China would already have adhered to the Agency statute and to apply would constitute an acceptance by the Red regime of a "Two-China" concept.

If Red China did apply for membership, the United States would, of course, vigorously oppose acceptance of its application and would no doubt be successful. The credentials of the representatives of the Republic of China, the government which will have signed and ratified the statute, will no doubt be challenged by members of the Communist bloc or others. Our experience in the U. N. system affords evidence that we will defeat this challenge.

8. Does the statute create an autonomous internationl Agency independent of the United Nations supervision, control, or jurisdiction? What is the analysis of this situation?

The IAEA will be independent of the United Nations supervision, control, or jurisdiction. It will be brought into relationship with the United Nations in accordance with an agreement as envisaged in article XVI of the statute. This agreement will, inter alia, call upon the Agency to submit reports to the United Nations and to consider resolutions relating to its work which might be adopted by the United Nations. The Agency will not be required, however, to abide by these resolutions or to carry out any directives from the United Nations. 9. Since the present and potential possibilities of atomic energy are so vast, what are the prospects that an autonomous international Agency will overshadow and perhaps supplant the United Nations in importance, prestige and functions?

The Agency is concerned with the field of atomic energy and has no competence in the many political and economic areas in which the U. N. is assigned responsibilities. Thus, the Agency and the U. N. are complementary rather than competing organizations. In view of the important and varied activities for which the U. N. is responsible, as compared with the single field of even so significant an activity as atomic energy, the prospect that the Agency will overshadow or supplant the United Nations is negligible.

10. Does the statute provide, for instance, that Red China could become a member of the Agency by the vote of a simple majority of the Board of Governors and of the General Conference?

It is unlikely, as explained in reply to question 7, that Red China would apply for membership in the Agency, although it is expected that certain states will continue their efforts to have representatives of this regime seated in place of the representatives of the Republic of China. The vote required on such a question will depend upon the rules of procedure adopted by the General Conference of the Agency. It should be noted in this connection that whereas a requirement of a two-thirds majority would facilitate the rejection of any move to seat representatives of the Communist regime, it would, on the other hand, make it more difficult to approve the credentials of representatives of the Republic of China if they are challenged. Whether the majority required to recognize the credentials of the present representatives of China is determined to be a simple majority or two-thirds, the United States does not anticipate the seating of the Red Chinese.

The United States successfully defeated past efforts to seat Red China during the negotiation and there is no reason to doubt that any future attempts will be similarly defeated.

It might be noted that the prospective membership of the Agency will not differ substantially from that of the 11th General Assembly of the U. N. which in November of last year voted by a large majority, 47 to 24 with 8 abstentions, to support a United States proposal not to consider any proposal to seat representaties of Communist China or to unseat representatives of the Republic of China. 11. Some 80 nations are reported to have signed the International Atomic Energy statute. If the United States joined, does this mean that we would have just 1 vote among the 80 in the General Conference, and depending also whether or not the United States representatives was on the Board of Gov ernors, 1 vote on the Board of Governors?

As explained in the answer to question 24, the United States is virtually certain of representation on the Board of Governors when it becomes a member of the Agency. As in the U. N. and most other international organizations, each State which is a member will have one vote. As in these other organizations, United States influence in the Agency will, of course, extend far beyond our single vote.

This will be particularly true in the IAEA because of our leadership in the atoms-for-peace program and because of its dependence on our contributions and cooperation. It should be remembered also that the great majority of Agency members in the General Conference, and to even a larger extent in the Board, will be free world countries. These nations will be basically in sympathy with

the United States on major issues.

12. Does the statute in any way require that any member of the Agency shall give to the Agency all requested information on peaceful uses and developments in the field of atomic energy possessed by such nation?

The supply of scientific information by members to the Agency is optional with the member, except for scientific information which is developed directly as the result of Agency assistance (art. VIII, A and B). Since the United States is not expected to be the beneficiary of Agency-supplied assistance, there would be no obligation for us to furnish any information. In no case is it contemplated that we furnish the Agency or members of the Agency classified information. 13. If the United States should deliver atomic materials to the Agency, could the United States get back this material if it so desired at any time? (I am aware that there are certain agreement provisions for recovery of material, but in the event a nation or the Agency simply refused to honor a request for returning of materials, what reliable means and methods would we have guaranteeing and actually securing the return of such materials?)

No country could itself require the return of fissionable materials that have actually been delivered to the Agency or to an Agency project. Nor can the Agency require the return of payment made for such materials. It is contemplated that such materials will be furnished to the Agency on a business basis and not as a gift. After delivery, the use and disposition of the materials are determined by the Agency itself, in which the United States will, of course, have substantial influence.

In the event that a member of the Agency should fail to comply with the safeguards established for Agency projects, the Board of Governors can call upon it to return the fissionable and other materials previously made available to it. In addition, the General Conference (under art. XIX (B)), acting by a twothirds majority of the members present and voting upon recommendation by the Board of Governors, may suspend from membership any State that has persistently violated the provisions of the statute or of any agreement entered into pursuant to the statute. Such actions by the Board of Governors and the General Conference are not subject to any veto. Article XII (C) also requires that the Board of Governors report any noncompliance with Agency safeguards to the Security Council and General Assembly of the United Nations. In the Security Council, the Soviet Union would, of course, be able to exercise the veto power that it has exercised so often in the past, but it should be pointed out that the General Assembly, in its Uniting for Peace Resolution, has found a way to act on situations threatening international peace and security when action by the Se curity Council is blocked by the veto power.

14. Since only four nations presently have the ability to make fissionable material in significant quantities, what might be the pressures exerted on the United States by the so-called "have not" members of the Agency if the Agency developed grand plans for farflung operations and the United States either felt unable or, in its own best interests, unwilling to supply the demanded amount of materials to implement these programs?

The limited ability of the "have-not" nations to finance programs of unusual size, will in itself act as a brake on their aspirations. In any event, the United States is under no obligation to sell to the Agency or its members any more material than it voluntarily allocates.

15. Article IX of the statute has far-reaching provisions. Section H of article IX states that special fissionable materials in the possession of the Agency shall be stored in such a way as not to allow concentration of large amounts of such material in any one country or region. Since sizable reactors require substantial amounts of atomic material of varying degrees of enrichment and often in amounts sufficient to make weapons, what is con sidered to be the concentration of "large amounts of such materials?” If the United States makes available 5,000 kilograms of enriched U-235 (certainly a "large amount") does this mean that this material could not be stored in the United States or in North America, but would have to be stored at various other places in the world?

Under the proposed treaty, Nations making materials available to the Agency have complete freedom with respect to their storage. Thus, they may or may not transfer such materials to the Agency for storage. For the present, the United States will retain possession of the 5,000 kilograms of U-235 which it has offered to make available until required for use in Agency approved projects. Deliveries will be to the project site as the materials are needed.

Any subsequent determination to transfer material to the Agency for storage will be voluntary on the part of the United States.

Attempted seizure of fuels in a reactor is very unlikely because of the technical difficulty of converting to weapons material and because it would be contrary to the economic self-interest of the participating state. Fuels in large-scale reactors will be of low enrichment and are highly radioactive and hazardous to handle. Considerable time, large-scale facilities and advanced technology would be required to extract the U-235 or plutonium, upgrade the enrichment and fabricate weapons. Curtailment of all future supplies of fuel would invalidate the large investment made in a nuclear power project in the recipient country. Plutonium generated in Agency assisted reactors will be stored by the Agency to the extent that it is not put to some immediate peaceful use under Agency safeguards. Any possible attempt to seize such material would be an open, overt act known to all member states. The amounts involved will be small relative to weapons material possessed by the United States and the Soviet Union, and could have no impact on the military balance of power between the Soviet bloc and the free world. Moreover, because of the time required to fabricate seized materials into weapons, none of the smaller powers could hope to profit from an attempt to seize materials.

16. Article IX, section D, requires that any member, "from material which it has made available,” shall deliver without delay to another member or group of members such quantities of such material as the Agency may specify. Does this mean that on the demand of the Agency the United States would have to deliver, from the material which it had made available to the Agency, such amounts of this material to, for instance, Bulgaria, Czechoslovakia, Rumania, Poland or any combination of these countries, if they are members of the Agency?

The Agency may allocate material made available to it to any member State. Such material must, however, be for use in projects approved by the Board of Governors in accordance with established criteria. There is no basis in the statute for discriminating against Soviet bloc or other member states, but of course all Agency supported projects would be subject to inspection and safeguard provisions of article XII.

17. With reference to section J of article IX, does this mean that the United States would have no voice whatsoever (except its vote in the General Conference or possibly on the Board of Governors) as to the use to which any member would put the materials received by such member (except, of course, military use which is prohibited by the statute)? Allocations by the Board of Governors of nuclear materials will be in accordance with established criteria for the appropriateness of projects including their scientific and technical feasibility, adequacy of plans, funds and technical personnel, and standards of health and safety. If it is assumed that the Agency will be dependent to a large degree on the United States for its supply of fissionable materials, it is reasonable to assume that the Agency will exercise due caution in allocating the materials available to it, since the pattern of its allocations will have a direct influence on the amounts of material that the United States may be willing to furnish in the future. Moreover, the United States will be able to exercise great influence on the disposition of materials available to the Agency through its membership on the Board of Governors.

18. Under article XIV, Finance, provisions are made for certain fiscal powers of the Agency. Precisely, how will the Agency be financed? Does section D of article XIV mean that members shall be assessed or required to contribute amounts as fixed by the Board of Governors under a scale established by the General Conference?

Article XIV, classifies the expenditures of the Agency in two categories; the administrative expenses and expenses other than administrative. The administrative expenses, salaries, meeting costs, rent, etc., are to be met by apportioning such expenses among members in accordance with a scale to be fixed by the General Conference. The budget estimates covering the administrative expenses shall initially be prepared by the Director General and submitted to the Board of Governors which in turn will submit the budget to the General Conference for its approval. The General Conference therefore shall have control not only of the scale of contribution but of the Agency's administrative budget as well.

The expenses other than administrative referred to in article XIV, B 2, are to be financed from revenues accruing to the Agency as a result of the charges to be made by it for storage, hauling, materials, services, equipment and facilities furnished to members by the Agency (art. XIV, E). The membership is thus not to be assessed for the cost of projects for the benefit of a single member or a group.

Section D of article XIV therefore means that the Board of Governors shall apportion the administrative expenses reflected in the budget approved by the General Conference and consistent with the scale of contribution fixed by the General Conference. The Board of Governors does not have authority to deviate from the approved budget or from the scale of contribution established by the General Conference. And in no case can a member be required to make a contribution for other than administrative expenses.

19. Under subsection E of article XIV, is it contemplated the Agency will depend to any substantial degree whatsoever upon "voluntary contributions" as against adequate charges for atomic materials to recipient nations to cover the expenses referred to in paragraph 2 of subsection B of article XIV?

The statute has been drawn in such a fashion that there is no dependency on voluntary contributions for the functioning of the Agency. At present no specific plans for voluntary contributions are known to the United States Government. Until and unless such donations are made, the operations of Agency projects will depend entirely on charges for materials and service provided, or on conventional financing.

20. While subsection G of article XIV authorizes borrowing power on behalf of the Agency without imposing any liability on members in respect of loans to the Agency, nevertheless, would not this borrowing power and its exercise, in fact, tend to create a moral pressure upon financially responsible members of the Agency to guarantee any such loans?

The borrowing authority provided in section G of article XIV is vested in the Board of Governors but is subject to rules and limitations approved by the General Conference. It is to be expected that this Agency will conduct its financial affairs as would any organization which resorts to borrowing for authorized purposes, that is, the authority would be exercised to the extent permitted by the assets of the organization and its annual income. Although there is no provision in the statute barring a member State from acting as guarantor for a loan or loans, it is most unlikely that a contributing member would, because of moral pressures, agree to act as guarantor or surety on any loan contracted by the Agency. In the case of the United States, the United States representative to the Agency, the United States delegation to a General Conference or United States member of the Board of Governors could not legally bind the United States as guarantor without specific congressional authority. 21. Does the statute make any provision or establish any requirement that the Agency purchase materials for Agency disposition and use, or does the statute contemplate that the Agency will rely upon gifts or donations of materials to the Agency?

Article XIII of the statute states:

"Unless otherwise agreed upon between the Board of Governors and the member furnishing to the Agency materials, services, equipment, or facilities, the

Board shall enter into an agreement with such member providing for reimbursement for the items furnished."

Any donation of materials would be entirely at the discretion of the prospective donor.

22. Does the statute contain any provisions for the raising of funds for the purchase of materials?

Section E of article XIV authorizes the Board of Governors to establish a scale of charges, including reasonable storage and handling charges, for materials, services, equipment, and facilities furnished to members by the Agency. This section also provides that the scale shall be designed to produce revenues for the Agency adequate to meet the expenses and costs to be covered by the operating budget of the Agency, that is, those expenses other than the administrative expenses referred to in answer to question 18.

23. With respect to the staffing of the Agency, is there anything in the statute which permits the United States to approve or disapprove of employees, either American citizens or citizens of any other country, other than the vote which the United States might have in the General Conference or on the Board of Governors?

There is no provision in the statute which would permit the United States to approve or disapprove of employees, whether or not of American citizenship. However, American citizens will be employed by the Agency only after they have been investigated and their loyalty to the United States has been determined under provisions of Executive Order 10420, as amended. Specific arrangements between the United States and the Director General of the Agency are expected to correspond to current arrangements of this kind with respect to other international organizations.

24. What is the number of members on the Board of Governors?

In present circumstances, it is anticipated that the Board of Governors will have 23 members. Thirteen of these members will be designated in accordance with article VI of the statute by the outgoing Board or, in the case of the first Board, by the Preparatory Commission. Ten members will be elected by the General Conference.

It is expected that the following 13 states will be designated to the first Board: United States, United Kingdom, U. S. S. R., France, Canada, Brazil, Union of South Africa, India, Australia, Japan, Belgium (or Portugal), Czecho slovakia (or Poland) and one state who will qualify as a supplier of technical assistance, i. e., a Scandinavian or Western European country.

Of the 10 elected members, it is expected that 3 will be Latin Americans, 2 from Africa and the Middle East, 1 Western European, 1 Eastern European, 1 South Asian, 1 from southeast Asia and the Pacific, and 1 Far Eastern country.

25. While the statute contains certain requirements for agreement by members who receive atomic materials to use those materials for peaceful uses only, what reliable guaranties, other than “agreements,” would we have against the use of atomic materials by some country or group of countries for mili tary purposes? If a nation refused to return materials that were being wrongfully used, would the Agency expect to use force to recover the materials?

Under article XII, A (5), the Agency will have a force of international inspectors, including United States representation, who will have free access, in the territory of any recipient states, at all times to all places and data and to any person dealing with an Agency project to provide proper accountability for fissionable materials supplied and to determine whether there is compliance with the undertaking against the use of any such materials for military purposes.

The Agency itself could not use force to recover materials in the case of viola tion of the statute provisions. The action which the Agency can take is described in article XII, paragraph C. In the case of noncompliance by a State, the Board of Governors is required to report the facts to the Security Council and the General Assembly of the United Nations. These bodies can take whatever actions are open to them under the Charter of the United Nations, including the use of force. It must be recognized, however, that the veto in the Security Council would apply in such instances. However, in view of the other safe. guards provided for the statute of the Agency, including the restriction found in article XII, A (5), against excessive stockpiling of dangerous materials, it is unlikely that a state would accept the risks involved in violation, including