did not originate with the duke, but with the army. A council of war, consisting of fifty general officers, was called; forty-eight gave their opinion that resistance beyond fifteen days was impracticable, and that the troops could not guarantee the safety of the capital for more than that time*. The Prince of Eckmülh communicated this decision to the government, and was so cautious that it should carry with it its full weight, that he repeated his letter the following day, and sent it again to the Tuileries, countersigned by two-and-twenty general officers. The prince did not take into consideration the army of the populace, and he knew that not more than half the national guard would serve with the troops of the line. With an army, therefore, of only 73,000, however well equipped and provided, he could not be justified in hazarding an action with, at least, 150,000 of the enemy, whose numbers were continually increasing, and

* It must not be concealed that the more decided imperialists accuse Davoust no less than Fouché of compromising the cause. They say he ought to have retired behind the Loire, if he could not fight before Paris, and thus have prevented the dispersion of the army, of which 35,000 had seceded before it reached its destination. But Marshal Davoust has gained nothing but mere security, for which it seems to me unlikely he would have betrayed his country; and the accusation is founded more in opinion than fact.

would be joined by 40,000 under Prince Wrede in a few days. The allies burned to fight, and, at one moment of anger, an English colonel, Staveley, with a flag of truce, having been severely wounded, the Duke of Wellington threatened an assault. Had the mass of the citizens taken arms, no one can feel assured that their imposing attitude would not have induced the allied sovereigns and ministers to pause before they ordered the bombardment of sixty thousand houses, as a fit conclusion of a quarrel which had been already decided, merely to please the legitimate representatives of Louis-leGros, and Philip-le-bel. The army was saved for the state, that is, for the country, and another man might have thought it worth while to preserve entire, as far as was in his power, such a guarantee for the respectability of his people and his crown. If Louis felt he could not partake of its noble devotion for the national honour, it was, at least, his policy not to brand that devotion with infamy, and make its services to the people so many titles of proscription. The army has not been backward in showing itself willing to make common cause with the returned family. So early as the 10th, three generals arrived from the marshal commanding in chief, and offered the instant adoption

VOL. II.

of the white cockade, demanding no terms of any kind, but a general amnesty, which 70,000 penitents in arms might fairly expect to obtain, however deep had been the die of their crimes. But Louis refused, and the consequence has been the unconditional submission of the troops, which he and his courtiers may think a triumph, but which, in other eyes, adds to the causes of future discontent the wish of wiping out such a sign of former depression. Louis has succeeded in attaching to their repentance that shame which ought to have been confined to their fault; and, whether he is regarded by his soldiers as having been thus rigorous from a desire of vengeance, or merely as the impotent tool of the hate and fear of the allies, is, I should fear, an object neither of their love nor their respect. I find indeed that, so far from pitying him, as being compelled to measures of severity, the king relieves the allies from some of their fair odium, and is looked upon as the cause of calamities, which are the inevitable consequences of conquest.

To say the truth, one cannot be surprised that the ministers and kings, finding how much they have been deceived in the expected and promised gratitude and joy, with which Louis and his cabinet had given them reason to think

that the deliverers of Europe would be again hailed in France, may be pardoned for wishing to make good certain deficiencies, both in their treasury and their character, caused by the former exploits of the nation now at their feet. They owe to themselves to quit old scores of pillage and disgrace. Were I a Frenchman, my principal indignation would not be directed against those who use, or abuse, the rights of victory, and are guilty of nothing but the usual infraction of previous engagements; but would be turned against those who have been able to make good the promise of 1,100,000 bayonets, and succeeded in forcing it down the throats of my countrymen. Allowing every virtue to the individuals composing it, the question of attachment, or disaffection to the restored dynasty, is now put in so simple a shape, that neither reason nor feeling can be supposed to hesitate a moment in deciding which way the great majority of Frenchmen must incline. Were this people grave or gay, fickle or constant, spiritual or dull, ignorant or enlightened, vain or impartial, prone to servitude or lovers of independence, timorous or brave, fond of glory or indifferent to it, elated by victory or bowed down by repeated defeat, were it important or were it insignificant in population

and position; whatever were its characteristics or its consequence, the question would not be altered; under no one possible supposition could the general disposition of France be considered favourable to Louis XVIII. The common sense of every one must furnish a reply to the insinuation," that out of a fatherly affection to his peo"ple he has re-ascended the throne, which his 66 age and inclination should otherwise have in"duced him to decline." Declarations of patriotism, which long prescription has made words of course in the mouths of kings, and which are pardoned because understood, and productive of no deception, are worse than hypocritic; they are cruel and insulting, when used on some occasions. Were the successes of the Bourbons only as it were cotemporary with the calamities of the nation, and coincident with, rather than formed upon, the fall of France; reflection would, in most instances, come too slowly, or prove too feeble, to counteract the first impression of disgust, spontaneously produced by such an unhappy association. It is hardly too much to say, that every disinterested Frenchman must have a prejudice at first against the Bourbons. It would be difficult to show what policy, on the part of Louis, would be successful; but it is not so dangerous to prophesy what is sure to fail.