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A agreed to sell goods to B., to be accounted for in part of a debt to B.; C., with notice, agreed to sell the goods as factor, not allowed to retain for a debt to him from A. Id. 416. The means of knowledge by which a party is to be affected with notice must be understood to be means of knowledge which are practically within reach, and of which a prudent man might have been expected to avail himself. Broadbent v. Barlow, 30 L. J., Ch. 569; 7 Jur. (N.S.) 479; 4 L. T. 193-L. C.

Notice to a person, to be binding on him, must be given to him in the character in which such notice is intended to affect him, and not in any other character. Beioley v. Carter, 17 W. R. 130.

Acts of the court, as the commitment of a wardship, &c., in a cause depending, to be taken notice of by every one at his peril. Herbert's Case, 3 P. W. 116.

On Whom Binding.]-A feme covert or infant is as much bound by notice as an adult. Jones v. Kearney, 1 Dr. & War. 134; 1 Con. & L. 34; 4 Ir. Eq. R. 74.

The only exception, and the well-known exception, to the rule which protects a purchaser with notice taking from a purchaser without notice is that which prevents a trustee buying back trust property which he has sold, or a fraudulent man who has acquired property by fraud saying he sold it to a bonâ fide purchaser without notice, and has got it back again. Those are cases to show that a person shall not take advantage of his own wrong. Barrow's Case, 49 L. J., Ch. 498; 14 Ch. D. 445; 42 L. T. 891 -C. A.

Publication of Statutory Notice.]-Where a statute required notices "to be affixed on the principal outer door of the church of such parish, or if there shall not be any church in such parish, then upon the principal outer door of every known place of religious worship in such parish," it was held that posting the notices on a notice-board fixed on a gate-pier facing the principal entrance to a place of worship, but on the opposite side of the road, was not a compliance with the statutory requirement. Reg. v. Meath JJ., [1897] 2 Ir.

Purchaser having employed the vendor's agent | R. 21. who had notice of an incumbrance, charged with notice, notwithstanding the purchase was made under the sanction of the court, and an infant was interested in it. Toulmin v. Steere, 3 Mer. 210; 17 R. R. 67.

A. agrees to take a lease of certain lands, but previous to signing articles, he has notice that B. has a previous agreement for lease. A. disregards notice, and obtains lease in his son's name:Held, that notice to father affected son. Coote v. Mammon, 5 Bro. P. C. 355.

If a man will purchase with notice of another's right, giving a consideration will not avail him. Mead v. Orrery (Lord), 3 Atk. 238.

Party having notice through his agent of sufficient to make him inquire as to the title, cannot protect himself by procuring the legal estate. Maddox v. Maddox, 1 Ves. 61.

To Persons under Statutory Obligation.]— When a duty to be performed at uncertain intervals has been created by statute, the person liable to fulfil it must have notice of the necessity to perform it before he can be held responsible for its non-fultiment by the person for whose benefit it exists, if the latter is aware of the circumstances requiring its fulfilment, and is in possession of the thing as to which it is to be discharged. L. & S. W. Ry. v. Flower, 45 L. J., C. P. 54; 1 C. P. D. 77; 33 L. T. 687.

To Landlord to Repair.]-Under a covenant by a lessor "to keep the main walls, main timbers, and roofs of the demised premises in good repair during the continuance of the demise," the lessor cannot be sued for any non-repair unless he has had notice from the lessee of the want of repair. Makin v. Watkinson, 40 L. J., Ex. 33; L. R. 6 Ex. 25 ; 23 L. T. 592; 19 W. R. 286.

2. TIME WHEN MATERIAL.

The purchaser of a legal estate having express notice of a prior equitable conveyance by registered deed, and purchasing from a vendor who is out of possession, is not entitled to the property as against the equitable purchaser, and an erroneous recital of the earlier title in the registered deed does not preclude the grantor from showing what interest really passed by the deed. Trinidad Execution of Deed or Payment.]-Though a Asphalte Co. v. Coryat, 65 L. J., P. C. 100; purchaser knew not of an encumbrance before he [1896] A. C. 587; 75 L. T. 108; 45 W. R. 225-paid his money, yet if he knew it before the deed P. C. was executed, it affects him with notice. Wigg v. Wigg, 1 Atk. 384.

Although between purchasers having equal equities the court will not be active to take away the benefit of diligence, it will hold it against conscience in a subsequent purchaser having actual notice, or in a person claiming as heir to the vendor, to use a legal estate in the trustee to evict the prior purchaser. Scott v. Dunbar, 1 Moll. 442.

The doctrine of notice, applicable in determining the priority of charges on choses in action, does not prevail as to equitable estates in land. Wilmot v. Pike, 5 Hare, 14; 9 Jur. 839.

Semble, an act done or payment made in England in accordance with the English law will be protected though inconsistent with a foreign law affecting the subject matter, if the party had no notice of such foreign law. Leslie V. Baillie, 2 Y. & Coll. C. C. 91; 12 L. J. Ch. 153; 7 Jur. 77

A purchaser denying notice at or before the execution of the deeds, is not sufficient; he must aver that he had none at or before the payment of the money. Story v. Windsor (Lord), 2 Atk. 630; 1 Ch. Ca. 34.

Where a man purchases an estate, pays part, and gives bond to pay the residue of the money, notice of an equitable incumbrance before payment of the money, though after the bond, is sufficient. Tourville v. Naish, 3 P. W. 306.

Denying notice of plaintiff's title at the time of the execution of the deed, or payment of the consideration money, is not sufficient; you must swear you had no notice at or before the execution. Fitzgerald v. Burk, 2 Atk. 397.

The purchaser of a reversion, under a decree of the court, will not be precluded from taking advantage of a breach of covenant incident to the reversion, by notice of a breach being com

mitted, before the sale was confirmed. Gerrald v. O'Reilly, 2 Con. & L. 165: 3 Dr. & War. 414. Where the master of a ship, in behalf of the owner, lets the ship on charterparty to A., and the owner becomes bankrupt, and his assignees give notice to A. not to pay any further sums of money on account thereof to the master, this notice will affect A., as to all sums paid afterwards by him to the master beyond what the master had actually paid or stood engaged for on account of the ship at the time of the notice, but will not defeat payments made to that extent. Wilkins v. Mure, 1 Cox, 150.

A party claiming to be a purchaser for a valuable consideration without notice, under a marriage contract, must show that he had no notice at the time of the settlement; proof that he had no notice at the time of the articles, is not sufficient. Davies v. Thomas, 2 Y. & Coll. 234; 7 L. J.. Ex. Eq. 21.

Purchaser or mortgagee coming in upon valuable consideration without notice, and purchasing in a precedent incumbrance, it shall protect his estate against any mortgage subsequent to the first, though before the last mortgage, though he purchased in the incumbrance after he had had notice of the second mortgage. Marsh v. Lee, 2 Vent. 339.

A purchaser for valuable consideration without notice of any prior equity, having accidentally acquired the legal estate under a deed of which he ha no notice at the time of the purchase, is not affected with notice of anything contained in such deed. Pilcher v. Rwlins, 41 L. J., Ch. 485; L. R. 7 Ch. 259; 25 L. T. 921; 20 W. R. 281.

A sale of the estate of an insolvent debtor, made bonâ fide, at a public auction, is not, after conveyance to the purchaser, necessarily voidable in equity, only because the purchaser, after the sale but before the conveyance, had notice of circumstances attending the conduct of the sale by the assignees amounting to negligence on their part. Borrell v. Dann, 2 Hare, 440.

Effect of in case of Tacking.]—See MORTGAGE.

3. THROUGH PARTICULAR PERSONS.

a. Agent.

Notice to an agent or trustee is notice to the principal. Le Nere v. Le Neve, Ambl. 436.

Notice to agent:-Held, to affect principals, and no difference in this case by his being owner of the estate. Sheldon v. Cox, 2 Eden, 224.

Notice to agent placing out money on mortgage, of a prior judgment, shall affect the employer. Ashley v. Baillie, 2 Ves. 370.

previous to signing articles he has notice that B. has a previous agreement for lease. B. disregards notice and obtains lease in his son's name:-Held, that notice to father affected son. Coste v. Mammon, 5 Bro. P. C. 355.

A person not a solicitor, nor attorney, nor certificated conveyancer, was employed by the purchaser to prepare the conveyance; such person knew of an incumbrance on the property:Held, that the purchaser had constructive notice. Dryden v. Frost, 1 Jur. 330.

An agent receiving notes from an executor payable to him as executor, as a security for advances by the principal to the executor on his private account, and not as executor, affects his principal, with notice that it is a dealing with an executor for the assets for a purpose foreign to the trusts he was to discharge; the principal is thereby a party to the devastavit, and liable to the consequences thereof, and cannot, therefore, retain the notes against those claiming under the will. Downes v. Power, 2 Ball & B. 491.

W. B. having, as land and law agent of F. H., negotiated and been party to a deed of separation and maintenance between F. H. and his wife M. H. in the year 1821, and having by fraud prevented the registry of that deed of maintenance, was four years afterwards employed throughout the negotiation of a loan of money which was advanced on a registered mortgage of the estates comprised in the deed of maintenance, as solicitor of F. II. & X. Y., the person advancing the money. In a contest for priority between the unregistered deed of maintenance and the registered mortgage :-Held, that X. Y. should be treated as a person who through his agent had actual notice of the deed of maintenance, and that consequently X. Y.'s registered deed should be postponed to M. H.'s unregistered deed. Nixon v. Hamilton, 2 Dr. & W. 364; 1 Ir. Eq. R. 46.

Agent-Who is.]-Purchaser, having employed the vendor's agent, who had notice of an incumbrance, charged with notice, notwithstanding the purchase was made under the sanction of the court, and an infant was interested in it. Toulmin v. Steere, 3 Mer. 210; 17 R. R. 67.

A party who takes an assignment of a lease from the agent of the lessor, with notice of the assignor's character as agent, has the same liability of sustaining the lease cast upon him that the agent has; and if the lease cannot be upheld by the agent, neither can it be supported by the purcha-er from the agent. Molony v. Kernan, 2 Dr. & War. 31.

A testatrix, who died in 1871, by her will devised real estate in Middlesex to trustees upon trust for sale. The will was not registered in Middlesex. The heir-at-law of the testatrix

Constructive knowledge imputed to the plaintiffs by the court of an infringement of their copyright by the defendants. Lewis v. Chap-having learned that the will had not been man, 3 Beav. 133.

Notice to an agent as well as personal notice will affect the party. Maddox v. Maddox, 1 Ves. 61.

If A., having notice that lands were contracted to be sold to B., purchases those lan is and takes a conveyance to his son and heirs, though the son had no notice of B.'s contract, yet the notice to his father shall affect him. Merry v. Abney, 1 Ch. Ca. 38.

So, if one who purchases for another has notice of a dormant incumbrance, it shall affect the very purchaser. Ib.

A. agrees to take a lease of certain lands, but

registered, mortgaged the property to different mortgagees, and registered the mortgages. The mortgage deeds were prepared and registered by the heir-at-law himself. The surviving trustee received the rents of the property down to 1878. when he died, and in 1879 a receiver was appointed in an action to administer the estate of the testatrix. The property was sold in 1882 under an order of the court, and notice of the mortgages was then given by the mortgagees to the purchasers, and the purchase-moneys were paid into court subject to the claims of the mortgagees. The heir-at-law died in 1885. An application was made to transfer the purchase

moneys to the acconnt of the devisees under the | will. The mortgagees resisted the application on the ground that the act of 7 Anne, c. 20, gave them a title, because the will had not been registered. Neither of the securities was for moneys advanced, but both for old debts, and the heir-at-law acted in the mortgage transactions as agent of both the mortgagees :-Held, that, if persons claiming under the act had notice of the will, they could not set up the title of the heirat-law; that in the present case the mortgagees were affected by the notice which their agent the heir-at-law possessed; and that consequently their claims failed. Weir, In re, Hollingworth v. Willing, 58 L. T. 792.

Where the assignor of a policy is the agent of the insurance company, notice to him is sufficient though formally given. Hennessy, In re, 2 Dr. & War. 555; 1 Con. & L. 559; 5 Ir. Eq. R. 259.

If the same person is agent both for the vendor and purchaser, or is himself vendor and agent for the purchaser, whatever notice he may have will affect the purchaser. Dryden v. Frost, 3 Myl. & C. 670; 8 L. J., Ch. 235; 2 Jur. 1030.

In Company Cases.]-P. having money at his banking account belonging to O. purchased with it, and other money of his own standing to the same account, some overdue bills. Very shortly afterwards he sold them at an advanced price to a company, of which he was the sole director, and he paid himself the price out of the assets of the company :-Held, that the company was not affected by constructive notice of the fraud committed by P. Oriental Commercial Bank, Er parte, European Bank, In_re, 39 L. J., Ch. 588; L. R. 5 Ch. 358; 22 L. T. 422; 18 W. R. 474.

On a question of priority of incumbrances on shares, notice to one member of a joint-stock company is not notice to the company. Martin v. Sedgwick, 9 Beav. 333; 10 Jur. 463. S. P., Carew, In re, 31 Beav. 39.

The mere fact that two companies have common directors or a common solicitor does not affect the one company with notice of acts done or knowledge possessed by the common directors or the common solicitor as directors or solicitor of the other company. Crédit Foncier and Mobilier, Ex parte, Marseilles Extension Ry, In re, 41 L. J., Ch. 345; L. R. 7 Ch. 161; 20 W. R.

254.

Where two companies have an officer in common, the test to be applied in determining whether notice of irregularities committed by one company is to be imputed to the other company is first, Was it within the scope of the duty of one company's officer to give notice to the other company? Secondly, Was it within the scope of the duty of the officer of the other company to receive such notice? Hampshire Land Co., In re, Portsea Island Building Society, Ex parte, 65 L. J., Ch. 860; [1896] 2 Ch. 743; 75 L. T. 181; 45 W. R. 136; 3 Manson, 269.

Hold, also (following Marseilles Extension Ry. In re, Crédit Fmcier and Mobilier, Ex parte, 41 L. J., Ch. 345; L. R. 7 Ch. 161; and Gale v. Lewis, 9 Q. B. 730; 16 L. J., Q. B. 119) that notice of the irregularity in summoning the meeting of the H. company could not be imputed to the P, company, and that the P. company was entitled to prove for the loan in the winding-up of the H. company. Ib.

In order that a notice to a company may be

effectual, either it must be given to the company itself through its proper officers, or it must be received by the company in the course of the transaction of its business; casual knowledge acquired by the secretary as an individual and not whilst he is engaged in transacting the business of the company, cannot be deemed notice to the company. Société Générale de Paris v. Tramways Union Co. 54 L. J., Q. B. 177; 14 Q. B. D. 424; 52 L. T. 912-C. A.

Though notice to the directors of a company is primâ facie notice to the company, it is otherwise in a case where it is certain that the directors would not communicate the information to the shareholders. Fitzroy Bessemer Steel Co., In re, 50 L. T. 144; 42 W. R. 475. Compromised on appeal, 33 W. R. 312.

Omitting to Inquire, no ground of Relief.]A purchaser of an estate, having made no inquiry respecting the title from an agent for the sale, is not entitled to any relief for noncommunication of any defect by him. Wilde v. Gibson, 1 H. L. Cas. 605; 12 Jur. 527

Knowledge acquired in Character of Agent.]— Constructive knowle lge of an agent, or knowledge acquired by him otherwise than as an agent for the sale, of a fact, the non-communication of which is made the ground for relief against the purchase, does not at all affect the contract. Ib.

Trustees not affected by notice to their agent, which he did not receive in that character. France v. Woods, Taml. 172.

Notice to an agent must come to the agent while concerned for the principal, and in the course of the very transaction which becomes the subject of the suit. Hiern v. Mill, 13 Ves. 120; 9 R. R. 149.

An agent must be confidentially employed by his principal, in order to affect the latter with constructive notice. Chandos v. Brownlow, 2 Ridgw. P. C. 394.

Though it is the general rule that notice to an agent, in order to affect the principal, must be in the same transaction, yet if, from all the surrounding circumstances, from the one transaction being so recent or so closely connected with the other, that the party must be presumed to have remembered the previous one, in such case the notice, although not in the same transaction, is nevertheless binding. Majoribanks v. Iovenden, Dru. 11; 6 Ir. Eq. R. 238.

In order to affect a principal with constructive notice of facts within the knowledge of an agent, it is necessary not only that the knowledge should be derived from the same transaction, but it must be knowledge of facts which are material to the transaction, and which it was the duty of the agent to communicate. Wyllie v. Pollen, 3 De G. J. & S. 596; 2 N. R. 500; 32 L. J., Ch. 782; 9 L. T. 71; 11 W. R. 1081.

Effect of Conveyancing Act, 1882, s. 3] -The effect of s. 3 of the Conveyancing Act, 1882, which provides that a purchaser shall not be prejudicially affected by notice of an instrument, fact, or thing, unless in the same transaction it has come to the knowledge of his counsel, solicitor, or agent, " as such," is that a purchaser is only to be affected with notice of such instruments, &c., as have come to the knowledge of the agent as agent for the purchaser. Cousins' Trusts,

In re, 55 L. J., Ch. 662; 31 Ch. D. 671; 54 L. T. | and irregularity in the accounts, a proper 376; 34 W. R. 393. investigation of the sources of which would have led to the discovery of all that had been done :Held, also, that under such circumstances the court, for the protection of those who deal with partnerships, must impute the knowledge which the partners, acting for their interests and in discharge of their plain duty, might and ought to have obtained. Sadler v. Lee, 6 Beav. 324; 12 L. J., Ch. 407; 7 Jur. 476.

In 1871 C. mortgaged his share of a trust fund to B. In 1873 C. mortgaged the same share to | R., repaying B. out of the sum advanced. In 1874 R. transferred the mortgage to D. In 1875 C. mortgage the same share to P., who had no notice of the prior mortgage. In all the transactions B., who was solicitor to the trustees of the fund, acted as solicitor for all parties. The first notice to the trustees of any assignment by C. was of the assignment by C. to P. :-Held, that P. was entitled to priority over D. Ib.

Ratification.]—A. having notice of an incumbrance, purchases in the name of B. and then agrees that B. shall be the purchaser, and he accordingly pays the purchase-money without notice of the incumbrance. Though B. did not employ A., nor knew anything of the purchase till after it was made, yet B., approving of it afterwards, made A. his agent ab initio, and therefore shall be affected with the notice to A. Jennings v. Moore, 2 Vern. 609. S. C. sub. nom. Blenkarne v. Jennens, 2 Bro. P. C. 278.

b. Counsel.

What sufficient.]-To affect purchaser by notice to his counsel, it should be in the same transaction. Fitzgerald v. Fuuconberge, Fitzg. 207.

Where notice to the party's counsel, is notice to the party. Preston v. Tubbin, 1 Vern. 287.

Where, by a transaction foreign to the business in hand, a counsel or attorney employed to look over a title has notice, that shall not affect the purchaser. Lowther v. Carlton, 2 Atk. 242; Cas. t. Talb. 186. S. P. Worsley v. Scarborough (Earl), 3 Atk. 292.

No constructive notice for title-deeds, etc., laid before counsel or attorney, or anything that could not be supposed to make an impression on the memory. Ashley v. Baillie, 2 Ves. 370.

In 1802 F., being in treaty with J., for his interest in the lease of 1796, laid a case before counsel, stating (amongst other things) the will of J. B., and being advised that the title was good, became the purchaser thereof, for valuable consideration, and died, having devised the same to his two daughters, upon whose respective marriages settlements were executed, stating the interest to be a lease for lives renewable for ever-Held, that F., and the several parties deriving under the settlements, were affected with the notice of the will of J. B. Buckley v. Lanauze, Ll. & G. t. Plunk. 327.

c. Partner.

The rule, that notice to one partner in an ordinary trading partnership is notice to all the partners, does not apply to a joint-stock company. Carew, In re, 31 Beav. 39.

Upon a question whether one partner had notice of the irregular course of dealing of his co-partner, to the prejudice of their customer, the court was of opinion that he ought to be deemed to have known the facts, it appearing from the evidence, that if he had used ordinary diligence and attention in the management of the business he might and must have discovered all the material facts; that the means of knowledge were within his power; that he would, with very little trouble, have found confusion

Two partners in a firm announced their intention of adding 1,000l. to their capital by admitting one or more additional partners. W. entered into a negotiation with one of the partners, then acting on behalf of both, on the subject of the announcement, but afterwards, declining to enter into the firm, advanced a sum of 4,000l. to that partner by way of loan, on the security of the bills of the firm, and also of the separate estate of such partner :-Held, that W. had, so far as this evidence went, no ice that the loan of 4,000l. was an advance not within the implied authority of the partner obtaining it, the other partner having authorised the capital to be raised in a different mode; but, inasmuch as the original partnership was then existing, and the advance might have been within the scope of the partnership authority, without reference to the proposed increase of capital, liberty was given to W., for the purpose of trying that question, to bring an action on the bills against the executors of the other partner. Fisher v. Taylor, 2 Hare, 218.

d. Solicitor.

Generally.]-Notice to a solicitor is actual notice to the client. Gosling's case, 3 Sim. 301. S. P. Espin v. Pemberton, 3 De G. & J. 547; 28 L. J., Ch. 311; 5 Jur. (N.S.) 157; 7 W. R. 221.

A. makes three several mortgages to B., C., and D., and in the last mortgage B. is a party, and agrees that after he is paid he will stand a trustee for D. :-Decreed, that C. shall be paid before D., for all the security being transacted by the same scrivener, it was notice to D. Brotherton v. Hatt, 2 Vern. 574.

The equitable doctrine of constructive notice as between solicitor and client is founded on the principle that the solicitor is alter ego, and his knowledge is the client's knowledge. Boursot v. Savage, 35 L. J., Ch. 627; L. R. 2 Eq. 134; 14 L. T. 299; 14 W. R. 565.

The doctrine of imputed notice, resulting from the relation of solicitor and client discussed. Sankey v. Alexander, Ir. R. 9 Eq. 259—Ch. App.

If a party in the matter of a purchase employ a solicitor who has any knowledge of an incumbrance affecting the property, such knowledge is in law communicated to the principal, although the latter may be wholly unconscious of the existence of the incumbrance. Majoribanks v. Hovenden, Dru. 11; 6 Ir. Eq. R. 238.

B., a solicitor, not having delivered his bill of costs, represents to his client that he is indebted to him in a certain sum, for which he induces him to execute a bond to W., to whom B. is indebted in the same amount, B. having acted as W.'s solicitor :-W. held to be affected with B.'s knowledge in the transaction. Harrison v. Wiltshire, 4 L. J., Ch. 260.

A registered mortgage will not be preferred to a prior unregistered deed of annuity, where the solicitor of the mortgagee was, at the time of executing the mortgage, fully aware of the

existence of the former deed, having himself assisted in the preparation and execution of it, and being a party thereto as trustee; there being at the same time some evidence to show that the non-registry of the former deed was caused by the improper conduct of the same solicitor. Nixon v. Hamilton, 2 Dr. & Wal. 364; 1 Ir. Eq. R. 46.

A. executed a mortgage to B. for 1,000l. This was not acted on, but A. afterwards executed another mortgage for 2,000l. to B. The solicitor employed retained the first deed, and afterwards fraudulently induced B., without consideration to sign a memorandum, undertaking to transfer the first mortgage to C., and he executed such transfer. C., on the faith of B.'s acts, advanced 1,0007., which was received by the solicitor and misapplied-Held, that B. must be postponed to C. Hiorns v. Holtom, 16 Beav. 259; 16 Jur. 1077.

A. conveyed an estate to B., and, according to the conveyance, an acceptance was given in full satisfaction for the absolute purchase; but in reality, it was agreed that the vendor should have a mortgage for the money. Before the acceptance became due, B. mortgaged to C., who employed the same solicitor as had been engaged in the purchase, and C. had notice that the bill had not been paid, and of the form of the conveyance-Held, first, that C. was affected by the notice in his solicitor; and, secondly, that under the circumstances, he was bound to inquire into the true nature of the transaction between A. and B., and consequently that his security ought to be postponed to A.'s. Frail v. Ellis, 16 Beav. 350 ; 22 L. J., Ch. 467 ; 1 W. R. 72. A mortgage was given for a judgment debt; there was a prior equitable charge, of which the mortgagee had no direct notice, but no investigation of title or production of deeds was had; besides which, by arrangement, the mortgagor's solicitor prepared the deed for the mortgagee's solicitor. The court concluded that the arrangement was to give a mortgage subject to existing charges, and also, that the mortgagee was affected by the notice possessed by the mortgagor's solicitor of the prior equitable title. Tweedale V. Tweedale, 23 Beav. 341.

Who are Agents.]-A., who was entitled under a will to share in the proceeds of sale of real estate in Middlesex, devised on trust for sale, mortgaged his interest to several persons. One set of incumbrances registered their charge in the Middlesex registry, and on that ground claimed priority over the other incumbrancers, who had either not registered their charges at all, or had registered them after the applicants had registered theirs -Held, that an interest of this nature was not within the Middlesex Registration Act (7 Anne, c. 20), s. 1, which was intended to apply to dealings with the land itself, and consequently no priority could be obtained by prior registration of a charge upon it. The applicants also claimed priority for their charge on the ground of notice, the alleged notice consisting of a letter not from them or their solicitors, but from the solicitors of the plaintiff in the action to the solicitors of the trustees of the will under which A. took, in which the applicants were mentioned as incumbrancers, and also of a correspondence between their solicitors and one of the firm of solicitors acting for the trustees, in which their solicitors mentioned that they were instructed for mortgagees of A., but did

not say who those mortgagees were, or give any further information. These statements appeared never to have come to the knowledge of the trustees themselves:-Held, that the solicitors of the trustees were not their agents for receiving notice of incumbrances, and neither of the so-called notices was such as would give priority to the applicants, or prevent a subsequent incumbrancer who gave direct notice to the trustees from obtaining priority over them. Arden v. Arden, 54 L. J., Ch. 655; 29 Ch. D. 702; 52 L. T. 610; 33 W. R. 593.

Where there had been an assignment of reversionary interests, and notice given to the solicitors of the trustees, but not for the express purpose of being communicated to them :-Held, that that was notice to the trustees so as to take the property out of the order and disposition of the assignor on his becoming insolvent. Rickards v. Gledstanes, 3 Giff. 298; 8 Jur. (N.S.) 455. Affirmed 31 L. J., Ch. 142; 5 L. T. 568.

The plaintiffs took a mortgage of a reversionary share in a testator's estate, and gave notice of the incumbrance to a firm of solicitors who were acting for the trustees and executors in a chancery suit to which the testator had been a party, and were employed by them in all matters relating to the testator's estate in which professional assistance was required. The solicitors wrote accepting the notice on behalf of the trustees. A member of the firm deposed that at the close of a meeting held at his office two months afterwards, with reference to the winding-up of the chancery suit, and lasting above three hours, the notice was read to the trustees. Two of the trustees positively denied this, and the third denied all recollection of it. There was no further proof of their having received notice of it until after notices of other incumbrances had been duly given to them :-Held, that notice to the solicitors was not good notice to the trustees. Saffron Walden Second Benefit Building Society v. Rayner, 49 L. J., Ch. 465; 14 Ch. D. 406; 43 L. T. 3; 28 W. R. 681.

Held, that the solicitors in accepting service of the notice on behalf of the trustees were not guilty of a misrepresentation of fact for which they could be made liable, but were acting under an opinion common to both parties, but which was erroneous in point of law, that their employment as solicitors enabled them effectually to accept service of the notice. Ib.

Held, further, that evidence of parol notice having been given to the trustees in the course of conversation at the end of a meeting called upon other business, could not be relied upon as fixing the trustees with notice in opposition to their denial of having received it. 16.

Held, therefore, that the plaintiffs must be postponed to the subsequent incumbrances. Ib. The employment of a solicitor to do a mere ministerial act, such as procuring the execution of a deed, does not so constitute him an agent as to affect his client with constructive notice of matters within the knowledge of the solicitor. Wyllie v. Pollen, 3 De G. J. & S. 596; 2 N. R. 500; 32 L. J., Ch. 782; 9 L. T. 71; 11 W. R. 1081.

The plaintiffs effected with the defendant a policy of marine insurance on goods which included risk on craft and lighters, and was not with no recourse against lightermen. At the time of effecting such policy the plaintiffs had an arrangement with one H., by which he was to do all the plaintiffs' lighterage on the terms

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