consequences as actual notice. Perry v. Holl, 2 De G. F. & J. 38.

Inquiry by a puisne incumbrancer on an equitable interest is immaterial, where none of the trustees of the property, at the time, knew of the prior incumbrance, and where the result of the inquiry would not, therefore, have affected the conduct of the puisne incumbrancer. Meux v. Bell, 1 Hare, 73; 11 L. J., Ch. 77; 6 Jur. 123.

Witness to Deed.]-A. voluntarily agrees to give certain houses to his niece, and the heirs of her body, after the death of himself and his wife, in case they should leave no issue; but no conveyance was executed by A., though he lived above twenty years afterwards; in the meantime, A. becomes indebted by mortgage, judgment, &c., and by his will devises all his estate, both real and personal, to his wife. This agreement is not good against a purchaser for valuable consideration, although he had notice by being a subscribing witness to it. Powell v. Pleydell, 1 Bro. P. C. 124.

as a ground for giving priority for the true amount of the charge, as against the party who received the incorrect notice, but made no inquiry. Gibson v. Ingo, 6 Hare, 124.

Effect of an indefinite representation by a vendor, as that a leasehold estate was nearly equal to freehold, being renewable upon a small fine, putting the purchaser upon inquiry; though connected with certain circumstances, such representation may be fraudulent, and form a ground for rescinding the contracts. Fenton v. Browne, 14 Ves. 144; 9 R. R. 225.

If purchaser is informed of incumbrances on estate, but is misinformed as to the nature of them, it is sufficient notice to set him on the inquiry as to incumbrances, and he is bound. Taylor v. Baker, 5 Price, 306; 19 R. R. 625.

A lunatic was fraudulently induced to sell, in 1815, the advowson of a rectory, of which he was the incumbent :-Held, that the absence of a receipt for the purchase money indorsed upon the deed, the non-residence of the incumbent, and the inadequacy of the consideration, did not Where a first mortgagee is a witness to the amount to constructive notice to a subsequent second mortgage, though no actual proof of his purchaser for valuable consideration in 1849, and knowing the contents thereof, yet since the pre-were not sufficient to have set a prudent person sumption is that he might have known the same, this shall postpone him. Mocatta v. Murgatroyd, 1 P. Wms. 394. Sed quære. See id. n.

upon inquiry as to the nature of the original transaction. Greenslade v. Dare, 24 L. J., Ch. 490; 1 Jur. (N.S.) 294; 3 W. R. 220.

A person who advances money on security of property, with notice that there are charges affecting it, cannot claim as purchaser without notice of those charges, because he believed that

which were sufficient to satisfy the words, were all the charges upon it. He is bound to inquire whether these are all the charges affecting the property. Jones v. Williams, 24 Beav. 47; 3 Jur. (N.S.) 1066; 5 W. R. 540, 775,

When put upon Inquiry.]-On the marriage of the defendant with A. B., who, under the will of her former husband, was entitled to certain real estates charged with a legacy of 2,000l. pay-two charges of which he was cognisant, and able to C. D. a feme sole, the defendant had notice that C. D., while sole, had released this legacy to A. B., and that A. B. had in consequence devised to C. D. a certain part of the real estates-Held, that the knowledge of these facts rendered it incumbent on the defendant to make further inquiries, and affected him with constructive notice of an equitable title acquired by the husband of C. D. under a subsequent agreement with A. B., to have the devised estate conveyed to him. Penny v. Watts, 1 Macn. & G. 150; 1 Hall & Tw. 266; 13 Jur. 459.

A false answer, or a reasonable answer, given to an inquiry, may be sufficient to dispense with further inquiries; but a purchaser cannot excuse himself for not having made proper inquiries, on the ground that had he made them there would have been no satisfactory result. Ib.

In a suit to impeach a lease which had been Where the creditors of a publican in London sold, it was held that the circumstance of the took from the latter a legal mortgage of copyhold lease being granted at an under-value and in con-premises as security for an antecedent debt, and sideration of services was sufficient notice to the purchaser to put him on his guard. Kerr v. Dungannon (Lord), 1 Con. & L. 335; 1 Dr. & War. 509; 4 Ir. Eq. R. 343.

Purchaser of a lease, though not considered a purchaser for valuable consideration without notice to extent of not being bound to know from whom the lessor derived his title, is not to take notice of all the circumstances under which it is derived. Therefore understood to have notice, that the lessors were trustees for a charity, not that the lease was bad, that depending on circumstances dehors. Att.-Gen. v. Backhouse, 17 Ves. 293.

A notice of a charge, although to an indefinite! amount, is sufficient to put a party dealing for the property on inquiry, as to its extent, even though the actual charge be incorrectly described. Beauce v. Muter, 5 Moore, P. C. 69.

Notice of a charge to an indefinite amount, although the notice be inaccurate as to the particulars or extent of the charge, is sufficient to put upon inquiry a party dealing for the property subject to the charge; and if the actual charge afterwards appears to be incorrectly described in the notice, it is nevertheless sufficient

at the time of taking this security, knew that the publican was indebted to his brewers, and likewise was aware of the ordinary practice in London of publicans depositing their leases with their brewers by way of mortgage :—Held, that the creditor had such notice of the transactions between his debtor and the brewers, as would have put a prudent man on further inquiry; and that, having omitted to make such further inquiry, the equitable security of the brewers had priority over his legal security. Whitbread v. Jordan, 1 Y. & Coll. 303; 4 L. J., Ex. Eq. 38.

6. BY RECITALS AND REFERENCES IN DOCUMENTS.

Recitals.]-Mortgagee of a lease which recited the surrender of a former lease in which plaintiff's title appeared :-Held, to have notice of the title. Coppin v. Ferneyhough, 2 Bro. C. C. 291.

An estate was devised to trustees, upon trust, by sale or mortgage, to discharge a specific debt, and to apply the residue for the benefit of the testator's children. A. purchased the est te of the surviving trustee (who was A.'s father) but

left the purchase money (except what was required to satisfy the debt) unpaid, giving his bond as a collateral security for the payment of it. Between the time of the contract and the actual conveyance of the premises, A. entered into marriage articles, whereby he covenanted to settle the premises upon his intended wife and her issue. After A.'s marriage, and the execution of the conveyance, a settlement was made in pursuance of the articles. The settlement recited the conveyance, and the conveyance referred to the will:-Held, that the settlement conveyed notice of the will, and that such notice was binding on the wife and children of A., although the articles were silent as to the will, and consequently that the testator's children were entitled as against the children of A. to a lien on the estate to the amount of the purchase money left unpaid. Davies v. Thomas, 2 Y. & Coll. 234; 7 L. J., Ex. Eq. 21.

residing in England for a short time, appointed the solicitors his attorneys to carry out a contract for the sale of the plaintiff's real estate, and to borrow certain sums of money for him upon mortgage. The solicitors, purporting to act under this power, borrowed further moneys from the defendants, charging the plaintiff's property with the repayment. The loans were also made without the plaintiff's knowledge, and the proceeds were misappropriated by the solicitors. The second power was not seen by any of the defendants, or by any of their agents acquainted with the previous transactions. Neither was the attention of any of these persons in any way called to it. Neither did they, or any of their clerks engaged in this business, know that the plaintiff had been in England. This power was produced to the defendants' solicitors, but they had no knowledge of the previous transactions :-Held, that the defendants were not put upon such inquiry by the recital that the plaintiff had been residing in England as would make them liable for not having discovered the solicitor's frauds, and consequently invalidate the charge made under the A will was inaccurately recited in a convey-second power. Danby v. Coutts, 29 Ch. D. 500; ance-Held, nevertheless, that the purchaser 52 L. T. 401; 33 W. R. 559. had notice of the real contents of the will. Hope v. Liddell, 21 Beav. 183.

A general recital in a deed that there were mortgages on the estate :-Held, to affect parties claiming under the deed with notice of a mortgage not specified therein. Farrow v. Rees, 4 Beav. 18; 4 Jur. 1028.

A. mortgaged a ship and freight to B., but the mortgage of the ship alone, as is usual, was indorsed in the ship's register. The ship and freight were subsequently mortgaged to C., whose deed recited the mortgage of the ship alone to B. This mortgage was also indorsed on the same register. C. positively denied all notice of the mortgage of the freight-Held, nevertheless, that he had constructive notice thereof. Dobson v. Lyall, 6 L. J., Ch. 115.

The recital in a deed of a fact which may or may not (according to circumstances) in equity amount to fraud, will not of necessity affect a purchaser for value, denying notice of the fraud. Kenney v. Browne, 3 Ridgw. P. C. 512.

....

The purchaser of a legal estate having express notice of a prior equitable conveyance by registered deed, and purchasing from a vendor who is out of possession, is not entitled to the property as against the equitable purchaser, and an erroneous recital of the earlier title in the registered deed does not preclude the grantor from showing what interest really passed by the deed. Trinidad Asphalte Co. v. Croyat, 65 L. J., P. C. 100; [1896] A. C. 587; 75 L. T. 108; 45 W. R. 225-P. C.

A marriage settlement of 1807, executed by all parties, contained a recital of the transfer of stock into the name of trustees. The stock never was transferred. The trustees died, one in 1827, the other in 1840. The person who ought to have transferred the stock became bankrupt in 1848, and died in 1851, only a fourth part dividend being got in under his bankruptcy :-Held, that a bill filed in 1855 by a child of the marriage, who had attained twenty-one in 1839, was not too late; and the estates of the two trustees were declared to be jointly and severally liable. Story v. Gape, 2 Jur. (N.S.) 706.

The plaintiff, who had lately become entitled to a life interest, with an ultimate remainder in fee, in a certain landed estate, being about to return to Australia, where he had been residing, gave to his solicitors a power of attorney in which there was a recital of his having become entitled to the estate, and that "whereas I am about to return to Australia, and am desirous of appointing attorneys to act for me during my absence from England, in the care and management of the said estates, and of dealing therewith either by way of sale mortgage or otherwise. . . . and generally to act for me in the management of and dealings with any property A trustee for sale, who had, though unauthobelonging to me, during my absence from Eng-rised by the settlement to do so, mortgaged the land." The plaintiff went abroad, and during his absence the solicitors borrowed from the defendants a sum of money on his behalf, charging his property with the repayment of it. They also on two subsequent occasions purported to charge his property, under this power, with the repayment of advances made by the defendants. On these two last occasions the plaintiff was in England, but that was not known to the defendants. The loans were made without the knowledge of the plaintiff, and the proceeds were misappropriated by the solicitors, who absconded. While the plaintiff was in England, being about to return to Australia, he gave the solicitors a new power. This, after referring to the former power, and reciting that the plaintiff had been

The recital of the transfer bound the trustees as much as an actual transfer, as in Knatchbull v. Fernhead (3 Myl. & C. 122), and also rendered it unnecessary in the cestuis que trustent to make any further inquiry as to whether the fund had been transferred or not. Ib.

property, and misappropriated the proceeds of the mortgage, sold it. The conveyance, to which the mortgagee was a party, being paid off by the purchaser, recited the facts connected with the trust. The cestuis que trustent sought, after completion of the purchase, to establish a lien on the property to the amount of the mortgage money-Held, that they were so entitled, as the purchaser had notice of circumstances sufficient to have led him to inquire whether the money which he had paid to the mortgagor was wanted for the purposes of the trust. Poole v. Adams, 33 L. J., Ch. 639; 10 L. T. 287; 12 W. R. 683.

A. contracted to purchase real estate, and died, having made his widow his universal devisee and

Deed Affecting Title.]-Where a purchaser cannot make out his title but through a deed which leads to a fact, he will be affected with notice of that fact. Mertins v. Jolliffe, Ambl. 311.

Though a man is bound to take notice of everything necessary to his title, he need not look into what is not necessary. Ib.

Where a man claims under a conveyance in which there is an estate tail prior to the estate he purchased, he is bound to see if that estate is spent. Kelsall v. Bennet, 1 Atk. 522.

legatee. The widow married B., who, in 1793, | took a conveyance of the premises contracted to be purchased by A., to himself and a trustee, reciting the contract by A.-his will and death -the marriage of his widow by B.; and that, "thereupon B. became entitled to the beneficial interest in the purchase." B., in 1817, sold the premises to C., and C. took a conveyance from B. and his trustee, reciting, that, by certain good and sufficient assurances in the law, the premises stood limited to B. and the trustee, but not reciting the deed of 1793. The widow died, leaving her heir-at-law an infant, who came of A. made a conveyance to B., with power age in 1825, in the lifetime of B. The bill was of revocation by will, and limited other uses. brought by the heir-at-law in 1836, after the If A. dispose to a purchaser by will, a subsedeath of B., for a conveyance of the estate-quent purchaser is intended to have notice of Held, that the recital in the deed must be under- the will, as well as of the power to revoke: stood as stating that the widow was devisee of and this is a notice in law; and so in all cases the purchased premises, and that the title of where a purchaser cannot make out a title, B. accrued by the marriage; that the court but by deed which leads him to another fact, the would not presume, in favour of a purchaser, purchaser shall not be a purchaser without notice that B. had any other title than was so repre- of that fact, but shall be presumed cognisant sented; that C. must be presumed to have been thereof; for it is crassa negligentia that he cognisant of, and to have taken, the title of B. sought not after it. Moore v. Bennett, 2 Ch. Ca. his vendor; that the equitable title of the heir-246. at-law of the widow was not affected by the lapse of time; and that the heir-at-law was entitled to the decree for conveyance of the estate. Neesom v. Clarkson, 2 Hare, 163; 12 L. J., Ch. 99; 6 Jur. 1055.

A. made a voluntary surrender of copyholds to a trustee, upon trust for F. during her life; and if at her death she left children who attained twenty-one, upon trust to sell and divide the money among them; but if that event did not take place, upon trust to A. in fee. Afterwards, by a deed reciting that the trustee was seised of the premises, upon trust for F. and her husband and A., the trustee, and F. and her husband and A. concurred in demising the premises for a valuable consideration to G., for a long term of years-Held, that the lessee was to be considered as having notice of the trust for the benefit of the children of F., and that the lease was void as against them. Malpas v. Ackland, 3 Russ. 273.

Security Inquiry as to Terms.]-A sole trustee of shares executed a transfer, and delivered it with the certificate of the shares to a mortgagee who had no notice of the trust. The certificate showed that the shares had formerly stood in the names of two persons :-Held, that this was not enough to put the mortgagee on inquiry, or fix him with notice. Dodds v. Hills, 2 Hem. & M. 424.

Circumstances under which an assignee of a security may be held to be put upon inquiry by the terms of the security itself as to matter of equitable fraud affecting its validity. Tabor v. Cunningham, 24 W. R. 153.

A transfer of shares, held as security by a bank, was executed by the bank manager and signed "J. O. B., manager in trust"-Held, that the words "manager in trust," according to their natural construction, meant that B., as an official of the bank, held the shares in trust for his employers, and were not calculated to suggest that he stood in a fiduciary relation to any other person; that those words were not so ambiguous as to cast upon the transferce the duty of making inquiry as to the transferor's title. London and Canadian Loan and Agency Co. v. Duggan, 63 L. J., P. C. 14; [1893] A. C. 506; 1 R. 413—P. C.

A settlement is made after marriage, in pursuance of articles before the marriage; but the articles are not taken notice of in the settlement. The purchaser, however, having notice of the settlement, it was incumbent on him to inquire whether it was voluntary, or made in pursuance of an agreement before marriage. Ferrurs v. Cherry, 2 Vern. 383.

Draft of deed traced into possession of defendant's family :-Held, good notice. Whitfield v Fausset, 1 Ves. 387.

The bankrupts were the owners of certain shares in a mine, but the mine was then a losing concern, liable to debts which had been incurred in working it. The assignees of the bankrupts renounced their interest in the mine, and by a decree in the Stannaries Court, the mine was ordered to be sold, and the purchase money applied in payment of the debts. Certain new adventurers agreed to become the purchasers, and paid the purchase money in shares. G., one of the assignees of the bankrupts, subscribed for some of the new shares in the name of himself "and friends." Four of the shares thus subscribed for by G. were taken by the defendant. The mine continued to be a losing concern to the new company until after they had prevailed on the defendant, who was the owner of the freehold, to accept a surrender of the lease under which it had been held, and to grant a new lease at reduced dues, and including new mining ground. Afterwards, G. was removed from the assigneeship, and a renewed commission was issued, under which the plaintiff was closen assignee of the bankrupts. Notwithstanding the term granted by the old lease had long expired, and the defendant had no knowledge of the bankruptcy, and fifteen years had elapsed, during which there had been a large expenditure on the mine, the court declared the defendant to be a trustee of his shares in the mine, including the new ground, and decreed him to account for and pay to the plaintiff the profits thereof. Turner v. Trelawney, 12 Sim. 49; 10 L. J., Ch. 249; 5 Jur. 698.

R. S., being seised of an undivided moiety of certain lands, conveyed it, on his marriage in 1775, to trustees for himself for life, remainder to his first and every other son in tail, remainder to himself in fee. This settlement contained a

power to R. S., to lease for three lives. R. S. subsequently purchased the other undivided moiety of the same lands; and, in 1785, leased Land was conveyed by a deed to a purchaser, the entire to T. M., for three lives renewable for subject to "existing leases and lettings made to ever. In 1797, upon the marriage of G. S., the under-tenants" of the vendor :-Held, that eldest son of R. S., by a deed to which R. S. and a parol contract for a lease, with part performG. S. were parties, all the lands were settled and ance of which the purchaser had no notice, was conveyed to the use of R. S. for life, and after not an existing lease, or letting within the meanhis death to G. S. for life, remainder to the useing of the deed. Rice v. O'Connor, 11 Ir. Ch. of such of the sons as G. S. should appoint to. R. 510.

Miles v. Langley, 2 Russ. & M. 626. Affirming 1 Russ. & M. 39.

R. S., by this deed, covenanted against all incum- | The principle of Cosser v. Collinge (3 Myl. & K. brances "save and except the leases heretofore 283) applies to the purchase of a sub fee-farm bona fide made by R.S."; and G. S. covenanted grant; and the purchaser of such an estate, if for further assurance and quiet enjoyment he knows that he is not purchasing the fee, is against all persons except the lessees in such bound to inquire as to the provisions of the leases, as aforesaid." G. S. executed the power superior grant, and if he has had a fair opporof appointment reserved to him in favour of tunity of ascertaining them, will be affected W. S., his son, and died in the lifetime of R. S. with constructive notice. Hyde v. Warden (3 On the death of R. S., W. S. filed his bill to set Ex. D. 72) distinguished. Bank of Ireland v. aside the lease of the moiety comprised within | Brookfield Linen Co., 15 L. R., Ir. 37. the settlement of 1775, as contrary to leasing power. But it was held, that W. S., claiming and deriving benefits under the settlement of 1797, which contained references to the lease made by R. S., was bound by the lease of 1785, and could not set it aside. Steele v. Mitchell, 1 Dr. & Wal. 568; 3 Ir. Eq. R. 1.

The purchaser of a charity lease takes it with notice of the facts appearing thereon, showing its equitable invalidity. Att.-Gen. v. Pargeter, 6 Beav. 150; 13 L. J., Ch. 81.

Purchaser of a lease, though not considered a purchaser for valuable consideration, without notice to extent of not being bound to know from whom the lessor derived his title, is not to take notice of all the circumstances under which it is derived. Therefore understood to have notice, that the lessors were trustees for a charity, not that the lease was bad, that depending on circumstances dehors. Att.-Gen. v. Backhouse, 17 Ves. 293.

A purchaser of a perpetual rent-charge had notice of a deed, making his vendor tenant for life of the lands on which the rent was charged, and of the subsequent deed, whereby the vendor, Suggesting that he was seised in fee of the lands, purported to convey them in fee, in consideration of the perpetual rent-charge:-Held, that he was bound to inquire into and had notice of the circumstances under which the latter deed was executed. Roddy v. Williams, 3 Jo. & Lat. 1. Where, in the office copy of a will, a whole line of the original had been omitted, but the same was left in such a manner, as to give reason to suppose that the original contained a limitation in tail of real estate :-Held, that this was sufficient to put a purchaser upon inquiry. Surman v. Barlow, 2 Eden, 165.

Covenant in a marriage settlement, that the husband shall within one year execute, he being then under age, does not show such an interest in him as to put a purchaser upon inquiry. Howorth v. Deem, 1 Eden, 351.

Semble, a purchaser may be presumed to have investigated every instrument which directly or inferentially forms a link in the title to the property, but not instruments which are not neither directly nor presumptively connected with it, and may by possibility only affect it. West v. Reid, 2 Hare, 249; 12 L. J., Ch. 245; 7 Jur. 147.

A. devised freeholds to S. and H., their heirs and assigns, upon certain trusts, and directed that the premises "should and might be leased and demised by S. and H., and the survivor of them, and the executors or administrators of such survivor." S. and H. disclaimed, and the testator's heir at law granted such a lease as they were authorised to grant. The defendant bought the lease subject to an agreement that the title should commence with the lease under which the premises were held-Held, that he was not a purchaser for value without notice of the doubtful validity of the lease. Robson v. Flight, 4 De G. J. & S. 608; 34 L. J., Ch. 226; 11 Jur. (N.S.) 147; 11 L. T. 725; 13 W. R. 393.

Abstract and Particulars.] If property is declared to be sold subject to the provisions contained in a deed which is specially referred to, without mentioning its contents, and which deed can be examined before the sale by the purchaser, he is bound by everything contained in that deed. But if the vendor, instead of referring the purchaser to the deed to ascertain its contents, himself states what the contents are, the purchaser is not bound to examine the deed, but may reasonably trust to the representation of it, contained in the particulars of sale, as being a correct statement of its contents. Cox V. Cocenton, 31 Beav. 378.

Redeemed land tax, amounting to 411. per annum, was sold by auction in one lot. The particulars represented 37. 148. (part of it) as charged on three houses, but stated that the title consisted of a contract for redemption of the land tax of the 25th March, 1818. This contract, when produced after the sale, showed that the 37. 148. was not charged on three houses, but consisted of three small sums, each charged separately on one of the houses-Held, that the reference to the contract did not give the purchaser notice of the actual state of the title. Ib.

Under an agreement of exchange between A., who held lands under a college lease, and B., the owner of an adjoining estate, B. occupied part of the college lands, and A. had occupied along with the residue of the leasehold part of B.'s estate. A. became bankrupt; the college leasehold was sold, and was described in the particulars of sale as " late the residence of A.": -Held, that the purchaser was not to be con- Under a marriage settlement containing the sidered as having noticed the agreement of usual powers of sale and exchange, with power exchange, and that he had a right to recover to the trustees (of whom one was a minor), with the part of the leasehold in B.'s occupation. the consent in writing of the wife, to lend the

dition as to compensation for any mistakes or error, but the purchaser lived in the neighbourhood, and was acquainted with the property:Held, that this did not affect him with notice of the easements, nor could he be compelled to take the title with compensation. Shackleton v. Sutcliffe, 1 De G. & Sm. 609; 12 Jur. 199.

whole or part of the proceeds to the husband on | part of the land, and there was the usual conhis bond, the trustees, in order to make the loan, inconsiderately sold the estate under the power to the family solicitor, who, as owner thereof, raised a sum of money by way of mortgage, of which part was paid to the husband. The solicitor afterwards resold the estate, no money being paid to the husband, who, for valuable consideration, mortgaged it to other persons, and Estate consisting of fen land, and so described soon after became insolvent. The husband, as in particulars of sale, was charged by a local purchaser from the solicitor, being in treaty for but public act with drainage and embankment a loan on mortgage of the estate, abstracts were taxes, of which purchaser had no express delivered, which disclosed the marriage settle- notice :-Held, he was not entitled to compenment, the conveyance to the solicitor as pur-sation. Barraud v. Archer, 2 Sim. 433; 9 chaser under the power, the covenant to repur- L. J. (0.s.) Ch. 173. chase by the husband, and the deed of confirmation by the infant trustee; the mortgage being completed-Held, that the abstract disclosed what ought to have put the mortgagees on inquiry; and that they were affected with notice. Robinson v. Briggs, 1 Sm. & G. 188.

Court rolls.]-The court rolls of a manor are not constructive notice of prior incumbrances to a purchaser of copyholds holden of the manor Bugden v. Bignold, 2 Y. & Coll. C. C. 377.

Production of Documents.] - Production of documents for the purpose of notice held insufficient to fasten a purchaser with notice unless reasonable opportunity had been given for examination. Brumfit v. Morton, 3 Jur. (N.S.) 1198.

7. OF CONTENTS OF DOCUMENTS.

By Notice of Document.]-General notices to a purchaser that there are leases is notice of all their contents. Brydges v. Chandos (Duke), 2 Ves. J. 437.

Notice to a purchaser that there is a lease, is notice of its contents. Hall v. Smith, 14 Ves. 426; 9 R. R. 313.

The abstract of title of real estate disclosed the fact that the land tax had been redeemed, thirty-three years previously to the sale, by persons acting as the guardians of an infant tenant in tail, out of the personal estate of the infant, who died a bachelor without having attained his majority; and in a suit instituted shortly afterwards by the personal representatives of the infant against the then tenant in tail in remainder, a decree was made declaring them entitled to charge the estate with an amount equal to the consideration money paid for the redemption. A deed was prepared for the purpose of charging the estate accordingly, which was duly executed by the then tenant in tail in remainder, but he died without having suffered a recovery. The succeeding tenant in tail entered, suffered a recovery, and sold the estate to a purchaser for valuable consideration, who had no express notice of the facts above stated:-Held, on a bill filed by the administrator de bonis non of the infant tenant in tail against the purchaser, that the omission on his part to inquire whether the redemption of the land tax might not have been so effected as to have given to third Notice to a purchaser of a lease necessarily persons equitable rights, of which there was implies notice of all the covenants in it, and, no trace on the face of the abstract, did not being specifically informed that the estate was amount to gross negligence, and that he ought in lease, he is bound to know all the contents not therefore to be affected with constructive of the leases, and cannot take upon himself a notice of such equitable rights. Ware v. Eg-partial knowledge. Eyre v. Dolphin, 2 Ball & mont (Lord), 4 De G. M. & G. 460; 24 L. J., Ch. B. 301; 12 R. R. 94. 361; 1 Jur. (N.S.) 97; 3 Eq. R. 1; 3 W. R. 48. A. B., the executor and also devisee of real Specific performance decreed against a pur- estate, subject to debts and legacies, mortgaged chaser at a public auction, where the representa- it first to C. D., subject to the legacies, and aftertion in the particulars of sale (complained of as wards to E. F., subject to the mortgage of C. D.; calculated to mislead) was so vague and indefi---Held, that E. F., taking with notice of C. D.'s nite, that it ought to have put the purchaser on making previous inquiry. Trower v. Newcombe, 3 Mer. 704; 17 R. R. 171.

Where an estate was directed by the testator to be sold after the death of a certain person, and the sale was made during the life of that person under a decree, the abstract stated that the person at whose death the sale was to be made, proved the will of the testator, but it did not state the pleadings in the cause, or whether that person was living or dead-Held, that this was not a sufficiently distinct intimation to the purchaser that the time of sale had, without any sufficient grounds, been anticipated. Blacklow v. Laws, 2 Hare, 40.

Where, in the particulars of sale, no mention was made of certain easements affecting a sixth

The rental of lands sold under a decree stated the date, tenure, and rent of a tenant's lease, but not a clause in it giving the tenant powers, under restrictions, to fell and dispose of the timber, which was very valuable :-Held, that the purchaser, having notice of the lease, was bound by constructive notice of the clause relating to the timber. Vignolles v. Bowen, 12 Ir. Eq. R. 194.

mortgage, took subject to the legacies. Eland v. Eland, 4 Myl. & C. 420; 8 L. J., Ch. 289; 3

Jur. 474.

Notice of letters patent, in which there was a trust for creditors, is sufficient notice of the trust. Dunch v. Kent, 1 Vern. 319.

Notice of a deed is notice of the whole of its contents so far as they affect the transaction in which notice of the deed is acquired. Hamilton v. Royse, 2 Sch. & Lef. 315.

Letters patent, under which lands sold by private contract were held, contained covenants by the grantee; first, that he would place three free tenants of English or British race, blood, or names on the premises, each of whom should have fifty acres, or one free tenant who should have one hundred acres, for one life; secondly,