this resolution was not meant primarily to apply only to the usual statute affecting the labor of women and children, or to the statute prescribing how long a day's labor shall be, in the absence of express contract. The nearest law passed by any State in this country to a general regulation of the hours of labor was that of the State of Nebraska, passed in 1891, which provided that eight hours should constitute a legal day's labor for all classes of mechanics, servants, and laborers, except those engaged in domestic or agricultural labor. Even this statute did not prohibit contracts for a longer day, but required double rates for such overtime; and the statute itself has been declared unconstitutional by the Supreme Court of Nebraska in a decision rendered a few months ago.

Constitutionality of such Laws.

Whether such statutes impose such a limitation upon personal freedom as to be unconstitutional under the inherited principles of the Anglo-Saxon race, or even perhaps under our written constitutions, is one of the most interesting questions now in the public mind, which we shall consider more fully when we come to speak specifically of the labor contract itself.

Exceptions.

Going on now with our general view, the next thing to note is that we do find a number of statutes

which prescribe what shall be the length of a day's labor in the absence of express contract to the contrary, and also the entering wedge of the attempt to regulate labor through principles of State socialism in limiting the time of labor done for the State, or for a town, or municipality, or any contractor of public work. Thus, in the absence of contract, eight States have limited the hours of labor to eight hours per day, and six to ten hours. The laws of Illinois also provide for an eight-hour day, but expressly state that overtime work for extra compensation may be contracted for. In New Jersey a week's work may not exceed fifty-five hours. This is as far as any of our States have yet gone in the direction of limiting general labor of full-grown men; but several States, and the United States law, limit hours of labor done for the State or on public work to eight hours, and Massachusetts and Texas to nine.

Regulation of Wages.

No regulation whatever as to price has yet been attempted in this country, or is attempted in modern times in England, with the solitary exception that Massachusetts provides that cities shall pay laborers a rate not exceeding $2 a day; and, as is doubtless familiar to you, many of our towns and cities fix a rate-usually $2-by ordinance, that is, by voluntary municipal contract,

not by general law. There is undoubtedly a strong tendency in this country to fix all public work at a rate somewhat higher than the market demands, usually $2 a day; and in England to require all public employers to give what is called a living wage; but so far the tendency has not become the fact. Indeed, the report of the last English Labor Commission shows that the employees of public works are paid, if anything, rather less than the average rate outside, which difference, it is said, is made up to the workmen by greater certainty of employment.

Women-and-Children Eight-hour Laws.

When we come to women and children, we find a great difference. Undoubtedly, this distinction rests on the theory that both women and children are wards of the State, the old theory being that women were not fully citizens, and might be, therefore, the subject of special protection. Substantially half the States in this country have a provision that women and children, in factories or workshops at least, may not be allowed to work more than eight hours a day, this being the law in Illinois and Wisconsin, or ten hours a day in New England, New York, and the Northern and Central States, or in any case more than fortyeight or fifty-eight hours a week, respectively. This statute was sustained in Massachusetts some

years ago on the express ground that it was a proper police regulation; but probably really on the theory that I have adverted to, that women and children might constitutionally be protected in making their own contracts. In Illinois, on the other hand, within a few weeks, the law as to women has been declared wholly unconstitutional on the ground that the modern theory is that a woman is a citizen, and that as such she has the same right as a man has to make her own contracts. This is certainly the logical modern view, and it will be curious to see which view will generally prevail throughout the United States.

Unconstitutional in States where Women Vote.

It is at least very clear that in those States which have adopted woman suffrage, there will be no longer any constitutional justification for thus artificially protecting woman from making such contract as she deems most advantageous to herself. Clearly, to do so will be to put her at a disadvantage in industrial competition with men, which disadvantage, however slight in effect, will afford a pretext for retaining her present low rate of wages, or perhaps for insisting on making it lower still. Therefore, in woman-suffrage States, any limitation thus imposed on the hours of labor of women will have to be imposed also on men ; and as our courts now stand, it is pretty clear that

they will permit this, if at all, only in the case of labor employed by corporations; and if this exception were generally made, it would put corporations at such a disadvantage that they would probably turn themselves into private trusts for the purpose of evading the law, and this could probably be easily done. We may, therefore, expect a check by the courts to the recent movement for statute regulation of labor hours.

As to Children.

The labor of children is also covered by this statute, and further, it is common to provide that children between the ages of twelve and fourteen and eighteen shall not be employed in such a way as to wholly prevent or interfere with their common-school education. Under the ages of eleven or twelve they may not usually be employed at all in factories, and in most of our States not at all in mines. The present state of English statute law is somewhat similar. A child between the age of fourteen and eighteen is there termed a "young person," and may be employed under certain restrictions, while a child-meaning a person under the age of fourteen-has to pass a certain standard of education; and under the age of eleven no child may be employed in factories at all. It will be noted that all these acts concerning the labor of women and children com