clusion of Peace;" and Lord Granville again replied that it was not desirable to offer mediation "until there seemed to be a basis on which both parties would consent to negotiate." Similar observations are exchanged on the same day between Lord Lyons and M. Favre himself; but M. Favre remained dissatisfied with Lord Granville's attitude, and on the 10th of September he directed M. Tissot to express the value he would attach to "a more active co-operation on the part of the Cabinet of London;" he said that public opinion in France looks for this co-operation, and "has been painfully affected on learning that England, amid the cruel trials which her most faithful ally is undergoing, hesitates to take a more decisive step."

In the midst of this restlessness and anxiety the mission of M. Thiers was announced on the 12th of September. On the 13th of September Lord Granville reports to Lord Lyons that M. Thiers asked for no forcible intervention, but appealed to England to exert her moral influence to obtain peace. He urged that England "belonged to Europe," and if she would only take the lead, all neutral nations would follow, and it would be impossible for Prussia to withstand the moral force of such a public opinion. Lord Granville replied that England had done more than she had a right to do, in the hope of preventing the war. Her advice had been disregarded, and she could not now interfere until a basis of negotiations, mutually acceptable to France and Prussia, was apparent. Lord Granville also suggested that it was worthy of M. Favre's consideration whether he should not at once negotiate the conditions of a Peace and not of an Armistice; and he urged the importance of obtaining a regular Government by means of a Constituent Assembly. In a third interview M. Thiers asked whether, if Russia were to take the initiative in addressing Germany in favour of France, England "would not object to be left behind?' Lord Granville replied that England felt no jealousy of other Powers in such a matter.

Emperor Napoleon is still formally, for foreign Powers, the bearer of the sorereignty. I answer by the counter question -What guarantee can the present Government, or one of those which will probably follow it in Paris, give that agreements with it would be recognized by France, or even immediately only by the troops at Strasburg and Metz ?"

M. Favre replied as follows

"The guarantees justly required by Count Bismarck can be given in a twofold respect-political and military. From

the political point of view the Government of the National Defence will sign an armistice, and call in an Assembly without delay, which will ratify the Treaty of Peace to be concluded between the Prus sian and the French Government.

"From the military point of view the Government of the Defence affords the same security as a regular Government, inasmuch as all orders of the War Minister are obeyed. Whatever in this respect should be settled by means of an armistice would, therefore, without delay be punetually carried out."

But M. Favre's eagerness had already outrun these despatches. He entertained the idea of going himself without delay to the German head-quarters, and Lord Granville, if he did not suggest this course, cordially supported it in his language both to M. Thiers and to Lord Lyons. On the 13th of September Lord Lyons tells Lord Granville it was the intention of M. Jules Favre to go to Count Bismarck himself, and "to say frankly and fairly that the Government did not shut its eyes to the results of the campaign," and was prepared, in short, to yield "almost any thing, provided the integrity of the territory be preserved."

Meanwhile, to appease M. Favre's anxiety, Lord Lyons had sent Mr. Malet through the French lines to insure the first of M. Favre's communications reaching Count Bismarck's hands. A short answer which Count Bismarck addressed to Lord Lyons is remarkable for a statement somewhat inconsistent with an assertion he afterwards made in his account of the interview of Ferrières. "Confidentially," he says, "I beg leave to inform your Excellency that we shall always be ready to enter into negotiations for peace but not for an armistice." M. Favre carried away the impression that Count Bismarck expressed a similar objection to an armistice in conversation with him, but this was denied by Count Bismarck. The question is more than once suggested in the course of these Papers, how far the idea of an armistice was at any time before the fall of Paris agreeable to the Prussian authorities.

The mission of Mr. Malet was opportune. On the 19th of September, M. Favre told Lord Lyons that, if Her Majesty's Government would not deem it discourteous, he "would sacrifice all personal pride and reserve," and if the answer of Count Bismarck to his last message were longer delayed, set out for the Prussian headquarters without waiting for it. Mr. Malet was able to state that Count Bismarck had said, "If the French Government wish to treat they should send some one to do so; we will treat with any one they send."

Of the negotiation which ensued two narratives were published by M. Favre and Count Bismarck.

Meanwhile Count Bismarck had issued his circular from Rheims, in which he publicly declared the intention of the German Government "to push back the French frontier on the south-west, and thereby the starting point of the French attacks," and to seek "to acquire for Germany the fortresses with which France threatens us, so as to make of them bulwarks of defence." This circular was officially communicated by Count Bernstorff to Lord Granville, and it is important to observe that Lord Granville asked "whether any expression of opinion on the contents of the Circular was invited by the Prussian Government," and the reply was in the negative. The Prussians maintained throughout a similar indisposition to invite the opinion of England or of any other Power, and this attitude seems materially to have affected Lord Granville's course.

On the 25th of September M. de Chaudordy, who now represented M. Favre at Tours, called on Lord Lyons to urge that "the time was come for the formal recognition of the present Government of France by Great Britain." He represented that the Government was now universally acknowledged and obeyed, that it was the only possible Government in France at the present moment, and that to recognize it would enable Her Majesty's Government, without in the least departing from neutrality, to establish a claim to the gratitude and sympathy of the French nation.

Lord Lyons referred the matter to Lord Granville, who contented himself for the moment with approving a reference Lord Lyons had made to the language used in the interviews with M. Thiers. But, on the 1st of October, he reported to Lord Lyons that the Cabinet fully sustained his views with respect to the recognition of the French Government.

In answer to M. Cadorna, Lord Granville again expressed the opinion that "there is no means at present by which the neutral Powers can accelerate the

conclusion of peace." On the same day M. de Chaudordy, after discussing with Lord Lyons the divergencies between the statements of Count Bismarck and M. Jules Favre, expressed the opinion that "the best course would be for the neutral Powers to ask Count Bismarck what his conditions really were;" and he said M. Jules Favre represented that the pretensions of Prussia were now avowed to be such as it was manifestly impossible for France ever to submit to. "He felt he was entitled to appeal to the rest of Europe for support. The time for good offices had passed. The Powers should now speak to Prussia in a tone which could not be mistaken, and take measures to ensure their being listened to." In a despatch of the 4th of October, Lord Granville, after a review of the course hitherto pursued by the Government, states explicitly that they are not prepared to support by force any representations they might make to Prussia, and that they must await some more favourable moment for interposition.

It is quite lamentable to read the almost frantic cries for help which the French authorities uttered. One day M. de Chaudordy read to Lord Lyons a despatch from M. Jules Favre "commenting with some bitterness upon what the writer termed the abandonment of France by the Cabinets of Europe, and containing a positive order to make a distinct demand for armed aid (concours arme) upon Italy." At this point we again hear of M. Thiers. He himself sent by telegraph an account of his reception at St. Petersburgh. M. Thiers, it appeared, expressed very great satisfaction with the reception which he had met with from the Emperor and the imperial family, from Prince Gortchakoff, and other men in high office, as well as from the society in general. He had found public opinion alarmed by the progress of Prussia, and extremely well-disposed towards France. The Emperor and Prince Gortchakoff had expressed themselves warmly against the enforcement by Prussia of any exorbitant terms of peace, and had declared that Russia would never give her sanction to any conditions which were not equitable; and that, consequently, the sanction of the other Powers would also be withheld, and the exactions of Prussia would be simply the effect of force, and would rest on no European foundation.

On the 10th of October Lord Granville writes to Lord Bloomfield at Vienna a report of a communication which Count Apponyi had been instructed to make to him on the expediency of mediation between France and Prussia, and on the views with regard to it entertained by the

Austro-Hungarian Government. Count Beust said that for special reasons it was impossible for Austria to take the initiative; but he was distressed at the "torpor " of Europe, and he thought England and Russia might move. Lord Granville adhered to his ordinary language on the subject.

On the 1st of October Count Bismarck issued from Ferrières the short despatch to Count Bernstorff in which he combated the statement of M. Favre that "Prussia means to continue the war and to bring France back to the position of a Power of the second rank." We refer to it here because in the course of it he distinctlymentions that the acquisition of Metz was included in "the general outlines" of the conditions of peace which he had sketched to M. Favre, and had indicated in his circular of September 16, dated from Meaux. He speaks of "the cession of Strasburg and Metz, which, in accordance with those ideas, we are striving for."

On the 11th of October Lord Granville addresses a brief despatch to Lord Lyons, in which he ventures further than he had yet done in offering advice to the French. He instructs Lord Lyons, if an opportunity should arise, to point out that Her Majesty's Government are of opinion that "the rigid adherence by M. Favre to the conditions of yielding not an inch of territory nor one stone of a fortress is a great obstacle to peace."

On the 5th of October M. de Chaudordy, at Tours, again returned to the subject of the intervention of the neutral Powers. He said :

"It was possible there were terms upon which France and Prussia might agree if they were proposed and insisted on by the united voice of Europe, but which neither Power was in a position to propose to the other."

It was at this critical moment, when it was still hoped that the elections for a Constituent Assembly would be held, and the question of Peace or War decided by France herself, that M. Gambetta appeared at Tours, bringing with him a positive order to postpone the elections indefinitely, and thus plunging France into the fierce prolongation of a blind struggle. Lord Lyons, on being informed of this, addressed some very just and vigorous remonstrances to M. de Chaudordy.

On the 12th of October, Lord Granville tells Lord Bloomfield he has learnt from Count Apponyi that the Provisional Government of France had appealed for "the active support of Austria, even supposing that Russia should maintain her present attitude." Count Beust's answer was in the sense of the language we have

already quoted from him. He again expressed the opinion that England and Russia might interefere, but he declined to do so himself. On the question of the recognition of the Provisional Government he held language closely corresponding to that of Lord Granville. In short, Lord Granville said that though there were some observations made by Count Beust in which he did not concur, yet "it was satisfactory to see that the policy of the two Governments was the same."

Lord Lyons, on the 13th of October, reports that the French Government adhere to their first programme. Nevertheless Lord Granville appears at this moment to have discerned a gleam of hope, for on the 16th, in a letter to Sir A. Buchanan, he said there was some reason to suppose the Provisional Government would agree to Metz and Strasburg being razed, and he wished to know whether Prince Gortchakoff thought it might be possible for England and Russia to come to some understanding on the reasonable terms of peace, and then make a joint appeal to both parties. This elicited some important statements on the part of the Russian Government. Prince Gortchakoff expressed a conviction even stronger than that of Lord Granville that it would at present be of no avail to interpose, and he added that Russia had already gone further than any other Power, " as the Emperor, in his private correspondence with the King of Prussia, had expressed a hope that no annexation of French territory would be required," and the King had answered that he must be guided by the opinion of his allies and of Germany.

On the 18th of October M. Tissot was instructed to inform Lord Granville that overtures were being made to Italy to give armed support to France, that there were reasons which might induce Italy to give it, and he hoped Lord Granville would abstain from preventing Italy acting on her own inspirations. At the same time M. de Chaudordy at Tours, and M. Tissot in London, were again urging England "to take at once a decided and active part in the present state of affairs in Europe, and to use their influence in a direct manner to bring the war to an end on terms which it would be possible for France to accept." M. de Chaudordy relied on that misconception to which we have already referred respecting the sup posed "League of Neutrals," urging that by placing herself at its head England had incurred a serious responsibility. She had " prevented France finding active

allies," and thus rendered it incumbent on her "to take an active part in uniting

the neutral Powers in a common effort to moderate the pretensions of Prussia." Such an appeal is a testimony to Lord Granville's wisdom in avoiding the more formal and exacting engagement which Count Beust had desired. Lord Lyons had no difficulty in showing that the simple promise to communicate ideas had no bearing on the present state of affairs, and at last, after reminding the Count that "Her Majesty's Government had declared that they could not contemplate going to war with Germany," he begged him "to say distinctly what, short of this, he would propose that England should do." The following is M. de Chaudordy's answer:- He said he must premise that whatever England did must be done of her own accord, and must not have any appearance of being prompted by France. After the rejection of M. Jules Favre's overtures, it was plain that France could not address Prussia again. What he would suggest was that Her Majesty's Government, acting quite apart from France, should invite the other neutral Powers to make a combined application to Prussia. England should, he thought, take the lead in bringing the neutral Powers to an understanding on the subject, or she might act alone. The object, in either case, would be to call upon Prussia to say how far she meant to go; in fact, to declare distinctly on what conditions she would make peace. Having ascertained this, England and the Powers acting in concert with her might, in the same way, make themselves acquainted with the views and feelings of France. This being done, the neutral Powers should hold a Conference (or, if this were objected to, communicate their ideas to each other in some other manner), and then pronounce, distinctly and authoritatively, what were, in their opinion, equitable terms of peace, and call upon both belligerents to accept the terms so laid down. Both France and Prussia must be disposed to listen with respect to the voice of united Europe, and each might find it easier to make concessions in deference to the recommendations of an European Conference than to yield to each other. Such was the plan M. de Chaudordy would suggest and if England was indisposed to take the lead in executing it, she might advise Italy or some other power to do so. Only, he repeated, whatever was done, must be done altogether independently of France and the French Government; "en dehors de nous," was the expression he used. Having made this suggestion, M. de Chaudordy reverted to the dangers to Europe, and to England in particular, which must

follow if means were not taken while it was yet time to prevent the establishment of Prussian supremacy.

But though Her Majesty's Government could not yield to these passionate appeals, they took advantage of Count Bismarck's Circular respecting the dangers of famine which threatened Paris, to make a formal suggestion to Prussia and France that they should agree upon an Armistice for the convocation of a Constituent Assembly. Having once suggested this proposal, Lord Granville seems to have pressed it with great energy. He promptly informed Count Bernstorff of M. Thiers' proposal to undertake the negotiation, and M. Thiers was assisted in his application by the personal intervention of the Emperor of Russia.

Russia, Austria, Italy, and Spain joined in urging the Armistice on both Governments, and Italy appeared to desire even more decided intervention. There is, however, a despatch we reluctantly omit from Sir A. Paget, detailing an account furnished to him by M. Visconti Venosta of a conversation with M. Senard, the French Representative at Florence, in the course of which M. Venosta gave most forcible expression to his views of the course which political prudence recommended to France at this juncture. If the rulers of France had been Italian politicians, they would probably before this have discovered some solution of their difficulties. The manner in which Count Bernstorff at first replied to Lord Granville's note of the 25th was not encouraging. The French, on their side, appeared still dissatisfied, for M. Tissot called on Lord Granville to urge again that the neutral Powers should call on Prussia to state her terms of peace, "bring them within fair limits, and then communicate them to the French Government." All the principal negotiators, however, adhered to the prudent course of confining the proposed negotiations solely to the question of an Armistice. We ought, perhaps, to mention that the Russian Government addressed its official support of Lord Granville's proposals to France alone, the Czar reserving all representations to Prussia for his private correspondence with the King.

We need not repeat from the Correspondence the history of M. Thiers' mission and its failure on the question of revictualment. Soon afterwards, however, Count Bernstorff said a renewed "direct communication" would be welcomed at Versailles, and this would be much the better course if the Provisional Government were in earnest. Lord Granville said it appeared strange on the

part of a great country like Germany to be so sensitive as to the friendly action of any other power; and that "the dead lock appeared to be created by the Germans declining to make advances, while the French were at least equally indisposed to take first steps." Lord Granville telegraphed at once to Lord Lyons Count Bernstorff's statement of the willingness of the Prussian Chancellor to resume the negotiation, and Lord Lyons reported from a conversation with M. Thiers and others that the French Government would gladly resume the negotiation on condition of revictualment. M. Tissot made representations in a similar sense to Lord Granville. The following day M. Tissot made a renewed suggestion:- He thought the presence of Mr. Odo Russell at Versailles might afford the Cabinet of London facilities for

negotiations." Lord Granville simply referred, in reply, to the language we have just quoted from him and to the fact that he "had been positively informed by Count Bernstorff that a direct communication from the French Government would be more likely to succeed." But though M. Favre wrote on the 19th that the Government of the National Defence "were more than ever anxious to be delivered from the horrible burden which had been on their shoulders since the 4th of September last," they still refused to make any overtures on their own account, they maintained the impossibility of holding elections without an Armistice, and they persisted in their request that Mr. Odo Russell might sound M. Bismarck. Lord Granville could not yield to this request, but nothing could discourage the pertinacity of the French appeals for help, and despatch after despatch describes interviews with M. de Chaudordy and M. Tissot. Lord Granville communicated one threefold alternative Count Bismarck, at M. de Chaudordy's suggestion, and on the 19th of December he sends to Lord Lyons the following uncompromising reply :

to

Foreign Office, Dec. 19th, 1870. My Lord,-Count Bismarck, who has been made acquainted with the terms of your Excellency's telegram of the 16th inst., has replied that it is quite impossible to accede to any one of the three demands of the French Government as therein stated-namely, either an Armistice with the condition of revictualling, in order to elect a Constituent Assembly; or the conclusion of peace without any cession of territory; or the assembly of a European Congress which should discuss the questions at issue between France and

(Signed) GRANVILLE.

We now approach the end, and Lord Granville begins to use language of partial remonstrance to Prussia. Count Bernstorff gave him an opening early in January, of which he availed himself as follows:

"If Germany was unable to conclude the war at once, obtaining her own terms of peace, she would regret the persistent way in which she had shown her objection to make use or to allow of the friendly offices of the neutral Powers. I quite understood that being successful in a great war of which she had to bear all the brunt and all the sacrifices, she had determined not to be dictated to by those who had stood aloof. It was probably the same feeling which had prevented the Imperial Government from consenting to any mediation. The Republican Government had made different appeals to us, to which we had invariably answered that we could not interfere unless our mediation or advice would be acceptable to both parties or would be likely to be effective. If the war was continued, if France became totally disorganized, a curse to herself and to Europe, incapable of indemnifying Germany for the costs of the war, and Germany had no resource but to seize and occupy vast territories filled with unwilling inhabitants, blame would attach to her for having rejected, not the intervention, but the good offices of some of the neutral Powers, of a character which had so often led to satisfactory results in international disputes."

Then followed a despatch in which Count Bismarck enumerated the misdeeds of the French in the war. In reference to this despatch, Lord Granville wrote to Lord Loftus, at Berlin, on the 20th of January, urging that Germany, in the full tide of her victories, could not fear any misconstruction of her motives in endeavouring to bring to an end the miseries of the war, and suggesting the advantage of a declaration by the Imperial Government of its views, and of its readiness to negotiate.

The series closes with the documents relating to the Armistice, and a final despatch from Lord Granville, announcing the decision of the Cabinet on the question of recognizing the Provisional Go

vernment.