SENATE.] Removal of the Deposites. [JAN. 8, 1834. under all Governments, misera est servitus ubi jus est aut be lawful to use the corporate name, style, and cavagum, aut incognitum. The lesson he teaches is worthy of pacity, for the purpose of suits for the final settlement imitation, not only from its intrinsic merits, but from the of the affairs and accounts of the corporation, and for character of him who teaches it. He is worthy, sir, of the the sale and disposition of their estate, real, personal, deepest homage and the closest imitation. He has devoted and mixed, but not for any other purpose or in any other a long, a pure, and a useful life to his country. He has manner whatsoever, nor for a period exceeding two years left the impress of his virtues and his talents on your con- after the expiration of the said term of incorporation." stitution and your laws, in all their history; and he now It has, therefore, four instead of two years to accomplish exhibits one of the most dignified, and lovely, and vener- the work of which the Secretary speaks, and we must able specimens of a philosophic and patriotic old age that apply his reasoning to the four, and not to the two years. the world has ever been permitted to witness. This provision, to my mind, indisputably proves the intenMr. President, the assertion of the Secretary, that this tion of Congress that the bank should discount, should dò question was finally and irreversibly settled, is not only every thing, make profit, and possess all its privileges, opposed to fact and to the respect due to Congress, but it until 1836; that the deposites should be enjoyed up to that is not respectful even to the character of the President time, and it should not be compelled to close its business himself. It turns upon the allegation that the President transactions before the full end of twenty years, the time was elected because he was opposed to the bank. It mentioned in its charter. It is a charter for twenty, not supposes disingenuousness in him in his messages to Con- eighteen years. The time subsequently given for winding gress; and that this single merit, this hostility to the bank,up was designed to enable it to act to the last moment, was the cause of the preference of him by the people. and to relieve it from the difficulties under which the old Had he, then, no other merits? Was there no other cause bank labored for want of such a provision. I find in this why he should be preferred, without even remembering his fact, in this provision, a full answer to the whole argument opposition to the bank? Had he rendered no services to of the Secretary as to time--a conclusive reason to believe his country; ought no battles; gained no glory; suffered that he has violated the intention of Congress and the no privations; made no sacrifices? Had he no constitu- chartered rights of the bank. Congress gave the bank tional principles to secure regard? no acts of reform to twenty years, and did not authorize the Secretary, by his win favor? Must the people have voted for him for this volition, to deprive it of two years of that time. merit alone? Does any man believe that he received a In the next place we must apply the reasoning to a solsingle vote on this ground, which he would not have re-vent, rich bank; able to pay all its debts, and count down ceived had there been no quarrel with the bank? No, its silver and gold, on every demand. This solvency, sir; I do not thus estimate the intelligence of the people, though not long since questioned by its adversaries, is now nor the motives of their approbation and support. The admitted by the President-by the Secretary--by all. President was chosen for other and stronger reasons, how- And what its difficulties in 1819 or 1820 have to do with its ever unfounded and misguided I may regard them. His present condition, I am unable to discover. We are speakelection was no reason on which the Secretary can be ing of it in 1833-now-and what it must be in 1836 unjustified in making the great movement which affected, der proper management. If it were even compelled to not our finances alone, but all the business and prosperity of the country. And he can find no apology in it, unless he assumes the odious position, that the President's will is law, and his opinions the unerring guide of legislative ac tion. wind up at this moment, the official reports of the Secretary prove that it is entirely able to pay deposites-debtsevery thing, and have a large surplus. I need not repeat the figures in the statement of its situation on the 1st of this month. It had in bills, and notes, stocks, specie, and The two next positions of the Secretary are, [Rep. p. debts from State banks, about seventy-two millions, besides 11,] that the deposites ought not to remain in the bank its large surplus contingent fund, and about three millions until the charter expired in 1836; and, as the Secretary in real estate; and all the claims which could be made only could remove them, it was his duty then to act. In against it for stock, notes in circulation, and debts, did relation to his exclusive power, I have said all that I in- not amount, I think, to more than sixty-seven millions. It tend. The reasoning of the Secretary, to be found in had more than ten millions of specie in its vaults in Depages 4 and 5, as I understand it, is this: that the deposites cember, and that specie constantly accumulating. It has always amount to several millions; their sudden withdraw- no cause to fear any attack. It can pay its debts, and real, at the expiration of the charter, would create incon- store to its stockholders their money, and much more. venience, and make the deposites unsafe, so that it could In winding up its concerns, and calling in its dues, its not return them to the Government; that its outstanding specie must, by necessity, constantly augment. It will notes would lose their value when not received for Gov- require its payments from debtors, and State banks to be ernment dues, and holders at a distance suffer by their in specie, that it may answer the claims upon it at home depreciation; that a sound currency must in the mean time and abroad, from creditors and stockholders. be created; that this can, under his direction, be accom- Apply, then, the positions of the Secretary to such a plished by the State banks, but could not be hastily sub-bank, having four years to close its concerns; or, if you stituted at the expiration of the charter. please, having only two. Now, sir, I profess to have very little financial skill or knowledge. I have not made it the study of my life; but few and passing moments, amidst other employments, have been devoted to acquiring it. But, as I am compelled to form and express, by my vote, an opinion on the financial reasons of the Secretary, such views as I have must be my guide in that vote. The sudden withdrawal, at the expiration of the charter, of the deposites. How could those deposites be unsafe? more unsafe then than now? Why withdraw them suddenly? Why with more haste than the claims against the Government would require? But, with whatever haste, why should not the bank be able to pay them? They must be paid before the stockholders, and the whole means of In the first place, it occurs to me that the Secretary has the bank, stock and all, to four times their amount, would mistaken the time when the affairs of the bank are to be be answerable for them. They had in December about wound up. Its charter, for certain purposes, expires in forty millions, subject to the payment of their eleven mil1836; but for paying its debts, and calling in its claims--in lions of public and private deposites. The same amount other words, settling up its concerns-it has two years of deposites which alarmed the Secretary have been paid, beyond that period. The 21st section of the charter so and suddenly, too, by the bank, more than once, and no expressly provides: "Notwithstanding the expiration of bankruptcy or pressure has ensued. They never have the term for which the corporation is created, it shall been, and never can be, more safe than at the precise mo JAN. 8, 1834.] Removal of the Deposites. [SENATE. ment that the bank closes its active business, and no longer financial Secretary: there can be no substitute in the preputs any of its concerns at hazard. It is so with all solvent sent state of things. The State banks are incompetent to trustees and agents, and must be so with the bank. But, supply it. But, in winding up, it would not be compelled sir, the Secretary need not be disturbed by the anticipat- to withdraw from active use one-half nor one-fourth of ed loss of the deposites. If we may trust his own reports, that amount, in the same time; and these would be reand if matters proceed as they have done for the last two placed by other circulation. What would be the value of or three years, there will be little or no money to deposite. that circulation, and how far it would subserve the conThe augmented expenses of administration and the insol-venience of the people of the country, is quite a different vency of departments will relieve us from any cause for matter. There would be enough-its quality no man can apprehension on this subject. tell. We had an example once on this point. When the Again: should the notes of the bank, not being receiv- old Bank of the United States was closed, other banks ed for Government dues, depreciate, and holders at a dis- grew up like mushrooms in a night, and perished almost tance lose by them? The receipt of these notes by the as soon. They threw out abundance of paper; but it Government is doubtless useful to their circulation, but it was not money, nor the equal representative of money. is not their only nor chief value. This is already proved Your currency increased, in four or five years, from about by the depreciated condition of the notes of some of the forty-five to much more than one hundred millions; and selected banks, at a distance from the places where they the consequences on the prosperity of the people and the are issued. They are below par. The chief value con- Government need not be described to him who has not sists in their being payable in specie whenever demanded; memory enough to recollect them, or virtue enough to their circulation throughout the Union, wherever busi- desire to guard against them. Absolute, unavoidable, ness or pleasure requires them; and because, from the uncontrollable, grinding necessity compelled us to seek a nature of the commerce and trade of the country, their remedy. It was found, by the wisdom of Congress, in tendency is to the commercial cities-to the sea-board, the charter of this bank, and in the restoration of specie where they will be cash, or its equivalent, to all who hold payments--the restoration of money to the country. In them. After new issues shall have ceased, they will and must less than five years, the circulation was reduced from be sought by all in the interior who have transactions upon nearly one hundred and ten to about fifty-five millions; the sea-coast. The amount of them now in circulation is and the effect has been told in years of private and pubstated at eighteen or nineteen millions--at this moment lic prosperity, until ignorance or folly blasted it. I am probably twenty millions. They form about one-fourth also unable to perceive why evils produced by the windof the circulating medium of the country, and are never ing up of the bank, in two years, in 1836 and 1837, should greater in amount than appears in the reports of the bank be greater than in 1834 and 1835? Why should they be to the department. They will be lessened, of course, by greater, when the bank and the country, by the regular the prudence and caution of the bank as it approaches its process under the law, are prepared for the operation, than dissolution; but, even if they were augmented, the causes when the Secretary, suddenly and unexpectedly, forces before stated would ensure their continued credit. I wish it upon them? We ought to have been instructed upon the Secretary had instructed us how notes thus situated this point. can depreciate below their nominal value; or how a bank, But, sir, although I cannot see why these notes should thus strong, would be unable to pay its deposites, public be depreciated, and these evils result which the Secretary or private. Nothing but the utter and entire ruin of its so clearly foresaw, I think I can perceive why the stock debtors, and of the State banks, which owed it five mil- itself may not bear, in market, the same price as when the lions of dollars on the 1st of January, could produce the charter had longer to run, and why it will not do to judge predicted evil. It is perchance possible that the pro- it now by "the infallible price current." As its charter phet, and those who sustain him, may be powerful enough approaches a close, it is not a place for permanent investto occasion the fulfilment of his prophecy; but they mustments, whence fair profits and interest may be expected reach it through the destruction of the credit and con- for years to come. It will then be an article to be purfidence of the country, and the prostration of commerce, chased only at its actual transfer value. It will bring just and dealing, and prosperity in the community. so much, and no more, as the buyer believes will be paid to him when the stock is taken up and cancelled; and this will be the nominal value of the stock, and the proper proportion of surplus profits. But, sir, it would be quite as fair to apply the price current to the stock of a bank just about to expire, and compare it with those which have longer time to run, as it is now to make the same comparison between the Bank of the United States and others, after all the weight of official and personal hostility has been made to bear upon the former, and the treasury of the Union has been poured into the lap of the latter. It is not strange that those who reason by such lights should reach false conclusions. The amount in circulation is large in itself, but small when compared with the capital of the bank. In the reports of Mr. Crawford, several years after it was created, this point is developed and discussed. It has been greater before and since the present Secretary reasoned about it. Its withdrawal, and closing up the concerns of the bank, will of course be felt whenever it may be performed, though with the utmost caution and moderation. It must be so in closing any large banking institution, or any large mercantile establishment; but, left to itself, unforced by the mandate of power, it would be less felt than the pres sure which now afflicts the community. The bank would not be obliged to withdraw from the active employments But, sir, the Secretary is to make a substitute for our of the country means greater than it has now been com- legislative fiscal agent, and for our present indifferent curpelled to do. Its debts and credits, to the amount of the rency. He is to perform the high duty of Congress, and former, would but change hands, in the shape of some prescribe a much better and sounder circulation-a much new circulation, and the balances due to it be paid in better, more economical, and efficient agent. And how? specie, or what would be received as equivalent by its By substituting State banks, and notes of State banks, and stockholders. The amount to which it has curtailed its making them receivable as the notes of the United States business within the last five months has been stated at twelve Bank now are. By law, the notes of the mother bank millions-I know not on what evidence. The statements and the branches are received every where from those and the reports from the Secretary show no such fact. It who have payments to make to the Government. An inhas been reduced, in about that period, somewhere about habitant of Maine can pay the Government, in Maine, with nine millions; but its own circulation has not been dimin-a note issued in New Orleans. He cannot, indeed, go to ished. The sum mentioned has been withdrawn from the branch in Maine and demand specie for it, (for the active use; for there was no substitute supplied by our note he holds does not promise to pay specie there, SENATE.] Removal of the Deposites. [JAN. 8, 1834. but where it was issued;) but he can pay Government Is it not inexcusable that the Secretary should, of his dues with it. The complaint that these notes are not pay-own authority, attempt to substitute for the fiscal agent of able every where in specie, on demand, I should designate the Government, created by law, agents heretofore found as absurd, if courtesy would permit. The law makes no incompetent, and whose employment has created such such requirement, and no bank, with branches so scat- distress in the country? tered, and with the commercial relations existing between But this is not the worst of the scheme. The Governthe different portions of our wide-spread country, with ment deposites its money in these banks to much more than any amount of capital, could long accomplish it. All that their whole capital, and the security is left at the option of it can do is to provide specie for the issues at each place. the Secretary! Now, what security is proposed? In the This it has done. If notes of the New Orleans, Lexington, last report from the department we have a document which Savannah, and other branches, were all payable in specie explains it; it is the report from the agent, who was also every where, it would put the safety and honor of the principal; for he was invested with full powers to make the whole institution in the power of any enemy who any proposition he pleased; and whatever he approved might collect notes enough to exceed its specie at any one was adopted by the Executive. place. The enmity of the treasury, or of a few individu- Will the Senate hear the plan of security for the public als, would have found a ready prey under such circum- money of the Union? [Report of Amos Kendall to the stances. The run upon the branch at Savannah would not Secretary of the Treasury, dated 4th September, 1833, have cost so much trouble and money. This mode of pay- page 11.] "When asked what kind of security would be ment was once attempted by the bank, and a committee most satisfactory, I did not hesitate to say that, in my of Congress, of able and intelligent men, who examined opinion, the personal responsibility of the directors would its concerns in 1819, looked to this as one of the causes be the very best. It would show their own perfect confiwhich embarrassed the bank in 1819, and as injurious to dence in the safety and success of the undertaking, and it the institution and the interest of the country: and com- would not only afford the Government an ample guaranty mittees of the House in 1830 and 1832, sustained by for the safety of its funds, in addition to the capital and the House, affirmed the same view of this matter. But character of the banks, but would satisfy the public mind. charges against the bank do not become stale. They are When it is seen that the managers of the State banks are repeated again and again, with all the complacency of willing to pledge not only the capital of those institutions, new discovery and invention. but their own property and character, it will be impossi To create an equal substitute, the State bank notes must ble to doubt that the deposite is as safe in their keeping as be received every where for Government dues; those of human precaution can make it. It is understood that the Maine in Kentucky, those of Buffalo in Charleston. To security intended to be offered by the banks east of Balaccomplish this, either the Government itself must become timore is of this description; and in case any of their direcresponsible for these banks, or the banks themselves must tors shall decline giving it, they will be substituted by become responsible for each other; otherwise the notes some of the richest stockholders. In case I had failed to will be, as they now are, and as they were from 1813 to procure the assent of any of the banks in all of the prin1817, at discount. The Government must receive them cipal cities to the giving of security, it was my purpose for its dues at par, and pay them out at the discount of to propose the payment of an interest of one or two per from three to fifteen and twenty per cent. Individuals cent. on the average deposite, to constitute a fund to will only receive and pay them at their commercial value. meet any possible losses. If this plan should be thought Are we prepared to pass a law, taking upon ourselves the advisable, I have no doubt of its entire practicability!!" solvency of these banks, and agreeing to receive them at par from our debtors? Will the banks become responsible for each other? The misconduct of a single one might prostrate the whole. Will their charters permit it? Will their stockholders consent? Sir, neither by contract nor by law can the Secretary render these notes receivable every where, much less can he make them payable in specie every where. They will and must depreciate; and as the Government lost between forty and fifty millions by their depreciation in the war, and the people were annually taxed by this cause more than six millions of dollars, so will it be again in time of peace as well as war. Let the Senate, let Congress, let the people, hear and approve this plan for the safety and management of their money, illegally and unconstitutionally plundered from the treasury-this substitution of the executive will for legislative action! Is it wonderful that Congress was not to be consulted before this scheme of consummate folly was adopted? Is it strange that Mr. Duane should regard it "a breach of public faith,” “vindictive and arbitrary,” "not conservative or just," as disrespectful to Congress, who were about to assemble, and who have pronounced the deposites safe; as calculated "to shake public confidence, and promote doubt and mischief in the operations of society;" as "crude and unsafe;" as dangerous in the hands of a Secretary dependent for office on executive will, by making the banks "political machinery;" as destructive of national credit and reputation; as designed "to promote selfish and factious purposes?" In saying these things, sir, I am not to be understood as intending to depreciate the State banks. I admit their general solvency so long as the business and currency of the country is in a natural and sound state. I admit, also, their entire competency to accomplish the objects of their creation within the limits of action and agency which were Personal security of some of the directors and stockcontemplated by those who formed them. But they were holders of these banks, for our public money, to the intended to be local: their nature and capital do not fit amount of millions! "The payment of one or two per them for the purposes of the Secretary; and whenever they cent. upon the average deposite, to constitute a fund to shall be substituted, you will find them as you have once meet any possible losses!" Am I to reason on such a before found them. You have had annually repeated, for scheme before an American Senate? Sir, human ingeyears, in the treasury reports, an item of between one and nuity could not offer a grosser insult to the human undertwo millions of unavailable funds. These were State bank standing. Your money is safe, perfectly safe, and admitnotes, and not worth a farthing. The Secretary would ted to be so, and you are to take it away, and venture it soon find a repetition of this item, swelled enormously, upon his scheme going into operation. Is it not graceless to complain against the bank that it does not pay specie where it has not promised to pay it, and when its charter does not require it, and yet propose to substitute for it that which can neither pay specie every where, nor be receivable where it is wanted? on personal security of individuals, and on a safety fund, to meet losses which you are to create by the change! The folly and madness of the act is only equalled by the confidence with which it is urged upon us. But, sir, you, the Congress of the Union, were not even to be permitted to judge of the scheme before it was executed. Your Secretary has already executed it, in part. Your money JAN. 8, 1834.] Removal of the Deposites. [SENATE. has been ventured, and without consulting you, and with- that the balance due from State banks increased two milout taking the security; for he yet has none, and of that lions, rendering them unable to protect the community, description he never will have. Directors and indivi- as they were compelled to look to their own safety; and dual stockholders are not idiots; they will refuse the se- that thus a pressure was produced by the bank, which it curity when it shall be demanded. The executive power was necessary to arrest before the meeting of Congress. has plundered your treasury, and presents you such per. I have seldom, if ever, seen a larger share of misapsonal security as he can get, and a safety fund in its stead. prehended facts and misapplied reasoning within the same And we, sir, we, on our solemn oaths, are to answer that compass. It commences with a false assumption, that the we approve his course. For myself, never! Let Con bank knew that it would not be rechartered in December, gress approve, and not only will your money be squan- 1832. I trust I have shown that this could be known dered, but your constitution violated, your laws con- only on one principle, which is, that, as the President temned; and, in the room of law, you will have the exe- was opposed to it, and his will was law, therefore there cutive will, acting upon and controlling an army of mo- could be no renewal. Is the bank to be condemned for neyed mercenaries, and regulating a money power, which, not crediting this conclusion? Yet, it is upon this fact united with the sword, can jeopard your liberties when-that the whole reasoning of the Secretary rests. If, in ever he pleases. The vindication of the law, at the hands December, 1832, the bank was not bound to act on the of Congress, can alone arrest this result. belief that a decision had already been made against it, We have had experience upon all the points connected then his reasoning altogether fails. with this part of the Secretary's reasons. But, sir, I be- But further. He complains of the increase, from Janugin to doubt the truth of the old maxim-that experience ary to August, of two and a half millions. The periods is an efficient teacher to public men and Governments. are unfairly selected. To learn correctly the extension The history of the old bank ought to have been full of or contraction of the business of a bank, in different instruction to the Secretary. It had a capital of six mil-years, it is necessary to compare the same periods of the lions; it had a circulation, in proportion to its capital, year. In the business of all banks this is the case, and nearly three times greater than the present: a large pro- between January and August no fair comparison can be portion of its stock was held abroad, and the holders were made. It is peculiarly so with the United States Bank. to be paid in specie. It had not an hour given to it to The great mass of its issues, discounts, and purchases of wind up its concerns. It continued its active operations bills, depends on the course of trade and business between to the last hour of its existence, and was compelled to the north and the south, and this country and Europe. appoint trustees for that purpose. Yet, sir, not one of Every man, whose thoughts have extended as far north all the views of the present Secretary was realized, so as Maine, as far south as New Orleans, and as far east as far as we are informed by its history. Its notes did not Europe, is perfectly apprized of this, and cannot be igdepreciate; specie became hourly more plentiful in its norant that, between times of purchases in the south and vaults; there was abundance of circulation, such as it was. remittances from the north, there never is, there never The immediate distress was small; the evil was conse- can be a fair comparison. Why, then, did the Secretary sequential. When Congress was deliberating on the pro-lect these periods? Was it to do justice to the bank, or to priety of its renewal, one of the principal difficulties frame an apology for an illegal act? But the increase was not arose from the fact that it had been allowed no time to greater than it had frequently before been between the settle its concerns, and it was feared that this circumstance same periods in other years; and if the Secretary had would create distress to the stockholders and to the com- taken the trouble to look into the returns of the bank, munity. This difficulty was, with assumed carelessness, and the reports of his predecessors, he would have found alluded to by the astute Secretary of the Treasury in a such facts as these. In 1831, between the same months, conversation with an agent of the bank. The agent in- there was an extension from about forty-six millions, to cautiously remarked that the bank could appoint trustees, more than fifty-seven millions--nearly twelve millions. and would thus be enabled to avoid these evils. "Thank In 1832, from January to April, only three months, an you, sir," said the Secretary; "you have relieved us from increase from sixty-eight to seventy and a half millions, our only difficulty." The charter was permitted to ex-nearly two and a half millions-as great as is complained pire; trustees were appointed; the settlement was made; of in nine months in 1833. And there are various other and not one of the anticipations of our present Secretary instances of a similar character, through all the history of was then realized. Not one of these irresistible causes the bank. The same results, also, are manifest, by comof basty action in him was then found to exist. paring its circulation at different periods. Under this head, the Secretary gives us another view, So, also, the Secretary complains of the contraction of to prove it a question of time, and that there could be no de- accommodations between August and October last. Yet, lay. [p. 7.] The argument is this: The election of Presi- if he had made the same comparison, he would have found dent and non-renewal of the charter were known in De-equal and more extensive diminutions at other times, which cember, 1832; and the bank ought then to have curtailed. were unfelt by the community, and which were never It had discounts in December, 1832, of sixty-one and a thought to be evidence of misconduct, nor attributed to half millions; and in nine months afterwards, in August, improper motives. One instance is to be found in the 1833, of sixty-four millions; being an increase of two and preceding year, 1832. From August to October, of four a half millions. An agent was then appointed to inquire, and a half m llions, that is, from 68,000,000 to 63,693,000; in the four principal commercial cities, whether the State almost double the amount complained of in 1833. banks would receive the deposites, and perform the du- Now, sir, I complain of this concealment. Did not the ties of the Bank of the United States. This ought not to Secretary see and know these things? Then, why did he have changed the action of the bank, as, by inquiry of attempt to impose on Congress the simple fact of the exthe Secretary, it might have learned that all the deposites tension and diminution, in this year, as evidence of imwould not be withdrawn, but that the process would be proper purposes and objects in the bank at the times they gradual; that the amount of revenue bonds falling due, were made? The whole history of the bank is filled with and the cash duties, enabled it to be liberal; but yet, in similar facts, not in relation to the notes and bills only, but three months, before 1st of October, it had curtailed its of every species of property and interest which the bank accommodations four millions. That it received two mil-holds. And it is so with every other bank. Besides, who lions additional deposites, which, added to the four mil-ever before heard that we were to estimate either the wislions, made its curtailment, in fact, six millions; that adom or virtue, or the folly and vice of a bank, by simply part of this was specie, for it was increased $639,000; taking the amount of its discounts, at different times, with SENATE.] Removal of the Deposites. [JAN. 8, 1834. The Secretary tells us that the bank reduced its accomout inquiring into the causes which produced them; the state of its active means; the funds under its control; the modations in August and September last about four milwants of the community in its commercial and other trans-lions of dollars. There were then in the bank nine milactions? Does the Secretary state? Did he know how lions eight hundred and sixty-three thousand dollars of all these circumstances operated upon the bank? Whether deposites. Now, sir, what was the situation of the bank they justified its conduct, without regard to the motives at that time in relation to these deposites? It had prewhich he attributes? Not at all. It was sufficient for him viously discounted upon them, and, to the proper extent, that the bank had 61 millions out in January, and 64 in furnished thereby accommodation to the public. But the August; and he infers that it must, of necessity, have been moment had come when it was necessary to withdraw all It the accommodation which rested upon them. If they regardless of the solemn decision against its charter. had curtailed four millions by October, and therefore it were to be taken from the bank, it could not, it had neither intended to oppress the community. If our Louis is satis- the right nor the power to discount upon them. It would fied with such reasoning, he will find that he has discharged have hazarded its own safety, if it had. It had been warned that they would be withdrawn; nay, at the time of its cura Necker and substituted a Calonne. But, while we are comparing these expansions and con- tailing the four millions, they had been in part withdrawn, tractions which are so offensive to the Secretary, I desire and the process was going forward. How, then, could the attention to a fact which is worthy of note. The expan- bank, without total disregard to its own interests, continue sions in 1831 and 1832 are attributed, in both the remarka- accommodations founded upon funds which it had not, or, ble papers which have issued from the Executive, to a if it had, was immediately to lose, before the discounts design in the bank to acquire political power, and affect could be returned? It was impossible. the presidential election. I wish self-love could permit The Secretary says that it might have been liberal to certain individuals to believe that there could be any mo- the wants of the commercial community, because, in adtives to action but such as relate to friendship or hatred dition to the ordinary receipts from bonds on previous of themselves. Sir, when did the presidential election importations, the season for cash duties was at hand, and take place? In the fall of 1832. When was the largest the receipts from both sources would be large. But, sir, Du- would not they be deposites still, and subject to the same extension? Through 1831, and up to April, 1832. ring that time, certainly the most vehement and active removal as the other deposites? Besides, the Secretary part of the electioneering campaign did not take place. takes the months of August and September, and speaks of It was after April, 1832. Now, in April, 1832, the amount diminution then, and of receipts from bonds and cash duties of these discounts and accommodations was greater than then. Yet, among the papers which he sent to us, is the at any moment during the existence of the bank. They copy of his order to the bank to deliver up to the colreached to nearly seventy and a half millions; and from lector "all the bonds to the United States, payable at or that moment, while the contest was hottest, as the election after the 1st October," dated 26th September, 1833; and was approaching, while the canvass was going on, there the order to the collector to take the bonds and deliver was a steady and rapid diminution; so that when the elec- them to the Girard Bank, and to make no deposites in the tion actually occurred, they were only $63,693,000-a United States Bank after the 30th September. And this decrease of more than six and a half millions in about six order is dated on the 26th September also. The bank months. The bank is accused of attempting to influence was to be liberal on the bonds and the cash duties; and the election by extending its discounts; yet, when the these are both taken from it, and the decision to take them election might be affected by it, (if it could, indeed, be af- away was made on the 18th September, and executed on fected by these means at all,) it reduces six and a half mil- the 26th, although the purpose to remove them was avowed lions. Why, sir, do these officers suppose us ready to long before. I leave these facts to the reflection of every ingenuous mind. receive any absurdity which they may choose to assert? Is it not unpardonable that such impositions should be The Secretary complains that there was a severe prespractised by grave official documents, and the people mis-sure on the community. Why then did he do an act which led thereby, because they have not the means of correct- he must have known would increase that pressure? His ing them? If the increase from January to August was assertion is now gravely denied, and we are assured that criminal, was the diminution afterwards also criminal? Shall it is mere imagination. The Secretary is right, and his the Secretary complain in August that the bank would not advocates wrong, in this difference between them. Sir, wind up its concerns, and then, when it did immediately no pressure? Are the murmurs which reach us on every afterwards diminish its business, charge that very act as a breeze, and burden every mail, mere fancy? Your stocks crime? Shall he avow his intention to force the bank to of all kinds are depreciated-even the price current tells close, do an act which compels it to look to that object, and then charge it as unprincipled for doing the very thing which he required it to do? Is such conduct to be tolerated and approved? us that. Your works of internal improvement are arrested. Your agricultural products, in the south and in the north, have fallen in price. Your merchants have countermanded their orders. Your manufacturers have diminished their But, sir, what right has the Secretary to complain that work, and are in danger of insolvency. The interest upon the bank extended its business? Did it injure us or our money has risen from six to twenty-four per cent. in some interests? Were the profits upon our stock less? Were instances. There is a paralysis of enterprise. Nor let it our deposites rendered unsafe by it? These things are be imagined that it reaches only your commercial cities not pretended. Our profits are increased; and, if possible, and large manufacturing establishments. The merchant so is our security, provided the business of the bank be cannot purchase, nor the farmer or mechanic sell, and not extended beyond its means; and of this the bank was laborers are thrown out of employ by thousands; and, the proper judge. An examination of the transactions of unless arrested, and speedily, it will, and must, reach the bank will show that there has always been remarkable through all interests and all classes of society. It will, in caution and skill in the extension and curtailment of its its progress, fall most heavily on the humble, and the labobusiness: both being adapted to the active means in its rious, and the poor-on men of small capital, your farmers, Their daily bread possession at the time, and to the wants of the community. your mechanics-your working men. A comparison of its conduct, in this respect, with the will be affected by it, for their occupations and their wages known history of the country, would justify high com- will be diminished or taken away, and their feelings will, mendation. But this is not my purpose. It is sufficient ere long, be heard in tones not pleasant to the ears of that it has been a faithful agent and trustee, and that the power. "Their griefs, and not their manners, will reason" reasons of the Secretary, as applied to it, are unfounded. [then. Already have anxiety-apprehension-gloom-dis |