that the Canon was not repealed, and that the ecclesiastical authorities had no suspicion that it had been.

II. The next opinion is that the Canons and the Act of Uniformity, being irreconcilable, set up distinct standards of ritual, the one of a more elaborate and the other of a severer type; the one a maximum and the other a minimum; the one represented by the Rubric and the other by the 58th Canon. To this view the learned judge in the court below appears to incline. Their Lordships, notwithstanding this authority, are obliged to come to the conclusion that this view is at variance with all the facts of the case. They have already observed that the chasuble, alb, and tunicle were swept away with severe exactness in the time of Queen Elizabeth, and that there was no trace of any attempt to revive them. The Act of Uniformity reflects, by the strictness of its provisions, the temper of the framers. The fate of a "proviso as to the dispensation with deprivation, for not using the cross and surplice," which was sent down from the House of Lords to the House of Commons, illustrates this. The Commons rejected the proviso (Commons' Journals, vol. viii. p. 413), and in the subsequent conference between the two Houses, the Manager, Serjeant Charlton, gave amongst other reasons for rejecting the proviso, "that it would unavoidably establish schism that he thought it better to impose no ceremonies than to dispense with any; and he thought it very incongruous at the same time when you are settling uniformity to establish schism" (Lords' Journals, vol xi. p. 449 a). And the House of Lords agreed that this proviso should be struck out (Lords' Journals, vol. xi. pp. 450 a, 450 b). It cannot be supposed that an Act which applied the principle of uniformity so strictly in one direction was intended on the other to open the door to a return to practices that were suspected as Romish, and this without serious remonstrance in either House from the minority. The purpose of the Act is clear. It was to establish a uniformity upon all parties alike. That is its language, and that is the interpretation it bore with those in authority who had to expound it in visitation articles and the like.

III. The third opinion remains, that the provisions of the Rubric of Edward the Sixth are continued, so far as they are not contrariant to other provisions still in force. And here it is to be observed again that the Rubric was altered, after refusal to listen to the Puritan objections, to a form different from that of any former Rubric, by introducing the word "retained." Both in the statute of Elizabeth and in the Rubric in question the word "retain" seems to mean that things should remain as they were at the time of the enactment. Chasuble, alb, and tunicle had disappeared for more than sixty years; and it has been argued fairly that this word would not have force to bring back any thing that had disappeared more than a generation ago. To retain means, in common parlance, to continue something now in existence. It is reasonable to presume that the alteration was not made without some purpose; and it appears to their Lordships that the words of the Rubric, strictly construed, would not suffice to revive ornaments which had been lawfully set aside, although they were in use in the second year of Edward VI. But whether this be so or not, their Lordships are of opinion that as the Canons of 1603-4, which in one part seemed to revive the vestments, and in another to order the surplice for all ministrations, ought to be construed together so that the Act of Uniformity is to be construed with the two Canons

on this subject which it did not repeal, and that the result is that the cope is to be worn in ministering the Holy Communion on high feast days in cathedrals and collegiate churches, and the surplice in all other ministrations. Their Lordships attach great weight to the abundant evidence which now exists that from the days of Elizabeth to about 1840 the practice is uniformly in accordance with this view; and is irreconcilable with either of the other views. Through the researches that have been referred to in these remarks a clear and abundant expositio contemporanea had been supplied which compensates for the scantiness of other materials for a judgment.

It is quite true that neither contrary practice nor disuse can repeal the positive enactment of a statute, but contemporaneous and continuous usage is of the greatest efficacy in law for determining the true construction of obscurely framed documents. In the case of the Bristol Charities (2 Jac. and Walker, 321) Lord Eldon observes, "Length of time (though it must be admitted that the charity is not barred by it) is a very material consideration when the question is, what is the effect and true construction of the instrument ? Is it according to the practice and enjoyment which has obtained for more than two centuries? or has that practice and enjoyment been a breach of trust ?" We may ask in like manner what is the true construction of the Act of 1662 and of the Rubric which it sanctioned? Is it according to the practice of two centuries, or was the practice a continual breach of the law, commanded and enforced by the Bishops, including the very Bishops who aided in framing the Act?

The learned judge relies on two former judgments of this Committee, as having almost determined the question of vestments; one of them in the case of Liddell v. Westerton, and the other in the case of Martin v. Mackonochie.

In Liddell v. Westerton, the question which their Lordships had to decide was whether the Rubric which excluded all use of crosses in the service affected crosses not used in the service but employed for decoration of the building only; and they'determined that these were unaffected by the Rubric.

They decided that the Rubric in question referred to the Act passed in 2 and 3 Edward VI., adopting the first Prayer Book, and not to any canons or injunctions having the authority of Parliament, but adopted at an earlier period. Their Lordships feel quite free to adopt both the positive and the negative conclusions thus arrived at. In construing the expressions made use of in that judgment, it should be borne in mind that this question of the vestments was not before the Court.

In Martin v. Mackonochie the Committee stated anew the substance of the Judgment in Liddell v. Westerton upon this point, but did not propose to take up any new ground.

Their Lordships will advise her Majesty that the defendant Mr. Purchas has offended against the laws ecclesiastical in wearing the chasuble, alb, and tunicle; and that a monition shall issue against the defendant accordingly.

With respect to the cap called a biretta, which the defendant is said to have carried in his hand, but not to have worn in church, their Lordships would not be justified, upon the evidence before them, in pronouncing that the defendant did an unlawful act.

As to the holy or consecrated water in the church, the evidence does not

go the full extent of the charge. There is no proof whatever that the water placed in the church was consecrated at all, nor that it was put there by the defendant with the purpose of its being used as the congregation seem to have used it. This is a penal proceeding, and each charge must be strictly proved as alleged. Upon this point, too, the appeal must be disallowed. Their Lordships now proceed to the 16th article, which charges that, on a certain day, the defendant "administered wine mixed with water instead of wine to the communicants at the Lord's Supper." The learned judge in the Court below has decided that it is illegal to mix water with the wine at the time of the service of Holy Communion; but he decides that water may be mixed with the wine "provided that the mingling be not made at the time of the celebration." For this view the learned judge quotes, amongst other authorities, Bishop Andrewes, but it has escaped him that the practice of Bishop Andrewes was that which he condemns; in his Consecration Service, the Bishop directs as follows:-Episcopus de novo in calicem ex poculo quod in sacrâ mensâ stabat, effundit, admistâque aquâ, recitat clare verba illa consecratoria. (Sparrow's Articles, &c.) The learned judge considers that the act of mixing has some symbolical meaning, but he holds that it was "wholly unconnected with any Papal superstition, or any doctrine which the Church of England has rejected." (Appendix, p. 88.) Nor does it appear that the controversy between the Romish and Reformed Churches turned so much upon the symbolism of the mixed cup as upon the necessity of its use.

Their Lordships find here two questions for their consideration. Since it has been decided by this Committee that additional ceremonies or innovations are excluded by implication by the service for Holy Communion; or, in other words, that the service for Holy Communion is not only a guide, but a sufficient guide in its celebration; and since the learned judge has decided that the act of mingling wine with water in the service, with a view to its administration, is one of the additional ceremonies so excluded, the first question is whether the doing the act before the service, and in the vestry or elsewhere, could so alter the symbolical character of the act that the cup might be brought in and consecrated and administered to the people, without constituting an innovation or additional ceremonial act, beyond what is ordered in the service.

If this question be decided in the affirmative, the second question would be whether, upon a fair construction of the directions of the Rubrics, this previous mingling could take place without violation of the Rubrics?

The first question is, whether this is an additional ceremony, not provided in the Rubric? the second question is, whether it is contrary to the express directions of the Rubric?

On the former question their Lordships observe that, whether the water mingled with the wine be used because Christ Himself is believed to have used it, or in order to symbolize the water from the rock given to the thirsty Israelites, or the blood and water from the side of the Lord, or the union of Christ with His people (the water being a type of the people), or the union of two natures in one Lord, it can scarcely be said that the reception of the mingled chalice had no share in this symbolism, but only the act of mingling. Their Lordships are unable to arrive at the conclusion that, if the mingling and administering in the service water and wine is an additional ceremony, and so

unlawful, it becomes lawful by removing from the service the act of mingling but keeping the mingled cup itself and administering it. But neither Eastern nor Western Church, so far as the Committee is aware, has any custom of mixing the water with wine apart from and before the service.

As to the second question, the addition of water is prescribed in the Prayer Book of 1549; it has disappeared from all the later books, and this omission must have been designed. The Rubric of 1662, following that of 1604, says, "The bread and wine for the Communion shall be provided by the curate and churchwardens at the charges of the parish." So far wine not mixed with water must be intended. The priest is directed in the Rubric before the Prayer for the Church Militant to place on the table "so much bread and wine as he shall think sufficient." Of so much of this wine as may remain unconsecrated, it is said that "the curate shall have it to his own use." These directions make it appear that the wine has not been mingled with water, but remains the same throughout. If the wine had been mingled with water before being placed on the table, then the portion of it that might revert to the curate would undergo this symbolical mixing, which cannot surely have been intended.

Their Lordships gladly leave these niceties of examination, to observe that they doubt whether this part of the article is of much importance. As the learned judge has decided that the act of mingling the water with the wine in the service is illegal, the private mingling of the wine is not likely to find favour with any. Whilst the former practice has prevailed both in the East and the West, and is of great antiquity, the latter practice has not prevailed at all; and it would be a manifest deviation from the Rubric of the Prayer Book of Edward VI. as well as from the exceptional practice and directions of Bishop Andrewes. Upon this 16th article, however, whether it be more or less important, their Lordships allow the appeal, and will advise that a monition should issue against the defendant.

The 20th article charges the defendant with using on divers occasions "wafer bread, being bread made in the special shape and fashion of circular wafers, instead of bread such as is usual to be eaten," and administering the same to the communicants. The Rubric of the Prayer Book now in force runs thus:"And to take away all occasion of dissension and superstition which any person hath or might have concerning the bread and wine, it shall suffice that the bread be such as is usual to be eaten, but the best and purest wheat bread that conveniently may be gotten." This is the same with the Rubric of 1552, 1559, and 1604, with two exceptions. The present Rubric omits after "eaten" the words "at the table with other meats," and it introduces words which have been prominent in the argument in this case; instead of "to take away the superstition," it reads "to take away all occasion of dissension and superstition." In the first Book of Edward VI. the direction is different: "For avoiding all matter and occasion of dissension, it is meet that the bread prepared for the Communion be made, through all this realm, after one sort or fashion, that is to say, unleavened and round, as it was afore, but without all manner of print, and something more larger and thicker than it was, so that it may be aptly divided into divers pieces, and every one shall be divided in two pieces at the least, or more by the discretion of the minister, and distributed." One of the Elizabethan injunctions is at variance with the Elizabethan Rubric, continued from the second Book of King Edward, and pro

vides as follows:- -"Where also it was in the time of King Edward VI. used to have the sacramental bread of common fine bread, it is ordered for the more reverence to be given to the holy mysteries, being the Sacraments of the body and blood of our Saviour Jesus Christ, that this same sacramental bread be made and formed plain, without any figure thereupon, of the same fineness and fashion, round though somewhat bigger in compass and thickness, as the usual bread and wafer heretofore named singing-cakes, which served for the use of the private masses." (Cardwell.) The learned judge calls this injunction a contemporanea expositio of the Rubric, but it is in fact a superseding of the Rubric, nor can it be regarded as at all reconcilable with it. Upon these facts the learned judge decides as follows:-"It appears, therefore, that while the first Rubric prescribed a uniformity of size and material, the later and the present Rubric are contented with the order that the purest wheaten flour shall suffice, and the bread may be leavened according to the use of the Eastern, or unleavened according to the use of the Western Church." Their Lordships do not find any mention of flour, and apart from this slight inadvertence, their Lordships are unable to accept this view of the passages that have been quoted. The first Book of Edward has in view uniformity of practice, and not the choice of two practices; the bread is to be made "through all this realm after the same sort and fashion." The second Book of Edward VI. is not so positive in form, for the words "it shall suffice" are used; but it produced uniformity and not diversity, for the injunction of 1559 says, "It was in the time of King Edward VI., used to have the sacramental bread of common fine bread." This general use the injunction proposes to change; but again the order is universal, and binds the very minutest details; the bread is to be plain without any figure, fashioned round but somewhat bigger in compass and thicker than the cakes used in private masses there is no trace of an intention to leave men free to follow the fashion of the Eastern or of the Western Church. So there are three distinct orders; first, for wafer bread, unleavened as before, but larger and without print; then for common bread usual at the table; then for a new kind of bread thicker than the wafer and without symbolical figures; and the first and last are in their form universal and absolute; and the second also had brought about a general usage and not a diversity. There was, no doubt, a great division of opinion upon this question; and this makes it all the more remarkable that none of the three orders takes the natural course of leaving the matter free. Each seems to have aimed at uniformity, but each in a different practice.

But it has been argued by some that the phrase "it shall suffice" implies a permission; that the words may mean, "it shall be sufficient, but another usage is allowed and might even be better." On the other hand, it has been argued, that in other places in the Liturgy "it shall suffice" must be construed into a positive direction; that if "it shall suffice" to pour water on a sickly child, this ought to restrain the clergyman from immersing a child known to be sickly; that even the weaker form "it may suffice" in the Rubric as to children and infants brought to be baptized, conveys to the minister a distinct direction as to what he is to do, and leaves no alternative course apparent; that "it shall suffice that the Litany be once read" for both deacons and priests is meant to be, and is received as a positive order; and that in such cases "it shall suffice means it shall be sufficient for the completeness