Secretary DULLES. Our commitment of the 5 million is nothing that is irrevocable because it is on terms and conditions to be negotiated, and except to the extent that it had already been actually drawn upon in accordance with terms that we approved of

Senator KNOWLAND. I think you will want to correct the record to 5,000. You said "5 million."

Secretary DULLES. Excuse me, 5,000. The unusued portion would still be subject to our terms and conditions, and would of course be stored in the United States, so it would not be out of our control.

INSPECTION

Senator KNOWLAND. Mr. Secretary, you mentioned the question of the desirability of at least starting on an inspection system. It is correct, however, is it not, that under the international statute the only inspection powers which the inspectors would have would be in the power reactor plants themselves, and that they would not have the power of general inspection within the country, so that if you had a powerplant in Prague and you had a weapons plant in a neighboring city a hundred miles away, the inspectors would have no authority other than in the powerplant?

Secretary DULLES. Yes, sir, that is true.

It is equally true of course under our own bilateral arrangements. We only have the right of inspection in the actual powerplants. We do not have the general right of inspection throughout the country.

BILATERAL AGREEMENTS

Senator KNOWLAND. I have just one more question, Mr. Chairman. While I understand a certain desirability which you have expressed for the international treaty, I would like either now or at some future date to have one of the witnesses go into more detail as to precisely what can be done under the international treaty which is here submitted, which could not be done just as well under the bilateral agreements.

Secretary DULLES. That can be and will be elaborated, Senator. I think that the answer which I made to Senator Pastore indicates that while in theory you could have the same degree of inspection under bilaterals as you have under the international agency, that in fact there would be competition between the countries-there is already evidence of that now-as to who would want to sell this material. One result would be dropping these standards of inspection, so that in fact we would not be able to maintain our own standards as the era of plenty arrives in this field.

Secondly, as I pointed out, there is objection to continuing inspection just by one nation as against international system.

Thirdly, as I pointed out, we do not have the manpower to do it adequately as the need increases.

So I think those answers would be elaborated by persons who can speak with more authority than I, particularly Admiral Strauss.

But I think you will find that those are convincing reasons. They have been convincing to me at least.

Senator KNOWLAND. I understand my time has expired.

The CHAIRMAN. There will be another round later.

Mr. Mansfield?

Senator MANSFIELD. Mr. Secretary, do you have an atomic assistant in the Department or an atomic branch in the Department of State? Secretary DULLES. Yes, we have a highly competent adviser on these matters who is sitting at my left hand now, Mr. Gerard Smith.

Senator MANSFIELD. I am just seeking information. This is all new to me. Do you have science advisers in the Department of State? Secretary DULLES. I think that we have not maintained our science advisers to the degree desirable because of budget problems.

Senator MANSFIELD. Are you satisfied that the United States is doing a good job in exporting power reactors to underdeveloped areas?

POWER REACTORS FOR UNDERDEVELOPED COUNTRIES

Secretary DULLES. I missed the first part of your question, Senator, I am sorry.

Senator MANSFIELD. Are you satisfied that the United States has been doing a good job in exporting power reactors to underdeveloped areas?

I recall that in a discussion of this matter before the committee last year Admiral Strauss appeared as a witness and maybe he should be the one who should answer that question.

Secretary DULLES. I would rather have him answer it, if I may. Senator MANSFIELD. Would you answer that, Admiral?

Mr. STRAUSS. Senator Mansfield, as far as I know, no power reactors have been exported to so-called underdeveloped areas in the world by the United States or by any other country to date. We have, however, under active development in the United States reactors designed or at least useful for that purpose, and one of them can be seen by you if you are interested, operating at the present time at Fort Belvoir, which is about a half hour outside of Washington. It was put on stream about 10 days ago.

Senator MANSFIELD. What about the reactor agreements we have reached with the Republic of the Philippines and I think at least one other Asiatic country?

Have we entered into any agreements with the Republic of the Philippines?

Mr STRAUSS. We have research agreements, Senator Mansfield, with the Philippines, and as has been stated, with some forty-odd other countries, calling for assistance and the exchange of information to facilitate those countries in the erection of research reactors, one of the primary purposes of which is to enable them to train personnel to operate power reactors in the future. It would be of little purpose for us to provide underdeveloped nations with a tool as potent and as in a way dangerous as a power reactor unless they possessed sufficient skilled personnel to operate it.

We do not have at the present time in the United States a supply of technical manpower sufficiently large to enable us to feel that we could export that skill to any great extent.

COMPARISON OF UNITED STATES, BRITISH AND RUSSIAN RESEARCH.

DEVELOPMENT

Senator MANSFIELD. Do you think, Admiral, that we have progressed as far as the Soviet Union and the British in the development of research and/or power reactors?

Mr. STRAUSS. I am a self-serving witness in that respect, Senator. I think we are far ahead of those countries, but I would not ask you to rely upon my testimony alone. That is the considered judgment and has been expressed in writing by a symposium of experts who have canvassed that question.

As far as we know, the Russians have only one reactor which they have announced, which is a 5,000 kilowatt reactor of a type that we regard as primitive, which they indicated had come on stream in 1954. We have had reactors of considerably larger size such as the Nautilus and the prototype of the Nautilus operating since 1953, and we have 6 power reactors coming on stream in the United States in this calendar year, 2 of which are already operating.

Senator MANSFIELD. Mr. Chairman, I would like to express the hope, because of certain questions which have been bothering me, that we may have the benefit of Admiral Strauss and his colleagues, Mr. Vance, Mr. Murray and Mr. Libby, appearing before the committee in the discussion of this particular matter.

Could we have some assurance to that effect?

Secretary DULLES. Is it not a fact that Admiral Strauss has been asked to appear as a witness on Tuesday and he is prepared to do so? Senator MANSFIELD. I Would like to see other members of the Commission appear at the same time because there might be some questions on which there may well be a difference of opinion.

SAFEGUARD DEVICE-BASIS FOR U. N. ACTION

Now, Mr. Secretary, it has been said that in one respect the safeguard devices under the agency statute are superior to our own because provision is made for a contractual basis of United Nations action.

Just how would this contractual basis of action operate to insure against misuse of atomic materials?

Secretary DULLES. You are asking what sanctions there are behind this?

Senator MANSFIELD. My time is up, Mr. Secretary.

Could you furnish a reply for the record?

Secretary DULLES. I will be glad to do so.

(See letter from the Department of State, p. 51.)

The CHAIRMAN. Mr. Bricker?

BILATERALS

Senator BRICKER. Mr. Secretary, will you furnish for this committee in its consideration of this treaty, a list of all of the bilaterals that we have with the various countries of the world, and the ones that are under negotiation with other countries?

(See status report on p. 50.)

Senator BRICKER. Yesterday the Atomic Energy Committee recommended out an indemnity or supplemental insurance program for the

domestic power program of $500 million above and beyond what would be available in private insurance, showing the importance of protection of the public.

I would like also if we could have from you or from the Atomic Energy Commission the nature of the inspection that is provided in the bilateral agreements on the reactors that we are furnishing and supplying materials for to the various countries of the world, as well as the distinction that there might be in any inspection system that is set up in this international agency.

Secretary DULLES. Those will be made available, Senator.

I understand that all these bilaterals are a matter of record with the joint committee.

Senator BRICKER. That is right, but not in this record. They will be made available?

Secretary DULLES. They will be made available also as part of this record.

Senator BRICKER. I think we ought to have them.

(See p. 50 for information on the bilateral agreements. The Atomic Energy Commission subsequently supplied the following information on comparison of safeguard provisions in the bilaterals and the statute:)

COMPARISON OF SAFEGUARDS PROVISIONS CONTAINED IN BILATERAL AGREEMENTS FOR COOPERATION AND IN THE STATUTE OF THE INTERNATIONAL ATOMIC ENERGY AGENCY

The Government of the United States of America and the Government of Switzerland emphasize their common interest in assuring that any material, equipment, or device made available to the Government of Switzerland pursuant to this Agreement shall be used solely for civil purposes.

A. Except to the extent that the safeguards provided for in this Agreement are supplanted, by agreement of the Parties as provided in Article XI, by safeguards of the proposed international atomic energy agency, the Government of the United States of America, notwithstanding any other provisions of this Agreement, shall have the following rights:

STATUTE OF INTERNATIONAL ATOMIC
ENERGY AGENCY

ARTICLE XII

A. With respect to any Agency project, or other arrangement where the Agency is requested by the parties concerned to apply safeguards, the Agency shall have the following rights and responsibilities to the extent relevant to the project or arrangement:

1 Text taken from Agreement for Cooperation with Switzerland.

EQUIPMENT AND FACILITIES

(1) With the objective of assuring 1. To examine the design of specialdesign and operation for civil purposes ized equipment and facilities, including and permitting effective application of nuclear reactors, and to approve it only safeguards, to review the design of any from the viewpoint of assuring that it (i) reactor and will not further any military purpose, that it complies with applicable health and safety standards, and that it will permit effective application of the safeguards provided for in this article;

(ii) other equipment and devices the design of which the United States Commission determines to be relevant to the effective application of safeguards, which are to be made available to the Government of Switzerland or any person under its jurisdiction by the Government of the United States of America or any person under its jurisdiction, or which are to use, fabricate or process any of the following materials so made available: source material, special nuclear material, moderator material, or other material designated by the United States Commission;

Source and Special Nuclear (Fissionable) Materials

(2) With respect to any source or special nuclear material made available to the Government of Switzerland or any person under its jurisdiction by the Government of the United States of America or any person under its jurisdiction and any source or special nuclear material utilized in, recovered from, or produced as a result of the use of any of the following materials, equipment, or devices so made available:

(i) source material, special nuclear material, moderator material, or other material designated by the United States Commission,

(ii) reactors,

(iii) any other equipment or device designated by the United States Commission as an item to be made available on the condition that the provisions of this subparagraph A. 2 will apply,

(a) to require the maintenance and production of operating records and to request and receive reports for the purpose of assisting in ensuring accountability for such materials; and

(b) to require that any such material in the custody of the Government of Switzerland or any person under its jurisdiction be subject to all of the safeguards provided for in this Article and the guaranties set forth in Article XIII.

3. To require the maintenance and production of operating records to assist in ensuring accountability for source and special fissionable materials used or produced in the project or arrangement;

4. To call for and receive progress reports;