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except such as is directed against his own subjects, over whom he has acquired, by his restoration, the power of oppression, but not of defence. Every hour adds strength to that persuasion, which, whether just or not, if England, at least, could have anticipated, she would not have gone to war that the Bourbons are not the sovereigns fit for France, and that they will retain the throne only so long as she shall be treated as a conquered country. Their minority will not be sufficient to defend them without foreign aid, and has not been augmented by their success. I question whether it has not been diminished. The army of La Vendée has,' it is reported, offered to join with the force behind the Loire, to prevent that dismemberment of the country which is now supposed likely to ensue. Whether this be true or not, the rumour is sufficient to show the rising indignation of the people, which, as the cause of the Bourbons is so entirely connected with the conduct of the allies, will be directed most probably against the person and family of the restored monarch. One step might alter the case, but that cannot be expected from a sexagenary, disqualified by disease for the requisite activity; and, perhaps, contented to reign quietly on any terms, rather than
hazard his throne by securing the love of his nation at the expense of the friendship of his allies.
If, upon discovering the determination on the part of the foreigners to listen to none of his intercessions (for of course he must have made intercessions in behalf of his people), he had quitted Paris suddenly, had joined his army at Orleans, had hoisted the tri-coloured standard, and had called upon the national guards, and all the troops of his kingdom to rise and put themselves in a position which might enable him to treat for peace on terms not dishonourable to their country and their king—then, indeed, he would have identitied himself with his subjects, as he is now identified with their enemies, and even his guilty victory would have been forgiven and forgotten in his first struggle, whether effectual or not, for the independence of his nation and of his crown.
The moral influence of Paris would, indeed, render the abandonment of it an extreme measure; but the ruin of the capital might be the saving of the country, which has now to lament the sacrifices made to preserve the corruptest and most unhealthy member of the whole body politic. It must move the indignation of any one to find the inhabitants of this city trembling at the threatened fall of a
column where they should weep over their prostrate liberties, and pray rather for the destruction of those ornaments, whose removal would direct their whole solicitude to the only worthy objects of their care, and would, in any future struggle, point all their efforts to the defence of their external and internal independence—those true monuments of national happiness and glory, which, as they reside not in marble nor in brass, are circumscribed by no walls, and fixed to no spot, are not to be overthrown by the fall of a city, nor the desolation of a province. The humane mind does not allow itself to make the destruction of a town such as Paris an article of speculative calculation, lest it should be tempted to regret that the only alternative which could save the independence of the nation had not been tried; but, whether a resistance under the walls of the capital had been victorious or not, desperation or victory, the fall or the salvation of the city, would have left the country itself less at the mercy of her conquerors and her king, than she is at this moment of uncertainty. I will tell you in this place, that, notwithstanding all the imputations of treacheries and treason cast upon the Duke of Otranto and the executive government in consequence of the capitulation, that measure
did not originate with the duke, but with the army.
A council of war, consisting of fifty general officers, was called; forty-eight gave their opinion that resistance beyond fifteen days was impracticable, and that the troops could not guarantee the safety of the capital for more than that time*. The Prince of Eckmülh communicated this decision to the government, and was so cautious that it should carry with it its full weight, that he repeated his letter the following day, and sent it again to the Tuileries, countersigned by two-and-twenty general officers. The prince did not take into consideration the army of the populace, and he knew that not more than half the national guard would serve with the troops of the line. With an army, therefore, of only 73,000, however well equipped and provided, he could not be justified in hazarding an action with, at least, 150,000 of the enemy, whose numbers were continually increasing, and
* It must not be concealed that the more decided imperialists accuse Davoust no less than Fouché of compromising the cause. They say he ought to have retired behind the Loire, if he could not fight before Paris, and thus have prevented the dispersion of the army, of which 35,000 had seceded before it reached its destination. But Marshal Davoust has gained nothing but mere security, for which it seems to me unlikely he would have betrayed his country; and the accusation is founded more in opinion than fact.
would be joined by 40,000 under Prince Wrede in a few days. The allies burned to fight, and, at one moment of anger, an English colonel, Staveley, with a flag of truce, having been severely wounded, the Duke of Wellington threatened an assault. Had the mass of the citizens taken arms, no one can feel assured that their imposing attitude would not have induced the allied sovereigns and ministers to pause before they ordered the bombardment of sixty thousand houses, as a fit conclusion of a quarrel which had been already decided, merely to please the legitimate representatives of Louis-leGros, and Philip-le-bel. The army was saved for the state, that is, for the country, and another mån might have thought it worth while to preserve entire, as far as was in his power, such a guarantee for the respectability of his people and his crown. If Louis felt he could not partake of its noble devotion for the national honour, it was, at least, his policy not to brand that devotion with infamy, and make its services to the people so many titles of proscription. The army has not been backward in showing itself willing to make common cause with the returned family. So early as the 10th, three generals arrived from the marshal commanding in chief, and offered the instant adoption