might occur should legal jurisdiction over the Canal Zone be assumed by the Government of Panama.

At present the U.S. exercises full jurisdiction within the Canal Zone and my commanders can and do use the airspace and the land and water areas of the Canal Zone for military training exercises. This, of course, is done in a way so as not to interfere with the transit of vessels or the operations of the canal, and the relationships of the military forces and the canal administration are maintained in a spirit of complete cooperation.

There is provided for my forces and their families the protection afforded them by living in a location subject to Canal Zone laws, police and courts, with the due process protections of United States laws.

I do recognize that members of the military forces do not spend all their time in the Canal Zone. They are encouraged to and do spend much of their off duty time in Panama. While there, they are subject to the laws, police and courts of the Republic of Panama. They occupy no status greater than that of any citizen of Panama or of any visiting tourist. It is characteristic of the relationship between U.S. military forces and the Guardia Nacional of the Republic of Panama that our servicemen who do violate the laws of Panama, while they are subject to punishment, do have the benefit of visits from their commanders, and often have their cases expedited in the judicial system.

The U.S. military commander can and does do much to assist the serviceman in Panama, and the Guardia Nacional cooperates in a very real way. I see no reason why that cooperation would not continue under a new treaty.

Since the thrust of the present negotiations is to reach agreement upon a treaty which will immediately terminate U.S. jurisdiction, there would be no Canal Zone, either from a jurisdictional viewpoint or for a U.S. commander to defend. Thereafter, the jurisdictional arrangements under which our forward-based U.S. Forces would be deployed would be set out in an agreement upon the status of forces, as they are elsewhere in the world. Such an agreement with Panama would provide for the stationing of U.S. Forces, use of agreed-upon facilities, and rules for disposition of criminal offenses.

It is, of course, essential for the U.S. to obtain an adequate status of forces arrangement for our forces in Panama under a new treaty arrangement, with provisions similar to the status of forces agreements under which U.S. military forces are now serving in Germany, Japan, and Korea.

In conclusion, I would like to thank you for your attention to such information as it is in my power to provide you at this time. I will now be pleased to answer to the best of my ability any questions you may have about the present nature of our canal defense posture or the current usage of our military facilities in the Canal Zone.

Senator ALLEN. Thank you, General McAuliffe, for a very fine state

ment.

Senator Scott, our senior minority committee member, interviewed General McAuliffe on his recent fact-finding mission to Panama. I will now ask Senator Scott to start the questioning. Senator SCOTT. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

Let me add my word of welcome, General, and Colonel Thornton, and thank you for being with us today. Thank you for the courtesies

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of you and your staff when I was visiting with you. You went out of your way to give us an understanding of the Canal beginning with the helicopter flight and then in the conference with members of your staff. We are indebted to you and appreciative of this courtesy.

General, in your opinion as the commanding general, could the Canal Zone-the Panama Canal, rather, not the Zone itself-be successfully defended against an overall attack by the Panamanians in the event that a treaty is not ratified and in the event that violence should result? Are your forces capable of defending the canal from an overall frontal attack?

General MCAULIFFE. I addressed this point somewhat in my opening statement. Much of my judgment on our ability to defend the canal depends a great deal upon the threat scenario that is laid out.

As I mentioned, right now we have a capability to defend against a fairly wide range of possibilities. However, in a so-called all out threat scenario as you have just described, I must say that the forces immediately assigned to me now would be insufficient to defend the canal. I would have to have reinforcement forces from the United States.

Let me say that with reinforcement forces we could defend the canal.

Senator SCOTT. Would that be your understanding of our present forces? Would that, in your judgment, be an insurmountable problem-to obtain the necessary supplemental forces from outside of the Canal Zone?

General MCAULIFFE. It of course would take the necessary approvals of the Executive, and of course of the Congress, for major reinforcements of the type envisioned. However, I can assure you that the forces are available and ready to come to our assistance if needed.

Senator Scort. Would it be in the interests of the people of Panama—Panamanians generally—for any act of sabotage to be committed by some small militant group that might close the canal? I am not talking about a temper tantrum or something of this nature. I am speaking their best interests. Looking at it from the viewpoint of the Panamanian Government, would it be in the best interests of the people of Panama to close down that canal by some terrorist activity?

General MCAULIFFE. I simply cannot see that it would. My feeling is that the Panamanian Government and the Panamanian people care quite a bit about the continued operation of the canal if for no other reason than because they gain certain economic benefits from the fact it is operating every day. They do not want to see it closed down. Senator SCOTT. Is their standard of living higher than that of other Central American nations?

General MCAULIFFE. In Central America, yes. This is correct. Senator SCOTT. General, the other questions that I would pose to you are asked in an effort to obtain your personal views rather than something that the Joint Chiefs or someone else might have in mind. You are a lieutenant general with long service in the military. At present you are commander of the Southern Command in the Canal Zone.

General, in your opinion, if the United States needs to utilize the canal for both economic and military purposes, would it be easier. strictly from a military point of view to keep our troops where they are today? Or, if we ratified the treaty and removed our troops and

turned over control of the canal-and I am talking about complete control, and not a united joint effort-would it be easier to stay where we are than to return to the canal if necessary and to open it and then use it ourselves to provide the use for other nations?

I am talking politics. From a military point of view, are we in a better position today, or would it be easier to wait and see what events happen and then go back and start operating it ourselves if we were not satisfied?

General MCAULIFFE. I think there is no question but that on the kind of proposition you have just described it would be much easier for the United States to exert control and influence with our forces there than if not there.

It is with that in mind that I have outlined my recommendations to the Joint Chiefs of Staff, the concept of which I can describe here. It provides, during the period of the treaty for the continuing presence of U.S. military forces in the vicinity of the canal, working cooperatively with, of course, the Panamanian forces.

Senator SCOTT. When you speak of "during the period of the treaty" you are speaking of the term between the time that the United States ratifies the treaty and the time when we completely give up control of the canal. You are speaking of that interim period. General MCAULIFFE. That is correct.

Senator SCOTT. My question was somewhat different.

General MCAULIFFE. It would be perhaps beyond the specified period of the new treaty.

Senator SCOTT. General, would General Torrijos' government be in difficulty politically in your judgment—and I am asking you a political question. Again, you have three stars on your shoulders. I would like you to respond by expressing a personal opinion. Would the present Government of Panama be in difficulty if the treaty was not ratified?

General MCAULIFFE. I would say the answer to that-and again, this is a personal view from my own observations and from my own knowledge of the scene-is that the present Government, or indeed any Panamanian Government, could be in trouble if a new treaty were not ratified.

The reason I say that, Senator, is that there is a very widespread and emotional support for a new treaty throughout Panama. In other words, you find this almost anyplace that you will go in Panama. The people really feel that now is the time to start taking over this canal.

It may be, as I had the benefit of listening to some of the questioning of Governor Parfitt, that the Torrijos government has made this. a propaganda objective. Nevertheless, it is there. I believe that the Panamanian people strongly feel the need for a new treaty and they want their Government to go get it.

Senator SCOTT. General, let me ask you another question. Again, I would like your personal opinion. Do Panamanians have the managerial ability to operate the canal?

General MCAULIFFE. I honestly cannot answer that one with any validity, Senator. I know that some great managerial skill is necessary to operate that canal, but I really am out of my element to make a judgment of that nature.

Senator ScoTT. I will not pursue it further, General.

Sometimes I am advised that members of the military, when they are stationed in a foreign land, work with citizens of the area where they are stationed. They have various civic projects, and maybe work with schools or orphanages, and generally try to be helpful to the people in the land where they are stationed. Does your command participate in any matters of this nature?

General MCAULIFFE. It has and it does, although over the last couple of years these kinds of visible projects within Panama have been very limited.

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Senator SCOTT. Has that been discouraged? Have activities of that nature been discouraged by Panamanians?

General MCAULIFFE. I can say specifically that it has been discouraged by the Panamanian Government. The Panamanian people and the people who run those orphanages and schools want this civic action work to continue very much, but it has been curtailed quite appreciably by the Panamanian Government in the time that I have been in command there.

MILITARY FORCE OF PANAMA

Senator SCOTT. Thank you, sir.

Now General, what size military force does Panama have?

General MCAULIFFE. The Panamanian Guardia Nacional, or National Guard, totals some 8,000 in strength. It is proportioned so that approximately 25 percent of that is what I would describe as a "tactical force." It is a tactically capable force. When we are talking about a cooperative defense arrangement we are really talking in terms of that 25 percent that could assume some tactical defensive functions. The rest of the Guardia Nacional is assigned police duties and administrative duties of various kinds. They are deployed throughout the nation.

Senator Scorr. What sort of a navy does Panama have?

General MCAULIFFE. A very small one, sir. The strength is about 200 in manpower. The number of boats is 11. They are patrol craft and a number of amphibious-capable ships.

Senator SCOTT. What sort of an air force do they have?

General MCAULIFFE. A very small one also. Again, the personnel strength is a little over 200, and they have a total of 33 aircraft. Most of these aircraft are cargo types. There are some helicopters, including some U.S. UH-1 model helicopters which Panama has purchased in recent years.

Senator SCOTT. When you speak of the National Guard they do not have an army separate and apart from the National Guard, do they? General MCAULIFFE. No, sir. There is one general staff. Of course, the commander is General Torrijos. Then you will find that the navy and the air force elements really report through that same general staff to General Torrijos.

Senator SCOTT. I believe that roughly the population of the country of Panama is 1.5 to 1.6 million people, or something in that nature. Do you have a more accurate figure?

General MCAULIFFE. Yes, it is about 1.7 million people.

Senator SCOTT. Do you know whether the United States has provided any military equipment for the country of Panama in recent years?

General MCAULIFFE. In recent years we have provided military equipment under the provisions of Foreign Military Sales Act.

Senator SCOTT. Have we provided some tanks for the Panamanian military?

General MCAULIFFE. No, not exactly. I believe that the vehicles that you refer to are what I would call armored cars. They are the V-150 armored car. Panama has purchased these.

Senator SCOTT. Could you describe that a little better for the record? What sort of vehicle is that?

General MCAULIFFE. It is a wheeled vehicle capable of cross country movement. It does have a very light armor plating on it capable of withstanding, I would say, small arms fire but nothing larger than that.

Senator SCOTT. Do you know roughly how many such vehicles have been provided over the last several years?

General MCAULIFFE. The number is 16.

Senator SCOTT. General, I would like to ask about three questions here that I posed to the Governor. I would just like to have you express your own personal views as distinguished from any official views. I would like your views as an individual and as a general officer with long military experience.

Do you have any concern that Panama might fall into Communist hands if the United States turned complete control over to the Panamanian Government? This is if we were out of the picture entirely. General MCAULIFFE. If we were out of the picture entirely?

My answer would have to depend on whether the scenario would be in the near future or the distant future.

I will have to say that in the near future I would question its falling into Communist hands. I am aware that there are certain Communist influences or Communist representation in the country. However, I also am aware that it has very little support throughout the country. So if you are talking about Communist inroads in the kind of situation that we have there now-assuming that we would pull out our forces and whatnot-I would be hard pressed to say that that would be the case.

My judgment is that instead you would have perhaps a continuation of the kind of nationalist-socialist leaning government that is represented by Torrijos.

It is very difficult for me to project this down the road. According to the treaty scenario as I understand it now, we would have U.S. forces and U.S. influence there for the period of the treaty. What that would be looking like at the end of that time I do not know. You are projecting, let's say, early into the next century here. I just do not know.

What I am saying to you, Senator, is that the Communist threat is not a real threat in Panama, in my judgment.

Senator SCOTT. Let me pose the question in this way. I have been told that General Torriios himself is not at this time a Communist. However, I have been told by various sources that he does have some advisers who are Communists, and that this is general knowledge among the people of Panama.

In your personal opinion, and in your personal judgment, do you believe that is correct or incorrect?