your enemy would be confirmed in his title, and have full opportunity to arm himself. Instead of fighting for the French crown, you would give him the chance of fighting for the English crown... . You are not to consider about what money you must spend, BUT WHAT FORTUNES YOU MAY BE ABLE TO KEEP. On the very principle of economy, you are to consider that you will not expend more by war thau by remaining at peace, with the demands of a war establishment.

Mr. PLUNKETT said, that he considered that we had, in fact, no option between peace and war. As for peace, we could have no more than a feverish, unrefreshing dream of peace still haunted by the spectre of war. In point of finances, we should find a peace with a war establishment would be much greater than war. If we did not now go to war in conjunction with all the great powers of Europe, we would soon be reduced to a war single-handed against France. If we did not now invade France, and carry on the war upon her territories, the time might come when our country would become the seat of war, and we would fall unpitied and despised. If we were now to turn our back upon the great powers that were our Allies, we would deserve that all nations should turn their backs upon us, when we began to feel the consequences of our impolicy.

Lord MILTON observed, that it was better to have war with the advantages of war, thun peace without the advantages of peace; and considering, as he did, that no faith could be placed in the present ruler of France, he thought the only real security we could have was to be found in a vigorous war.

Lord CASTLEREAGI said, when the proper period arrived, he was prepared to justify them as carrying into execution, not only in substance, but almost in all the details, that plan which had been formed by a statesman, from whom he, and those who acted with him, must ever feel the highest deference and admiration-Mr. PITT. He (Mr. Pitt), when contemplating the possible success of a great confederation against France, had considered that general arrangement which had been in a great measure carried into effect, to be that which would prove most conducive to the happiness of Europe. He (Lord Castlereagh) was prepared to show, when the question came before the House, that the decisions which had been made with respect to the immediate interests of this country,

were more advantageous than those fondly contemplated by Mr. Pitt, as the consequences of successful war. He had not hoped that such good conditions could be obtained for Holland as had been secured at the Congress. Mr. Pitt had considered it necessary to extend the power of Prussia beyond the Rhine, and the annexation of Genoa with Piedmont was a part of his plan, much as that arrangement had of late been censured by those in opposition to the present Government. At an early period of the late war, at least when the successes of the Allies had first given a prospect of a successful termination of the struggle against France, soon after the Russian army had crossed the Vistula, he (Lord Castlereagh) had transmitted a copy of the dispatch of Mr. Pitt to the ambassador of the Emperor Alexander, and desired to be apprized if any and what alteration had taken place in the views of Russia with respect to that plan in the event of the contest being brought to a successful issue. The answer to this communication informed him, that "the Emperor of Russia had nothing to state in "departure from the principles of the arrangement laid down " by Mr. Pitt in 1805." This was some proof of their solidity, and on these principles England had gone into the contest closely united in the views with her Allies. Acting on these feelings, which had regulated his conduct, however he might be sensible that it was not possible that an arrangement with any par ticular power could fix the relations of all Europe; and feeling as he did, that as all Europe must co-operate in the great work, it could only be effected in a spirit of compromise; yet was it no small satisfaction to him, and to all who reverenced the politics of that great statesman, Mr. Pitt, as he did, that they had lived to see that reduced to practice which his great mind, when given to the consideration of this important question, had fondly imagined in the abstract as the utmost of his wishes..... He (Lord Castlereagh) had endeavoured to open the general ground of the war, trusting much to the MIND, the IN. TELLIGENCE, the EXPERIENCE, and EXTENSIVE KNOWLEDGE of the HOUSE! which had, for twenty-five years, dwelt on passing events. Although painful to his feelings to make a proposition of this nature, instead of realizing those BRILLIANT PROSPECTS of peace and security, which, after so many exertions, the country had a right to

contemplate, yet he felt much consolation in comparing our present situation with that in which we stood in the course of former wars. We were not now contending for our own safety, without a single ally, against the power of the enemy. Let the House recollect, that even at that moment, when engaged in the prosecution of our own moral duty, our aid was required for Portugal and Spain, we had not hesitated to interpose our strong hand: we had felt bold in the justice of our cause, and became the protectors of other countries. This resolution had been pursued with a degree of perseverance which did honour to the country. We had struggled through the storm-we survived the period of calamity, and had the satisfaction of seeing those two natio is freed, and the whole of Europe confederated against France, instead of being combined against us. It was therefore evident, that we now started from a different point. We were then fighting against France, and the whole power of Europe. All Europe was now contending with us against France: nay, a strong combination in France itself was probably formed on our side, so that we were fighting with the Powers of the Continent and a portion of France, against the usurpation of Buonaparte and of the army... .As far as Austria was concerned, there were in full operation, ready to act and be put in motion, an army of 150,000 men in Italy, sufficient of itself to satisfy the stipulatious in the treaty. Lut this power would have an army of extent in another quarter towards the Rhine, so that instead of 150,000, we might consider the operating and effective army to amount to 300,000 men.-With respect to the Russian force, he had the satisfaction to state, that the Emperor had engaged in the present contest with that decision which marked the whole of his conduct throughout the late eventful war, and had resolved to call out a great part of the forces of his mighty empire. General Barclay de Tolly was at the head of as fine an army as ever was called out on service in any country, having such ample means of selection in their power. The force in the ranks under him, which would arrive at the Rhine, amounted to 225,000 men; and as this army was accompanied by a number of volunteers, it would arrive at the Rhine as complete in numbers as when it left the Russian empire. There was assembled besides on the frontiers another

.......

army of 150,000 men, under General Wittgenstein; and the Emperor had signified to his Royal Highness the Prince Regent his readiness to put in motion this army, if exigencies should render such a measure necessary. No money that it was in our power to grant could create such an army-all that we could possibly do was to assist them in their efforts. That force of 225,000 men was very nearly advanced to the Rhine, and in such a state of military efficiency as was never exceeded by any army. The third Power which had made such great exertions during the last war, to the great admiration of every man, had not confined himself to the stipulations of the treaty, but had six corps, of 236,000 men in the whole, in an effective state. But the House were entitled to inquire from him, and he was anxious to anticipate them in their wish for information, whether our pecuniary assistance was to be confided to the three great Powers, and whether such other Powers as might join the common cause were to share all the difficulties, without receiving any extent of assistance. Ile thought it right that the House should know what was the extent of that description of force, and what was the value of the aid which they were likely to receive from us. Having stated the force of the great Powers, he did not wish to enter into a statement of the force of each subordinate Power. Considering Great Britain and Holland separately, he would estimate the other Powers together-some of them would bring considerable forces into the field; Bavaria, for instance, had an army of 60,000 men of the very best description. The force which that Power, with Wirtemburg, Baden, Hesse, Saxony, the Hanse Towns, and the small States on the Rhine, would bring into the field, amounted to 150,000 men, besides what was already stated. That collective mass was independent of the force of the three great Powers, and the force of Great Britain and Holland.-The British force would be 50,000 men, and the King of the Netherlands was to furnish an equal amount of 50,000 men to the Confederacy. There were actually 30,000 of them in service and in the field, and the remainder of the force was in a state of preparation, and was expected to be soon ready. Taking, therefore, the whole collective force

T

-it formed a total of one million and eleven thousand men, exclusive of the army of the Emperor of Russia, assembled on the frontiers of his dominions, and ready to act in case of exigency.

The Earl of LIVERPOOL said, that the sentiments of the bulk of the French nation were extremely averse to Napoleon.

Mr. GRATTAN observed, that the French power had in other respects been diminished. Buonaparte had no cavalry ; he had no money; he had no title, nor any credit. The people had never regretted his absence; on the contrary, they were overjoyed at it. Indeed, how could they regret the man who had imposed on them a military yoke-who had taken their money by his own decrees-who had robbed them of their children by an arbitrary conscription? The people would not rise in favour and support of a conqueror who had proved himself an oppressor of France. On the contrary, they would be glad to see the Allies triumph over him; for they must clearly see, that when the conqueror was removed the oppressor would be removed also. The first Powers of Europe had now united to remove the oppressor; and it would be ridiculous to suppose that the French people would break their oaths to a mild and merciful Sovereign, for the purpose of saddling themselves with the eternal damnation of a military despotism..... That his (Napoleon's) power was at present tottering to the very base.

Mr. PLUNKETT said, that if we were to tell the French people that we were ready to negotiate with Buonaparte as their ruler, it would at once destroy all the hopes that might now fairly be entertained of the co-operation of a considerable portion of the nation. When, however, we saw the situation in