publish libels) proceed to sue out and execute a writ of inquiry as in any ordinary case. Middlesex (Sheriff), Ex parte, 8 D. P. C. 148; 3 Jur. 1030.

Of Member-Words spoken in Debate.]Words spoken by a member of parliament in parliament are absolutely privileged: the court has no jurisdiction to entertain an action in respect of them, and will upon motion set aside the writ of summons and statement of claim in such action. Dillon v. Balfour, 20 L. R., Ir. 600.

When Witness at a Trial.]-At a trial, a member may be asked who was speaker on a particular day, but if he is asked how a member voted, he will not be compelled to answer if he declines doing so, and has not the leave of the house to give evidence. Howard v. Gossett, Car. & M. 380.

Of Witness Examined before Committee. To an action of slander the defendant pleaded that the statements complained of were part of the evidence given by him in the character of a witness before a select committee of the house of commons-Held, that the statements so made were privileged, and that the action would not lie. Goffin v. Donnelly, 50 L. J., Q. B. 303; 6 Q. B. D. 307; 44 L. T. 141; 29 W. R. 440; 45 J. P. 439.

On Bankruptcy.]-Privilege of parliament exists at common law, and is not taken away by implication because a statute makes persons enjoying it subject to the law of bankruptcy, and does not specially reserve the privilege. Newcastle (Duke) v. Morris, 40 L. J., Bk. 4; L. R. 4 H. L. 661; 23 L. T. 569; 19 W. R. 26.

Before the Bankruptcy Act of 1861, traders having privilege of parliament were rendered liable to the bankrupt laws, but the privilege of freedom from personal arrest was expressly reserved to them. By s. 69 of that act all debtors (non-traders as well as traders) were made liable to the bankrupt laws. Nothing was said in the act to reserve to debtors who had privilege of parliament their freedom from personal arrest: -Held, that the statute included all debtors whatever, but that such debtors as were entitled to privilege of parliament still continued to enjoy its protection. 1b.

The provisions of the Bankruptcy Act, 1869, ss. 121, 122, relating to the vacating of his seat in parliament by a member of the house of commons who has been adjudged bankrupt, do not apply to the case of a member whose affairs are in liquidation by arrangement. Pooley, Ex parte, Russell, In re, 41 L. J., Bk. 67 ; L. R. 7 Ch. 519; 26 L. T. 813; 20 W. R. 735.

The duty cast upon the court of bankruptcy by s. 122, of certifying a member's bankruptcy to the speaker, is an ex-officio duty as between the court and the house of commons, and an application for such a certificate should not be made a creditor. Ib.

Of Officers of House.]-Officers of the house of commons who have a warrant of the speaker to take a person therein named, although they may have a right to enter his house (having been peaceably admitted) and to search the house, have no right, in case they do not find him, to remain there to await his return; and if

they stay several hours in the house for that purpose, they are trespassers ab initio. Howard v. Gossett, Car. & M. 380.

Warrant-Construction.]—A warrant of the house is to be construed as a mandate or as a writ of a superior court, acting according to the course of the common law, and not as the warrant of a justice of the peace, or of a court acting under a special statute authority. Gossett v. Howard, supra.

Ne Exeat Regno.]-Ne exeat to restrain member of parliament going to Ireland, refused. Bernal v. Donegal (Marquis), 11 Ves. 43.

Contempt of Court.]-The privilege attaching to members of parliament, which protects them from arrest for contempt of court in not obeying civil process, does not extend to cases where the contempt is in its nature or by its incidents of a criminal character. Lindsay, Ex parte, Armstrong, In re, [1892] 1 Q. B. 327; 65 L. T. 464; 40 W. R. 159; 17 Cox, C. C. 349; 8 Morrell, 271.

A member of parliament refused to be examined on oath upon a summons under s 27 of the Bankruptcy Act, 1883:—Held, that parliamentary privilege was an answer to an application to commit him for contempt of court. Ib.

Member of parliament committed for contempt in writing threatening letter to master. Charlton's Case, 2 Myl. & C. 316; 6 L. J., Ch. 185.

Privilege of parliament is no protection against an attachment for any contempt which is of a criminal kind. Wellesley v. Beaufort (Duke), 2 Russ. & M. 639.

Disobedience to Order under Debtors Act.]— Parliamentary privilege has no application to a case in which a person is liable to imprisonment within s. 4 of the Debtors Act, 1869, as a person in a fiduciary capacity. Gent, In re, GentDavis v. Harris, 58 L. J., Ch. 162; 40 Ch. D. 190; 60 L. T. 355; 37 W. R. 151.

Of Member from Arrest.]-Since a member of either house of parliament is privileged from arrest, a writ of capias against him is irregular, and will be set aside; although, in the case of a Imember of the lower house, the writ is not intended to be put in execution till his privilege expires; nor although, in either instance, no proceedings are contemplated against the person of the member, but the writ is only sued as part of process to outlawry. Cassidy v. Steuart, 2 Scott (N.R.) 432; 2 Man. & G. 437; 9 D. P. C. 366; 5 Jur. 25.

The privilege of a member from arrest on a ca. sa. exists for forty days before and forty days after a meeting of parliament. The rule of privilege is the same in the case of a dissolution as in that of a prorogation. Goudy v. Duncombe, 1 Ex. 430; 5 D. & L. 209; 17 L. J., Ex. 76.

On a motion for attachment of a member of the parliament which was dissolved on the 24th of March, for contempt in not obeying an order of the court to pay certain moneys, &c., to the liquidator of the company :-Held, that the rule laid down in Goudy v. Duncombe (1 Ex. 430), that a member of parliament was entitled to privilege from arrest for forty days both after and before the meeting of parliament, and

whether after a prorogation or a dissolution, applies to a person who was a member of the old, but is not a member of the new parliament. Anglo-French Co-operative Society, In re, 49 L. J., Ch. 388; 14 Ch. D. 533; 28 W. R. 580.

A judgment debtor summons will not lie against a member, and the privilege of parliament is not affected by the circumstance that the member has not been sworn in. European and American Finance Corporation v. M. P., 13 L. T. 447; 14 W. R. 135. S. P., Cutmur v. Knatchbull, 7 Term Rep. 443.

An unprivileged person, in custody in execution, is entitled to his discharge on motion on his being elected an M. P. Phillips v. Wellesley,

1 D. P. C. 9.

A., having privilege of parliament, owed B. a sum of money, for which B. sued him; in consequence of which, C. entered into a bond together with A., conditioned for the payment to B. of such sum as B. should recover in the action against A., in pursuance of 4 Geo. 3, c. 33. B. obtained judgment and put the bond in suit against C. To the action on the bond, C., being under terms to plead issuably, may plead in bar that a writ of error is depending on the judgment against A. Curling v. Innes, 2 H. Bl. 372.

Money voted by Parliament.]—The court has no jurisdiction to take account of money voted by parliament for the general expenses of a branch of the executive. Grenville Murray v. Clarendon (Earl), 39 L. J., Ch. 221 ; L. R. 9 Eq. 11; 21 L. T. 448; 18 W. R. 124.

Impeachment.]—By 12 & 13 Will. 3, c. 2, s. 3, no pardon under the great seal of England is pleadable to an impeachment by the commons in parliament.

On the trial of an information for bribery at a parliamentary election, filed by the attorney-general, in pursuance of a resolution of the house of commons, a person, alleged in the indictment to have been bribed, was called as a witness; he refused to answer any question, on the ground that the answer would tend to criminate him. A pardon under the great seal was handed to the witness, but he still refused to answer, upon which the judge compelled him to answer, and on his evidence the defendant was convicted :-Held, that the pardon took away the privilege of the witness so far as any risk of prosecution at the suit of the crown was concerned and that though the witness might be liable to an impeachment by the house of commons, notwithstanding the pardon, by reason of the above statute, yet that was so unlikely to happen that the witness could not be said to be in any real danger, and he was therefore rightly compelled to answer. Reg. v. Boyes, 1 B. & S. 311; 2 F. & F. 157; 30 L. J., Q. B. 301; 7 Jur. (N.s.) 1158; 5 L. T. 147; 9 W. R. 690; 9 Cox, C. C. 32.

Petition-Right to compel Representative to Present.-A parliamentary elector cannot under

the common law compel the member representing that particular constituency to present a petition to the house of commons that complies with the rules of the house. No action will lie against such member for refusing to present such petition. Chaffers v. Goldsmid, 63 L. J., Q. B. 59; [1894] 1 Q. B. 186; 10 R. 19; 70 L. T. 24 ; 42 W. R. 239; 58 J. P. 212.

Colonial.]-The lex et consuetudo parliamenti apply exclusively to the house of lords and house of commons in England, and are not conferred upon a supreme legislative assembly of a colony law of England into the colony. Fenton v. or settlement, by the introduction of the common Hampton, 11 Moore, P. C. 347; 6 W. R. 341. See Dill v. Murphy, 1 Moore, P. C. (N.S.) 487; 10 Jur. (N.S.) 549; 10 L. T. 170; 12 W. K. 491. No distinction in this respect exists between colonial legislative councils and assemblies whose power is derived by grant from the crown, or created under the authority of an act of the imperial parliament. Ib.

B. BILLS IN.

1. CONTRACTS FOR WITHDRAWAL OF OPPOSITION.

a. Legality.

Generally.]-Securities given to persons who would be prejudiced by the passing of a private bill in parliament, in consideration of their withdrawing their opposition to it, are not illegal. Vauxhall Bridge Co. v. Spencer (Earl), Jac. 64. Reversing 2 Madd. 356.

Where a person acting on behalf of the subscribers to a railway, who were then soliciting a bill in parliament, for the purpose of forming themselves into an incorporated joint-stock company, entered into a contract with the trustees of a road, whereby it was stipulated, that in consideration of the trustees withdrawing their opposition in parliament, and consenting to forego certain clauses, of which they had intended to press for the insertion in the act, a formal instrument to the effect of the clauses should be executed under the seal of the company when incorporated, and the bill was accordingly allowed to pass unopposed, and without the clauses, an injunction was granted at the suit of the trustees, to prevent the company from violating the provisions contained in the omitted clauses. An agreement to withdraw or withhold opposition to a bill in parliament is not illegal, and a court of equity will enforce a contract founded on such a consideration. Edwards v. Grand Junction Ry., 1 Myl. & C. 650; 7 Sim. 337; 6 L. J., Ch. 47.

The Shrewsbury and Birmingham Railway opposed a bill brought into parliament by the London and North Western Railway, seeking to authorise a lease to that company of a scheme by the Shropshire Union Railway, whereupon an agreement in writing was come to between the companies, that, in consideration of the withdrawal of the opposition by the Shrewsbury and Birmingham Railway, an account should be kept of the profits received from the traffic on the lines of the Shrewsbury and Birmingham Railway and Shropshire Union Railway, and that the profits to be received in respect of the traffic should be divided between them in certain proportions. By reason of the withdrawal of the opposition the bill was passed :-Held, that the

agreement was not a fraud on parliament, the public and their subscribers, or illegal. Shrewsbury and Birmingham Ry. v. L. & N. W. Ry., 2 Macn. & G. 324; 2 H. & Tw. 257; 20 L. J., Ch. 90; 14 Jur. 921, 1125.

And see LANDS CLAUSES ACT.

Whether Rights Postponed.]-On the construction of an act of parliament, the operation of the agreement was not postponed until all the contemplated lines were completed; but that the rights and liabilities of the two companies inter se, on which the agreement with the third company depended, arose on the completion of any one of the contemplated lines. Ib. An act of parliament recited three other acts, one only of which had relation to an agreement entered into between the plaintiffs and defendants. By the first section, on the completion of the works of the three lines of railways, by the recited acts authorised to be made, so as to be opened for public traffic, or at such other period as might be agreed upon, the Shropshire Union Railway were empowered to grant to the London and North Western Railway a lease in perpetuity of the undertaking. By the eleventh section of the same act, it was enacted, that as each of the lines of railway should be completed, the same should be worked and used by the London and North Western Railway, and for the purposes of such working, the London and North Western Railway were to exercise the powers before given by the act to the Shropshire Union Railway in relation to every such completed railway. Other sections of the act spoke of the "lease of the said railways," and the "making of such lease":-Held, that, according to the true construction of the act, there was no postponement of the rights of the parties to the benefit of the provisions of the lease, until the whole of the three lines had been completed.

Ib.

Not ultra vires.]—Where the projectors of a railway company, in order to induce a landowner to withdraw his opposition to their bill, enter into a contract with him, in which the stipulation is that the contract is to be performed by the company after the company has obtained an act of incorporation from parliament, such contract to be valid ought to be one which might be lawfully made by the company after incorporation. Preston v. Liverpool, Manchester and Newcastle Ry., 5 H. L. Cas. 605; 25 L. J., Ch. 421; 2 Jur. (N.S.) 241; 4 W. R. 383.

It is ultra vires of a corporation established for the purpose of making a railway, to enter into a covenant to pay a large sum of money to an individual for not opposing the passing of the company's bill in parliament. Ib.

P. was a landowner; a railway company was projected, and for the intended railway some of his land would be required. He threatened to oppose the bill. The projectors entered into an agreement with him, that "in case the company shall obtain an act of incorporation, the company should pay him 1,0007. for all lands required by the company for the due making of the railway, and 4,000l. for consequential injury to his estate and hall"; that a tunnel should be constructed in a particular manner through a part of his property, and that a passenger station should be made, &c. P. withdrew his opposition, and the bill passed; the railway was not made, nor were the lands required :-Held, that this was not a

contract which on the mere passing of the bill entitled him to claim from the company payment of the money. Ib.

Edwards v. Grand Junction Ry. (1 Myl. & Cr. 650), and Petre (Lord) v. Eastern Counties Ry. (1 Railw. Cas. 462), impugned. Ib.

A bill in parliament to authorise a railway company to grant a lease in perpetuity to another railway company of certain projected lines was opposed by a third railway company, who withdrew their opposition on an agreement being come to that during the continuance of any lease to be authorised by the act the companies should participate in portions of each other's profits, and that the two former companies should not take traffic on specified portions of their lines:-Held, that the agreement was ultra vires, and ought not to be decreed to be specifically performed. Held, also, on the construction of the whole agreement, that, if valid, it would have come into operation, although only a portion of the projected lines was completed. Shrewsbury and Birmingham Ry. v. L. & N. W. Ry., 4 De G. M. & G. 115; 22 L. J., Ch. 682; 17 Jur. 845.

The directors of a railway company are trustees (in an important sense of the word) of their statutory powers, and an agreement entered into by the company amounting to a breach of trust will not be enforced to the prejudice, or not according to the views, of all or some of the shareholders, at the instance of parties cognisant of the circumstances. This proposition is not inconsistent with Hawkes v. Eastern Counties Ry. (1 De G. M. & G. 737). Ib.

For Countenance and Support.]—A com pany will not be bound by the contract of its promoters, where the thing contracted to be done is ultra vires of the company. An agreement by the promoters of a railway to pay whose estate their line is to pass, for his couna sum of money to a landowner, through

tenance and support to the scheme, is ultra vires of the company when incorporated, and though adopted and acted on, will not be enforced against the company. Shrewsbury (Earl) v. North Staffordshire Ry., 35 L. J., Ch. 156 ; L. R. 1 Eq. 593; 12 Jur. (N.S.) 63; 13 L. T. 648; 14 W. R. 220.

An agreement to give a sum of money as a bribe to buy off opposition to a railway bill in parliament cannot be enforced. Scottish North Eastern Ry. v. Stewart, 3 Macq. H. L. 382; 5 Jur. (N.S.) 607; 7 W. R. 458.

With Member.]—It is not illegal for the promoters of a railway to agree personally with a landowner, even (so long as there is no proof of corrupt influence on his vote) though he is a member of either house of parliament, to pay him a sum of money for withdrawing his opposi tion to their bill, or giving his countenance and support to their scheme; but such a payment is not an expense incurred in obtaining the special act, or incident thereto," within s. 5 of the Companies Clauses Act, and cannot so be upheld as a liability of the company. Shrewsbury (Earl) v. North Staffordshire Ry., supra.

A bill being introduced into parliament according to which the line would pass through Lord H.'s estates, and near his mansion, it was agreed between the plaintiffs (in error) and Lord H., that if he withdrew his opposition they would endeavour to deviate the line, and would, in six months after the bill passed, pay

benefit of the agreement were bound by it. Edwards v. Grand Junction Ry., 7 Sim. 337; 1 Railw. Cas. 173; 1 Myl. & Cr. 650; 6 L. J., Ch.

47.

Traffic Arrangements.]-In 1846, two competing lines of railway, the Direct Northern and the Lancashire and Yorkshire, being before parliament, L. agreed with eleven persons (the promoters of the Direct Northern Railway) to give them certain portions of land, at different prices; to withdraw all parliamentary opposition from them, and offer every description of opposition to the Lancashire and Yorkshire Railway; and that if amalgamation took place on any grounds, he would not oppose the amalgamated company. In case of the amalgamated company obtaining their bill, they were to adopt this agreement and all the covenants, &c., one of which was, that the Direct Northern Railway Company were to build a station near T., at a point to be approved by L., at which station all trains should stop. The two companies did amalgamate by the name of "the Great Northern Railway Company." Litigation took place, both in equity and at law, upon the construction of the agreement, the validity of which was never impeached in such litigation. The Great Northern Company now refused to stop their express trains at the T. station :-Held, first, that the agreement was legal in itself, and was now decided by authority; but semble, that if such authority had been wanting, it would not have been open to the defendants now to impeach it after having brought it forward as a defence in former litigation. Secondly, that the balance of inconvenience on stopping such trains was in favour of a specific performance of the agreement, and that the court would not hesitate to interfere to restrain a breach of it on interlocutory application. Thirdly, that the amalgamated company's act having been passed without opposition by L., which might reasonably be supposed to be in consequence of the agreement, acts done by the company under their act were to be looked at as if done under the agreement. Lindsay (Earl) v. G. N. Ry., 10 Hare, 665; 22 L. J., Ch. 995; 17 Jur. 522; 1 W. R. 257.

An agreement entered into by two companies, by which one of those companies agreed that it would not prejudice, or by an indirect or circuitous course interfere with the traffic passing on the direct line of the other company, was not illegal. Shrewsbury and Birmingħam Ry. v. L. &N. W. Ry., supra.

The decision in the case of Edwards v. Grand Junction Ry. (1 Myl. & Cr. 650) did not proceed on the principle that the incorporated company was bound by the contract of a party acting as an agent for them prior to their corporate existence, but on the principle that the court would not allow them to exercise powers acquired by means of such contract without carrying it into full effect; and in the absence of any adoption of the contract of such a party by the incorporated company, or of any attempt to exercise the powers thereby acquired, or of any part performance, the court might refuse to enforce specific performance of such a contract against the incorporated company; but if they adopt or avail themselves of the contract, or exercise the powers acquired by its means, the court will in that case not only negatively but positively interpose, and compel the performance by them of every portion of the contract. Lindsay (Earl) v. G. N. Ry., 10 Hare, 665; 22 L. J., Ch. 995; 17 Jur. 522; 1 W. R. 257.

The committee of certain subscribers applying for an act to authorise the formation of a railway agreed with the plaintiff, a peer of parliament, through whose estates the railway had to pass, that in consideration of his withholding his opposition to their bill, the incorporated company, in the event of the railway being, under the powers of their act, made to pass through the plaintiff's estates, in the line laid down on their parliamentary plan, should previous to entering thereon pay to the plaintiff the sum of 120,0007. for the value of the land, and for compensation; and that the company should, within three weeks after their incorporation, ratify the agreement. The plaintiff withheld his opposition to the bill, and it passed into an act. The incorporated company refused to ratify the agreement; and, being empowered by their act to take compulsorily the plaintiff's land in the line mentioned in the agreement, served on him a notice to treat for the same. Injunction granted, restraining the company from proceeding to assess the value of the land; and continued, notwithstanding the tender of an undertaking on the part of the company, not to enter on the land until the further order of the court; and notwithstanding the time during which the company was authorised to take lands for the railway would have expired before the hearing of the cause. Petre (Lord) v. Eastern Counties Ry., 1 Railw. Cas. 462.

A railway company, having applied for an act to extend their line, was opposed by a landowner; whereupon an agreement was entered into between the solicitor of the company and the landowner that the latter should withdraw his opposition, and if the act passed, that the company should purchase his land on certain terms. Neither the appointment of agent, nor the agreement was under the seal of the corporation. The act passed, but the company did not