compelled to appeal to the three fourth votes, in order to arrest the law, she would be compelled to submit to the exercise of an unconstitutional power and it would be absurd to suppose that any redress could be obtained upon such an appeal, even if a State were at liberty to make it.

A majority of both Houses of Congress must sanction the law before it could be passed, and there was no probability of its being declared unconstitutional by three fourths of the States. A proposition too, to amend the Constitution, can only come from two thirds of the two Houses of Congress or from the legislatures of two thirds of the States. A minority therefore has no other mode of obtaining redress. There is no danger of weakening the Union in this manner. The Government is one of checks and balances, and it is in the true spirit of the system, that the States should have the power to check the Federal Government, so far as to preserve the Constitution from gross, palpable, and deliberate violations,' and to compel an appeal to the amending power in cases of real doubt and difficulty.

This check is by far the safest and least liable to abuse, of any provided by the Constitution. A quorum of the Supreme Court, can, by a bare majority, consisting only of three judges, declare a law to be unconstitutional.

Mr H. said that without meaning to detract from that high tribunal, for whose decisions when confined to their appropriate sphere (questions in law equity') he had great respect, he thought that that delicate power might be

as safely entrusted to a State. She would always feel the necessity of consulting public opinion both at home and abroad before she would venture to resort to such a measure, and as it was only an extreme case that would justify the interposition, there would be no danger of any abuse of the power.

In reply to the call to show the practical effects of his doctrine, Mr Hayne said that the right of a State being established, the General Government, as a matter of course, was bound to acquiesce in a solemn decision of the State acting in its sovereign capacity, until the people by an amendment. of the Constitution had decided to the contrary. Until this solemn decision is thus reversed, the Federal Government is bound not to resort to any means of coercion against the citizens of the dissenting States. All collision is thus prevented. But if a law unconstitutional in the opinion of the citizens of any one State, should be carried into effect even with the concurrence of all the branches of the Federal Government, collision must The juries in the dissenting State would not give effect to the unconstitutional law, and unless they could be coerced by the bayonet, the law would be in effect nullified. The difference between the Senator from Massachusetts and himself respecting a clear violation of the Constitution which ought to be resisted, was, that he advocated upon the principles of revolution and he (Mr Hayne) upon those of constitutional resistance. He would make force the only arbiter in cases of colli

sion between the Federal and State Governments, while he (Mr Hayne) would resort to a peaceful remedy, the interposition of the States to arrest the progress of the evil, until a convention called according to the Constitution should determine the dispute.

In reply to this argument Mr Webster said, that the argument of Mr H. consisted of two propositions, and an inference. His propositions are

1. That the Constitution is a compact between the States.

2. That a compact between two, with authority reserved to one to interpret its terms, would be a surrender to that one of all power whatever.

3. Therefore, (such is his inference) the General Government does not possess the authority to construe its own powers.

Now, sir, who does not see, without the aid of exposition or detection, the utter confusion of ideas, involved in this, so elaborate and systematic argument.

The Constitution, it is said, is a compact between States; the States, then, and the States only, are parties to the compact. How comes the General Government itself a party? Upon the honorable gentleman's hypothesis, the General Government is the result of the compact, the creature of the compact, not one of the parties to it. Yet the argument, as the gentleman has now stated it, makes the Government itself one of its own creators. It makes it a party to that compact, to which it owes its own existence.

For the purpose of erecting the

Constitution on the basis of a compact, the gentleman considers the States as parties to that compact; but as soon as his compact is made, then he chooses to consider the General Government, which is the offspring of that compact, not its offspring, but one of its parties; and so, being a party, has not the power of judging on the terms of the compact. In what school is such reasoning as this taught?

If the whole of the gentleman's main proposition were conceded. to him, that is to say that the Constitution is a compact between States, the inferences, which he draws from that proposition, are warranted by no just reason. Because, if the Constitution be a compact between States, still, that Constitution, or that compact, has established a government, with certain powers; and whether it be one of those powers, that it shall construe and interpret for itself, the terms of the compact, in doubtful cases, can only be decided by looking to the compact, and inquiring what provisions it contains on this point. Without any inconsistency with natural reason, the Government, even thus created, might be trusted with this power of construction. The extent of its powers, therefore, must still be sought for in the instrument itself.

If the old Confederation had contained a clause, declaring that. resolutions of the Congress should be the supreme law of the land, any State law or constitution to the contrary notwithstanding, and that a committee of Congress, or any other body created by it,

should possess Judicial powers, extending to all cases arising under resolutions of Congress, then the power of ultimate decision would have been vested in Congress, under the Confederation, although that Confederation was a compact between States. And for this plain reason: that it would have been competent to the states, who alone were parties to the compact, to agree, who should decide in cases of dispute arising on the construction of the com

pact.

For the same reason, sir, if I were now to concede to the gentleman his principal propositions, viz. that the Constitution is a compact between States, the question would still be, what provision is made, in this compact, to settle points of disputed construction, or contested power, that shall come into controversy? and this question would still be answered, and conclusively answered, by the Constitution itself. While the gentleman is contending against construction, he himself is setting up the most loose and dangerous construction. The Constitutio declares, that the laws of Congress shall be the supreme law of the land. No construction is necessary here. It declares, also, with equal plainness and precision, that the Judicial power of United States shall extend to every case arising under the laws of Congress. This needs no construction. Here is a law, then, which is declared to be supreme: and here is a power established, which is to interpret that law. Now, sir, now has the gentleman met this? Suppose the Constitu

tion to be a compact, yet here are its terms, and how does the gentleman get rid of them? He cannot argue the seal off the bond, nor the words out of the instrument. Here they are what answer does he give to them? None in the world, sir, except, that the effect of this would be to place the States in a condition of inferiority; and because it results, from the very nature of things, there being no superior, that the parties must be their own judges! Thus closely and cogently does the honorable gentleman reason on the words of the Constitution. The gentleman says, if there be such a power of final decision in the General Government, he asks for the grant of that power. Well, sir, I show him the grant I turn him to the very words show him that the laws of Congress are made supreme; and that the Judicial power extends, by express words, to the interpretation of these laws. Instead of answering this, he retreats into the general reflection, that it must result from the nature of things, that the States, being parties, must judge for themselves.

I have admitted, that if the Constitution were to be considered as the creature of the State Governments, it might be modified, interpreted, or construed, according to their pleasure. But even in that case, it would be necessary that they should agree. One, alone, could not interpret itc onclusively; one, alone, could not construe it; one, alone, could not modify it. Yet the gentleman's doctrine is, that Carolina, alone, may construe and interpret

I

that compact, which equally binds all, and gives equal rights to all. So then, sir, even supposing the Constitution to be a compact between the States, the gentleman's doctrine, nevertheless, is not maintainable; because, first, the General Government is not a party to that compact, but a Government established by it, and vested by it with the powers of trying and deciding doubtful questions; and, secondly because, if the Constitution be regarded as a compact, not one State only, but all the States, are parties to that compact and one can have no right to fix upon it her own peculiar construction.

So much, sir, for the argument, even if the premises of the gentleman were granted, or could be proved. But, sir, the gentleman has failed to maintain his leading proposition. He has not shown, it cannot be shown, that the Constitution is a compact between State Governments. The Constitution itself in its very front, refutes that it declares that it is ordained and established by the People of the United States. So far from saying that it is established by the Governments of the several States, it does not even say that it is established by the People of the several States; but it pronounces that it is established by the people of the United States, in the aggregate. The gentleman says it must mean no more than the People of the several States. Doubtless, the People of the several States, taken collectively, constitute the People of the United States; but it is in this, their collective capacity,

it is as all the People of the United States, that they established the Constitution. So they declare; and words cannot be plainer than the words used.

When the gentleman says the Constitution is a compact between the States, he uses language exactly applicable to the old Confederation. He speaks as if he were in Congress before 1789. He describes fully that old state of things then existing. The Confederation was, in strictness, a compact: the States, as States, were parties to it. We had no other General Government. But that was found insufficient, and inadequate to the public exigencies. The People were not satisfied with it, and undertook to establish a better. They undertook to form a General Government, which should stand on a new basis not a confederacy, not a league, not a compact between States, but a Constitution "; a Popular Government, founded in popular election, directly responsible to the People themselves, and divided into branches, with prescribed limits of power, and prescribed duties. They ordained such a Government; they gave it the name of a Constitution, and therein they established a distribution of powers between this their General Government, and their several State Governments. When they shall become dissatisfied with this distribution, they can alter it. Their own power over their own instrument remains. But until they shall alter it, it must stand as their will, and is equally binding on the General Government and on the States.