41. Article XV refers to privileges and immunities of the Agency and of the members of the Board of Governors as well as all other personnel of the Agency. It also seems to place authority in the Agency through its Board of Governors and the Director General to agree with the members, which may mean the General Conference, in defining such "legal capacity, privileges, and immunities." Is not this an unlimited authority to the Agency to declare any activity of the Agency or its personnel as coming within this definition without any recourse whatsoever on the part of any member (after the Agency has made its definition) against any acts engaged in by any of the Agency personnel? By way of illustration, while certain diplomatic personnel enjoy immunities in the country to which they are assigned, if they perform acts sufficiently offensive to that country the country can request their withdrawal, but it seems that not even that protective safeguard is contained in this treaty.

Article XV is not an unlimited grant of authority to the Agency to declare any activity of the Agency as falling within the category of "privileges and immunities *** necessary for the exercise of its functions." On the contrary, it is expressly provided that such "privileges and immunities *** shall be defined in a separate agreement or agreements between the Agency * * * and the members." In negotiating such agreements any member State can insist on provisions for recourse with regard to offensive acts.

42. Under present law can the United States make fissionable material available to any foreign state except under bilateral agreements?

Under the Atomic Energy Act of 1954, special nuclear material may be distributed abroad pursuant to an agreement for cooperation entered into in accordance with section 123 to (1) “any nation" (sec. 54), or (2) a "group of nations" with whom there is an "international arrangement" (sec. 124). The term “international arrangement" is defined in section 11 k. Section 124 has been described as providing "a mechanism to implement the President's peacetime international atomic pool plan, outlined in his speech before the United Nations on December 8, 1953" (S. Rept. No. 1699 on S. 3690, 83d Cong., 2d Sess., p. 6). 43. The statute places almost exclusive emphasis on aid to underdeveloped areas, and since most of the underdeveloped areas of the world seem to have no finances with which to purchase materials and facilities, how will they obtain such materials and facilities from the Agency except by gift to be paid for in substantial amount by the United States? How does this square with the statement in the State Department release for March 1957 with reference to the Agency, page 7, in which it is stated that "the IAEA was not created for the purpose of distributing economic aid. Unless otherwise agreed, the nations receiving materials and facilities will pay for them, and the contributing nations will be reimbursed by the Agency"? Does not the proviso "unless otherwise agreed" in fact completely nullify the reasonable possibility of any payment to any contributing nation from "under. developed areas"?

The cited clause "unless otherwise agreed" does not imply that there is no reasonable possibility of payment to supplying nations. Article XI, F 3 provides that charges shall be agreed upon for any materials, services, equipment, and facilities provided by the Agency.

The establishment of the IAEA will provide a channel through which atomic materials and technology can be obtained under terms and conditions to be agreed upon with supplying countries. The high priority placed on atomic development by underdeveloped countries is likely to lead them to devote some of their limited financial resources in this direction. As technological progress increases the potential contribution of the peaceful uses of atomic energy to economic welfare, there will be greater incentives to underdeveloped countries to devote resources to these purposes.

The IAEA was not created for the purpose of distributing economic aid. The use of voluntary contributions, should they be forthcoming, or grants of financial assistance is not precluded. However, underdeveloped countries seeking financial assistance for Agency approved projects will normally seek to borrow funds from the IBRD or other sources, or seek aid through other foreign aid channels. In joining the Agency, the United States would assume no obligation to donate such aid.

44. Has there been any ascertainment of the annual cost and budget of the Agency projected over the next several years? If so, what is the amount of such budget, etc., and how many employees in total over, say, the next 10 years on an annual basis may be anticipated?

The Agency's annual administrative budget is dependent upon the size of the staff which in turn will be governed by the program to be undertaken by the Agency. Preliminary thinking would indicate that the majority of member states represented on the Preparatory Commission envisage a total eventual employment of approximately 450 people with an annual assessment budget of approximately $7 million.

Expenses, other than administrative, will be financed from the revenue derived from charges.

45. Does the statute permit the Agency to have complete authority to fix compensation allowances, etc., of its personnel?

The rate of compensation and the scale of allowances and other adjustments, usually embodied in "Staff Regulations," would be established by the Board of Governors subject to general rules approved by the General Conference on the recommendation of the Board.

46. What advantages could any non-Communist nation obtain from this International Agency which it could not obtain now under a bilateral agreement with the United States?

Definite technical and economic benefits will accrue from cooperative arrangements. The Agency will stress activities where the greatest progress can be achieved through a cooperative worldwide approach. Members will have access to assistance which is not tied to any particular country or political bloc and will receive the combined benefits of assistance from all the technically advanced countries. This will be particularly important in the fields of standardization of nuclear power equipment, training, health and safety, waste disposal, and exchange of information.

More important, however, is the fact that each member can participate as an equal partner in exerting influence on the development of peaceful uses under prudent safeguards, and can enjoy the added security of knowing that a framework of international controls is being established.

47. Will the establishment of the International Agency in effect nullify or greatly depreciate the bilateral agreement program of the United States?

No, it will not. The two programs are complementary. The Agency will provide enlarged facilities and opportunities for the training and research necessary to equip countries to achieve concrete results in the use of atomic energy. The pool of trained manpower available from all technically advanced countries will reduce the drain on United States resources both for operating programs and inspection and control. By establishing worldwide patterns of control the Agency will be contributing to the broader objectives of world security and influencing desirable worldwide developments. The bilateral program lends itself to being specifically tailored to meet the particular needs of individual countries. The Atomic Energy Act of 1954 contemplates the use of both channels of foreign cooperation.

48. Has any other nation in ratifying the treaty attached any reservations, interpretations, or other limitations in its act of ratification, and if so, what are the nations and what are the limitations?

The only nation which, to date, has made a reservation or other statement in depositing its instrument of ratification is Switzerland, which made the following reservation (in translation):

"Upon the occasion of the deposit of its instrument of ratification of the Statute of the International Atomic Energy Agency, Switzerland makes the general reservation that its collaboration with the International Atomic Energy Agency, particularly with regard to the relations of that organization with the United Nations, may not go beyond the limits imposed upon it by its position as a perpetually neutral state. It is within the meaning of this general reservation that it makes a special reservation both with respect to the text of article III, letter b, figure 4, of the statute and with respect to any similar clause that might replace or supplement these provisions in this statute or in another arrangement." This reservation means that Switzerland does not obligate itself to report to the United Nations since it is not a member.

Venezuela made a reservation on signing the statute.

This reservation states that in signing or ratifying the statute Venezuela does not imply acceptance of the jurisdiction of the International Court of Justice without its express consent in each case and that Venezuela will not regard any amendments as operative until its constitutional provisions have been complied with.

The CHAIRMAN.

Mr. Pastore?

Senator PASTORE. Mr. Secretary, let me say as a predicate to my questioning that I was associated with the American delegation in the formulation and adoption of this statute before the United Nations, and that I for one believe in the spirit, the purpose, the ideal and the fact that we have achieved a reasonable compromise in so far as an effective statute is concerned.

I realize some of the opposition that might come into play with reference to this statute, and I realize too that wisely you have confined yourself to the political aspects of this question, and the other elements will be discussed by men who are possibly more familiar with it.

BILATERAL AGREEMENTS AND THE INTERNATIONAL AGENCY

You have touched in your statement on this question of the difference between bilaterals and this International Agency. I think that you have delineated pretty well some of your arguments of distinction. I realize of course that a great argument will be made in the future, why do we need this International Agency if we have bilaterals with practically all of the free nations of the world.

At this moment I think we have about 44 bilateral agreements. Eight of them of course are power-reactor bilaterals.

Can you be a little more explicit on that point?

Why is it necessary, realizing the fact that we have not yet developed technical knowledge nor the technology to detect hidden stockpiles which will lead to effective disarmament agreements on the use of nuclear and thermonuclear weapons, why do you feel that it is necessary to develop an international attitude with reference to control and inspection for eventual proper control in disarmament agreements?

Would you care to discuss that point?

Secretary DULLES. Yes, sir. There are several reasons that support our view that an international agency is preferable.

The first is that even though we do now have these bilaterals, which impose adequate standards in our opinion, unless there is an international agreement, there is almost sure to be competition later on among the suppliers in bilaterals. An effect of the competition in this field will be to force the standards down.

At the moment we have a sufficient preponderance in the field so that we can, in a sense, write our own ticket. But that will not always be the case.

The second thing is that we do not believe, in fact we have reason to believe the contrary, we do not believe that nations will indefinitely accept having their powerplants inspected just by the United States. They will accept international supervision indefinitely, but they will not, I think, indefinitely accept mere inspection by another

nation.

A third reason is that I understand we do not have adequate technical people to carry out the inspection, as the need develops. It would be a drain upon our manpower resources which we would much prefer to avoid by sharing the task with others to have an international inspection team and not have to draw entirely upon United States people to carry out the inspection.

INSPECTION AND CONTROL

Senator PASTORE. Isn't it a fact that in so far as inspection and control of nuclear energy is concerned, that the line of demarcation between peaceful and military uses is becoming more and more a fictional line?

If ever we are going to develop an international attitude towards inspection and control, which presently is the only effective means of determining where nuclear fissionable material is and where reactors are, and where stockpiles are, we have to develop an international attitude towards these procedures, and that this lays a basis that eventually could be used as a groundwork for future agreements on disarmament and control of nuclear and thermonuclear weapons?

Secretary DULLES. Yes, Senator, I think that is a very accurate and fine statement you have made.

RED CHINA

Senator PASTORE. There is a serious question that this will afford Red China an opportunity to participate in this International Agency as distinguished from the problems which we have had with Red China and the United Nations.

Are you prepared to make any comment on that?

Secretary DULLES. In my opinion there is no appreciable danger in that respect. China will already be represented in this Agency by the National Government of China. As long as the National Government of China exists, and we think and believe that that is for an indefinite time, it will represent China.

I do not see how another government can very well intrude itself into a field already preempted by another national government. Senator PASTORE. I will wait for my next turn around. The CHAIRMAN. Mr. Knowland?

TREATY AMENDMENT PROVISIONS

Senator KNOWLAND. Mr. Secretary, I have a number of questions, some of which you may be able to answer, some of which you may prefer to pass on to Mr. Wadsworth or someone else.

On the provisions under this international treaty providing for amendment, as I understand it, it can be modified, amended, by a two-thirds vote of the members present; and once modified it becomes binding on all the members without reverting back to all of the countries for their approval of modification.

Isn't this a rather unusual provision in a treaty-that the basic document can be fundamentally modified without the submission of a major revision to the Senate, in the case of our own country?

Secretary DULLES. The necessary steps for amending the statute, Senator, are that the proposed amendment must be approved by twothirds of those present and voting in the general conference after consideration of the observations of the Board of Governors, and must be accepted by two-thirds of all the members in accordance with their constitutional processes.

Our position is protected, Senator, by the fact that we have the right to withdraw in the case of any amendment of which we do not approve. In view of the preponderant role which the United States will play, and I have testified that in my opinion it could not get started without the United States, I am equally prepared to testify that for the foreseeable future it could not continue without the United States. We, in effect, have control over the amendments in that if there was an amendment which the Senate did not approve, we would then withdraw.

To answer your other question, whether this is unusual, I may say that the same amendment process is to be found in the World Health Organization, UNESCO, and International Civil Aviation Organization.

Anything less than that, Senator, would mean that any member country would have a veto power over amendments which in the course of time might be found to be desirable by the United States and other important countries. Rather than give any one of 80 nations a complete veto power over what we might want to see done and others might want to see done, it seemed preferable to set it up so that if a qualified majority wanted the amendment, it would be effective, but if we did not like it, we would get out, and thereby have in effect a practical veto power over amendments.

RATIO OF CONTRIBUTION

Senator KNOWLAND. Of course you then come to the second point. That might be an entirely satisfactory arrangement save for the unusual factor in this case. At least at the present time the fuel that is being furnished to get the Agency underway is at the present time, and we all hope that that will not continue, at the ratio of 5,000 to 50, or perhaps to be more accurate, 5,000 to 50 plus 20, which I think the British have agreed to put up. That sets a ratio of, we will say, 5,000 kilograms for the United States and 70 kilograms for the rest of the world.

That is a pretty predominant ratio of contribution.

Secretary DULLES It is so predominant that I am quite sure that it means there will be no amendments adopted here which we do not approve of.

THE AGENCY'S SOLE CONTROL OF CONTRIBUTED MATERIALS

Senator KNOWLAND. Is it not a fact, under the statute, that, except as we might use our good offices as one member of the Board of Governors, once the contribution has been made to the international agency, we have no control over the contributed material beyond that point?

In other words, the sole disposal is within the hands of the international agency?