s.oned to him, he afterwards and within twelve attend the business. Bradshaw v. Lancashire calendar months next before this suit died:Held, that on the words "that the same were dangerous to those who used them," being added after, and the words "by reason of the crane and tackle being in such bad order and so badly adjusted, and kept adjusted as aforesaid," after ‡, the declaration was good. King v. G. W. Ry.from.

evidence of negligence. Leishmann v. L. B. | emplary damages. Emblen v. Myers, 6 H. & N. &S. C. Ry., 23 L. T. 712; 19 W. R. 106.

Where there is conflicting evidence on a question of fact, whatever may be the opinion of the judge who tries the cause as to the value of that evidence, he must leave the consideration of it for the decision of the jury. Dublin, Wicklow and Wexford Ry. v. Slattery, 3 App. Cas. 1155; 39 L. T. 365; 27 W. R. 191-H. L. (Ir.)

In an action for negligence it is for the judge to say whether any facts have been proved from which a case of negligence may reasonably be inferred, and then it is for the jury to say whether from those facts negligence ought to be inferred; and Bridges v. North London Ry. (L. R. 7 H. L. 213) does not lay down any new rule as to what is evidence for the jury. Metropolitan Ry. v. Jackson, 47 L. J., C. P. 303; 3 App. Cas. 193; 37 L. T. 679; 26 W. R. 175H. L. (E.)

54; 30 L. J., Ex. 71; 2 L. T. 774; 8 W. R. 665. See Bell v. Midland Ry., 10 C. B. (N.S.) 287; 30 L. J., C. P. 273; 7 Jur. (N.S.) 1200; 4 L. T. 293; 9 W. R. 612.

Amount of Annuity.]-Although a plaintiff, through the negligence of the defendant, is disabled for life from performing the duties of the office to which he has been accustomed, yet the measure of his damages is by no means to be taken from the amount of an annuity which would replace the annual salary of the plaintiff ; for, non constat that he would have retained his situation for life. Rapson v. Cubitt, Car. & M. 64.

Deduction of Insurance Money.]-In an action by a person against a railway company, to recover compensation for bodily injuries sustained through the negligence of the company, the latter is not entitled to deduct, from the damages awarded to the plaintiff by the jury, the amount of money received by him under an insurance in an accidental insurance office as compensation for the same injuries; the latter sum being paid to him under a contract, and as an equivalent for premiums expressly paid upon the contingency of an accident occurring. Bradburn v. G. W. Ry., 44 L. J., Ex. 9; L. R. 10 Ex. 1; 31 L. T. 464;.23 W. R. 48. S. P., Yates v. Whyte, 4 Bing. (N.C.) 272; 5 Scott, 640; 1 Arn. 85; 7 L. J., C. P. 116; 2 Jur. 303, contra, see ante, col. 112.

The plaintiff was a passenger by railway, and at one station, though all the seats in the carri ge in which he was were filled, three more persons got in and stood up. There was no evidence that the servants of the company were aware of this, but the plaintiff remonstrated with the persons who had so got in. At the next station, the door of the carriage was opened by persons who tried to get in, and the plaintiff rose and held up his hand to prevent them. After the train had started, a porter pushed away the persons who were trying to get in and slammed the door, which caught and injured the hand of the plaintiff, who had been thrown Proximate Cause of Loss.]-The plaintiffs, a forward by the motion of the train :-Held, corporate body, left their seal in the custody of that there was no evidence from which the jury their clerk, who, without authority, affixed it to might infer negligence on the part of the com-powers of attorney, under which certain stock in pany so as to entitle the plaintiff to recover damages. Ib.

Semble, when there is more than a scintilla of evidence of contributory negligence the court will not go into the question of degree, that being for the jury. Gee v. Metropolitan Ry., 42 L. J., Q. B. 105; L. R. 8 Q. B. 161; 28 L. T. 282; 21 W. R. 584-Ex. Ch.

Where there is conflicting evidence on a question of fact, whatever may be the opinion of the judge who tries the cause as to the value of that evidence, he must leave the question for the consideration of the jury. Finegan v. L. & N. W. Ry., 53 J. P. 663.

A declaration in an action for negligence, after alleging that the plaintiff was hurt while being carried as a passenger, concluded by stating as damage that she was greatly hurt, maimed, wounded, and permanently injured. At the trial, it was proved that the plaintiff was accustomed to the management of a restaurant, and the judge directed the jury in assessing the damages to ask themselves, "what salary would a lady of experience in that trade be able to command for managing a public-house in London, at a fair salary":-Held, that the question was justified by the form of the count, although no special damage was laid. Potter v. Metropolitan Ry., 28 L. T. 735.

2. DAMAGES.

Exemplary.]-In an action for wilful negligence the jury may take into consideration the motives of the defendant, and if the negligence is accompanied with a contempt of the plaintiff's rights and conveniences the jury may give ex

the public funds, the property of the plaintiffs, was sold. The clerk appropriated the proceeds. In an action in which the plaintiffs claimed that they were entitled to the stock on the ground that it had been transferred without their authority by the defendants :-Held, on the authority of Bank of Ireland v. Ecans' Charities (5 H. L. Cas. 389), that assuming the plaintiffs liad been negligent their negligence was not the proximate cause of the loss, and did not disentitle them from recovering in the action. Merchants of Staple of England v. Bank of England, 57 L. J., Q. B. 418 ; 21 Q. B. D. 160; 36 W. R. 880; 52 J. P. 580-C. A.

Remoteness of Damage.] A servant (in breach of the Metropolitan Police Act, 2 & 3 Vict. c. 47, s. 54), washed a van in a public street, and allowed the waste water to run down the gutter towards a grating leading to the sewer, about twenty-five yards off. In consequence of the extreme severity of the weather, the grating was obstructed by ice, and the water flowed over a portion of the causeway, which was ill paved and uneven, and there froze. There was no evidence that the master knew of the grating being obstructed. A horse, while being led past the spot, slipped upon the ice and broke its leg:-Held, that this was a consequence too remote to be attributed to the wrongful act of the servant. Sharp v. Powell, 41 L. J., C. P. 95; L. R. 7 C. P. 253; 26 L. T. 436; 20 W. R. 584.

In consequence of the servants of a railway company negligently sending trucks down an incline into a siding at 11 p.m., the plaintiff's drove of cattle, which were lawfully being driven

vent his recovering. & P. 613.

Raisin v. Mitchell, 9 Car. | Held, that in the absence of evidence to the contrary, it should be presumed that the defendants accepted the securities in discharge of their manager's obligation to restore them, and were, therefore, bonâ fide holders for value, and entitled to retain them. London and County Banking Co. v. London and River Plate Bank, 57 L. J., Q. B. 601; 21 Q. B. D. 535; 61 L. T. 37: 37 W. R. 89-C. A.

In an action to recover damages for the upsetting of a barge laden with coal belonging to the plaintiff, it appeared that a small steamvessel belonging to the defendant, called the "Water Lily," was proceeding down the river, preceded by a larger one, called the "Ramona," and that, in consequence of the swell occasioned by one or both of these vessels, the barge was swamped, and the coal lost. The amount of damage was about 801. The jury returned a verdict for the plaintiff for 201., assigning, as a reason for giving that sum only, that they did not think the "Water Lily" to have been the sole cause of the accident. The court refused to interfere with the verdict. Smith v. Dobson, 3 Scott (N.R.) 336; 3 Man. & G. 59.

J. M.

NEGOTIABLE INSTRU·

MENTS.

1. General Principles, 121.

2. Delivery Orders and Dock Warrants, 122.

3. Exchequer Bills, 128.

The appellant, who was associated with E. in a financial speculation, gave him, for the purpose of raising a loan, certificates of stock in a foreign railway, of which he executed transfert in blank, and some bonds of foreign companies. Some of the bonds were payable to bearer, and in others the name of the obligee was left blank, and they were transferable, after the name had been filled in, by entry in the company's books. There was evidence that both classes of bonds were treated as negotiable securities transferable by delivery. E., with the consent of the appellant, gave these securities to M., a moneydealer, for the purpose of raising money. M. obtained advances from the respondent banks by depositing these securities, together with others, having first filled up the blank transfers of railway stock. M. became bankrupt, and the banks claimed a right to hold the stock and bonds as security for the whole debt due from him to them. There was evidence that it was

4. Bills of Exchange, Cheques, and Promissory the custom of banks dealing with money-dealers

Notes.-See BILLS OF EXCHANGE.

5. Bank Notes.--See BANKER.

6. Banker's Letter of Credit.-See BANKER. 7. Bills of Lading.-See SHIPPING.

8. Debentures.-See COMPANY.

9. Lloyd's Bonds.-See COMPANY. 10. Other Documents, 129.

1. GENERAL PRINCIPLES.

to make advances to them on deposit of securities en bloc, without regard to particular interests:-Held, that, under the circumstances, the banks could not be considered as holders for value without notice, and, as against the appellant, could not hold the certificates and bonds as security for the whole debt due from M., but only for the specific advances made on them. Sheffield (Earl) v. London Joint Stock Bank, 57 L. J., Ch. 986; 13 App. Cas. 333; 58 L. T. 735; 37 W. R. 33-H. L. (E.)

Holder for Value and in Good Faith.]-A person taking a negotiable instrument in good faith and for value obtains a valid title though 2. DELIVERY ORDERS AND DOCK WARRANTS. he takes from one who had none. A broker in Effect of, as creating Estoppel.]—The defenfraud of the owner pledged negotiable instruments together with other instruments belong-dant being possessed of a quantity of barley sold ing to other persons with a bank as a security eighty quarters to M., who afterwards, on June en bloc for an advance. The bank did not know 27, sold sixty of the eighty quarters to the plainwhether the instruments belonged to the broker tiff, who on the same day paid the price, and foror other persons, or whether the broker had any warded M.'s delivery order for the sixty quarters authority to deal with them, and made no to the defendant, who assented to the same on inquiries. The broker having absconded the the 29th. The bailey remained in bulk in the bank realised the securities :-Held, that there defendant's possession until July 7, on which being as a matter of fact no circumstances to day the plaintiff sent a forwarding order to the create suspicion the bank was entitled to retain defendant, which the latter refused to comply and realise the securities, having taken negoti- with on the ground that M. had in the meantime able instruments for value and in good faith. become bankrupt, and that the barley purchased London Joint Stock Bank v. Simmons, 61 L. J., by him was unpaid for :-Held, that the defenCh. 723; [1892] A. C. 201; 66 L. T. 625; 41 dant, by assenting to the delivery order for the W. R. 108; 56 J. P. 644-H. L. (E.) See sixty quarters, was estopped from denying the Bentinck v. London Joint Stock Bank, 62 L. J., plaintiff's right thereto, notwithstanding that Ch. 358; [1893] 2 Ch. 120; 3 R. 120; 68 L. T. the price of the barley was paid to M. con315; 42 W. R. 140. temporaneously with the forwarding of the delivery order to the defendant. Knights v. Wiffen, 40 L. J., Q. B. 51; L. R., 5 Q. B. 660; 23 L. T. 610; 19 W. R. 244.

Certain negotiable securities were stolen from the defendants by their manager, and came into the possession of the plaintiffs for value, and without notice of any fraud. Subsequently the manager obtained the securities from the plaintiffs by fraud, and restored them to the defendants, who did not know that the securities had been out of their possession. A portion of the restored securities were not the bonds actually stolen, but bonds of a like kind and value:

As excluding Doctrine of Reputed Ownership.]-At the time of the presentation of a petition for liquidation by arrangement there were lying in the bonded warehouse of the debtors, who were wine and spirit merchants in Liverpool, certain butts of whisky which they

had sold to the purchaser. The goods were left there for the convenience of the purchaser, to whom a delivery warrant had been given by the vendors, in which they stated that they held the goods to his order as warehousemen. The vendors did not carry on business as general warehousemen, but it was proved to be the usual custom of the wine and spirit trade, in Liver-dorsement directing the company to deliver the pool, for goods sold in bond to remain in the possession or under the control of the vendors, in the bonded warehouse in which they were at the time of sale, until they were required by the purchaser for use:-Held, that the existence of a custom of this nature, shown to be well known among persons concerned in the wine and spirit trade, excluded the doctrine of reputed ownership, and that the goods did not pass to the trustee. Watkins, Ex parte, Couston, In re, 42 L. J., Bk. 50; L. R. 8 Ch. 520; 28 L. T. 793; 21 W. R. 530.

At the commencement of the liquidation of wine and spirit merchants, whisky which they had sold was lying in the bonded warehouse of a third party to the order of the vendors. The delivery order was not sent to the purchaser till after the petition had been filed. It was shown that it is the well-known custom in the wine and spirit trade for goods after sale to remain in the bonded warehouse of the vendor, or in that of a third party to his order, till the purchaser requires them for use-Held, that the custom excluded reputation of ownership in the vendors, and that the purchaser was entitled to the whisky, the giving of the delivery order being immaterial. Vaur, Ex parte, Couston or Conston, In re, 43 L. J., Bk. 113; L. R. 9 Ch. 602; 30 L. T. 739; 22 W. R. 811.

Held, also, that it was immaterial that the goods were in the warehouse of a third party instead of being in the vendor's own warehouse.

Ib.

A., the owner of goods which were warehoused in bond in the name of B., his agent, sold the goods to C., and gave him a delivery note, addressed to B., directing him to deliver the goods to the order of C." C. never presented the delivery note, nor intimated his purchase to the warehouseman, but sold the goods to D., and received the purchase-money, on which sale C. handed over the delivery note, endorsed "Deliver to the order of D." D. presented this delivery order so endorsed to B., the agent of A., who thereupon gave D. a document, in these terms: "Delivered to the order of D.;" but D. did not intimate his purchase to the warehouseman. On the same day that D. presented his delivery order to B., C. became bankrupt, not having paid A. for the goods :-Held, this case not being within the meaning of the Factors' Act, the 6 Geo. 4, c. 94, that the delivery note, unlike a bill of lading, did not transfer the possession of the goods; and that the document signed by B., "Delivered to the order of D.," did not alter the case, B. not being the custodier of the goods; and consequently that A., the vendor, upon the bankruptcy of C., was entitled to the goods. M'Ewan v. Smith, 2 H. L. Cas. 309; 13 Jur. 265.

A second vendee of goods, who purchases and pays his money upon the transfer of a delivery order, does not, in the absence of special circumstances, acquire any better title to the goods than the first vendee, as against the first vendor. Ib.

Lien of Unpaid Vendor.]-Goods were consigned to the plaintiffs' order to a railway station, and the usual advice note was sent them by the company. On the 12th April, the plaintiffs sold these goods to J., payment half by cash, half by bill at three months, due the 13th July, and handed over the advice note to J., with an ingoods to J.'s order. On the 24th April, J. handed over this delivery order to D. as collateral security for the payment of money advanced to him by D., with a second indorsement ordering the company to deliver the goods to D.'s order. But neither this delivery order nor that made by the plaintiffs was stamped in accordance with the Stamp Act, 1870, s. 89. J. becoming insolvent, C. on the 14th May wrote to the company inclosing the delivery order, and directing them to hold the goods to his order. To this he received the following reply from the goods manager, dated the 15th May: "I have yours of yesterday, inclosing transfer of rails, and beg to say I hold them to your order; but will you please produce this order when applying for the rails, and which order must also bear a transfer stamp by both parties transferring the goods, in accordance with the act of parliament. You will be aware they remain here at owner's risk and subject to our usual rent-charges." On the 19th May, D. affixed an adhesive stamp to each transfer, but omitted to cancel the stamps, as required by ss. 24 and 89, and the same were never, up to trial, so cancelied. On the 23rd May, the company wrote to the plaintiffs, asking if they consented to the goods being delivered to D., to which they replied on the 23rd and 30th June, giving the company formal notice to hold them to their (plaintiffs')_order; but upon indemnity being given by D. the goods were handed over to D. The bill given to the plaintiffs by J. in part payment of these goods not being met at maturity, the plaintiffs claimed the goods as partial unpaid ven lors, and brought an action against the company for wrongfully parting with the possession of them :-Held, that the condition in the company's letter of the 15th May, as to the transfer stamp, was no qualification of their admission that they held the goods to D.'s order; that the letter was an absolute attornment by the company to D., by which the plaintiffs' right of possession as unpaid vendors was destroyed, and that the plaintiffs were, therefore, not entitled to recover. Pooley v. G. E. Ry., 34 L. T. 537.

On the 3rd of March goods belonging to C., lying at the St. Katherine Dock, in the custody of the docks company, were bought by D., as broker for buyers and sellers, for B. & Co., without disclosing the names of his principals, and D. indorsed to them the delivery order he had obtained from the sellers, on the representation of B. & Co. that the goods were wanted for immediate shipment. They, however, pledged their interest in the goods to the plaintiffs, and indorsed the order to them. On the prompt day, the 18th of March, the plaintiffs' clerk lodged the order at the London office of the docks company, with this memorandum : “Hold within to our order, and have warrants made out as soon as possible." He was told that the warrants would be ready with the goods on the 20th of March. Three hours later a messenger from the office reached the warrant office at the dock house with a notice that the order had been lodged. Meanwhile B. & Co. had stopped payment, and D.