Rule of the Road.]to an action for negligently driving, that the plaintiff was on the wrong side of the road, if there was room sufficient for the defendant to pass without inconvenience. Clay v. Wood, 5 Esp. 44; 8 R. R. 827. S. P., Wayde v. Carr, 2 D. & R. 255; 1 L. J. (0.s.) K. B. 63; 25 R. R.

554.

It is no justification | drawing a brougham under the care of the defendant's coachman in a public street, suddenly and without any explainable cause bolted, and, notwithstanding the utmost efforts of the driver to control him, swerved on to the footway and injured the plaintiff :- Held, no evidence of negligence to go to a jury. Manzoni v. Douglas, 50 L. J., Q. B. 289; 6 Q. B. D. 145; 29 W. R. 425 ; 45 J. P. 391.

Although a person driving a carriage is not bound to keep on the regular side of the road, yet, if he does not, he must use more care, and keep a better look-out, to avoid collision than would be necessary if he was on the proper side of the road. Pluckwell v. Wilson, 5 Car. & P. 375. Though the rule of the road is not to be adhered to, if, by departing from it, an injury can be avoided, yet, where parties meet on the sudden, and an injury results, the party on the wrong side should be held answerable, unless it appears clearly that the party on the right had ample means and opportunity to prevent it. Chaplin v. Hawes, 3 Car. & P. 554.

It is matter of evidence whether sufficient room is left or not, in case any accident happens. Wordsworth v. Willan, Esp. 273.

The rule of the road, as to keeping the proper side, applies to saddled horses as well as carriages; and if a carriage and a horse are to pass, the carriage must keep its proper side, and so must the horse. Turley v. Thomas, 8 Car. & P. 103.

If the driver of a carriage is on his proper side, and sees a horse coming furiously on its wrong side of the road, it is the duty of the driver of the carriage to give way and avoid an accident, although, in so doing, he does go a little on what would otherwise be his wrong side of the road. Ib.

There is no such rule of the road as to make the left always the proper side. Finegan v. L. & N. W. Ry., 53 J. P. 663.

Horse too Large for Van-Proximate Cause of Collision.]-The defendant was driving along the highway a 16-hands horse in a van which was far too small for such a horse, and in consequence the horse's houghs rubbed against the cross-bar of the shafts of the van. The plaintiff's omnibus was standing at the kerb on its proper side. The defendant's horse was startled by a slight collision with a cab, and afterwards violently collided with the plaintiff's omnibus, producing damage. No accident would have happened to the plaintiff's omnibus if the defendant's horse had not been too large for the van:-Held, that the harnessing of the horse to such a van was the negligence which materially and proximately led to the accident. Burkin v. Bilezikdji, 53 J. P. 760.

Joint Wrongful Act-Claim by Person not responsible for Negligence.]-Where a person receives injuries in consequence of the joint act of two wrongdoers, it is no defence for one of the wrongdoers to say that the injuries were not received solely through his wrongful act. M. was a passenger on an omnibus which collided with a tramcar of the defendants :-Held, that if there was negligence on the part of the tramcar driver which caused the accident, it is no answer to say that there was negligence on the part of the omnibus driver. Mathews v. London Street Tramways Co., 58 L. J., Q. B. 12; 60 L. T. 47; 52 J. P. 774.

And held, that the fact that the horse had cast a shoe shortly after he bolted, and that the driver did not under the circumstances in which he was placed call out or give any warning, did not alter the case. Hammack v. White (11 C. B. (N.S.) 588) upheld. Ib.

Where it was shown that the defendant was riding a horse at a walking pace when the animal became restive, and, rushing on to the pavement, knocked down and killed the husband of the plaintiff; but the witnesses for the plaintiff also proved that the defendant was doing his best to prevent the accident :-Held, that this was no evidence of negligence; that taking the evidence of the witnesses for the plaintiff altogether, it was clear that the defendant was carried on to the pavement against his will, and that there was therefore nothing to turn the scale of evidence against the defendant, and to show that he was responsible for the conse quences of the accident. Hammack v. White, 11 C. B. (N.S.) 588; 31 L. J., C. P. 129; 8 Jur. (N.S.) 796; 5 L. T. 676; 10 W. R. 230.

But there is evidence of negligence where a coachman drives improperly, or uses imperfect harness, and the horse takes fright and kills another. Wakeman v. Robinson, 8 Moore, 63; Bing. 213; 2 Chit. 639.

The defendant, who kept two horses at a livery stable, being desirous of trying them in double harness, had them put into his carriage and driven by a groom employed at the stable, whilst he himself sat beside the groom. As the groom was driving, the horses were startled by a dog, and became unmanageable to such an extent that the groom could not stop them, though he still retained some control over them. The groom endeavoured to turn down a side street, but, failing to do so, drove on to the pavement and injured the plaintiff. The jury having found that there was no negligence on the part of any one:-Held, that the act of the groom in giving to the horses the direction which brought them on the pavement and into collision with the plaintiff, being neither negligent nor wilful, did not give a cause of action. Holmes v. Mather, 44 L. J., Ex. 176; L. R. 10 Ex. 261; 33 L. T. 361; 23 W. R. 364.

Where Horse Unattended.]—A porter removing goods is not liable for damage, unless he has been guilty of negligence; he is not obliged to put a person at the head of his horse while he removes goods from his cart. Hayman v. Hewitt, Peake's Add. Cas. 170.

But if a horse and cart are left standing in a street, without any person to watch them, the owner is liable for any damage done by them, though occasioned by the act of a passer-by in striking the horse. Illidgev. Goodwin, 5 Car. & P. 190.

In an action for negligence, it appeared that the plaintiff's horse and cart were drawn up opposite to his shop and left unattended, and that a horse and van of the defendants were Horse Bolting-No Negligence.]-A horse drawn up two or three feet in the rear of the

cart, and also left unattended. No person actually saw the circumstances leading to the accident; but it seemed that the two vehicles had been in collision, and the evidence was conflicting. The judge, in summing up, withdrew from the jury the question of contributory negligence on the part of the plaintiff :-Held, that there must be a new trial for misdirection. Watson v. L. B. & S. C. Ry., 1 H. & R. 424; 14 L. T. 253; 14 W. R. 395.

Injury to Plaintiff while on Defendant's Premises.The defendant's horse, by the negligence of the defendant's servant, ran away with a cart and turned from a highway into the yard of the defendant's house which opened on to the highway. The plaintiff's wife, who happened to be paying a visit at the defendant's house, ran out into the yard to see what was the matter, when she was met and knocked down by the horse and cart, receiving serious injuries:-Held, that as the defendant's servant was not bound to anticipate that the plaintiff's wife would be in the yard, there was no duty on the part of the defendant towards the plaintiff's wife, and that the action, therefore, was not maintainable. Tolhausen v. Davies, 58 L. J., Q. B. 98--C. A. Affirming, 59 L. T. 436; 52 J. P. 804.

dant to recover damages for injuries caused by | apparatus according to the best-known system, the negligence of the defendant's servant :Held, that there was no evidence upon which the jury could reasonably find negligence on the part of the defendant. Abbott v. Freeman, 35 L. T. 783—C. A.

A passenger in an omnibus was injured by a blow from the hoof of one of the horses, which had kicked through the front panel of the vehicle. There was no evidence on the part of the passenger that the horse was a kicker; but it was proved that the panel bore marks of other kicks; and that no precaution had been taken, by the use of a kicking strap or otherwise, against the possible consequences of a horse striking out, and no explanation was offered on the part of the owner of the omnibus :-Held, that there was evidence of negligence proper to be submitted to a jury. Simson v. London General Omnibus Co., 42 L. J., C. P. 112; L. R. 8 C. P. 390; 28 L. T. 560; 21 W. R. 595.

E. LIABILITY FOR ESCAPE OF
INJURIOUS MATTER.

and kept it in proper repair for twenty-five years, at the end of which time a frost of unusual severity acted on the apparatus, so as to cause injury to the property of another person :-Held, that the company was not liable for negligence. Ib.

Overflow of Canal.]-The plaintiffs, owners of collieries, sued the defendants, proprietors of a canal constructed under an act of parliament, for damage caused to their mines by water which overflowed from the canal into a brook, and there into the mines. They also in the alternative claimed to be entitled to a mandamus for the summoning of a jury to assess compensation for the same injury, as being one caused by the works which the canal company were authorised to construct and maintain. It was found in the special case stated by an official referee, that on the occasion of an extraordinary rainfall the defendants opened a sluice and discharged from the canal into a brook more water than the latter was able to carry off, the consequence being that the brook overflowed into the plaintiffs' mines. It was found, further, that if the sluice had not been so opened the canal bank would shortly have burst; that the adjacent country and the plaintiffs' mines would have been inundated; that the course which the defendants adopted to avert such a catastrophe was a prudent one, and the only effectual one which could have been adopted in the emergency; that so far as the plaintiffs' mines were concerned the opening of the sluice caused them to be flooded some hours sooner If a person brings or accumulates on his land than they would otherwise have been, but that anything which if it should escape may cause no additional damage was caused thereby to the damage to his neighbour, he does so at his peril. plaintiffs, the inundation being inevitable by If it does escape and causes damage, he is respon- reason of the excessive rainfall and consequent sible, however careful he may have been, and accumulation of water :-Held, upon these findwhatever precautions he may have taken to pre-ings, that even assuming the defendants' act to vent the damage. Rylands v. Fletcher, 37 have been a wrongful one, it was injuria absque L. J., Ex. 161; L. R. 3 H. L. 330; 19 L. T. 220 damno, and, therefore, not a ground of action. -H. L. Affirming 12 Jur. (N.S.) 603; 14 W. R. Thomas v. Birmingham Canal, 49 L. J., Q. B. 799-Ex. Ch. 351; 43 L. T. 435; 45 J. P. 21.

Extent of.]-In an action for negligence there is no distinction between injuries arising from the careless management of an animal or other personal chattel, and an injury resulting from the negligent management of fixed real property, unless, perhaps, where the act complained of amounts to a nuisance. Reedie v. L. & N. W. Ry., 6 Railw. Cas. 184; 4 Ex. 244; 20 L. J., Ex. 65.

Exception-Act of God.]-The defendant was the owner of a series of artificial lakes, which had existed for a long time without causing damage. Upon a most unusual rainfall occurring, the bank at the end of the higher lake gave way, and the water rushing with great violence into the lakes below caused their banks also to give way, and the aggregate volume of water from the lakes, rushing down the valley, caused damage to certain county bridges lower down the stream. On the trial of an action by the surveyor of the county against the defendant to recover for the damage done to the bridges, the jury found that there had been no negligence in the construction or the maintenance of the lakes, but that if the flood had been anticipated, the effect might have been prevented :-Held, that the rainfall being so unusual as to amount to vis major or the act of God, the defendant was not liable. Nichols v. Marsland, 46 L. J., Ex. 174; 2 Ex. D. 1; 35 L. T. 725; 25 W. R. 173-C. A.

A party who takes reasonable care to guard against accidents arising from ordinary causes is not liable for accidents arising from extraordinary causes. Blyth v. Birmingham Waterworks, 11 Ex. 781; 25 L. J., Ex. 212; 2 Jur. (N.S.) 333; 4 W. R. 294.

Therefore where a company incorporated for supplying a street with water constructed their

Percolation of Water-Act of Third PartyDuty to Repair.]-A company with statutory powers suffered water to percolate from their canal into an adjoining mill and cause damage. Such percolation arose in the first instance from a subsidence of the land caused by the working of a mine-owner under both the canal and the mill, and could not have been foreseen or prevented by the company by any reasonable means at any reasonable cost:-Held, that the canal company were nevertheless guilty of negligence in not making good the damage when it occurred, and must pay compensation to be assessed as provided by the Canal Act, but that it was not a case for granting an injunction against the company to restrain the percolation of water. Evans v. Manchester, Sheffield, and Lincolnshire Ry., 57 L. J., Ch. 153; 36 Ch. D. 626; 57 L. T. 194; 36 W. R. 328.

Of Sewer.]-The defendants, under the powers conferred upon them by the Metropolis Local Management Act, 1855 (18 & 19 Vict. c. 120), ss. 135, 136, constructed, and properly constructed, a sewer, having its outfall at Deptford Creek, a little above the plaintiff's coal wharf, with water-gates, which it was the duty of the person in charge of them to open when the

Held, thirdly, that the extraordinary high tide of November, 1875, although an act of God, did not excuse the dock company from its liability; but that they ought to have an opportunity of showing that the damage done by the act of God and the damage done through their negligence ought to be apportioned. Ib.

water within them became eight feet deep-a | and that the company was liable to the plaintiff depth which was reached only in heavy rainfalls. for negligence in not doing so. Ib. On the 29th of August, 1879, there was an excep. tionally heavy rainfall, and it became necessary to open the water-gates to prevent a large district from being flooded. This having been done, and the rain increasing in violence, the rush of water from the sewer carried away a portion of the plaintiff's wharf, with a barge moored thereto and a quantity of coals deposited therein and thereon:-Held, that the injury complained of was occasioned by the opening of the water-gates, and not by the act of God, and therefore the defendants were primâ facie liable for the damage done, within the principle of Rylands v. Fletcher (L. R. 3 H. L. 330); but that, as they were a private body acting in the discharge of a public duty, and as that which happened was only the inevitable result of what parliament had authorised them to do, they were not liable. Dixon v. Metropolitan Board of Works, 50 L. J., Q. B. 772; 7 Q. B. D. 418; 45 L. T. 312; 30 W. R. 83; 46 J. P. 4.

Insufficient Embankment.]—Where a person charged with negligence has been guilty of a breach of duty sufficient to produce the damage complained of, he cannot escape liability by showing that the same damage would have arisen from some other cause beyond his control if he had done his duty. But if he can show that some of the damage which actually happened arose from a cause beyond his control, the liability for damage will be apportioned. NitroPhosphate and Odam's Chemical Manure Co. v. London and St. Katharine Docks, 9 Ch. D. 503; 39 L. T. 433; 27 W. R. 267-C. A.

Negligence of Third Party.]-A company charged with the duty of repairing a drain is responsible for the injury arising from the banks of the drain giving way at a period of extraordinary rainfall, which swelled the drain, in consequence of the outlet not being sufficiently widened by other parties, whose duty it was to keep the outlet of a certain width. Harrison v. G. N. Ry., 3 H. & C. 231; 33 L. J., Ex. 266; 10 Jur. (N.S.) 992; 10 L. T. 621; 12 W. R. 1081.

Pipes Overflowing in House.]-A. carried on business on the ground floor of a house, and B. carried on business in offices on the second floor. A quantity of water oozed through the ceiling and damaged A.'s stock-in-trade, and it was discovered that the water had escaped from a water-closet in B.'s private offices, owing to the valve having got out of order, so that the water flowed into the pan, completely filling it. There was no evidence of negligence with regard to the fittings of the water-closet on B.'s part, nor did it appear that he knew the valve was out of repair :-Held, that he was not liable, as there was no obligation on him under all circumstances and at all hazards to keep the pipes from overflowing, and his room watertight. Ross V. Fedden, 41 L. J., Q. B. 270; L. R. 7 Q. B. 661; 26 L. T. 966. And see Stevens v. Woodward, 50 L. J., Q. B. 231; 6 Q. B. D. 318; 44 L. T. 153; 29 W. R. 506; 45 J. P. 603; Carstairs v. Taylor, 40 L. J., Ex. 129; L. R. 6 Ex. 217; 19 W. R. 723.

sequence of which the pipe leading from the sink was choked, and an overflow of water took place, which damaged the plaintiff's rooms and the goods stored therein :-Held, that the plaintiff was entitled to recover damages, as a duty was cast upon the defendant to prevent an overflow, which duty he had failed to discharge. Abelson v. Brockman, 54 J. P. 119.

A dock company was authorised by its special act to make and maintain a dock and works connected therewith according to the levels defined in plans and sections deposited with the clerk of the peace. The dock communicated with the river Thames by an artificial channel, through which the water was admitted. The sections showed the retaining bank of the dock and The plaintiff occupied the ground floor and channel at a uniform height of four feet above the defendant the third and fourth floors of the Trinity high-water mark. The level of the sur- same building. The defendant's employés withrounding country was some feet below Trinity out his knowledge were in the habit of emptying high-water mark, the river being kept from over-tea-leaves into a sink upon his premises, in conflowing by means of a river wall 4 feet 2 inches above Trinity high-water mark. The company allowed its retaining bank to be at one point several inches below the level of 4 feet. In November, 1875, an extraordinary high tide took place, and the river rose to 4 feet 5 inches above Trinity high-water mark, in consequence of which the water in the dock overflowed the bank and damaged the property of a neighbouring landowner. The tide had never been known to rise so high before, but in March, 1874, it had risen to 4 feet above Trinity high-water mark. On that occasion, there was a small overflow from the dock, but no damage was done to the neighbouring landowner. Previously to that the tide had never risen above 3 feet 4 inches, and the water had never overflowed from the dock-Held, first, that the company was bound to keep their bank up to the level of 4 feet above Trinity high-water mark, and was liable to the plaintiff for breach of its statutory duty in not doing so. Ib.

Held, secondly, that, independently of the act, the dock company was bound as a riparian owner to keep the bank up to the level of 4 feet 2 inches, the height of the rest of the river wall,

Poisonous Trees.]-A declaration alleged that the defendant was possessed of yew trees upon land belonging to him and in his occupation, the clippings of which trees were to his knowledge poisonous to horses and cattle, whereupon it became his duty to take due care to prevent the clippings from being put or placed upon land other than his own or in his occupation, where the horses and cattle of his neighbours and others might be enabled to eat them. Breach, that he took so little care of the clippings that they were put and placed upon land other than his own or in his occupation, whereby the horses of the plaintiff were enabled to eat the clippings, and were poisoned and killed :— Held, that this declaration was bad, as it was consistent with the inference, that the clippings

had been carried from the land of the defendant having been broken down before the escape of by a stranger, or through some cause over the cows. There was evidence that the defenwhich he had no control. Wilson v. Newberry, dant and his predecessors had for more than 41 L. J., Q. B. 31; L. R. 7 Q. B. 31; 25 L. T. forty years repaired the fence (which was on his 695; 20 W. R. 111. land) between the two closes whenever repairs were necessary; and that for the last nineteen years the fence had been repaired by the defendant and his predecessors upon notice by the occupier for the time being of the plaintiff's close. Whenever the fence was so repaired it was for the purpose of preventing cattle on the plaintiff's close from escaping into the defen. dant's close :-Held, that the evidence showed a prescriptive obligation on the part of the defendant to maintain the fence so as to keep in the cattle in the plaintiff's close; that the obligation was absolute to keep up a sufficient fence at all times, the act of God or vis major only excepted, without any notice of want of repair; that the damage was not too remote; and that the defendant was therefore liable to the plaintiff for the loss of the cows. Lawrence or Laurence v. Jenkins, 42 L. J., Q. B. 147; L. R. 8 Q. B. 274; 28 L. T. 406; 21 W. R. 577.

A burial board purchased a piece of ground seventeen years before for the purposes of their cemetery, and fenced it round with a dwarf wall two feet high, with, at two places, open iron railings two feet high on the top of the wall. In the part of their ground opposite these railings, and about four feet within the same, the board planted two yew trees, which in course of time grew through and beyond the railings, and projected on and over the adjoining meadow occupied by the plaintiff, and which he had, for two years before action, hired for the purpose of pasturing his horse therein. The horse, having eaten a quantity of the leaves and branches projecting over the plaintiff's meadow, was poisoned thereby :Held, that the board was liable to the plaintiff in damages for the loss of his horse, and that it was immaterial whether or not the board knew that yew trees were poisonous to cattle, inasmuch as, in either case, they must be held responsible for the direct consequences of their own act in the original planting of the trees. Crowhurst v. Amersham Burial Board, 48 L. J., Ex. 109; 4 Ex. D. 5; 39 L. T. 355; 27 W. R.

95.

Held, also, that the plaintiff was not bound to examine all the boundaries of the field which he had hired, so as to see that no tree likely to be injurious to his horse was projecting over it. Ib.

A tenant for life of an estate, in 1868, leased a farm adjoining plantations in which yew trees were growing, and which the lessor reserved to himself. In March and September, 1869, sheep belonging to the lessee died from having eaten of the yew that protruded through the fence surrounding the plantations, and clippings of yew that had been thrown over the fence by the lessor's gardener. The lessor died in February, 1870; the tenant continued to hold the farm as the tenant of the trustees of the will by which the estate was settled. In September and October, 1870, four steers belonging to him got over a ditch, which happened to be nearly dried up, on to land in the hands of the trustees, and died from eating yew there. A bill for the administration of the lessor's estate was filed in February, 1871, and the lessee brought in under the decree a claim against his executors for damages on account of the loss of his sheep and cattle so poisoned :-Held, that the claim for the losses which occurred in the lessor's life, if ever sustainable, was one in respect of an injury to property coming within 3 & 4 Will. 4, c. 42, s. 2, and was made too late. Erskine v. Adeane, Bennett's Claim, 42 L. J., Ch. 835; L. R. 8 Ch. 756; 29 L. T. 234 ; 21 W. R. 802.

The defendant was the occupier of a close adjoining a close occupied by the plaintiff. The defendant's close was woodland, and he sold the fellage of the timber to H., continuing himself to occupy the close. H. felled a tree in a negligent manner, so that it fell over the fence between the two closes, and made a gap in it. Two cows of the plaintiff soon afterwards got from his close through the gap into the defendant's close, and fed on the leaves of a yew tree which had been felled there by H., and died in consequence. The defendant had had no notice of the fence

Decayed Wire Rope.]—The plaintiff and the defendants occupied adjoining lands as tenants under the same landlord. By the terms of their lease the defendants were bound to fence the land in their occupation for the benefit of the lessor and his tenants. About twenty years ago the predecessors of the defendants had fenced their land with wire rope, and the defendants allowed this fence to remain and from time to time partially repaired it. From long exposure the strands of the wires composing the rope decayed, and pieces of it fell to the ground and lay hidden in the grass of the adjoining pasture occupied by the plaintiff. The plaintiff's cow grazing there swallowed one of these pieces, and died in consequence :-Held, that the defendants were liable to compensate the plaintiff for the loss of the cow, the death of the cow being the natural and direct result of the state of the fence, and which was within the knowledge of those who were bound to maintain it. Firth v. Bowling Iron Co. 47 L. J., C. P. 358; 3 C. P. D. 254; 38 L. T. 568; 26 W. R. 558.

Escape of Animals.]-Through the defect of a gate which the defendant was bound to repair, his horse got out of the defendant's farm into an occupation road, and strayed into the plaintiff's field, where it kicked his horse :-Held, that the defendant was liable for the trespass by his horse, and that it was not necessary for the maintenance of the action to prove that his horse was vicious, and that he was aware thereof. Lee v. Riley, 18 C.B. (N.S.) 722; 34 L. J., C. P. 212; 11 Jur. (N.S.) 822; 12 L. T. 388; 13 W. R. 51.

Held, also, that the damage the plaintiff had sustained by the injury to his horse was not too remote, but was sufficiently the consequence of the defendant's neglect to be recoverable. Ib.

The defendants' horse having injured the plaintiff's mare by biting and kicking her through the fence separating the plaintiff's land from the defendants':-Held, that there was a trespass by the act of the defendants' horse, for which the defendants were liable, apart from any question of negligence on their part :-Held, secondly, that the damage to the plaintiff's mare was not too remote. Ellis v. Loftus Iron Co. 44 L. J., C. P. 24; L. R. 10 C. P. 10; 31 L. T. 483; 23 W. R. 246.