In the performance of this work the workmen | 1 Q. B. D. 321; 35 L. T. 321. Excavations.-A. received an injury by falling at night from the highway into an unfenced and unlighted sewer, which was being constructed under a written contract between B. and certain local commissioners. A clause in the contract prohibited subletting without the engineer's consent. B. contracted by parol with N., a competent workman, to do the excavation and brickwork, and the watching, lighting, and fencing, at an ascertained price per yard, while he supplied the bricks, and carted away the surplus earth. B.'s name was on the carts, and also on a temporary office near the works. He did not interfere during the progress of the work, but admitted that he should have dismissed N. if dissatisfied with the execution of the work. The clerk of the works was in the employment of the commissioners : Held, that there was evidence of B.'s liability. Blake v. Thirst, 2 H. & C. 20; 32 L. J., Ex. 188; 8 L. T. 251; 11 W. R. 1034. And see Dalton Control of Employer.]-Where work is done for a company under a contract (parol or otherwise), the company is not responsible for injury resulting to a third person from the negligent manner of doing the work, though the company employs their own surveyor to superintend it, and to direct what shall be done. Steel v. S. E. Ry., 16 C. B. 550. The defendant employed P. to clean out a drain which was on the defendant's land. P. was not in the defendant's service, but was a common labourer, selected by the defendant on account of his having dug the drain originally. P. cleaned out the drain without assistance from any other person, and without the further direction or inspection of the defendant. He received 5s. for the job from the defendant. In the course of cleaning out the drain, P. took up part of an adjoining highway, and replaced the same in an improper manner and with insufficient materials, in consequence of which the plaintiff's horse, passing along the highway, was injured :-Held, that under these circumstances P. was not an independent contractor, but was acting as the servant and under the control of the defendant, and consequently that the defendant was responsible for the injury. Sadler v. Henlock, 4 El. & Bl. 570; 24 L. J., Q. B. 138; 1 Jur. (N.S.) 677 : 3 W. R. 181; 3 C. L. R. 760. By an act for improving and maintaining a harbour, commissioners were empowered to build An incorporated water company created a or provide steam-tugs, for towing vessels into or nuisance in a public highway by leaving un-out of the harbour, and to receive for the use of fenced a stream of water which they had caused to spout up in it. The horses of the plaintiff were frightened, and swerving from it fell into an unfenced excavation in the highway made by contractors who were constructing a sewer, and were thereby injured :-Held, that the water company and not the contractor was the party liable. Hill v. New River Co., 9 B. & S. 303; 18 L. T. 555. Where a company has the right by law of taking up the pavement of the street, for the purpose of laying down pipes, the workmen they employ are bound to use such care and caution in doing the work as will protect the king's subjects, themselves using reasonable care, from injury; and if they so lay the stones as to give such an appearance of security as would induce a careful person, using reasonable caution, to tread upon them as safe, when, in fact, they are not so, the company will be answerable for any injury such person may sustain in consequence. Drew v. New River Co., 6 Car. & P. 754. B. and P. were respective owners of two adjoining houses, B. being entitled to the support, for his house, of P.'s soil. P. employed a contractor to pull down his house, excavate the foundations, and rebuild the house; the contractor undertook the risk of supporting B.'s house, as far as might be necessary, during the work, and to make good any damage and satisfy any claims arising therefrom. B.'s house was injured, in the progress of the work, owing to the means taken by the contractor to support it being insufficient :-Held, that P. was liable, even if the undertaking as to risk had amounted, which it did not, to an express stipulation that the contractor should do, as part of the works contracted for all that was necessary to support P.'s house. Bower v. Peate, 45 L. J., Q. B. 446; such vessels such reasonable compensation as they should fix. The commissioners entered into an arrangement with the proprietors of steam vessels to perform this duty for them at certain rates of charge; the commissioners paying them in addition a sum annually, and the vessels being placed under the direction and control of the harbour-master. A vessel having sustained damage in consequence of the negligence and want of skill of the master and crew of a tug, whilst being towed into the harbour, the owner brought an action in a county court against the commissioners, and under the direction of the judge recovered a verdict. The court, on appeal, set aside the verdict; holding that the decision of the judge could not, upon any inference which could be legitimately drawn from the facts before him, be correct in point of law. Cuthbertson v. Parsons, 12 C. B. 304; 21 L. J., C. P. 165; 16 Jur. 860. Some bales of cotton were insecurely piled in a warehouse by cotton porters acting under the control of the warehouse keeper, but in the employ of the defendant, a cotton merchant, to whom the bales belonged. A few days after the plaintiff, being lawfully in the warehouse to re-canvas the bales of another cotton merchant, was injured by the fall of one of the defendant's bales :-Held, that the defendant was responsible. Murphy v. Caralli, 3 H. & C. 462; 34 L. J., Ex. 14; 10 Jur. (N.s.) 1206; 13 W. R. 165. The unloading of a cargo of corn, for which the defendants were paid by the owner, being done by men engaged and paid by a ganger or a contractor, with whom the defendants contracted, they having no control over the men :-Held, not liable for an injury caused by their negligence to a corn meter in the service of the city, engaged in measuring the cargo. Innocent v. Peto, 4 F. & F. 8. For not Removing Piles in River.]-The defendants, in execution of some public works which A person who erects a building by contract they had contracted with the lords of the admirand employs a clerk of the works to superintendalty to execute, and, under their authority, drove the erection, is not liable for injury to a workman in the building by reason of its negligent construction, unless he personally interfered, or negligently appointed an incompetent clerk of the works, with knowledge of his incompetency. Brown v. Accrington Cotton Spinning Co., 3 H. & C. 511; 34 L. J., Ex. 208; 13 L. T. 94. A railway company contracted, under seal, with certain persons to make a portion of the line, and by the contract reserved to themselves the power of dismissing any of the contractors' workmen for incompetency. The workmen in constructing a bridge over a public highway negligently caused the death of a person passing beneath, along the highway, by allowing a stone to fall upon him :-Held, that the company was not liable, and that in such case the terms of the contract in question did not make any difference. Reedie v. L. & N. W. Ry., 4 Ex. 244; 6 Railw. Cas. 184; 20 L. J., Ex. 65. some piles in the bed of a public navigable river. After the works were completed and a reasonable time to remove the piles had elapsed, the defendants sold them for a valuable consideration to J., who cut them off, and the surrounding soil being washed away, parts of the piles under the water protruded above the bed of the river, and the plaintiff's barge, whilst lawfully navigating it, struck upon them and was injured. If the piles had not been cut the damage would not have happened without gross negligence :-Held, that the defendants were not liable. Bartlett v. Baker, 3 H. & C. 153; 34 L. J., Ex. 8. Explosion of Gas.]-A builder was employed by a committee of a club to execute alterations at the club-house, including the preparation and fixing of gas-fittings. He made a sub-contract with B., a gas-fitter, to execute this part of the work. In the course of doing it, through B.'s negligence, the gas exploded, and injured the plaintiff :-Held, that the builder was not liable for this injury. Ripson v. Cubitt, 9 M. & W. 710; Car. & M. 64; 11 L. J. Ex. 271; 6 Jur. 606. Construction of Sewer.]-A contractor employed by the metropolitan board of works, under their compulsory powers, to open a public road for the purpose of constructing a sewer, is not liable, after filling in the trench, and making that part of the road as sound and compact as it can then be made, for injury or damage to passengers in consequence of the natural subsidence of the soil which he has put in. Hyams 272; 36 L. J., Q. B. 166; L. R. 2 Q. B. 264; 16 L. T. 118; 15 W. R. 619. Affirmed, 38 L. J., Q. B. 21; L. R. 4 Q. B. 138 ; 17 W. R. 232-Ex. Ch. D. LIABILITY OF CONTRACTORS. Tool falling from Scaffold.]-The defendants were builders and contractors, who, after the outside of a house was finished, had removed the outer hoarding and had employed a sub-contractor to do the internal plastering. One of the men employed by the sub-contractor, in walking, shook a plank, which caused a tool to fall out of a window of the house, and the tool in falling injured the plaintiff who was passing along the highway. The jury found that the hoarding had been properly removed, but that. Webster, 8 B. & the injury was caused by the negligence of the defendants in not providing some other protection for the public:-Held, that the defendants were entitled to judgment, for there was no evidence that the falling of the tool was a probable accident which might reasonably have been foreseen, so as to make it the duty of the defendants to provide against it. Pearson v. Cox, 2 C. P. D. 369: 36 L. T. 495-C. A. The 18 & 19 Vict. c. 120, s. 135, empowers the board of works to make a sewer, and to carry their works through or under any cellar or vault under the carriage-way or pavement of any street, making compensation for any damage done thereby; and a special mode of ascertaining Held, also, that if it was the duty of any--Held, that these provisions did not preclude the amount of damage sustained is pointed out : one to supply protection against the consequences of the falling of the tool, it was the duty of the sub-contractor and not of the defendants. Ib. one who had sustained damage from work done by a contractor, under the order of the board, from maintaining an action against the contractor, where the damage had arisen from his negligence and want of proper care and skill. Clothier v. Webster, 12 C. B. (N.S.) 790; 31 L. J., C. P. 316; 9 Jur. (N.S.) 231; 6 L. T. 461; 10 W. R. 624. STATUTORY POWERS. Neglect to Fence Machinery.]-The workmen in a government dockyard were permitted to use the waterclosets erected for their accommodation, and for that purpose to use certain paths across the dockyard. A government contractor was permitted to erect in the dockyard machinery E. PUBLIC BODIES AND PERSONS WITH for the purpose of his work. He erected across a path which led to one of the waterclosets a revolving shaft, partly covered with planks. A workman in the dockyard, having gone along this path to the watercloset, on his return stumbled, and on putting out his hand to save himself, his arm was caught by the shaft and lacerated. There was another path along which he might have gone, but the one he used was the more convenient :-Held, that the contractor was not liable for the injury, since he was under no obligation to fence the shaft, and the defect in the fencing was apparent. Boleh v. Smith, 7 H. & N. 736; 31 L. J., Ex. 201; 8 Jur. (N.s.) 197; 6 L. T. 158; 10 W. R. 387. Scope of Powers.]-When persons are incorporated by an act of parliament for a particular purpose, and have full powers given them to effect that purpose, if the effecting of it may occasion (not only in the course of originally executing the necessary works for the required purpose, but at recurring intervals afterwards) inconvenience or injury to others, they may be treated as under an obligation to take, from time to time, measures to prevent the occurrence of such inconvenience and injury. Geddis v. Bann Reservoir (Proprietors), 3 App Cas. 430 -H. L. (Sc.) When the legislature has authorised certain | shall from time to time place such fences and persons to effect a certain purpose, and has posts on the side of the footways of the streets given them the powers necessary to effect it, under their management, as may be needed for they may exercise those powers to their full ex- the protection of passengers on such footways: tent without incurring responsibility, but in so-Held, that under this section no discretion doing they must not occasion any needless injury was vested in commissioners as to the fencing of to anyone. lb. footways under their government, but that an action lay against them for injuries sustained by a passenger, by reason of their omission to fence, although they acted gratuitously, and it was not shown that they had, or were empowered to raise, funds to meet damages which might be recovered against them. Ohrby v. Ryde Commissioners, 5 B. & S. 743; 33 L. J., Q. B. 296 ; 10 Jur. (N.s.) 1048; 12 W. R. 1079. - Authority not Exceeded.]—Where trustees under 3 Geo. 4, c. 126, by improving the course of a public road, had effected a consequential injury to a private individual whose estate abutted on the road :-Held, that they were not liable to an action, it appearing that they had not exceeded the authority given them by the statute. Bolton v. Crowther, 4 D. & R. 195; 2 B. & C. 703; 2 L. J. (0.s.) K. B. 139. Where the acts of commissioners, appointed by a paving act, occasion a damage to an individual without any excess of jurisdiction on their part, the commissioners, or paviors acting under them, are not liable to an action. British Cast Plate-Glass Manufacturers v. Meredith, 4 Term Rep. 794. The principle which imposes liabilities upon a private company, as arising in consideration of the statutable powers granted to them, has no application in the case of commissioners appointed under a public act of parliament, to do, on behalf of the executive government, certain things for the benefit of the public. Reg. v. Woods and Forests Commissioners, 19 L. J., Q. B. 497; 15 Jur. 35. By a local act for better preserving a harbour, trustees were appointed for carrying out the act. They acted gratuitously; the property in the harbour was vested in them, and they were empowered to elect a harbour-master and other officers and servants connected with the harbour, with power also to discharge them. The harbourmaster was empowered to direct the situation in which a vessel entering the harbour was to be moored. The trustees were empowered to make by-laws as to the management of the harbour, and to impose tonnage rates upon vessels using it, and to borrow money on the security of such rates, and to apply the proceeds in payment of the interest of the money borrowed, and of the expenses attending the carrying into execution the purposes of the act connected with the harbour, and also in the reduction of the capital borrowed-Held, that the trustees were not master, in directing a vessel to be moored in an improper place whereby it received damage, or, secondly, for an injury occasioned to a vessel by an accumulation of rubbish in the harbour. Metcalfe v. Hetherington, 11 Ex. 257; 24 L. J., Ex. 314. When Special Mode of Compensation Pro-liable, either, first, for the acts of the harbourvided.]—If, in the execution of works authorised by an act of parliament, damage is sustained, and the act provides a special mode in which compensation for such damage may be recovered, no action will lie for it. But this only relates to works carefully and skilfully executed, and if there is a want of proper care and skill on the Held, also, that although the trustees had part of those executing the works, an action for almost an absolute discretion (with certain exthe negligence, to recover damages for the injury ceptions) in the appropriation of the funds for thereby sustained, will lie. Clothier v. Web-the management of the harbour, they would not ster, 12 C. B. (N.S.) 790; 31 L. J., C. P. 216; 9 Jur. (N.S.) 231; 6 L. T. 461; 10 W. R. 624. Gratuitous Performance of Duties.]-Persons entrusted with the performance of a public duty, discharging it gratuitously, and being personally guilty of no negligence or default, are not responsible for an injury sustained by an individual through the negligence of workmen employed under them. Holliday v. St. Leonard's, Shoreditch, 11 C. B. (N.S.) 192; 30 L. J., C. P. 361; 8 Jur. (N.S.) 79; 4 L. T. 406; 9 W. R. 694. A vestry in whom were, by 18 & 19 Vict. c. 120, vested the powers and duties of surveyors of highways, under the powers conferred upon them by that act, appointed a surveyor at a salary. Workmen employed by the surveyor, and paid out of the parish funds, being directed to carry certain paving-stones from a public street under repair, and place them in another public street, so negligently performed that duty that the plaintiff, in driving through the street, was upset and injured-Held, that the vestry was not responsible. Ib. A public body bound to discharge a public duty without reward and without funds is responsible for the negligence of those whom they employ. Coe v. Wise, 7 B. & S. 831; L. R. 1 Q. B. 711; 14 L. T. 891; 14 W. R. 865-Ex. Ch. By 10 & 11 Vict. c. 34, s. 52, commissioners have been liable for the accident arising from the accumulation of rubbish in the harbour if they had been in possession of funds. Ib. One who, in the exercise of a public function, without emolument, which he is compellable to execute, acting without malice, and according to his best skill and diligence, and obtaining the best information he can, does an act which occasions consequential damage to a subject, is not liable to an action for such damage. Sutton v. Clarke, 6 Taunt. 29; 1 Marsh. 429; 16 R. R. 563. By a turnpike act, trustees were appointed with authority to cut drains in lands adjoining the road, making reasonable satisfaction to the owners. It was provided that all actions for anything done in pursuance of the act, should be brought within six months after doing the thing complained of. A drain was cut by an order signed by a competent number of trustees and according to the plan of a surveyor, in land adjoining the plaintiff's, by which the latter was overflowed. An action was brought against one of the trustees only, more than six months after the act done and the first injury sustained, but within six months after a subsequent injury accrued:-Held, first, that the action, if it could have been supported at all, was well brought against the defendant only; but, secondly, that the trustees, having acted to the best of their skill and with the best advice, were not answerable for the damage which had accrued. Ib. Where Power to Levy Tolls.]-Although, where statutable powers are conferred, and exercised merely for the public benefit, and in the discharge of public duties, the persons so exercising them being in the position of trustees for the public interest, may not be liable for injuries thereby occasioned; yet where such powers are conferred on parties, partly for their own benefit, and exercised for their own profit, such parties are answerable for injuries occasioned by their careless exercise of the powers so conferred. Manley v. St. Helen's Canal and Ry., 2 H. & N. 840; 27 L. J., Ex. 159; 6 W. R. 297. bar, but the plaintiff did not :-Held, that the proprietors were liable for the injury to the ship, as they were guilty of negligence in not having taken reasonable care, while they kept the basin open for the public use, that those who chose to navigate it might do so without danger. Thomp son v. N. E. Ry., 2 B. & S. 119; 31 L. J., Q. B. 194; 8 Jur. N. S. 991; 6 L. T. 127; 10 W. R. 404-Ex. Ch. Held, also, assuming the knowledge of the pilot to be the knowledge of the plaintiff, that knowledge of the existence of the bar did not disentitle him to recover, as it was not found by the jury that it was an act of imprudence on his part, if he had such knowledge, to attempt to navigate the vessel out. Ib. A corporation constituted for the purpose of the upper navigation of the river Thames by the Thames Navigation Act, 1866 (29 & 30 Vict. c. 89), and under the powers of that act, and of the previous statutes relating to the navigation which had become vested in them, had constructed bridges and other works, and had acquired the right to use the whole of the towing path along the river, and to take toll for the same. In the exercise of such right the corporation took an Therefore, where a canal company is empowered by a private act of parliament to intersect highways, and to construct bridges to connect the intercepted portions, and the canal and bridges are vested in them as proprietors, and they are enabled to take tolls from boats passing the bridges, and they erect swing-bridges, which the boatmen are entitled to open for the purpose of passing, and which, when opened, leave the cdge of the canal unprotected, and there is not sufficient light or other means of preventing acci-aggregate toll in one sum for the use of the dents, and the consequence is that while the bridge is lawfully opened at night-time a person falls into the canal, without any fault on his part, the company will be liable to an action. Ib. entire navigation and towing-paths, which included the works it had constructed, as well as the natural soil which had been worn into the track of a towing-path. Part of such natural towing-path got into a dangerous state A corporation was empowered by act of par- by the action of the water, and in consequence liament to make and maintain docks for the use thereof the horses of the plaintiff, whilst using of the public, and to take tolls from persons it in towing a barge, for which the proper toll using them. The corporation did not (nor did had been paid to the corporation, fell into the its individual members) derive any emolument river and were drowned :-Held, that as the from the tolls, but was bound to apply them in corporation took one toll for the use of the maintaining the docks, and in paying a debt entire towing-path, parts of which were artificial, contracted in making them. The corporation it mattered not that the place where the had the usual powers of appointing water-accident happened was not artificial, but that bailiffs, harbour-masters, and servants, by whose it was its duty to take reasonable care that hands the duties of superintendence were practically carried out. A ship, in entering one of the docks, struck against a bank of mud left at its entrance, of the existence of which the corporation was either aware, or negligently ignorant. The ship and cargo were both damaged, and the respective owners thereof brought actions for negligence against the corporation:-Held, that as long as the docks were open for the public, the corporation was bound, whether it received the tolls for beneficial or fiduciary purposes, to take care that the docks were navigable without danger, and consequently that the corporation was liable to the owners for negligence. Mersey Docks v. Gibbs, 11 H. L. Cas. 686; 35 L. J., Ex. 225; L. R. 1 H. L. 93; 12 Jur. (N.S.) 571; 14 L. T. 677; 14 W. R. 872. Proprietors of docks, for the use of which they were entitled to tolls, opened them for public use to all vessels of a certain size before the lowwater basin was completed, and while a bar of earth remained across a large part of it, dangerous to navigation, not visible at high tide, not in any manner marked by buoys, and which, by the exercise of reasonable care on their part, might have been removed before. The plaintiff's vessel, which was under the size limited, and had entered the docks and loaded her cargo, on coming out into the basin was driven upon the bar and wrecked, without any negligence or mismanagement on the part of the plaintiff, or of the crew, or of the pilot who had been engaged to take the vessel out. The pilot knew of the the whole of the towing-path was in such a state as not to expose those using it to undue danger, and that for a neglect of such duty the corporation was responsible to the owner of the horses, although they were a public body receiving their powers for public purposes. Winch v. Thames Conservators, 43 L. J., C. P. 167; L. R. 9 C. P. 378; 31 L. T. 128; 22 W. R. 879-Ex. Ch. Held, also, that the towing-path was not confined to the mere beaten track, but included so much of the bank as might ordinarily be used by horses when towing barges. Ib. By the Merchant Shipping Act, 1854, the superintendence and management of all lighthouses and beacons in England and the adjacent seas are vested in the trinity house, subject to the existing jurisdiction of local lighthouse authorities; the trinity house continuing to hold and maintain all property vested in them in the same manner and for the same purposes as they have hitherto held and maintained the same, and extensive powers are given to them, to be exercised with the consent of the board of trade, in respect of the management and control of lighthouses and beacons which are subject to the jurisdiction of local authorities, and in other respects. The act further provides that the light dues levied by the trinity house shall be carried to the account of the mercantile marine fund; that the expenses incurred in respect of the service of lighthouses and beacons shall be paid out of that fund; that the trinity house Corporation-Laying Gas Pipes.]-A municipal corporation employing workmen to lay down gas pipes in the borough is responsible for the negligence of the persons employed. Scott v. Manchester Corporation, 2 H. & N. 204; 26 L. J., Ex. 406; 3 Jur. (N.s.) 590; 5 W. R. 598. shall account to the board of trade for their of negligence on the part of the appellants to go receipts and expenditure, and that their accounts to a jury. The fact that a latent danger in shall be audited by the commissioners of fact exists does not necessarily imply negligence audit :-Held, that the corporation of trinity in not discovering its existence. Ib. house were not, by virtue of the Merchant Shipping Act, 1854, constituted servants of the crown so as to exempt them from liability to an action for negligence in the performance of their duties. A beacon vested in the corporation of trinity house having become partially destroyed, they licensed G. to remove it, and in so doing he negligently left an iron stump sticking up under water. In an action to recover damages caused thereby to the plaintiff's ship:-Held, that the defendants were liable for G.'s negligence. Gilbert v. Trinity House Corporation, 56 L. J., Q. B. 85; 17 Q. B. D. 795; 35 W. R. 30. The defendants were the owners of a cattle market, and in the market-place they had erected a statue, round which they had placed a railing as a fence. The plaintiffs attended the market with their cattle, and occupied a particular site, for which they paid a toll. A cow belonging to them, in attempting to jump the railing, injured herself, and subsequently died from the injuries. The jury found that the railing was dangerous: -Held, that the defendants having received toll from the plaintiffs, and invited them to come to the market with their cattle, a duty was imposed on them to keep the market in a safe condition, and therefore an action would lie against the defendants for the loss sustained by the plaintiffs. Lax v. Darlington Corporation, 49 L. J., Ex. 105; 5 Ex. D. 28; 41 L. T. 489; 28 W. R. 221-C. A. - Executive Government of Colony.]-In a proceeding under the Crown Suits Act, 1861, it appeared that a harbour was under the management of the executive government of the colony, which appointed the harbour officials and received rates for the use of staiths and wharves, but no harbour dues :-Held, that such executive government was liable for negligence in permitting an obstruction to remain in the harbour by which the plaintiff's ship was injured. Reg. v. Williams, 53 L. J., P. C. 64 ; 9 App. Cas. 418; 51 L. T. 546-P. C. Fencing Footpath.]-The Towns Improvement Clauses Act (10 & 11 Vict. c. 34), s. 52, imposes on the commissioners elected under the act the duty of fencing footpaths, if needed, for the protection of passengers, and leaves them no discretion :-Held, that such commissioners are therefore liable, in their corporate capacity, to an action at the suit of a person injured by their negligent omission to fence a footpath. Ohrby v. Ryde Commissioners, 5 B. & S. 743; 33 L. J., Q. B. 296; 10 Jur. (N.s.) 1048; 12 W. R. 1079. Washhouses.]-A corporation erected baths and washhouses, under 9 & 10 Vict. c. 74. While using a drying machine, moved by steam, a person who paid a small sum for the use of it, was, by reason of its improper construction, dragged against the machinery and injured :-Held, that an action was maintainable, and that the corporation was the proper party to be sued, notwithstanding the affairs of the washhouses were managed by a committee consisting of some only of the members of the corporation. Cowley v. Sunderland Corporation, 6 H. & N. 565; 30 L. J., Ex. 127; 4 L. T. 720; 9 W. R. 668. Non-repair of Highway-Non-feasance.]-The transfer of an obligation to repair a highway to a public corporation does not of itself render such corporation liable to an action in respect of mere non-feasance. To establish such a liability the legislature must have used language indicating an intention that this liability should be imposed. Bathurst (Borough) v. Macpherson (4 App. Cas. 256) distinguished. Pictou Municipality v. Geldert, 63 L. J., P. C. 37; [1893] A. C. 524; 1 R. 447; 69 L. T. 510; 42 W. R. 114-P. C. Nonfeasance.]-The liability of a body created by statute is governed by the statutes which create it. The powers conferred when exercised at all must be executed with due care. A local authority which, under the Public In the absence of a contrary intention, its duties Health Act, 1875, has vested in it both the highand liabilities are the same as those imposed by ways and the sewers of the district, and the the general law on a private person doing the control and management of the same, is not same thing. But for mere nonfeasance no action civilly liable for an injury caused by a sewer lies except in regard to a duty towards the plain-grating that projects beyond the road surface if tiff imposed by the statute, and negligently omitted. Mersey Docks v. Gibbs (L. R. 1 H. L. 93) approved. Gibraltar Sanitary Commissimmers v. Orfila, 59 L. J., P. C. 95; 15 App. Cas. 400; 63 L. T. 58-P. C. the grating is in proper repair and condition, and the accident is attributable solely to the nonrepair of the highway. The fact that the local authority has the control of the sewers as well as of the highways does not render the local authority liable. Kent v. Worthing Local Board (10 Q. B. D. 118) overruled; Moore v. Lambeth Waterworks (17 Q. B. D. 462) discussed: Cowley v. Newmarket Local Board (1 R. 45) followed. Oliver v. Horsham Local Board, 63 L. J., Q. B. 181; [1894] 1 Q. B. 332; 9 R. 111; 70 L. T. 206; 42 W. R. 161; 58 J. P. 297—C. A. Latent Danger.]—In an action to recover damages for injury to the respondent's property arising from the fall of an overhanging road, consequent upon the giving way of its retaining wall, which the appellant corporation was under a statutory duty to maintain for the purposes merely of road conservancy, it appeared that the A local board, being the highway authority of result was due to original defects in the structure the district, are not liable for damages caused to of the wall, and that the appellant was not a person in consequence of the highway being out negligently ignorant thereof, and not guilty of of repair, where such non-repair is a mere nonmisfeasance :-Held, that there was no evidence feasance. Gibson v. Preston Corporation (L. R. |