built, or altered so as to increase the lateral pressure, at the beginning of that time; and it is so acquired if the enjoyment is peaceable and without deception or concealment, and so open that it must be known that some support is being enjoyed by the building. Dalton v. Angus, 50 L. J., Q. B. 689; 6 App. Cas. 740; 44 L. T. 844; 30 W. R. 191-H. L. (E.) Semble, per Lord Selborne, L.C.:-Such a right of support is an easement within the meaning of the Prescription Act, 2 & 3 Will. 4, c. 71, s. 2. Ib. Escape of Gas.]-A gas company contracted to supply the plaintiff with a proper service pipe to convey gas from the main outside to a meter inside his premises. Gas escaped, from the pipe laid down under the contract, into his shop. The servant of a gasfitter employed by the plaintiff happened to be at work in another room at the time of the escape, and went into the shop upon hearing of it, with a view of finding out its cause. He was carrying a lighted candle in his hand, and immediately on entering the shop an explosion took place, doing damage to the plaintiff's premises and stock. On the trial of an action against the gas company to recover for the injury sustained, the jury found, first, that the escape of gas was occasioned by a defect in the pipe, and that the defect existed in the pipe when supplied; and, secondly, that there was negligence on the part of the gasfitter's servant in carrying a lighted candle:Held, that the plaintiff was entitled to recover, and that the company was not relieved from re-lateral pressure than before upon the soil under sponsibility by the negligent act of the gasfitter's servant. Burrows v. March Gas and Coke Co. 41 L. J., Ex. 46; L. R. 7 Ex. 96; 26 L. T. 318; 20 W. R. 493-Ex. Ch. The defendant, a gasfitter, was employed by the plaintiff's master to repair a gasmeter upon his premises, and for the purpose of doing so took away the meter and in lieu of it made a temporary connection by means of a flexible tube between the inlet pipe and the pipe communicating with the house. The plaintiff having gone in the ordinary performance of his duty with a light into the cellar where the meter had been, gas, which had escaped by reason of the insufficiency of the connecting tube, exploded and injured him. The jury found that the work had been negligently done, and that the injury to the plaintiff proceeded entirely from such negligence: Held, that the defendant was liable. Parry v. Smith, 48 L. J., C. P. 731; 4 C. P. D. 325; 41 L. T. 93; 27 W. R. 801. A declaration stated that plaintiff was possessed of certain premises; that defendants were employed in laying on gas to certain premises adjoining; and that they did their work so negligently that the gas escaped and ignited, and the premises adjoining plaintiff's were set on fire, and thereby the premises of plaintiff were set on fire and burnt :-Held, on demurrer, that the declaration showed a good cause of action; that it was unnecessary to negative negligence in the owner of the adjoining house in putting out the fire before it communicated with plaintiff's premises; and that the plea of not guilty would put in issue the defendants' negligence. Blenkiron v. Great Central Gas Consumers Co., 3 L. T. 317. A gas company is bound to keep up such a reasonable inspection of their mains and pipes, as may enable them to detect when there is such an escape of gas, by fracture or imperfection of pipes, as may lead to danger of an explosion. Mose v. Hastings and St. Leonards Gas Co.. 4 F. & F. 324. F. PULLING DOWN HOUSES AND Two dwelling-houses adjoined, built independently, but each on the extremity of its owner's soil and having lateral support from the soil on which the other rested. This having continued for much more than twenty years, one of the houses (the plaintiffs') was in 1849, converted into a coach factory, the internal walls being removed and girders inserted into a stack of brickwork in such a way as to throw much more the adjoining house. The conversion was made openly, and without deception or concealment. More than twenty years after the conversion the owners of the adjoining house employed a contractor to pull down their house and excavate, the contractor being bound to shore up adjoining buildings and make good all damage. The contractor employed a sub-contractor upon similar terms. The house was pulled down, and the soil under it excavated to a depth of several feet, and the plaintiffs' stack being deprived of the lateral support of the adjacent soil sank and fell, bringing down with it most of the factory :Held, that the plaintiffs had acquired a right of support for their factory by the twenty years' enjoyment, and could sue the owners of the adjoining house and the contractor for the injury. Bower v. Peate, infra, approved. Ib. The defendant contracted with a builder to rebuild his house, the latter agreeing to take upon himself the risk and responsibility of shoring and supporting, as far as might be necessary, the adjoining buildings affected by this alteration during the progress of the works, and to make good any damage which might be sustained by the buildings during the progress or in consequence of the works contracted for, and to satisfy any claims for compensation arising therefrom which might be substantiated. In consequence of the insufficiency of the contractor's shoring, the adjoining land of the plaintiff, which was supported by the defendant's land, became injured, and this action was brought to recover damages :-Held, that the defendant was liable. Bower v. Peate, 45 L. J., Q. B. 446; 1 Q. B. D. 321; 35 L. T. 321. Where an owner of land builds houses upon it adjoining each other so as to require mutual support, there is either by a presumed grant or by a presumed reservation a right to such mutual support, and such right is not affected by a subsequent subdivision of the property. Richards v. Rose, 9 Ex. 218; 2 C. L. R. 311; 23 L. J., Ex. 3; 17 Jur. 1036. The right of a person to the support of the land immediately around his house is not in the nature of an easement, but is the ordinary right of enjoyment of property, and till that is interfered with he has no legal ground of complaint, Rights of Support-Prescription. -A right to although in fact something may have been done lateral support from adjoining land may be which (without his knowledge) has occasioned acquired by twenty years' uninterrupted enjoy- results that will afterwards affect his property. ment for a building proved to have been newly | Backhouse v. Bonomi, 9 H. L. Cas. 503 ; 34 L. J., Q. B. 181; 7 Jur. (N.s.) 809; 4 L. T. 754; 9 house-Held, that C. had no right of action W. R. 769. against D. Soloman v. Vintners' Co., 4 H. & N. 585; 28 L. J., Ex. 370; 5 Jur. (N.S.) 1177; 7 W. R. 613. A landowner has a right independently of prescription to the lateral support of his neighbour's land, so far as that is necessary to sustain his soil in its natural state, and also to compensation for damage caused either to the land or to buildings upon it by the withdrawal of such support. Hunt v. Peake, 1 Johns. 705; 29 L. J., Ch. 785; 6 Jur. (N.s.) 107. The plaintiff was owner of land, and of modern buildings abutting on the land, in the occupation of the defendant. The defendant contracted with C. to erect some buildings upon the border of the defendant's premises, and C.'s workmen, in excavating the soil, shook and damaged the plaintiff's building. In an action founded on an alleged right to the support of the adjoining soil in the occupation of the defendant, for the damage occasioned by the negligence of the contractor's workmen:-Held, that in the absence of such right of support the action for the injury to the plaintiff's buildings failed. Gayford V. Nicholls, 9 Ex. 702; 2 C. L. R. 1066; 23 L. J., Ex. 205; 2 W. R. 453. Upon a declaration for negligence in pulling down a house adjoining the plaintiff's house without shoring up the latter, whereby it fell, the plaintiff cannot recover without evidence, from which a grant of a right to the support of the adjoining house can be inferred. Peyton v. London Corporation, 9 B. & C. 725; 3 Car. & P. 363; 4 M. & Ry. 625; 7 L. J. (0.s.) K. B. 322. See Partridge v. Scott, 3 M. & W. 220: 7 L. J., Ex. 101. A count stated that a messuage and land, the reversion whereof belonged to the plaintiff, were, in fact, supported by the land adjoining, yet the defendant wrongfully and negligently dug and made excavations in the land adjoining without sufficiently shoring the messuage and land, and thereby deprived them of their support, whereby they sank and were injured. A second count stated that the plaintiff, by reason of her own interest in the messuage and land, was entitled to have the messuage supported laterally by land adjoining; yet the defendant wrongfully and negligently dug and made excavations in the land adjoining without sufficiently shoring the messuage and land, and thereby deprived the messuage of the support to which the plaintiff was so entitled, whereby the messuage and land sank and were injured-Held, that the first count was good, although it did not allege any right to support; for, as it did not appear that the defendant was the owner of the adjoining land, he must be taken to be a stranger and a wrongdoer. Bibby v. Carter, 4 H. & N. 153; 28 L. J., Ex. 182; 7 W. R. 193. Held, also, that the second count was good. Ib. C. was the owner of a house built on a hill, having a descent towards the west. There was a house next below and adjoining his, belonging to A., and D. was the owner of the two houses next adjoining. For upwards of thirty years the four houses were visibly out of the perpendicular, leaning to the west, but there was no evidence how or when this occurred, or when the houses were built, or that there was any connection between them in title, occupation, or possession. In 1857, a lease of D.'s houses, which he had granted, having expired, he entered into a contract with B. to pull them down, and erect two other houses in their place. This B. proceeded to do, and in so doing caused damage to C.'s Notice of Operations.]-Where notice was given to the occupier of adjoining premises of an intention to pull down and remove the foundations of a building, on part of the footing of one of the walls of which one of the walls of such adjoining premises rested :-Held, that the party giving notice was only bound to use reasonable and ordinary care in the work, and was not bound in any other way to secure the adjoining premises from injury, although, from the peculiar nature of the soil, he was compelled to lay the foundation of his new building several feet deeper than that of the old. Massey v. Goyder, 4 Car. & P. 161. When necessary to be Given.] — The mere circumstance of juxtaposition does not render it necessary for a person who pulls down his wall to give notice of his intention to the owner of an adjoining wall. Chadwick v. Trower, 6 Bing. (N.C.) 1; 8 Scott, 1; 8 L. J., Ex. 286-Ex. Ch. Nor if he is ignorant of the existence of the adjoining wall-as, where it is underground— is he bound to use extraordinary caution is pulling down his own. Ib. Upon a declaration for negligence in pulling down a house adjoining the plaintiff's house whereby it fell, where there is no evidence of a grant of a right to support, the plaintiff cannot insist that the defendent ought to have given notice of his intention to pull down. Peyton v. London Corporation, 9 B. & C. 725; 3 Car. & P. 363; 4 M. & Ry. 625; 7 L. J. (0.s.) K. B. 322. Negligence in doing Work.]-In 1803, the plaintiff's house was built against the pine end wall of the defendant's house, by permission. In 1829, the defendant made an excavation in a careless and an unskilful manner, in his own land, near to his pine end wall, by which he weakened his pine end wall and consequently injured the house of the plaintiff :-Held, that an action was maintainable for this injury. Brown v. Windsor, 1 C. & J. 20, It is a good ground of action, that a next door neighbour conducts himself so negligently and unskilfully in pulling down his own wall, as by reason thereof to injure his neighbour's wall. Trower v. Chadwick, 3 Bing. (N.C.) 334; 3 Scott, 699; 2 Hodges, 267; 6 L. J., C. P. 47. The possessor of a house which is not ancient, cannot maintain an action against the owner of adjoining lands, for digging away that land, so that the house falls in. Wyatt v. Harrison, 3 B. & Ad. 871; 1 L. J., K. B. 237. But an action lies against a party who, by carlessness or negligence in excavating his own ground, either causes or accelerates the fall of an adjoining house. Dodd v. Holme, 3 N. & M. 739 ; 1 A. & E. 493. A declaration alleged that the plaintiff was possessed of a house, and that the defendant was possessed of a house next adjoining to that of the plaintiff, and that the defendant conducted himself so carelessly, negligently and improperly, in pulling down the house of the defendant, and in neglecting to use due and proper precaution in that behalf, that quantities of bricks, tiles, &c., fell from the house of the defendant into and upon divers parts of the house of the plaintiff, 59 and upon and through the windows and skylights of the plaintiff :-Held, that the declaration disclosed a sufficient cause of action, for that it complained, not of a mere omission on the part of the defendant, but of his doing certain acts, by the negligent performance of which the plaintiff was injured. Bradbee v. Christ Hospital, 2 D. (N.S.) 164; 4 Man. & G. 714; 5 Scott (N.R.) 79; 11 L. J., C. P. 209. who dug a foundation for some intended building so near the house of A. that it fell :-Held, that if A.'s house had been so supported and both parties knew it, the plaintiff had a right to such support as an easement, and that the defendant could not withdraw that support without being liable in damages for any injury that the plaintiff might sustain thereby, which damages should be such as to put the plaintiff in the same state in which he was before; but the jury ought not to Hide v. give him a new house for an old one. Thornborough, 2 Car. & K. 250. In an action against a railway company for an injury to the plaintiff's house by reason of an adjoining house falling against it, the breach alleged was, that the company did not use due care or skill, or take proper precautions in making the railway and excavations; and that they proceeded in making the railway and excavations without taking proper precautions to prevent the Duty of Manufacturer.]-When an article is house, so near to the house of the plaintiff, from supplied for a specific purpose the manufacturer falling upon and against the house of the plain-warrants that it is reasonably fit for that tiff, by reason of the careless, negligent, uns kil G. DANGEROUS AND DEFECTIVE ful and improper conduct of the company; and purpose. In an action against a carriage builder for want of proper precautions by them, the for supplying a pole, which the jury, although house gave way, and fell upon and against the house of the plaintiff :--Held, sufficient. Davis v. London and Blackwall Ry., 2 Scott (N.R.) 74; 1 Man. & G. 799; 2 Railw. Cas. 308; 1 Drink. 9. In an action for an injury to the plaintiff's premises, in consequence of the pulling down of the defendant's house adjoining, the plaintiff may recover damages for an injury actually caused by the negligence of the defendant, although he has not himself used those precautions which was his duty to adopt against such injury. Walters v. Pfeil, M. & M. 362. Contributory Negligence of Plaintiff's Servants.]-In an action against the defendant for the negligence of his agent in pulling down the party-wall between the houses of the plaintiff and defendant, it is a good defence to show that the plaintiff appointed an agent to superintend the work jointly with the defendant's agent, and that both agents were to blame. Hill v. Warren, 2 Stark. 377. Damages.]-In order to entitle the owner of land to succeed in an action against a neighbour for excavating near his boundary, it is necessary that appreciable damage should have been caused thereby. Smith v. Thackerah, 35 L. J., C. P. 276; L. R. 1 C. P. 564; 12 Jur. (N.S.) 545; 14 L. T. 761; 14 W. R. 832; 1 H. & R. 615. If, by negligence of A. in building his house adjoining that of B., the house of B. is thrown down, A. is liable only to such sum in damages as was the value of the old house, and not the whole expense of building a new one. Lukin v. Godsall, Peake's Add. Cas. 15. Where it is alleged and proved that the defendant so negligently, unskilfully, and improperly dug his own soil, that the plaintiff's house was thereby injured, an action lies; and, although it is shown that the house was infirm, and could at all events have stood only a few months, still the plaintiff may recover, in proportion to the loss actually suffered, if the jury finds that the injury to the house was the consequence of the defendant's negligence; and in determining the question of negligence, the jury ought to consider the state of the plaintiff's house. Dodd v. Holme, 3 N. & M. 739; 1 A. & E. 493. A. and B. were the owners of adjoining lands, and the house of A. had for more than twenty years been supported by the adjoining land of B., acquitting him of negligence, found was not Carriage Hired.]-A jobmaster supplying a carriage is bound to present it as fit for the purpose for which it is hired as care and skill can make it, and if damage is caused to the hirer by a defect not attributable to mere accident, the jobmaster is liable. Hyman v. Nye, 6 Q. B. D. 685; 44 L. T. 919; 45 J. P. 554. A. built a coach for the postmaster-general, B. horsed it and hired C. as a coachman to drive it. The coach broke down from a defect in the building :-Held, that C. could not sue A. Winterbottom v. Wright, 10 M. & W. 109; 11 L. J., Ex. 415. Duty of Vendor.]-Where the defendant sold a bottle of hair wash to a husband to be used by his wife, and the latter was injured in using the same:-Held, that the duty of the vendor to use ordinary care in compounding the wash extended to the person for whose use the vendor knew it was purchased. George v. Skivington, 39 L. J., Ex. 8; L. R. 5 Ex. 1; 21 L. T. 495; 18 W. R. 118. The father of the plaintiff bought a gun of the defendant for the use of himself and his sons, and the defendant warranted the gun to have been made by Nock and to be a good and safe gun. The gun burst while the plaintiff was using it and injured his hand :---Held, that there had been fraud and damage, the result of that fraud, from an act contemplated by the defendant at the time of the sale, and that the action was maintainable. Langridge v. Lery, 2 M. & W. 519; 6 L. J., Ex. 137. S. C., 4 M. & W. 337; 1 H. & H. 325; 7 L. J., Ex. 387-Ex. Ch. A tradesman who sells an article which he at the time of sale believes to be sound, but which is actually unsound, is not liable for an injury subsequently sustained by a third person not a party to the contract of sale, in consequence of such unsoundness. Longmeid v. Holliday, 6 Ex. 761; 20 L. J., Ex. 430. To sustain an action under Lord Campbell's Act against the vendor of a machine, by the personal representative of a stranger to the contract of sale killed by an accident resulting from the defective construction of the machine, an averment of a fraudulent representation made by the vendor, and known and acted on by the deceased, is necessary. Thompson v. Lucas, 17 W. R. 520; Ir. R., 3 C. L. 208. Articles Sold consigned in Defective Truck to Vendee-Injury to Servant of Vendee.]-The defendant, a colliery owner, consigned coals sold by him to the buyers by rail in a truck rented by him from a waggon company for the purposes of the colliery. Through the negligence of the defendant's servants the truck was allowed to leave the colliery in a defective state. In consequence of the defect in the truck injury was occasioned to the plaintiff, one of the buyer's servants, who was employed in unloading the coals, and had got into the truck for that purpose:-Held, that there was a duty on the part of the defendant towards the plaintiff to exercise reasonable care with regard to the condition of the truck, and the defendant was therefore liable to the plaintiff in respect of the injuries sustained by him. Elliott v. Hall, or Nailstone Colliery Co., 54 L. J., Q. B. 518; 15 Q. B. D. 315; 34 W. R. 16. Liability to Stranger.]-The defendant supplied and erected a staging round a ship under a contract with the shipowner. The plaintiff was employed by the shipowner to paint the ship, and in the course of the work fell from the staging and was injured by reason of a defect in its condition. In an action for damages :Held, that the defendant had a duty towards the plaintiff to supply a reasonably safe staging, and therefore was liable. Heaven v. Pender, 52 L. J., Q. B. 702; 11 Q. B. D. 503; 49 L. T. 357; 47 J. P. 709-C. A. T. rented certain premises from a railway company as a coal store. The premises were immediately under the company's line, from which there was a shoot through which coal was discharged from the railway to the store underneath, and at the bottom of the shoot was an iron door. At the time when the premises were let the shoot and the door at its lower end were in good condition. The railway company could only enter on the premises to do repairs when requested to do so by T. H., a servant of T., while working in the store below the shoot, was injured by a large piece of coal which came down the shoot, and, owing to the defective condition of the iron door, broke through same. No request had ever been made by T. to the railway company to repair such door. H. sued the railway company to recover damages for their negligence in not having kept the iron door in proper repair :-Held, that, although there was a duty on the company to see that the iron door was in good repair at the time when the premises were first rented by T., there was no duty upon the company to continue to see that it was maintained in good repair. Hopkins v. G. E. Ry., 60 J.P. 86—C. A. Work ordered to be done upon Defective Goods.]-In an action for negligence in galvanising wire sent by the plaintiff to be galvanised by the defendant, it is no misdirection on the part of the judge if he tell the jury that if, when the wire was sent by the plaintiff to the defendant, it was in such a state that he could not galvanise it without spoiling it, it would be negligence on the part of the defendant to galvanise it. Combe v. Simmonds, 1 W. R. 289. Borrowers and Lenders-Correlative Duties.]— The duties of gratuitous lender and borrower of a chattel are, in some degree, correlative. The loan must be taken to be for the purpose of a beneficial use by the borrower; and the borrower is not responsible for reasonable wear and tear, but he is for negligence, for misuse, for gross want of skill in the use, and for anything which may be defined to be legal fraud. The lender is responsible for defects in the chattel, with reference to the use for which he knows the loan is accepted, of which he is aware, and owing to which directly the borrower is injured. By the necessarily implied purpose of the loan a duty is contracted towards the borrower not to conceal from him those defects, known to the lender, which may make the loan perilous or unprofitable to him. Blackmore v. Bristol and Exeter Ry., 8 El. & Bl. 1035; 27 L. J., Q. B. 167; 4 Jur. (N.S.) 657; 6 W. R. 336. A gratuitous lender of an article is not liable for injury resulting to the borrower or his servant while using it, from its defective state, if the lender was not aware of it. MacCarthy v. Young, 6 H. & N. 329; 30 L. J., Ex. 227; 3 L. T. 785; 9 W. R. 439. Donor and Donee.]-A donor of a chattel is not liable for negligence of the donee, who, in carrying it away from the donor's warehouse, injures a person passing in the street. Walworth v. Barton, 8 W. R. 190. H. DANGEROUS PREMISES. Lamp over Public Pavement.]-The defendant became the lessee and occupier of a house, from the front of which a heavy lamp projected several feet over the public foot-pavement. As the plaintiff was walking along, in November, the lamp fell on her and injured her. In the previous August the defendant had employed an experienced gasfitter, C., to put this lamp in repair. At the time of the accident a person employed by the defendant was blowing the water out of the gas-pipes of the lamp, and in doing this a ladder was raised against the lampiron or bracket from which the lamp hung, and on the man mounting the ladder, owing to the wind and wet, the ladder slipped, and he, to save himself, clung to the lamp-iron, and the shaking caused the lamp to fall. On examination it turned out that the fastening by which the lamp was attached to the lamp-iron was in a decayed state. The jury found that there had been negligence on the part of C., but no negligence on the part of the defendant personally; that the lamp was out of repair through general decay, but not to the knowledge of the defendant; that the immediate cause of the fall of the lamp was the slipping of the ladder; but that, if the lamp had been in good repair, the slipping of the ladder would not have caused it to fall :-Held, that the plaintiff was entitled to the verdict. By Lush and Quain, JJ., on the ground that if a person maintains a lamp projecting over the highway for his own purposes it is his duty to maintain it so as not to be dangerous to the passengers; and if it causes injury owing to want of repair, it is no answer on his part that he had employed a competent person to repair it. By Blackburn, J., on the ground that, under the circumstances of the case, it was shown that the defendant knew that the lamp wanted repair in August, and it was his duty, therefore, to put it in reasonable repair, and the person he employed having failed to do so, he was liable for the consequences of the breach of duty. Tarry v. Ashton, 45 L. J., Q. B. 260; 1 Q. B. D. 314; 34 L. T. 97; 24 W. R 581. such a case is, whether the excavation is substantially adjoining the way. Ib. A company was possessed of a canal and the land between it and a sluice; an ancient public footpath passed through the land close to the Railings in Market.]-Defendants, owners of sluice; there was a towing-path, nine feet wide, a market for the sale of cattle, had, some three by the side of the canal, and an intervening years before action, erected some railings round space of twelve feet of grass between the a statue in the street of the town where the towing-path and the footpath. By permission market was held, and near to the site which of the company the intervening space had been plaintiff, who was in the habit of bringing cattle recently used for carting, and ruts having been to the market, occupied and paid a toll for. A caused, the whole space between the sluice and cow of plaintiff's was killed in trying to jump the canal had been covered with cinders, and the railings, and in an action brought against thus all distinction between the path and the defendants to recover damages for her loss, the rest of the land had been obliterated. A person jury found that the railings were of insufficient using the path at night missed his way and fell height:-Held, by Lush, J., on further consider-into the canal and was drowned :-Held, that ation, that plaintiff was entitled to recover, on the ground that the owners of the market were under an obligation to keep the market-place free from danger to those who lawfully frequented it; and that by erecting the railings of insufficient height they had been guilty of a misfeasance, resulting in damage to plaintiff, who was not a mere licensee of a particular site, but entitled to use the whole of the market-place subject to the regulations and control of the owners. Lax v. Darlington Corporation, 49 L. J., Ex. 105; 5 Ex. D. 28; 41 L. T. 489; 28 W. R. 221-C. A. Excavation near Highway.]—A person who excavates a hole in his own ground abutting on an immemorial public highway, so that the use of such way is rendered unsafe to the public, even when using ordinary care, is responsible for an injury to a person accidentally falling into such hole while passing with ordinary caution along the highway. Barnes v. Ward, 2 Car. & K. 661; 9 C. B. 392; 19 L. J., C. P. 195; 14 Jur. 334. the canal was not so near the footpath as to be adjoining to it, so as to throw upon the company the duty of fencing the canal off; and that the other facts did not render the company liable for the accident. Binks v. South Yorkshire Railway, 3 B. & S. 244, 350; 32 L. J., Q. B. 26; 7 L. T. 350; 11 W. R. 66. Excavations in Private Road. J-The defendant, whilst erecting houses upon land adjoining a new road, which had not been dedicated to the public, had dug a trench across the road for the purpose of making drains. The plaintiff's servant, while driving his master's horses along the road after dark, drove into the trench, no lights having been placed to warn persons using the road :-Held, that the defendant had not been guilty of any negligence, there being no duty cast upon him to protect anyone using the road without licence. Dictum of Crompton J., in Gallagher v. Humphrey (10 W. R. 664), doubted. Murley v. Grove, 46 J. P. 360. Liability for Obstruction in Road.]-An owner The fact of the person so falling into the hole of a private way passing by his warehouses is being thereby a trespasser, is no answer to an liable for an injury to persons lawfully using the action by him for the injury which he has sus-way if caused by the negligence of his servants, tained. Ib. e.g., by negligently lowering goods from the warehouses. Gallagher v. Humphrey, 6 L. T. 684; 10 W. R. 664. An owner of land is under no legal obligation to fence an excavation therein, unless it is made so near to a public road, or way, as to constitute An owner of land having a private road for the a public nuisance. Hounsell v. Smyth, 7 C. B. use of persons coming to his house, gave permis(N.S.) 731; 29 L. J., C. P. 203; 6 Jur. (N.S.) 897;sion to A., who was engaged in building on the 1 L. T. 440; 8 W. R. 277. If an excavation has been made so near to a highway since its dedication and adoption as to create or increase danger to the public, and an accident happens thereby, the person making the excavation is not absolved from liability by reason that a statutory obligation to fence the highway is imposed upon other parties, who have neglected to do so. Wettor v. Dunk, 4 F. & F. 298. When an owner of land makes upon it an excavation adjoining a public way, so that a person walking upon it might, by making a false step, or being affected with a sudden giddiness, or by the sudden starting of a horse, be thrown into the excavation, the party making the excavation is liable for the consequences; but it is otherwise when the excavation is made at some distance from the way, and the person falling into it would be a trespasser upon the land of the party making the excavation before he reached it. Hardcastle v. South Yorkshire Ry., 4 H. & N. 67; 28 L. J., Ex. 139; 5 Jur. (N.S.) 150; 7 W. R. 326. The proper and true test of legal liability in land, to place materials on the road. A. placed a quantity of slates there, in such a manner that B. in using the road was injured-Held, that A. was liable. Corby v. Hill, 4 C. B. (N.S.) 566 ; 27 L. J., C. P. 318; 4 Jur. (N.S.) 512; 6 W. R. 575. A declaration stated that the defendant wrongfully caused to be kept and continued quantities of dirt and rubbish, before wrongfully placed upon a public highway, near a wall and a canal; by means whereof the plaintiff, passing along the highway, was induced and caused to walk over the rubbish, and to fall into the canal: Held, on motion in arrest of judgment, that the declaration was good. Goldthorpe v. Hardman, 2 D. & L. 442; 13 M. & W. 377; 14 L. J., Ex. 61. Necessity of Precautions against Danger.]-A person placing a dangerous obstruction in a highway or in a private road over which persons have a right of way is bound to take all necessary precautions to protect persons exercising their right of way; and if he neglects to do so is liable for the consequences. Clark v. |