material that is already located outside of the United States is in Switzerland.

Senator SMITH. You mentioned Switzerland?

Mr. STRAUSS. That is right.

Senator SMITH. There has been no danger of any violation there? Mr. STRAUSS. In the first place there has been no danger, in the second place we have seen it and in the third place the amount is quite small, but with the passage of time, since we have some eight-power bilaterals now in existence, and since plants will presumably be built on the strength of those bilaterals, I would say within the next 3 to 5 years we will have fissionable material that originated here in the shape of fuel elements made by American contractors in reactors in other countries, and we will be inspecting those.

Senator SMITH. You said there are eight such bilaterals?

Mr. STRAUSS. There are eight in existence today, and there are a number of others in process of negotiation which, when completed, when certified by the President as being in the best interests of the United States, will be sent to the Joint Committee and they will remain with the Joint Committee for 30 days before they become binding. Senator SMITH. I think you have testified that there is no competition between our bilaterals and the Agency's operations, and there is no reason for any complications due to the fact that we might have bilaterals with certain countries and agency relations with these countries?

Mr. STRAUSS. That is my belief, Senator. I think they are complementary, not competitive.

DEGREE OF ENRICHMENT OF FISSIONABLE MATERIALS TO BE HANDLED BY AGENCY

Senator SMITH. I think you answered this question in your testimony but I will ask it again. What do you estimate would be the amount of the enrichment of the fissionable material to be handled by the Agency in agreement with the recipients?

Mr. STRAUSS. The information which I received from our technical people on that subject is that the bulk of these power reactor concepts will probably operate on a material enriched 2, 3 or 4 percent. Senator SMITH. At one place in your testimony I think you said it would not be greater in any case than 20 percent?

Mr. STRAUSS. We have taken the position that on the basis of our experience, that material enriched in U-235 below 20 percent is not of weapons quality.

Senator SMITH. That is what I wanted to get at.

Mr. STRAUSS. Yes, sir.

Senator SMITH. You can go up to 20 percent. You don't intend to, but if you go up to 20 percent it would not be of military quality? Mr. STRAUSS. Below 20 percent it is our conviction that that is so. Senator SMITH. The next question is this: As an atomic fuel becomes burned up in use does not a natural control exist over violators of Agency agreements by the power to curtail any new shipments? Mr. STRAUSS. Yes, sir, that is the great built-in control that we have over this situation.

92318-57- -8

All of our friends desire our continued friendship and our continued assistance, and it is inconceivable to me that they will sacrifice that prospect for any purpose whatsoever.

Senator SMITH. I thank you.
My time is up, Mr. Chairman.
The CHAIRMAN. Thank you.
Mr. Hickenlooper?

UNITED STATES-JAPAN BILATERAL DISCUSSIONS

Senator HICKENLOOPER. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

Chairman Strauss, I have many questions for which 6 minutes is not sufficient, but I will ask 2 or 3 here.

With respect to the fact that the Agency is not competitive with our bilateral agreements, it comes to my mind that Japan has already told the world that she isn't going to discuss bilateral agreements with us until she sees what kind of a deal she can get out of the International Atomic Energy Agency, which would indicate to me that it is competitive, or they expect it to be competitive.

Mr. STRAUSS. Senator, there have been a number of statements that have appeared in the press as to the Japanese attitude, but the only official attitude that we have is that we are discussing bilaterals with them.

Senator HICKENLOOPER. I am just going on newspaper statements that the Japanese officials have said that they are not actually going to finalize any bilateral with us until they can find out what is the best deal they can get out of the International Agency if it is set up.

Mr. STRAUSS. There is, as you are aware, a bilateral agreement in effect with Japan at the present time between Japan and the United States for research reactor, and I suspect, Senator, that the attitude of the Japanese is much more likely to be controlled by the question of whether the reactor that they will purchase will be a British or an American type reactor, and certain aspects of the guaranties that are to accompany that transaction.

QUESTION OF ATOMIC WEAPONS FABRICATION

Senator HICKENLOOPER. One question with respect to the question asked by Senator Aiken about the possibility of countries that are beneficiaries of this program, members of the Agency, being able to make weapons.

I don't quite follow the reasoning in these presentations this morning. I ask you if it is not possible that the knowledge they will gain in the handling of atomic materials and operating reactors and things of that kind would not put them a substantial degree down the road toward the knowledge pointing to fabrication of weapons.

Mr. STRAUSS. Senator, I think it is clear that knowledge gained in the handling of an atomic energy program will certainly be of use to a nation that contemplates a weapons program, just as instructing them in physics would be.

On the other hand, there is no direct connection between a reactor program and a weapons program as such, as I am sure of course you know.

Senator HICKENLOOPER. I think, generally speaking, that is true in my understanding of it, but I was merely attempting to point out that all the information they gain is a step toward the final fabrication of a weapon, regardless of whether it goes all the way or not.

Mr. STRAUSS. Almost any help we give them, be it economic, be it educational will be of help in a weapons program if that is their end object.

URANIUM ENRICHMENT

Senator HICKENLOOPER. In the event that it is contemplated that the enrichment of this uranium will be only 2 or 3 percent, what is the underlying reason for making the offer of availability of 5,000 kilograms of 20 percent enriched uranium?

Mr. STRAUSS. That was in order to measure the total amount, Senator. If this had been stated, for example, in terms of 2 or 3 percent, the figure of 5,000 kilograms would have been multiplied.

If one were mentioning it in terms of 100 percent enrichment, it would be yet another figure. The figure of 5,000 kilograms was tied to the 20,000 kilogram statement which had been made in February of the preceding year in order to indicate that it was one-fourth of that

amount.

Senator HICKENLOOPER. Then do I understand that if we make available to the agency uranium enriched, let's say 2 or 3 percent, that the kilograms of uranium, that is the total weight, would be substantially in excess of that?

Mr. STRAUSS. That is right, Senator.

Senator HICKENLOOPER. If the enrichment were 2 percent, then it would be the equivalent of 50,000 kilograms of uranium?

Mr. STRAUSS. That is correct, Senator. The tonnage would be very much increased.

(The Atomic Energy Commission subsequently supplied the following information :)

Hon. B. B. HICKENLOOPER,

United States Senate.

MAY 17, 1957.

DEAR SENATOR HICKENLOOPER: You have requested information on equivalent amounts of U-235 at concentrations of 20 percent and 2 percent, in connection with the 5,000 kilograms of U-235 which the President stated on October 26, 1956, will be made available to the International Atomic Energy Agency on terms to be agreed. That 5,000 kilograms is part of the 20,200 kilograms of U-235 which the President announced on February 22, 1956, will be available for distribution outside the United States for peaceful purposes. The 20,200 kilograms is, at present, the maximum permitted reduction in output of highly enriched uranium from our gaseous diffusion plants resulting from the distribution of enriched uranium of any U-235 concentration for peaceful uses abroad. The simplest way to evaluate the effects of withdrawing materials of various concentrations from the gaseous diffusion plants is to consider the dollar values of such materials according to the price schedule. That schedule is computed in such a way that equal dollar values of material withdrawn at any concentration mean equal reductions in the output of highly enriched uranium.

According to the price schedule publicly announced by the AEC on November 18, 1956, the price per gram of U-235 content is $17.07 at a U-235 concentration of 90 percent, $16.12 at a U-235 concentration of 20 percent, and $11 at a U-235 concentration of 2 percent. Five thousand kilograms of U-235, which would have a value of $85,350,000 at a U-235 concentration of 90 percent, corresponds to about 5,300 kilograms of U-235 at 20 percent concentration and about 7,760 kilograms of U-235 at 2 percent concentration. On the same basis, the total amount of uranium (including the U-238 content) is 26,500 kilograms at

a U-235 concentration of 20 percent and 388,000 kilograms at a U-235 concentration of 2 percent.

In general the relation is that the U-235 content for a concentration of 2 percent corresponds to 1.465 times the U-235 content for a concentration of 20 percent. The total uranium (including the U-238 content) for a concentration of 2 percent corresponds to 14.65 times the total uranium for a concentration of 20 percent.

Sincerely yours,

K. E. FIELDS, General Manager. Senator HICKENLOOPER. Is there any reactor, where we have ac-curate knowledge today, that does not require at least a certain amount of enrichment much in excess of 20 percent?

Mr. STRAUSS. Yes, Senator, I understand that the Calderhall reactors of which we have heard were designed for natural uranium, in which case the enrichment is only one part in 140, seven-tenths of 1 percent.

I don't know whether they succeeded in using natural uranium in those reactors but that is the purpose which they were designed for and it is quite possible theoretically to build a reactor using natural uranium.

Senator HICKENLOOPER. As a matter of fact, however, don't we operate our reactors with at least a certain portion of enriched uranium greatly in excess of 20 percent?

Mr. STRAUSS. As you know, Senator, we have reactors operating at various degrees of enrichment including very large ones. Two. of the reactors which are in the present program, construction program, the so-called Yankee reactor at Rowe, Mass., will be operating they calculate on an enrichment of something less than 2.6 percent, and the Commonwealth Edison reactor will be operating at an enrichment of 11/2 percent.

Senator HICKENLOOPER. But don't they actually have cores there, or portions of cores, that are greatly in excess of that? Mr. STRAUSS. No, sir; not those two.

Senator HICKENLOOPER. I don't mean the whole core.

Mr. STRAUSS. No, sir; they do not.

Senator HICKENLOOPER. Do I have the assurance then from your technical advisers that there is no material in those reactors that has an enrichment above 2 or 21/2 percent?

Mr. STRAUSS. No, I did not say that Senator. You said 21⁄2 percent?

Senator HICKENLOOPER. No; that is greater than 2 to 212 percent in those cores?

Mr. STRAUSS. No. The reactor for example at Shippingport has some highly enriched material in the core, and there will be other reactors that have highly enriched cores.

I was mentioning those that had cores of low enrichment, to indicate that it is possible to build reactors with cores of enrichment as low as in the case of Commonwealth Edison of less than 112 percent. Senator HICKENLOOPER. I don't want to get into the details of this matter, but I am pretty firmly of the impression that, although it be a small amount of the whole, there is material in these reactors which is greatly enriched beyond 2 or 3 percent, whereas the averagemay be a certain percent.

may

Mr. STRAUSS. Senator, your familiarity with this is so great and your experience with it so long that I hesitate to even accept the statement of Dr. Kirk in contradiction of it, but I would like to furnish for the record, for your information, sir, a written statement to that effect.

Senator HICKENLOOPER. I have been reading the reactor report, No. 57 or 82 or some such number, which I think states in several places the degrees of enrichment, which do not quite correspond to my understanding of this low enrichment proposal.

(The Atomic Energy Commission subsequently furnished the following additional information, by letter dated May 20, 1957:)

Mr. CARL MARCY,

Chief of Staff, Committee on Foreign Relations,

United States Senate.

DEAR MR. MARCY: During Admiral Strauss' testimony before the Committee on the International Atomic Energy Agency, Senator Hickenlooper inquired whether all power reactors require at least some highly enriched, i. e., over 20 percent U-235, uranium.

I would like to provide for the record the following information in response to this inquiry:

One of the things that chacterizes reactor designs is their variability. There are a number of fuels, moderators, and coolants. The permutations possible run to the hundreds.

Similarly, the composition and distribution of fuel varies. Some designs contemplate small amounts of high-enrichment material in conjunction with natural or depleted uranium. The present plan for the Shippingport unit is just this. However, the original design contemplated a uniform enrichment and subsequent cores may return to this plan. The unit can be operated satisfactorily under both arrangements so we cannot say that such designs require highly enriched material.

Moreover, we know of approximately a dozen units covering 6 different basic types of reactors that will use low-enrichment material, i. e., without fuel exceeding 20 percent enrichment. For example, we have the—

1. Yankee Atomic Electric Co. unit, a 134-MWE pressurized-water type which uses 2.6 percent UO2.

2. Dresden nuclear power station, a 180-MWE unit of the boiling-water type which uses 1.5 percent fuel.

3. Calder Hall graphite-moderated type which uses natural-U fuel.

4. Chugach Electric Association unit, a Na-cooled D2O-moderated unit that uses 1.5 percent fuel.

5. Consumers Public Power District unit, a Na-cooled graphite moderated unit using 2.3 percent fuel.

6. City of Piqua unit, terphenyl cooled and moderated, using 3 percent fuel. I believe the important point is that it is possible to have power reactors without requiring the use of fuel exceeding the 20 percent enrichment level which applies to material made available to foreign projects, even though a number of reactors in the domestic program contemplate the use of highly enriched material which is available to projects located in the United States.

Senator Hickenlooper also inquired regarding the fuel enrichment of the six reactor projects that were discussed in the hearings before the Joint Committee in February. It must be recognized that exact design conditions vary somewhat during the course of designs and that the values cited for these units, and the ones listed above, may therefore be modified. However, the information we have on these six reactors indicate the following fuel enrichments:

1. The Belgian fair reactor: 4.5 percent.

2. The Edison-Volta unit: 2.6 percent.

3. Three units for Latin America: 20 percent.

4. The Dominican Republic unit: Not yet established.
Sincerely yours,

JOHN A. HALL,

Director, Division of International Affairs.