance the price. It is the motive which distinguishes the illegal from the legal agreement to purchase. If the motive is dishonest, and fraud, falsehood, or deceit is used, it is unlawful: Commonwealth v. Tack, 1 Brews. 511. It is also indictable to conspire on a particular day, by false rumors, to raise the price of the public government funds, with the intent to injure the subjects who should purchase on that day: The King v. De Berenger, 3 Mau. & Sel. 67.

CONSPIRACIES TO COMMIT TRESPASS ORTO INJURE PROPERTY.-An indictment will not lie for conspiracy to commit a civil trespass upon property, by agreeing to go and by going into a preserve for hares, the property of another, for the purpose of snaring them, although alleged to be done in the night by the defendants armed with offensive weapons for the purpose of opposing resistance to any endeavor to apprehend or obstruct them: The King v. Turner, 13 Fast, 228. "I should be sorry," said Lord Ellenborough in this case, that the cases in conspiracy against individuals, which have gone far enough, should be pushed still further. I should be sorry to have it doubted whether persons agreeing to go and sport upon another's ground, in other words, to commit a civil trespass, should be thereby in peril of an indictment for an offense which would subject them to an infamous punishment." But if the defendants should meet and go out for the purpose of a fox-hunt, and should chase