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phlegm. Such hints as,

ing to the molestation or repose of his lordship's "that had better not be asked;" or, "this should be postponed;" or, "I beg you to allow me to put that question;' were sufficient for the representatives of the representatives of the sovereigns, and produced the commanded silence. The French gentlemen were told from the advanced chair, that they had talked of the chamber of representatives having enforced the abdication of Napoleon, and being occupied in preparing a constitution for the monarch who might be elected, "Now, what right "can an assembly of this kind have to depose "and choose kings?" Pray, my lord," said Mr.Lt, "what right had the convention par"liament to depose James, and choose William?” The chair gave no answer, but went on: "and your army too-you talk of your army-what "is your army, but a band of traitors in arms, "who have all broken their oath to their lawful "sovereign?" M. Laforet again replied, "what name does your lordship give to the English "army encamped on Hounslow Heath, who to "a man went over to the Prince of Orange ?" He received no reply to this remark, and concluded, from the subsequent silence, that he had been the first person to convey those little incidents to the ear of the British general. But Mr.

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L-t undervalued the education of our English gentry, and, for the moment, perhaps forgot, that a man may read history without recollecting it, or recollect it without being ready with its appropriate application. No farther strictures, however, were attempted, for fear, probably, of some other unlucky lurking similitude, which might again show, that the French had not acted on this occasion so entirely without precedent as an observer with less memory than passion might be apt to conceive. The general found, no doubt, the comparison odious, and when he heard of the disinclination of the French to this or that prince, or their attachment to these or those principles, was not a little at a loss to conceive what "they had to do with preference "and aversion." The plenipotentiaries touched upon one or two names boldly, but only sounded the ministers relative to Napoleon the Second, without a direct question on that subject. They were treated with much politeness by the allied commissaries, but received no definitive answer, except that a note informed them, that the first preliminary to any negotiation must be the certitude, that Napoleon had no longer any influence, or character, or authority of any kind, or through any channel; and that no step could be taken unless in concert with the English cabinet,

and all the allied courts*.

The plenipoten

tiaries were not suffered to remain in the rear of the armies, which were advancing, but received an escort that conveyed them, the next day, towards Bâle. The inference to be drawn was unavoidable, for, although, as the government told the chambers, the sovereigns had not at first appeared to be agreed in the choice of a sovereign for France, yet it was clear she would not be left to choose for herself.

In such an extremity, it would be difficult to point out what line of conduct those placed at the head of the government could pursue, except that which M. Fouché and his colleagues chose to adopt. Nothing was left for them but to save their fellow-citizens from themselves and from the foe, as Waller said of Cromwell; and the president of the executive still, in some sort, was but the chief of the national police. It is asserted, that M. Carnot inclined to attempting a protracted defence, and that a dispute arose between him and the president, which was carried on in terms of no little asperity. Paris was indefensible. M. Carnot and the chiefs of the army, together with the chambers, might have

The imperial gazette of the 10th of July gives a pretended copy of that note, in which a positive demand is made for the person of Napoleon.

taken post in the departments; but such a desperation was not to be expected, after Napoleon himself, and his second in command, had been the first to succumb under the panic. The commission of government, although they might be justified in keeping back the knowledge of the intentions of the allied sovereigns for purposes of public tranquillity, did their duty in telling the plain truth in their last communication to the chambers, and in putting their dissolution on the right footing; a submission to the laws of conquest, and to the exertion of force. They were right in talking of the king as the sovereign chosen for them by the allies, although, I see, the Courier of the 11th denies that there was ever any difference of opinion between the monarchs, as to the person whom they should desire to see replaced on the throne of France. But the remainder of the official article in this authentic journal is astounding. "And we know, also, that nothing has passed "in the conferences which have preceded or "followed the entry of the allies into Paris, qui "soit en contravention aux declarations publiées "anterieurement par les alliés, par lesquelles ils "avaient annoncé ne vouloir point imposer à la "France un gouvernement interieur qui ne lui con"viendrait pas." I quote without the original,

and am therefore almost incredulous of such an audacious assertion being contained in the English text. What did the allies, in their original declaration, say any thing of this suitable interior government? Was not the objection to the eighth article founded upon the principle of the rights of nations to choose their own government and governor, without the interposition of foreigners, pretending to judge of the suitableness of such king or constitution? According to this modification of the declaration, it is impossible to say, that the allied sovereigns might not lop off some of the excrescences of France, and lower the temperament of her remaining members, by copious phlebotomy, and reducing diet, and wholesome restraint, such a treatment being judged suitable for her dangerous plethora. After the deposition of Napoleon, France implored of these conquerors only one favour-to be permitted to be independent. The response was like that of the generous soldier, who, hearing an enemy, on his knees before him, beg for his life, exclaimed, "Demandez toute autre chose— "mais pour votre vie, il n'y a pas moyen. The writer of this positive assurance means, then, that the allies are to judge of the interior government suitable for France, and, I presume, that with the kindest views towards this propriety and excel,

VOL. II.

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