The statute provides also for borrowing powers on the part of the Agency. It makes clear, however, that members of the Agency are not legally or financially liable for repayment of the money borrowed.

A two-thirds majority of those present and voting is required for decisions of the General Conference on financial questions and of the Board of Governors on the amount of the Agency's budget.

ARTICLE XV

Article XV concerns legal capacity, privileges, and immunities to be enjoyed by the Agency in the territory of each member, and the privileges and immunities to be enjoyed by delegates, alternates, advisers, the Director General, and the Agency staff in exercising their official functions. Provision is made for special agreements on this subject between the Agency and its members.

It is anticipated that such privileges and immunities as may be granted in the United States will be pursuant to the International Organizaions Immunities Act (22 U. S. C. 288 et seq.).

ARTICLE XVI

Establishment by special agreement of the relationship between the Agency and the United Nations is provided for by article XVI, with special reference to submission of reports to the United Nations and consideration of United Nations resolutions. The article also anticipates the establishment by special agreement of an appropriate relationship between the Agency and other organizations with related interests.

ARTICLE XVII

Article XVII calls for reference to the International Court of Justice of disputes concerning interpretation or application of the statute, unless the parties concerned agree on another mode of settlement. In addition, the General Conference and the Board of Governors are separately empowered, subject to authorization from the United Nations General Assembly, to request the International Court of Justice to give an advisory opinion on any legal question arising within the scope of the Agency's activities.

ARTICLE XVIII

Amendments to the statute are provided for in article XVIII. Proposals for amendment may be made by any member and will be communicated to all members at least ninety days before being considered by the General Conference. Amendments come into force for all members when they have been approved by the General Conference by a two-thirds majority of those present and voting and have been accepted by two-thirds of all the members in accordance with their respective constitutional processes.

If a member is unwilling to accept an amendment to the statute, it may withdraw from the Agency by notice in writing to the depositary government. In addition, a member may withdraw for any reason at any time after 5 years from the date the statute takes effect. Withdrawal does not relieve a member of its contractual obligations with regard to assistance received from the Agency, or budgetary obligations for the year in which it withdraws.

This article also provides that the question of a general review of the statute is to be placed on the agenda of the fifth annual session of the General Conference. If approved by a majority of members present and voting, the review is to take place at the next General Conference. Thereafter, a proposal for general review may be submitted at any General Conference session.

ARTICLE XIX

If a member of the Agency becomes in arrears in its financial contributions to the Agency in an amount totaling 2 years' contributions, it is to lose its vote in the Agency unless the General Conference is satisfied that failure to pay is due to conditions beyond the member's control (art. XIX).

Persistent violation of the statute or of any agreement made under it may result in suspension of the offending member from privileges and rights of membership. Decisions on suspension are to be made, upon recommendation of the

Board of Governors, by a two-thirds majority of members present and voting in the General Conference.

ARTICLE XX

Article XX defines the terms "special fissionable material," "uranium enriched in the isotopes 235 or 233," and "source material."

ARTICLE XXI

In accordance with article XXI, the statute was opened for signature on October 26, 1956, by states members of the United Nations or of any of the specialized agencies and remained open for 90 days. Ratification by signatory states is called for.

The United States is named depositary Government for receipt of instruments of ratification by signatory states and instruments of acceptance by states approved for membership in conformity with the statute. It is specified that ratification or acceptance by states is to be effected in accordance with constitutional processes.

The statute, apart from its annex, comes into force on deposit of instruments of ratification by 18 states, including 3 of the following: Canada, France, the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics, the United Kingdom, and the United States. The annex, by the terms of article XXI, came into force October 26, 1956, the day on which the statute was opened for signature.

ARTICLE XXII

Article XXII provides for registration of the statute pursuant to article 102 of the United Nations Charter. In addition, agreements between the Agency and any member or members, agreements between the Agency and any other organization or organizations, and agreements between members subject to the approval of the Agency are to be registered with the Agency and, if required by article 102 of the United Nations Charter, are also to be registered with the United Nations.

ARTICLE XXIII

Article XXIII provides for equal authenticity of the five language texts in which the statute is drawn up and for transmittal of certified copies of the statute to the governments concerned.

ANNEX I

The annex to the statute establishes a Preparatory Commission, which is composed of 1 representative each of Australia, Belgium, Brazil, Canada, Czechoslovakia, France, India, Portugal, Union of South Africa, Union of Soviet Socialist Republics, the United Kingdom, and the United States, and 1 representative each of 6 other states which were chosen by the International Conference on the Statute of the International Atomic Energy Agency (Argentina, Egypt, Indonesia, Japan, Pakistan, and Peru). The Preparatory Commission is to remain in existence until the first General Conference of the Agency is convened and a Board of Governors has been selected in accordance with article VI of the statute. The Commission elects its own officers, adopts its own rules of procedure, establishes such committees as it deems necessary, and determines its place of meeting. It has appointed an Executive Secretary and a small staff in accordance with the provisions of the annex. The expenses of the Commission are being met by a loan negotiated by the Commission with the United Nations. The loan is ultimately to be repaid by the Agency. If the funds from this source should prove insufficient, the Commission is empowered to accept advances from governments; if such advances are made, they may be set off against contributions of the governments concerned to the Agency.

The functions of the Preparatory Commission are (a) to make arrangements for the first session of the General Conference of the Agency, including the preparation of a provisional agenda and draft rules of procedure; (b) to designate certain members of the first Board of Governors of the Agency in accordance with subparagraphs A-1 and A-2 and paragraph B of article VI of the statute; (c) to make studies, reports, and recommendations for the first session of the General Conference and for the Board of Governors on subjects requiring immediate attention, including financing, programs and budget, technical problems relevant to planning Agency operations, establishment of a permanent staff of the Agency, and location of permanent headquarters for the Agency; (d) to make recommen

dations for the first meeting of the Board of Governors concerning the provisions of a headquarters agreement; (e) to negotiate with the United Nations regarding a draft agreement to define the relationship between the United Nations and the Agency; and (f) to make recommendations concerning the relationship of the Agency to other international organizations.

REPORT BY THE CHAIRMAN OF THE UNITED STATES DELEGATION

REPORT ON THE CONFERENCE ON THE STATUTE OF THE INTERNATIONAL ATOMIC ENERGY AGENCY

1. BACKGROUND

A Conference of 81 states and observers from 7 specialized agencies of the United Nations (enclosure 1) met at United Nations Headquarters in New York between September 20 and October 26, 1956, to consider the draft statute of April 18, 1956, for the International Atomic Energy Agency. The Agency was originally proposed by President Eisenhower on December 8, 1953, to foster the peaceful uses of the atom and to provide a positive new approach to the solution of international problems.

The text of the statute debated by the Conference had been drafted and unanimously adopted as a whole by the 12 states sponsoring the Conference (Australia, Belgium, Brazil, Canada, Czechoslovakia, France, India, Portugal, Union of South Africa, Union of Soviet Socialist Republics, United Kingdom, United States) at a Working Level Meeting held in Washington during the winter and spring of 1956.

The United States, acting on behalf of the sponsoring group, invited all 87 members of the United Nations and its specialized agencies to the Conference, one of the largest international gatherings held to date. Previously this community of nations had had an opportunity to review an earlier draft of the statute circulated for comment by the original eight negotiating states (Australia, Belgium, Canada, France, Portugal, Union of South Africa, United Kingdom, United States) on August 22, 1955. The comment received in response was carefully studied by the Working Level Meeting in addition to views expressed on the proposed Agency at the sessions of the General Assembly of the United Nations in 1954 and 1955. Thus prior to the Conference, opportunity had been given to interested countries to have their ideas and suggestions incorporated into the draft statute of April 18, 1956.

II. CONFERENCE ORGANIZATION

(a) Officers and Secretariat

The two candidates supported by the sponsoring states, Ambassador Muniz of Brazil and Ambassador Winkler of Czechoslovakia, were unanimously elected President and Vice President of the Conference, respectively. Their able and impartial direction contributed much to the success of the Conference. Much credit must also go to the Secretary General of the Conference, Mr. Dag Hammarskjold, his Deputy, Mr. Ralph Bunche, and supporting members of the United Nations Secretariat, who provided the Conference with exceptionally efficient services.

(b) The agenda of the Conference

The agenda (enclosure 2) was a simple one, the most important item being the discussion of the draft statute of April 18, 1956.

(c) Rules of Procedure

The Rules of Procedure, based generally on those of the United Nations General Assembly and, therefore, familiar to most of the participants, were originally agreed upon by the sponsoring states and were adopted unchanged (enclosure 3) by the Conference. Rule 26, requiring a two-thirds majority vote on decisions to amend the statute and a simple majority for all other decisions, occasioned some criticism and debate. The rule was defended on the grounds that there should be a presumption in favor of the standing text of the statute, which had been carefully drafted by a representative group and which already reflected views expressed by a large number of interested countries.

(d) Conference Proceedings

In accordance with the Rules of Procedure, amendments to the statute could be submitted up through midnight of October 2, unless the Conference decided otherwise. Since it would not have been practical to consider specific articles of the statute until all amendments had been submitted, during the first 8 working days (September 20 to October 2) the Conference met in 13 plenary sessions in the General Assembly Hall of the United Nations to debate the status as a whole Representatives of 63 countries took advantage of this opportunity to express their general views on the statute and the Agency.

Between October 3 and October 22, the Conference met in Conference Room 4 in 24 sessions as a Main Committee (equivalent of Committee of the Whole) in which all states attending the Conference participated. During this time, the statute was considered article by article, either in terms of amendments to articles or requests for clarification in cases of articles to which there were no amendments. With reference to more controversial articles, such as articles III and XII, there were first and second readings but in most instances the articles were voted upon after one reading.

Some 80 amendments were submitted to all but 6 (art. I, VIII, XIII, XVI, XIX, and XXIII) of the articles. Of the approximately 60 amendments voted upon, one-half were adopted by the Conference, evidence of the fact that the Conference was not of a "rubber stamp" nature.

The Coordination Committee, consisting of the 12 sponsoring states, was the only other Conference Committee. The main work of the Committee was to review amendments approved by the Conference and the statute as a whole in order to correct drafting errors and eliminate inconsistencies in terminology. The Committee accomplished its review between October 20 and October 22.

(a) Agency functions

III. MAJOR CONFERENCE ISSUES

The largest number of amendments was submitted to article III, which outlines general Agency functions. The basic problem in this connection was to determine to what extent authority for specific activities should be spelled out in a broad constitutional document such as the statute or be left to the discretion of the Board of Governors and the General Conference after the establishment of the Agency. Amendments authorizing the Agency to engage in projects such as sponsoring international technical conferences, publishing an international periodical, and establishing a world atomic university, were finally withdrawn after their sponsors were persuaded that a legislative record had been made for these activities which the Agency could undertake under the wide grant of authority contained in the Statute if it so desired later on.

Specific authorization, however, for the Agency to encourage the training of scientists and experts in the field of peaceful uses of atomic energy was incorporated into the statute. Atomically less advanced countries were particularly anxious that this Agency activity of special usefulness to them should be explicitly covered by the statute.

The most important amendment to article III adopted by the Conference gives the Agency enabling authority to apply its safeguard system upon request of a member state to the atomic energy activities of that state. The Agency would thus be in a position to apply its safeguards universally in the event of future agreement among countries with atomic weapon programs to safeguard their atomic energy activities against diversion to military purposes. The inclusion of this objective as a possible Agency activity helped ameliorate the fact that for the time being safeguards will be applied only to countries requesting and receiving assistance.

(b) Composition of Board of Governors

Considerable criticism developed of the composition of the Board of Governors (art. VI) in which the atomically advanced countries would have the dominant position. The 12 sponsoring powers, however, maintained a united front against any change on the grounds that the present formula was the most equitable and practical solution that could be attained after long and arduous negotiations of the Working Level Meeting. They stated that in such a compromise formula, even a small change could not be made without impairing the whole structure. To attempt such changes could set off a chain reaction which would delay or even frustrate the establishment of the Agency. Although the present formula might not be perfect, they pointed out that it did provide for wide representation

both in terms of geographic areas and of countries that would be the recipients of Agency assistance.

After a useful debate in which issues were clarified and assurances given on points not actually written into the Statute (such as support for two seats for Latin America and one seat for Africa and the Middle East from among the three elected but geographically unassigned seats under Paragraph A-3 of Article VI), the formula for the Board's composition was approved unchanged.

(c) Relationship of the Board of Governors to the General Conference

There was also initial criticism of the limited authority which the General Conference, representing the total membership of the Agency, had in relation to the more complete powers of the Board of Governors. This criticism was met by amendments clarifying and increasing the authority of the General Conference without, however, upsetting the balance of power between the Conference and the Board of Governors necessary for efficient operations of an essentially technical agency. For example, language based on article X of the United Nations Charter containing a more clearly defined and comprehensive grant of authority to the General Conference was adopted; authority for making decisions referred to the General Conference for that purpose by the Board of Governors was spelled out; appointment by the Board of the Director General was made subject to the approval of the General Conference, etc. Criticism was thus mollified and the structural balance between the General Conference and the Board of Governors maintained.

(d) Safeguard provisions

The extent and depth of the safeguard system contained in article XII of the draft statute proved the most controversial issue of the Conference. Two joint amendments submitted by Ceylon, Egypt, India, and Indonesia struck at the heart of the safeguard system. One would have removed source materials from Agency accountability (art. XII A-3); the other would have crippled Agency ability to prevent the accumulation of national stockpiles of weapon-grade fissionable materials produced as byproducts in Agency assisted projects (art. XII A-5). The sponsors claimed this curtailment of Agency authority in applying safeguards was necessary to prevent burdensome, unnecessary and possibly dangerous interference by the Agency in the economic growth of member states, especially the poor and undeveloped members most in need of Agency assistance. The U. S. S. R. supported these amendments, alleging that safeguard provisions as they stood were uncalled for in the absence of agreement on the abolition of nuclear weapons and that these provisions constituted an invasion of sovereign rights.

Following an extensive debate that revealed misconceptions and fears arising from some ambiguity in the language of the draft statute on the issues concerned, Canada, the United Kingdom, and the United States introduced 2 clarifying and qualifying amendments: 1 clearly limiting accountability for source materials to those used or produced in Agency projects and the other making it explicit that in deciding upon retention by member states of byproduct fissionable materials or their deposit with the Agency, the Agency should be guided by only two criteria-whether the materials were to be used for peaceful purposes and in such a way as not to endanger health and safety. These amendments had the effect of removing any possibility that the Agency would seek to judge the economic merit or technical feasibility of projects or programs when reaching decisions concerning the retention of byproduct fissionable materials.

Agreement of India and her cosponsoring states after further negotiations was finally obtained to the Canadian, United Kingdom, and United States amendment on source materials and to a mutually acceptable Franco-Swiss amendment further clarifying and defining Agency rights and objectives regarding the deposit of byproduct fissionable materials to prevent national stockpiling. In both instances, therefore, the basic principles were retained but were couched in new language aimed at dispelling fears that Agency authority would be greater than required to discharge its responsibilities and would be used to interfere beyond its competence in domestic arrangements of member states. The adoption of a number of Swiss amendments delineating more specifically the Agency's inspection rights (art. XII A-6) also helped to allay misgivings, both among the underdeveloped countries and certain countries of Western Europe. In this connection, it was pointed out that the more technically advanced countries in Western Europe and elsewhere would be the first with pro