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their observance, the company cannot, in the case of an injury occurring to anyone crossing the line at that point, set up the existence of the notices by way of answer to an action for damages for such injury. Dublin, Wicklow & Wexford Ry. v. Slattery, 3 App. Cas. 1155; 39 L. T. 365; 27 W. R. 191-H. L. (E.)

Told not to Cross.]—A public footway crossed a railway on a level. The plaintiff while crossing on the footway in the evening, after dark, was knocked down and injured by a train on the crossing. He stated at the trial that he did not see the train until it was close upon him; that he saw no lights on the train and heard no whistling. He stated also that he did not hear any caution or warning given to him by any servant of the company. The driver and fireman of the engine were called on behalf of the company, and stated that there were lamps on the engine and train, which were lighted in due course on the night in question, at the commencement of the journey, and which, if lighted, could be seen for a considerable distance by any. one standing at the crossing. A porter also stated that he had seen the plantiff at the crossing on the night in question, and had called to him not to cross-Held, that there was no evidence of negligence to go to the jury. Ellis v. G. W. Ry., 43 L. J., C. P. 304; L. R. 9 C. P. 551; 30 L. T. 874-Ex. Ch.

contractors who are entirely independent of the company, it is not the duty of the directors to assume that such works will be negligently conducted by those who have contracted for their execution, and to take precautions against possible negligence on the part of persons who are not in their employment nor under their control. Daniel v. Metropolitan Ry., 40 L. J., C. P. 121; L. R. 5 H. L. 45; 24 L. T. 815; 20 W. R. 37.

The corporation of London was authorised to execute certain works over the line of the Metropolitan Railway Company. These works consisted partly in placing heavy iron girders upon the walls running along the line of railway, and were therefore works in the execution of which danger was involved, but which were often executed elsewhere without mischief. The railway company had no control over these works, which were executed by contractors engaged by the corporation. Several girders had been safely put in their places by manual labour, but, on this occasion, the contractors brought into use for one of the girders a monkey steam-engine which moved the girder with a jerk, and so It fell on a caused it to overbalance and fall. passing train, and injured the plaintiff :—Held, that this was not a mischief the occurrence of which the railway company was bound to anticipate, and against which it was bound to take precautions, and consequently that the railway company was not liable. Ib.

Brick Falling from Bridge.]-A person was

part of a line of railway, when a brick fell from and injured him. He at the time heard a noise its place in the perpendicular pier of the bridge, as of a train passing above :-Held, that these the part of the railway company. Kearney v. facts were sufficient evidence of negligence on L. B. & S. C. Ry., 40 L. J., Q. B. 285; L. Ř. 6 Q. B. 759; 24 L. T. 913; 20 W. R. 24-Ex. Ch.

Keeping a Gatekeeper.]— C., while passing along an occupation road which crossed a rail-walking on a highway under a bridge forming way on a level, was knocked down and injured by a train, owing, as was alleged, to the negligence of the railway company. There were gates across the road left unfastened, and the company had at one time kept a gatekeeper, but had ceased to keep one some time before the accident. About three years before the accident the company had obtained powers under an act to make a new road and discontinue the level occupation road; the powers of the act were to be exercised within five years, and then to cease; and nothing had been done as to the road till after the accident. The jury negatived negligence in the driver of the engine; but found for the plaintiff on the ground generally of "negligence as to the crossing." The judge, in summing up, left to the jury, as evidence of negligence in the company, the omission to keep a gatekeeper, and the omission to exercise the powers of their act :-Held, a misdirection. Cliff v. Midland Ry., L. R. 5 Q. B. 258; 22 L. T. 382;

18 W. R. 456.

2. STATE OF PREMISES.

State of Level Crossing.]-When a railway company constructs its line across a highway on a level under the sanction of an act of parliament, it is the duty of the company to keep the crossing in a proper state for the passage of carriages across the rails; and if a carriage is damaged in consequence of the rails being too high above the surface of the roadway, the company is liable. Oliver v. N. E. Ry., 43 L. J., Q. B. 198; L. R. 9 Q. B. 409.

Fall of Girder on Train.]-Where works are going on over a line of railway, with which works the railway company has nothing to do, and the execution of such works is entrusted to

Footbridge over Railway.]-A railway company, in lieu of and substitution for an old public footpath crossing their line on the level, also over an adjoining road running parallel built a footway bridge over the railway, and therewith, at a height of about 15 feet from sides with close wooden boarding 6 feet high, the ground. This bridge was fenced on both where it crossed the railway, and with open ornamental iron work 4 feet high, with trianinches wide, where it crossed the road. There gular apertures 3 feet 3 inches high by 1 foot was no interval between the wooden boarding and the iron work, nor any aperture than those above mentioned, in the fencing or the bridge. A child four and a half years old, together with another child seven years old, went upon the bridge to cross over, when he, instead of walking straight forward in the ordinary way, placed his back against the wooden boarding, and slid or edged himself along against it until he came to the ironwork, when he fell backwards, through one of the above-mentioned triangular apertures, on to the road, and was injured. In an action to recover damages, the county court judge ruled that there was evidence of negligence in the company, and asked the jury whether they thought the bridge was reasonably safe for all her Majesty's subjects, and whether the child materially contributed to the accident :-Held, that there was no evidence of negligence on the part of the company, and that the plaintiff

ought to have been nonsuited. The only duty Yard Unenclosed.]-A man went with a cart upon the company was to keep the bridge, and team, by implied invitation, to fetch lime which they had substituted for the old public from a railway yard. While in the yard he unfootpath, in a state ordinarily safe for persons harnessed a mare that was leading his team. A using it for the purpose of crossing over it in passing train frightened the mare; she backed the ordinary way, and that the plaintiff's user of some considerable distance, and, in spite of his it in this instance was not such a user. Lay v. efforts to hold her, fell over a dwarf wall of the Midland Ry., 30 L. T. 529. company's, and was hurt. An action having A railway company, in place of a public foot-been brought in the county court by him against way crossing their line on the level, built a the company for not having a sufficient fence to bridge over the line, and also over a roadway the yard, it was proved at the trial that he knew adjoining. The bridge was fenced with wooden the place well, and had been there often before. hoardings where it crossed the rails, and with The county court judge found that the fence was open ornamental work with triangular openings insufficient, and decided in his favour:-Held, where it crossed the road. A child about four that there was no proof of want of reasonable years of age went upon the bridge in company care on the part of the company to prevent with another child, for the purpose of crossing damage from unusual danger to persons visiting over, and instead of walking straight forward, the premises with full knowledge of the state of he placed his back against the hoardings and the place, and that, therefore, he was not enslid along until he came to the ornamental iron- titled to recover. Manchester, Sheffield, and work, when he fell through backwards on to the Lincolnshire Ry. v. Woodcock, 25 L. T. 333. road and was injured. In an action to recover compensation, evidence was adduced as to the Gates Open.]-A railway crossed a highway dangerous character of the bridge. The jury at a level. There were gates to stop carriages, found that the child was lawfully using the horses and cattle, and a watch-box, and a person bridge when the accident occurred, and that to close the gates as soon as such horses, &c., the bridge was not reasonably safe for all her should have passed. There were also swingmajesty's subjects:-Held, that there was evi- gates for foot passengers. A boy, aged fourteen, dence of negligence, and that it was the duty of came to the crossing soon after a cart had passed the company to keep the bridge in such a state over the line; the gates were still open, and he as not to be dangerous to any one using it in a went through and got on the line; but, seeing lawful manner, and that there was no negli- an up-train approaching, he waited on the down gence on the part of the child contributory to line till it had passed. While he was thus waitthe accident. Lay v. Midland Ry., 34 L. T. 30. ing a down-train approached, but the boy did not see it, though he might have done so if he had been on the look-out for it, or if his attention had not been engrossed by the up-train. The up-train having passed, the boy was just leaving the down line to cross, when the train knocked him down :-Held, evidence of negligence, the the company being bound by s. 47 of the Railways Clauses Act, 1845, to have the gates closed at the time. North-Eastern Ry. v. Wanless, 43 L. J., Q. B. 185; L. R. 7 H. L. 12; 30 L. T. 275; 22 W. R. 561.

Plank across Bridge-Licensee.]-A railway porter was standing, in broad daylight, upon a plank thrown across from parapet to parapet of a footbridge connecting the two platforms of a station, cleaning a lamp, when the plaintiff accompanying her daughter to a train, in crossing the bridge, struck her head against the plank and was injured:-Held, that the plaintiff was not a mere licensee; but that there was no evidence of negligence on the part of the railway company. Watkins v. G. W. Ry., 46 L. J., C. P. 817; 37 L. T. 193; 25 W. R. 905.

The question whether there was, or was not, negligence on the part of the company should have been left to the jury. Ib.

Dangerous Coal Shed.]—At a railway station it was the practice to unload coal waggons by shunting them, and tipping the coal into cells; it was also the practice for the consignees of the coal or their servants to assist in the unloading, and for that purpose to go along a flagged path by the side of the waggons. A consignee of a coal waggon could not unload it in the usual way on account of all the cells being occupied. With the permission of the station-master he went to his waggon, which was shunted in the usual place, took some coal from the top of the waggon, and descended on to the flagged path. The flag he stepped on gave way, and he fell into one of the cells and was injured:-Held, that, although not getting his coal in the usual mode, he was not a mere licensee, but was engaged, with the consent of the company, in a transaction of common interest to both parties, and was therefore entitled to require that the premises should be in a reasonably secure condition. Holmes v. North-Eastern Ry., 40 L. J., Ex. 121; L. R. 6 Ex. 123; 24 L. T. 69-Ex. Ch. Affirming, 17 W. R. 800.

Neglect to Fence.]-A line crossed a public footpath on the level; but the railway company had not erected any gate or stile as provided by s. 61 of the Railway Clauses Act, 1845. A child of four years old having been sent on an errand was shortly after found lying on the level crossing, a foot having been cut off by a passing train :-Held, that there was evidence that the act had been caused by neglect of the company to fence. Williams v. G. W. Ry., 43 L. J., Ex. 105; L. R. 9 Ex. 157; 31 L. T. 124; 22 W. R. 531.

At the point where a railway crossed a high road by a level crossing there were two large gates, which, when closed, covered the entire width of the metalled road and fenced-in the line therefrom. At the side of the large gates, and beyond the width of the metalled road, but communicating therewith by a short footpath, there was a small gate for foot passengers. A piece of fence, which stood immediately beyond the small gate, and against which it rested, was allowed by the railway company to get out of repair, and became rotten, in consequence whereof some horses belonging to the plaintiff, which were straying on the high road, were enabled, by passing along the short footpath and pushing against the fence, to get on to the line, where they were killed by a passing train:

Held, that the company had failed to satisfy the obligation to fence their line imposed on them by s. 47 of the Railway Clauses Act, 1845, and were liable in an action for damages. Charman v. S. E. Ry., 57 L. J., Q. B. 597; 21 Q. B. D. 524; 37 W. R. 8; 53 J. P. 86-C. A.

objection or complaint had ever been made in respect of it, and it was a description of fastening used on many crossings and gates along the line and elsewhere. Several cows were being driven over the crossing in question, and whilst in the gateway two of them began to butt and fight with each other, and the larger and stronger of the two drove the other against the catch of the gate, and thereby caused injuries resulting in the death of the injured cow. In an action to recover damages for the loss of the cow :-Held, that there was no evidence of negligence on the part of the railway company. G. W. Ry. v. Davies, 39 L. T. 475.

The plaintiff in 1846 became tenant from year to year of land belonging to one G. In 1847 the defendants, a railway company, acquired part of the land in the exercise of their statutory powers, and by arrangements with G. paid him compensation in lieu of all accommodation works, including the right to have his land fenced from the railway, G. releasing the defendants from their statutory obligation in that respect. The defendants, however, made a fence Obstruction on Line Contributory Negliof posts and rails between the land so occupied gence.]-The plaintiffs were the owners of a by the plaintiff and a ditch in the defendants' colliery, and of a siding connected with a line of land adjoining the railway, and they planted a railway, which siding was crossed by a wooden hedge on the side of the ditch nearest the rail- bridge about eight feet high, also belonging to way itself, sufficient to prevent animals from the plaintiffs. The siding was used for the purstraying thereon. They, however, neglected to pose of bringing loaded trucks of coal from the keep up the posts and rails, and in consequence colliery upon the railway and of bringing them of their neglect to do so, a cow belonging to the back when empty. The company was in the plaintiff, in 1879, whilst the plaintiff so con- practice of bringing the empty trucks upon the tinued in the occupation of the land under the siding, and the plaintiffs removed them whenoriginal tenancy which had never been deter-ever it was convenient. On a Saturday aftermined, fell into the ditch and was killed-noon, after working hours in the colliery were Held, that the defendants were liable for the loss of the cow, for that their arrangement with the owner did not exonerate them from their liability under the Railway Clauses Act, 1845, s. 68, to maintain the fence for the benefit of the occupied, and so as to prevent his cattle from straying from his land. Corry v. G. W. Ry., 50 L. J., Q. B. 386: 7 Q. B. D. 322; 44 L. T. 701; 29 W. R. 623; 45 J. P. 712—C. A.

Cattle were driven at night along an occupation road, which crossed a branch line of a railway on a level. As they were passing over the crossing they became frightened, owing to a number of trucks being shunted in a negligent manner, and part of them escaped from the control of their drivers, and were found dead on the main line of the railway, which they reached owing to defects in the fence of an orchard and a garden adjoining the railway :Held, that there was sufficient evidence that the death of the cattle was the natural result of the negligence of the railway company. Sneesby v. Lancashire and Yorkshire Ry., 45 L. J., Q. B. 1; 1 Q. B. D. 42; 33 L. T. 372; 24 W. R. 99C. A.

Insufficiency of Gate.]—The fact of a railway company knowing that a gate erected under s. 8 of the Railway Clauses Act, 1845, is out of repair by a spring catch being ineffective, although the gate be also provided with a staple and hasp, and padlock and key, is some evidence for a jury that the company were guilty of negligence. Brooks v. L. & N. W. Ry., 33 W. R. 167.

Fastening of Gate Injuring Animal.]-A railway crossed, on a level, a parish highway; at the crossing was a gate for cattle and carriages, and a swing gate for foot passengers. The gate for cattle and carriages, when closed across the highway, shut against the gate-post of the swing gate, and upon and against a catch, or fastening of iron, fixed on and projecting from the front of the gatepost. This catch had been on the gate and in the same condition for eight or nine years without causing any injury or accident, and no

over, the company left several trucks on the siding, one of which had upon it another truck which had broken down, and the combined height of the two trucks was too great for them to pass under the bridge. The presence of this truck was known to the person left in charge of the colliery. On the following evening, after it was dark, the servants of the company brought some more trucks upon the siding, and the engine driver, in order to clear the main line, shunted the trucks against those which were already there, and thus brought the loaded truck into contact with the bridge. On finding that there was an obstruction he did not go to ascertain its cause, but assuming that it was caused by a brake he drew back his engine and pushed up the whole train of trucks with such violence as entirely to carry away the bridge. In an action for the damage caused to the bridge, the judge directed the jury that if there was any negli gence or want of ordinary care on the part of the plaintiffs contributing to the accident the company would be entitled to the verdict. A verdict was found for the company :-Held, that there was evidence of contributory negligence to go to the jury, but that the judge had misdirected the jury in not leaving to them the question whether, even if there had been contributory negligence on the part of the plaintiffs, the company might not have avoided the accident by the exercise of due care and diligence. Radley v. L. & N. W. Ry., 46 L. J., Ex. 573; 1 App. Cas. 754; 35 L. T. 637; 25 W. R. 147—H. L. (E.)

Locomotive Engine at Station-Noise of Steam -Duty to Screen.]-In an action against the defendants, a railway company, it appeared that the plaintiffs were leaving a station belonging to the defendants, in a carriage, when the horse was frightened by the sight and sound of a locomotive engine at the station, which was blowing off steam, and the carriage was upset and the plaintiffs injured. It did not appear that the engine was defective, or that it was used in an improper manner, or that the approach to the station was inconvenient, but the jury found that the defendants were guilty of negligence in not screening

the railway from the roadway leading to the station, and that such negligence had caused the accident :-Held, that the defendants were not liable, as there was no evidence of any obligation on their part to screen the railway from the road. Simkin v. L. & N.-W. Ry., 21 Q. B. D. 453; 59 L. T. 797; 53 J. P. 85—C. A.

Dog on Platform.]---A person using a railway station, through which there was a public right of way, was bitten by a dog which was not the property of the company, and there was no evidence that it was seen by the servants of the company till immediately before the accident, when it went into the signal-box, and was turned out by the signal-man. There was evidence that a dog was on the platform, and attempted to bite a lady about an hour previously; but though this was mentioned to a porter, it did not appear that the dog was pointed out to him, or that he saw it :-Held, that there was no evidence of negligence on the part of the company or their servants. Smith v. G. E. Ry., 36 L. J., C. P. 22; L. R. 2 C. P. 4; 15 L. T. 246; 15 W. R. 131.

C. IN MANAGEMENT OF SHIP. Injury to Sea Wall-Wreck by Negligence. The defendants' vessel, through the negligence of their servants, took the ground, and becoming unmanageable in consequence, was driven against and damaged the plaintiffs' sea wall. She could not be removed from her position against the wall without being broken up. During the time occupied in landing the cargo, which was done with reasonable care, speed, and diligence, further damage was done to the wall by the vessel bumping against it. The declaration stated in a first count that the vessel was wrecked by the negligence of the defendants' servants, and thereby injured the wall; and in a second count that the vessel had been wrecked and driven against the wall, and did and was continuing to do injury to it, and that by reasonable care the defendants might have prevented her from doing and continuing to do further injury to the wall:-Held, that the plaintiffs were entitled to recover on the first but not on the second count. Romney Marsh Bailiffs v. Trinity House Corporation, 41 L. J., Ex. 106; L. R. 7 Ex. 247; 20 W. R. 952—Ex. Ch. Affirming, 22 L. T. 446.

Vis major.-S. 74 of the Harbours, Docks and Piers Act, 1847, enacts that "the owner of every vessel or float of timber shall be answerable to the undertakers for any damage done by such vessel or float of timber, or by any person employed about the same, to the harbour, dock or pier, or the quays or works connected therewith; and the master or person having the charge of such vessel or float of timber, through whose wilful act or negligence any such damage is done, shall also be liable to make good the Provided always, that nothing herein contained shall extend to impose any liability upon the owner when the vessel is at the time when the damage is caused in charge of a compulsory pilot. A vessel was driven aground by a violent storm, and after the master and crew had been obliged to abandon her, was forced by the wind and waves against a pier, whereby serious damage was occasioned :-Held, that the owners of the ship were not liable under

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the above section. Wear River Commissioners v. Adamson, 47 L. J., Q. B. 193; 2 App. Cas. 743; 37 L. T. 543; 26 W. R. 217-H. L.

The exemption from obligation to make good losses or injuries caused by the act of God applies to liabilities created by s. 74 no less than to those existing before the passing of the act. Ib.

Liability of Owner.]-Lester, who was the registered owner of a ship, and who was also registered as managing owner, under the Merchant Shipping Act, 1875, traded with her for about three months, employing Lilee as captain. It was then verbally agreed between Lester and Lilee, that on condition Lester received onethird of the net profits, Lilee should be at liberty, without being subject to any control on the part of Lester, to take the ship wherever and to whatever port he chose, to take any cargo, and to refuse any cargo. Lilee was also to engage and pay the seamen, and to find all stores required by the ship. A wharf having been injured through the negligent management of the ship while under the control of Lilee, the owner brought an action against Lester and Lilee-Held, that Lester had so far retained his ownership of the ship as not to divest himself of responsibility for the negligence of Lilee, and he was therefore liable in the action. Steel v. Lester, 47 L. J., C. P. 43; 3 C. P. D. 121; 37 L. T. 642; 26 W. R. 212.

A. agreed to carry B. from Milford Haven to Liverpool; the mode of transit provided was that B. should come on to a hulk lying in the harbour at Milford Haven, and wait till a steamer came and took him to Liverpool. On the hulk, close to a ladder down which B. had to pass to reach the steamer, was a large hatchway, which was negligently left unguarded and improperly lighted, and B. fell through it and was injured. The hulk belonged to a third party, and A. had only acquired a right to use it for the purpose of embarking passengers on his steamer. In an action by B. against A. for the injury he sustained-Held, that he was answerable for all injury occurring through the means of transit being improper, whether it arose from negligence of his own servants or of other parties who helped to provide the means of transit. John v. Bacon, 39 L. J., C. P. 365 ; L. R. 5 C. P. 437; 22 L. T. 477; 18 W. R. 894.

A., lessee of a ferry, hired from the defendant, for one day, a steam tug and crew, to assist in carrying his passengers across. He received the fares; and the defendant was paid by him for the hire of the tug; the defendant sent and paid the crew. The plaintiff, who had contracted with and paid A. for being carried across the ferry at all times during one year, went on board the tug, from A.'s pier, as a passenger, for the purpose of crossing. By the negligence of the crew some tackle broke, and the plaintiff, whilst on board, was injured :— Held, that he was entitled to recover against the defendant for such negligence. Dalyell v. Tyrer, El., Bl. & El. 809; 28 L. J., Q. B. 52; 5 Jur. (N.S.) 335; 6 W. R. 684.

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after dark in unloading the barge, and, stepping | down, the jury must be satisfied that the injury back to get clear, fell through the cabin hatch- was attributable to the negligence of the driver, way, which was left uncovered. The defendant and to that alone, before they can find a verdict had not provided the barge with a cabin top. In an action for compensation for personal injuries-Held, that the defendant owed no duty to the persons using his barge to provide a cabin-top or to give warning of its absence; and that the accident did not directly result from the absence of the cabin-top, but from the hatchway being left uncovered, and that the action failed. Heaven v. Pender (11 Q. B. D. 503); and Smith v. London and St. Katherine Dock (L. R., 3 C. P. 326) distinguished. O'Neil v. Everest, 61 L. J., Q. B. 453; 66 L. T. 396; 7 Asp. M. C. 163; 56 J. P. 612-C. A.

for the plaintiff; and if they think that it was occasioned in any degree by the improper conduct of the plaintiff in crossing the road in an incautious and imprudent manner, they must find their verdict for the defendant. Hawkins v. Cooper, 8 Car. & P. 473.

Unseaworthiness of Ship.]-The fact that the captain of a vessel neglects to have certain appliances which have been provided by her owners for closing a necessary aperture in the bulwarks properly fitted up, does not affect the seaworthiness of the vesssel within the meaning of s. 5 of the Merchant Shipping Act, 1876, although it is a source of danger to her crew, Hedley v. Pinkney, 61 L. J., Q. B. 179; [1892] 1 Q. B. 58; 66 L. T. 71; 40 W. R. 113; 7 Asp. M. C. 135; 56 J. P. 308-C. A.

Omission to Perform usual Operation.] In an action for personal injuries sustained by the non-performance of an operation which defendants were under no statutory obligation to perform :-Held, that the fact that such operation was usually performed by persons who were servants of the defendants was no evidence of any contractual duty upon the defendants to perform the operation, and imposed no liability for the non-performance on the occasion in question. Loader v. London Docks, 65 L. T. 674; 56 J. P. 165-C. A.

Failure of Steam Steering Gear.]—The steamship E. while proceeding down the river Thames came into collision with a brig which was moored alongside a wharf. The cause of the collision was the failure of the steam steering gear on board the E. The same steering gear had failed in an exactly similar manner a few days before, as the E. was on her inward voyage. It was then disconnected, and the hand gear used on the way up the river. On the ship's arrival the machinery was taken to pieces and examined, but nothing was found wrong with it, nor was the cause of the failure ascertained-Held, that having regard to what had happened on the inward voyage, to trust the control of the ship to the same steering gear in the crowded and intricate navigation of the Thames constituted negligence. The European, 54 L. J., P. 61; 10 P. D. 99; 52 L. T. 868; 33 W. R. 937; 5 Asp.

M. C. 417.

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To sustain an action for an injury caused by the negligent driving of the defendant, the injury must have been caused by his negligence only, without the negligence of the plaintiff contributing in any way to the accident. Williams v. Richards, 3 Car. & K. 81.

Inability from Deafness to Hear Warning.]-The plaintiff, who was almost deaf, was walking across a street in a diagonal direction at a place where there was no crossing. The defendant's driver turned his horse round from where he had stopped, and proceeded to drive up the same street. He saw the plaintiff for the first time a short distance off, and shouted a warning. The plaintiff not hearing, continued on his course, whereupon the driver began to pull up, and shouted again, but immediately after collided with the plaintiff, who was thereby seriously injured. The jury having found a verdict for the plaintiff :-Held, that the verdict was not against the weight of evidence. Smith V. Browne, 28 L. R., Ir. 1.

Persons Crossing Road.]-It is the duty of passengers at the entrance of a street, to drive a person who is driving over a crossing for foot slowly, cautiously and carefully; but it is also the duty of a foot passenger to use due care and caution in going upon such crossing, so as not to get among the carriages, and thus receive injury. Williams v. Richards, 3 Car. & K. 81.

A foot passenger has a right to cross a carriageroad, and a person driving a carriage along the road is liable to an action if he does not take care so as to avoid driving against a foot passenger who is crossing the road; and if a person thus driving cannot pull up in time because his reins break, that is no defence, as he is bound to have Cotterill v. Starkey, 8 Car, & P.

proper tackle.

691.

side of the road is no evidence of negligence in The mere fact of a man's driving on the wrong an action brought against him for running over a person who was crossing the road on foot. Lloyd v. Ogleby, 5 C. B. (N.S.) 667.

Where A., by the wrongful act of B., loses his presence of mind, and, in consequence, runs into danger, and receives an injury from the act of B.-Held, that B. is not protected by a warning given to A. immediately before the accident; and that an action lies for the injury sustained. Woolley v. Scovell, 3 M. & Ry. 105; 7 L. J. (0.s.)

K. B. 41.

It is equally the duty of persons crossing a street or a road to look out for vehicles coming along, as it is for the drivers of those vehicles to be vigilant in not running against persons crossing. Cotton v. Wood, 8 C. B. (N.S.) 568; 29 L. J., C. P. 333; 7 Jur. (N.S.) 168.

Therefore a person suing an owner of a vehicle for negligence by and through the misconduct of his servant, in running over him while crossing a thoroughfare, must, in order to succeed, give affirmative and preponderant evidence of neglect of duty on the driver's part. Ib.

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