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R. 250.

randum of deposit: "I hereby certify that Mr. | against even him. Twycross v. Moore, 13 Ir. Eq. C. has a good title to the above properties," for which the bank paid him a fee. In 1868 W. became bankrupt, whereupon the fact of the deposit with the bank was discovered by the co-trustee and the beneficiaries; and the bank were informed of the trustees' claim. In 1869 C. died, and the mortgagee deeds could not be found. In 1873 W. died. On a bill by the beneficiaries and surviving trustee of the settlement against the bank, praying for a declaration that they were first mortgagees, and for the delivery up of the title deeds :-Held, that by reason of the fraud of W. notice of the first mortgage could not be imputed through him to the bank, and that the bank was a mortgagee for value without notice of the prior mortgage. Waldy v. Gray, 44 L. J., Ch. 394; L. R. 20 Eq. 238; 32 L. T. 531; 23 W. R. 676.

A solicitor mortgaged hereditaments in Middlesex to one client, and did not register the charge; he subsequently mortgaged the same hereditaments to another client who did register :-Held, that the second mortgagee was affected with Lotice of the earlier incumbrance, and did not gain priority by registration. Bradley v. Riches, 47 L. J., Ch. 811; 9 Ch. D. 189; 38 L. T. 810; 26 W. R. 910.

Action by a legatee under the will of F., who died in 1870, asking for payment of her legacy, which was directed to be raised out of real estate, and the non-raising of which she alleged to be a breach of trust and the execution of the trusts of F.'s will. There had originally been three executors and trustees of F.'s will; one of these, J., still survived, and was a party to the action. C. H. F.. another of the executers, had died in 1878. The executors of C. H. F. were made defendants, but claimed to be dismissed on the ground that in October, 1879, they had issued | advertisements for claims under the provisions of 22 & 23 Vict. c. 35, s. 29, that no claim had been made for the legacy, and they had distributed the whole of C. H. F.'s estate. The plaintiff insisted that they ought to be retained as defendants because J., the surviving trustee, had acted as solicitor for the executors of C. H. F., and had committed a breach of trust in not seeing that the plaintiff's legacy was raised, and that the executors of C. H. F. had constructive notice of this breach of trust when they distributed the estate-Held, that, under the circumstances, no notice of the plaintiff's claim could be brought home to the executors of C. H. F. Frewen, In re, Frewen v. Frewen, 60 L. T. 953.

Who bound.]-Notice to the solicitor is notice to the client, but the rule does not extend to cases where the solicitor acts for third parties. Gerrard v. O'Reilly, 2 Con. & L. 165; 3 Dr. & War. 414.

T. a trustee, lent trust money on mortgage to M. By an arrangement on the marriage of M.'s daughter, a valuable leasehold interest was granted by M. out of the mortgaged premises, and put in settlement; T. being the person who managed it and the solicitor who prepared the lease and settlement, the daughter or her husband not being informed of the mortgage. T. afterwards, with his co-trustee and their cestuis que trustent, filed a bill to foreclose the mortgage, and sell discharged of the lease, if necessary :-Held, that the parties deriving under the settlement were fixed with notice of the mortgage and trusts, and could not rely on T.'s conduct as a defence

The solicitor for X., who was plaintiff in a suit to raise a charge on certain lands, purchased in the name of a trustee the lands at a sale under the decree, which was conducted by him in a manner that showed either great negligence or a design to depreciate the property, and the proceeds of which were insufficient to discharge his demand for costs, without paying anything to X. The solicitor settled the estate on the marriage of his son; he himself prepared the settlement for all parties, which recited the documents connected with the purchase :-Held, that, although where a solicitor, being vendor, acts for the purchaser from him, his knowledge may not always be constructive notice, yet such a doctrine did not apply to this case; and that the son, his wife, and children were bound, as purchasers, with notice. Atkins v. Delmege, 12 Ir. Eq. R. 1. The owner of real estate deposited the title deeds with his bankers to secure the balance of his account current, and executed a memorandum whereby he agreed, at their request, to execute any deed or deeds necessary for legally carrying out the security. Afterwards, being about to be married, he agreed to settle the property. Two days before the marriage the solicitor of the intended wife, having only then received instructions to prepare articles of settlement, inquired of the owner whether he had the title deeds in his possession unincumbered; he replied that he had, but that they were at his bankers. The solicitor made no further inquiry, and prepared articles of settlement, which were executed. After the marriage the husband conveyed the property to the trustee of the articles upon the trusts therein contained, being for the benefit of the wife and issue of the marriage. A suit was afterwards instituted by the bankers for foreclosure; and the wife claimed to be a purchaser for value without notice :-Held, that the solicitor had not made sufficient inquiry, and that the wife must be taken to have had constructive notice of the mortgage. Maxfield v. Burton, 43 L.J., Ch. 46; L. R. 17 Eq. 15; 29 L. T. 571; 22 W. R. 148.

Held, also, that the husband, having contracted to execute a legal mortgage to his bankers, could not deprive them of priority by conveying the property to a party with whom he had entered into a subsequent contract for value, even although such party was a purchaser without notice. Ib.

Rebutting Presumption.]-The presumption that a solicitor has communicated to his client facts which he ought to have made known cannot be rebutted by proof that it was the solicitor's interest to conceal the facts. Bradley v. Riches, 47 L. J., Ch. 811; 9 Ch. D. 189; 38 L. T. 810; 26 W. R. 910.

e. Trustees.

What Charges.] - Where two charges on a chose in action are contained in one deed, and a notice given to the trustees which specifies one only, the trustees have not constructive notice of the contents of the deed, so that notice of both the charges is to be imputed to them. Bright's Trusts, In re, 21 Beav. 430; 25 L. J., Ch. 449; 2 Jur. (N.s.) 300; 4 W. R. 381.

A., having a contingent interest in residuary estate which was vested in trustees. by deed

assigned to B. so much of his inte rest as would amount to 9237., with a covenant to insure his life, and pay the premiums; and if B. paid them, to charge the amount on the whole share. B. gave notice to the trustees that A. had sold him so much of his share as would amount to 9237., but the notice was silent as to the covenant for insurance. Subsequent incumbrancers, without knowledge of this covenant, gave notice to the trustees - Held, that B.'s notice of the deed was no notice of the contents, and that the subsequent incumbrancers were entitled to priority in respect of the premiums paid by him. Ib.

To whom Given.]—In assignments of mortgages of equitable interests in property held by trustees, notice to one of several trustees is sufficient notice to all. Willes v. Greenhill, 4 De G. F. & J. 147; 31 L. J., Ch. 1; 7 Jur. (N.S.) 1134; L. T. 236; 10 W. R. 33.

The husband of a legatee beneficially entitled under a will to a share of the testator's residuary estate, was one of the trustees of the will, and joined with his wife in mortgaging her share. The mortgagee served notice of the deed upon the mortgagor trustee, but gave no other notice of the incumbrance :-Held, that the notice was sufficient as against subsequent incumbrancers, although the latter had given formal notice of their incumbrances to every trustee. Ib.

notice of an incumbrance or assignment affecting the trust fund, and a second assignment is afterwards made, of which both trustees receive notice, the subsequent death of the trustee who alone had notice of the prior incumbrance or assignment does not alter the priority obtained by the first assignee. Ward v. Duncombe, 62 L. J., Ch. 881; [1893] A. C. 369; 1 R. 221; 69 L. T. 121; 42 W. R. 59-H. L. (E.)

Notice by an incumbrancer on a fund to one trustee of it is sufficient. Brown v. Savage, ↓ Drew. 635; 5 Jur. (N.s.) 1020 ; 7 W. R. 571.

Inquiry for incumbrances should be made of all the trustees. Ib.

Where a trustee is himself the assignor, notice to him is not sufficient. Ib.

Where a trustee is himself the assignee, the fact of the assignment is sufficient notice. Ib. Notice to a trustee need not be formal, but a mere casual observation is not sufficient. Ib.

Although, as a general rule, notice to one of several trustees is a notice to all, yet where one of such trustees was also a beneficiary, and assigned his beneficial interest in the trust fund to a stranger :-Held, that the notice acquired by such trustee, as assignor, did not constitute notice to the trustees, so as to prevail over subsequent incumbrances, it being the interest of such trustee, as assignor, to conceal the assignment; but that where such trustee assigned his beneficial interest to one of his cotrustees, the notice which that co-trustee ac

It is not necessary to give notice of an equitable incumbrance to more than one of several trustees of the property so long as the circum-quired, as assignee, constituted, during his life, stances of the case remain unaltered, by the death of that trustee, or his ceasing to continue such trustee, or otherwise. Meux v. Bell, 1 Hare, 73; 11 L. J., Ch. 77; 6 Jur. 123.

notice to the trustees, it not being his interest, as assignee, to conceal the assignment, and therefore that it prevailed over subsequent incumbrances with notice. Ib.

Notice of assignment of a trust fund, effected A lease for seven years was granted by three by the cestui que trust, was given to one only of trustees, and an option was given to the lessee two trustees, who afterwards died in the lifetime to purchase the fee at any time during the term of his co-trustee :-Held, following Meux v. Bellon giving notice in writing of his intention "to (1 Hare, 73), ineffectual to give priority over a subsequent incumbrance, of which notice was given to the surviving trustee. Hall, In re, Nolan v. O'Brien, 7 L. R., Ir. 180.

A., one of several executors, who alone acted, took an assignment of his son's interest in the residuary estate of the testator, as a security for advances made by him to his son, but gave no notice of the assignment to his co-executors. After the death of A., the son assigned the same interest to B., who was not proved to have had any notice of the prior assignment, and who gave notice of his assignment to the surviving executor -Held, that the assignment to B. should have priority, and that inquiry of the legal holder is not necessary to give effect to a notice by subsequent assignee, so as to entitle him to priority over a prior assignee, who has given no notice. Timson v. Ramsbottom, 2 Keen, 35.

the said lessors, or the survivors or survivor of them, or the executors, administrators, or assigns of such survivors." The lessee during the term gave notice in writing of his intention to purchase to one only of the trustees, all three of them being alive:-Held, that notice ought to have been given to all the trustees or the survivors or survivor of them; that notice to them was insufficient, and therefore that the lessee could not enforce a sale to him of the property. Sutcliffe v. Wardle, 63 L. T. 329.

New Trustees-Notice of Incumbrance to Original Trustees Constructive Notice.]Persons appointed new trustees under a will or settlement are bound to inquire what the trust property consists of, and what the trusts are, and to look into the trust documents to see what incumbrances their predecessors had notice of. But if there was nothing among the trust documents which would have given them notice of an incumbrance, they will not be held liable for loss arising from their ignorance of it, even though they have in fact omitted to look into those documents. Hallows v. Lloyd, 58 L. J., Ch. 105; 39 Ch. D. 686; 59 L. T. 603; 37 W. R. 12.

Stock was transferred into the names of trustees, and, by a settlement made in 1799, settled upon trust for A. for life, and after his death in trust for other persons. By another settlement, dated in 1829, the reversionary interest under the first settlement was assigned to trustees upon trust for B. for life, and other persons. During the lifetime of A., B. mortgaged his interest to C. and D. successively. C. gave notice of his assignment to the trustee of the settlement of Effect of Assignee in Insolvency.]-The 1799. D. gave notice to the trustee of the settle-assignee in insolvency of a person entitled to ment of 1829:- Held, that C. thereby retained a reversionary fund vested in trustees, one of his priority over D. Booth's Settlement Trusts, In re, 16 Jur. 965; 1 W. R. 444.

Where one only of two trustees of a fund has

whom at the time of the insolvency had notice of a prior assignment, is affected with notice of the assignment; so that if he delays making

inquiry until, through changes in the body of trustees, none remain who have notice of the assignment, want of actual notice and circumstances of subsequent diligence on his part will not entitle him to the fund as against the prior assignee. Bird v. Blyth, 24 W. R. 356.

4. BY TENANCY.

When Purchaser bound.]—The possession of a tenant is notice to a purchaser of the whole actual interest he may have in the estate; therefore, of a right to the timber on the estate, although such right accrued by a title posterior to that on which his possession was grounded. Allen v. Anthony, 1 Mer. 282; 15 R. R. 113.

A purchaser, aware of tenant's possession of part of the estate, has constructive, though not actual, notice of the whole of the tenant's interest in the estate. Powell v. Dillon, 2 Ball & B. 416.

Constructive notice to a purchaser of a tenant's title precludes the plea of purchase for valuable consideration without notice. Id.

421.

Purchaser being told part of the estate was in possession of a tenant, was bound by the lease. Taylor v. Stibbert, 2 Ves. J. 440; 2 R. R.

278.

Purchaser with notice is bound in all respects as the vendor; therefore, where tenant for life granted leases for lives under a power, and bound himself upon the dropping of a life to grant a new lease, with the same provision for renewal on the death of any person to be named in any future lease, and afterwards join in a sale, though the power is exceeded; yet if a life drops in the life of the lessor, the purchaser having notice, must specifically perform by granting a new lease, with the same provision. General notice to a purchaser, that there are leases, is notice of all their contents. Brydges v. Chandos (Duke), 2 Ves. J. 437.

Notice to a purchaser of possession by a tenant, is notice of his interest. Hiern v. Mill, 13 Ves. 120; 9 R. R. 149.

Jones, 320. See Wallace v. Donegal, 1 Dr. &
Wal. 462.

When at the time of a purchase, tenants are in possession, the purchaser, entering into possession and receipt of the rents, has constructive notice of the title by which the tenants hold. Hamilton v. Lyster, 7 Ir. Eq. R. 560.

Notice to a purchaser of the occupancy of a portion of the lands by a tenant fixes him with notice of all the rights of the tenant, not only as between the purchaser and the tenant, but also as between the purchaser and the vendor. Carroll v. Keays, 22 W. R. 243.

A. contracted to purchase property, of part of which he was tenant from year to year. B. was tenant of another part under a lease, of which thirteen years were unexpired, and at the time of contracting A. was aware of B.'s being tenant, but not of the nature of the tenancy:-Held, that notice that B. was a tenant was notice of the nature of his interest, and A. could not have a decree for specific performance with an abatement for not being able to obtain possession. James v. Lichfield, L. R. 9 Eq. 51; 21 L. T. 521; 18 W. R. 158.

A deed of conveyance to a purchaser of lands held under a lease purported to grant the whole of the demised premises without exception or qualification, and the covenants for title corresponded with the granting part; the vendor had previously assigned a portion of the premises to a railway company by a deed which had not been disclosed to the purchaser, but the works constructed by the company upon that part of the premises were of such a character as to be apparent to any one approaching them, and the purchaser was aware of them before he purchased-Held, that the condition of the premises being known to both parties at the time of the contract, they should be taken to have contracted as to them in that condition, and that the deed of conveyance should be rectified so as to carry out the real contract between the parties. Young v. Halahan, Ir. R. 9 Eq. 70.

legal estate after he has had notice that his mortgagor has made himself a trustee for the owner of the prior equity. Mumford v. Stohwasser, 43 L. J., Ch. 694; L. R. 18 Eq. 556; 30 L. T. 859; 22 W. R. 833.

When money is lent on an equitable mortgage without notice of a prior equitable agreement, The possession of a tenant is notice to a the lender gains no priority over the owner of purchaser of the actual interest he may have the prior equitable interest by getting in the either as tenant, or father; as in this instance, by an agreement to purchase the premises. Daniels v. Davison, 16 Ves. 249; 10 R. R. 171. The purchaser of property has notice of the interest of a tenant in possession, and the purchaser of leaseholds has notice of what it is he purports to buy, and that he must be bound by all the covenants in the lease; but one who contracts for a lease from a party, with knowledge that he holds under a leasehold title, has notice of ordinary but not of unusual covenants in the original lease. Wilbraham v. Livesey, 18 Beav. 206.

A. agreed to grant a lease to B., who knew that A. held under a leasehold title:-Held, that B. must be deemed to have known that A. could only grant a lease with such restrictions as those under which he held. Lewis v. Bond, 18 Beav. 85.

A purchaser of property in the occupation of a tenant has constructive notice of the terms under which the land is occupied. Greenwood v. Bairstow, 5 L. J., Ch. 179.

Actual notice that lands are in the tenancy of a third person, is not such notice of that person's title thereto, as will avoid the effect of the registry act. Popham v. Baldwin, 2

A builder entered into a building agreement under which leases of plots of land were to be granted on completion of houses on them. He built a house on one plot, and verbally agreed on getting his lease to grant an underlease to M., who gave valuable consideration for the underlease, and entered into possession. Subsequently the builder, without the knowlege of M., obtained a lease of the house, and deposited it with the defendant to secure an advance made without notice of M.'s title. After this the builder, as agent for the plaintiff (who claimed under M.'s will), let the house to a tenant. Subsequently the builder granted to the defendant a legal mortgage to secure the previous advance. The suit was instituted for specific performance of the agreement for an underlease-Held, that the tenancy gave the defendant constructive notice at the time of taking the legal mortgage that the builder was a trustee for M., and that the legal estate was no protection to the defendant against the prior equity;

and a decree was made for specific performance. | instrument by which they were compelled so to Ib. pay them, and of the rights of all parties thereunder. Ib.

Where a tenant is in possession of land, a purchaser is bound by all the equities which the tenant could enforce against the vendor. Barnhart v. Greenshields, 9 Moore, P. C. 18.

This equity of the tenant extends not only to interests connected with his tenancy, but also to interest under collateral agreements. Ib.

The principal is the same in both classes of cases, that the possession of the tenant is notice that he has some interest in the land, and a purchaser having notice of that fact is bound to inquire what that interest is. Ib.

But a purchaser is not bound to attend to vague rumours, or to statements by mere strangers. A notice to be binding must proceed from some person interested in the property.

Ib.

A purchaser of real estate affected by certain equities in the sub-tenants as against the vendor is held to buy with notice of such equities, his duty being, when he knew that he was buying property let to under-tenants, to ascertain the terms of such tenancies. Phillips v. Miller, 43 L. J., C. P. 74; L. R. 9 C. P. 196; 30 L. T. 61; 22 W. R. 485.

At the death of a landowner, three yearly tenants of his farms, on receiving from the trustees of his will notice to quit when the tenancies should expire at Michaelmas, 1869, asserted that the testator had promised them leases, whereupon the trustees entered into an agreement with them, in which, after reciting the alleged promise, it was agreed that, on the expiration of their tenancies, the tenants should be allowed half a year's rent, and market value for their hay, straw, and manure produced on the farms during the last year of their tenancies, whereas, by the custom of the country, fodder value only was payable. The estate was afterwards sold by the trustees, under particulars of sale describing the farms by the full annual rent at which they were held, and giving the names of the tenants, but no mention of the agreement was made in the particulars or conditions of sale, or abstract of title, under the bona fide belief that it was unnecessary to allude to it; nor did the purchaser become aware of its existence until an interview with the tenants after the sale. At the expiration of these tenancies, the farmers claimed from the plaintiff for their hay, straw, and manure the fodder value, which much exceeded the market price, and he, meaning to keep the farms in hand, paid their demand, and sought to recover the amount so paid from the trustees :-Held, that he took the estate subject to the existing rights of the tenants, and, therefore, the trustees were not liable. Ib.

Knowledge as to Receipt of Rents.] The rule, that a purchaser has constructive notice of the rights of the tenant is not limited to the terre-tenant, who is in the actual occupation, but it extends also to the person who is known to receive the rents from the occupier of the land. Knight v. Bowyer, 23 Beav. 609. Affirmed, 2 De G. & J. 421; 27 L. J., Ch. 520; 4 Jur. (N.S.) 569; 6 W. R. 565.

The purchaser of a charge upon an estate had notice that the rents were received by A., and not by the owner of the estate :-Held, that the notice that the tenants paid their rents to a person other than the owner, was notice of the

Duty to Inquire.]—A purchaser having notice that another person, or his under tenant, is in possession of the property, is not justified in presuming the possession of that person to be the possession of the vendor, but is bound to make inquiries of the person who, by himself or his under tenant, is so in possession, or he will be deemed to have notice of the title of such person. Bailey v. Richardson, 9 Hare, 734.

Where a solicitor acquires by contract a different interest beyond what his character of solicitor confers (such as an equitable mortgage), it is incumbent on him immediately to give clear and distinct notice of such interest to all persons in the visible ownership of the estate, and such a case is not within the principle of the cases in which a purchaser has been held bound to inquire of the tenant in possession the nature of his interest. Bozon v. Williams, 3 Y. & J. 150.

The conditions of sale of a public-house stated that it was in the occupation of a tenant. A brewer, intending to use the public-house for the sale of his beer, agreed to buy it. He afterwards learnt that it was under lease to another brewer for a term of which eight years were unexpired: -Held, that the purchaser was not bound to ascertain from the tenant the terms of his tenancy; and that in such a case the vendor could not enforce specific performance. Caballero v. Henty, 43 L. J., Ch. 635; L. R. 9 Ch. 447; 30 L. T. 314; 22 W. R. 446.

A person, seised in fee of an estate subject to the life interest therein of his mother, and having knowledge of his mother's interest, contracted to sell the estate to a party who had no actual knowledge of her interest, but knew, or might have known, that she resided on the property as tenant or occupier :-Held, that although the mother's residence might, as between her and the purchaser, have carried constructive notice of her rights, it was not necessarily notice as between the vendor and purchaser, in those respective characters, so as to deprive the purchaser of his right to compensation in respect of the life interest. Nelthorpe v. Holgate, 1 Colly. 203; 8 Jur. 551. And see cases stated 1 Colly. 223, et seq.

A deed of partition was executed in 1794, of land protected from the sea by a wall which skirted the land of one of the part-owners. The deed contained a covenant that the expenses of maintaining the sea-walls should be borne by the parties to the deed, their heirs, executors, and administrators, in proportion to their acre. age. Part of the land was liable to scots for the repair of other sea-walls, and had been purchased by the present owners under conditions which precluded them from inquiring into the deed of 1794 :-Held, that they were, from the position of their land, put on inquiry as to their liability to repair all sea-walls which protected it, and were liable to contribute to the expenses of repairing the wall. Morland v. Cook, 37 L. J., Ch. 825; L. R. 6 Eq. 252; 18 L. T. 496; 16 W. R. 777.

Vendor's Lien.]-Where a vendor signs a receipt for the whole purchase money, but suffers the purchaser to retain part of it, and remains in possession of the estate, as tenant to the purchaser; his possession is no notice to a subse

quent purchaser or incumbrancer, of his lien on the estate for the sum retained. White v. Wakefield, 7 Sim. 401; 4 L. J., Ch. 195.

Visible Possession.]-Where the possession is vacant, a purchaser is not bound to inquire of the late occupier what was the nature of his title. Under an agreement between A., who held lands under a college lease, and B., the owner of an adjoining estate, B. occupied part of the college lands, and A. had occupied, along with the residue of the leasehold, part of B.'s estate. A. having become bankrupt, the college leasehold was sold, and was described in the particulars of sale as "late the residence of A." : -Held, that the purchaser was not to be considered as having implied notice of the agreement of exchange, and that he had a right to recover by ejectment that portion of the leasehold which was in B.'s occupation. Miles v. Langley, 1 Russ. & M. 39. Affirmed, 2 Russ. & M. 626.

When a man is of right in possession of a corporeal hereditament, he is entitled to impute knowledge of that possession to all who deal for any interest in the property, and persons so dealing cannot be heard to deny notice of the title under which the possession is held. Nor is it necessary that such possession should be continually visible or actively asserted. Holmes v. Powell, 8 De G. M. & G. 572.

Where, therefore, the purchasers of mines took possession, under an agreement for purchase, without any conveyance :-Held, that a subsequent purchaser of land without any exception of mines, took with notice of the agreement, and was bound specifically to perform it. Ib.

Possession of Partnership.]-C. and B., tenants in common in fee, in equal shares, of a messuage and premises, entered into partnership, and it was agreed by the articles that this property | should be partnership assets; and it became the place where the business of the firm was carried on. After this B. made a legal mortgage in fee of one moiety to secure his private debt to a person who knew that the property was the place of business of the firm. Some years afterwards B. absconded, and C. was obliged to pay the debts of the firm, all of which had been contracted since the mortgage, and a large balance thus became due to him :-Held, that as the mortgagee when he took his security, knew that the firm was in possession of the property, he had constructive notice of the title of the partnership, and that his claim must be postponed to that of C.; and that the circumstance of the debts paid by C. having been incurred since the mortgage did not affect the case. Carander Bulteel, 43 L. J., Ch. 370; L. R. 9 Ch. 79; L. T. 710; 22 W. R. 177.

will not be affected by constructive notice of circumstances of negligence on the part of the assignees, in conducting the sale, such circum. stances being entirely collateral to any question of title. Borell v. Dann, 2 Hare, 440.

A purchaser or mortgagee who takes his purchase or security without investigation of title is affected with constructive notice of all that he would have discovered upon the usual investigation of title, although not of such matters as he would not have ascertained without going behind the documents of title themselves. Gainsborough (Earl) v. Watcombe Terra Cotta Co., 54 L. J., Ch. 991; 53 L. T. 116.

A shareholder, who with knowledge that the company have issued shares at a discount, buys shares on the market and receives certificates stating the numbers of the shares and that they are fully paid, is not guilty of such negligence in omitting to search the register of joint stock companies as will amount to constructive notice that the shares he bought were improperly issued. New Chile Gold Mining Co., In re, 3 R. 219; 68 L. T. 15.

A mortgagee advancing money on the security of a considerable estate, and omitting to investigate the title to a particular portion of it, will not be affected with notice of equities affecting the residue of the estate which upon such investigation he might possibly have discovered. Hunter v. Walters, 41 L. J., Ch. 175; L. R. 7 Ch. 75; 25 L. T. 765; 20 W. R. 218.

Debentures belong to the class of documents which may or may not, as opposed to that which necessarily must, affect title; the omission, therefore, of the solicitor to certain mortgagees to inquire as to the terms of certain debentures did not, in the circumstances, amount to such gross negligence as to affect the mortgagees with constructive notice of a restrictive clause contained in such debentures. English and Scottish Mercantile Investment Trust v. Brunton, 62 L. J., Q. B. 136; [1892] 2 Q. B. 700; 4 R. 58; 67 L. T. 406; 41 W. R. 133—C. A.

Notice of ancient articles by which the estate is agreed to be settled on the husband for life, remainder subject to a charge by way of jointure for the wife to the heirs male of husband by his wife, shall not affect the title of a purchaser claiming under the husband by reason of the modern method of carrying such articles into execution. Senhouse v. Earle, Ambl. 285; 2 Ves. 450.

Testator devised his estates charged with debts and legacies. The devisee mortgaged the estate to A., subject, expressly, to the legacies. A. having called in his money, and the devisee requiring a further advance, they join in mortv.gaging the estate to B., but not expressly subject 29 to the legacies, and B. is informed falsely by the devisee, that all the legacies had been paid :— Held, that B. took the estate subject to the legacies. Rogers v. Rogers, 6 Sim. 364.

5. BY NEGLIGENCE AND NON-INQUIRY. Negligence.]-Semble, where a party has the means of knowing a fact, he is bound to show that he exercised reasonable diligence to ascertain it. Heathorn v. Darling, 1 Moore, P. C. 5. Plea of valuable consideration, without notice, no protection against adverse claim of which purchaser might have had notice by using due diligence. Jackson v. Rowe, 2 Sim. & S. 472; 4 L. J. (0.8.) Ch. 118.

The purchaser of the estate of an insolvent debtor from his assignees, at a sale by auction,

If a purchaser, taking lands with notice that a stated sum (201.) was issuing annually out of them, and makes no inquiry of the parties to whom the rent charge is made respecting it, and it turns out that the whole lands were devoted to charitable uses, and not merely that 207. is issuing out of them, he is affected with notice, and the charity would be decreed to be entitled to them. Att.-Gen. v. Jones, 2 Jur. 369.

The omission to require strict evidence of title before advancing money is not necessarily such negligence as would be attended with the same

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