rate opinion was rendered in the Hawaiian Islands cases.1 Duties paid under protest on goods brought from Honolulu to New York were ordered to be refunded on the grounds which were stated in the opinion in De Lima vs. Bidwell.

§ 61e. The Foraker Act.-The cases referred to in the preceding sections involved the payment of duties imposed and collected on merchandise brought to New York and Chicago from Porto Rico, Manila and Honolulu, under the provisions of the Dingley Act, the respective collectors claiming that the places last named remained foreign, so far as the revenue laws of the United States were concerned, until Congress by appropriate legislation determined otherwise. After May 1, 1900, however, duties were collected on goods brought from Porto Rico to New York under the Foraker act,1 socalled because the senior senator from Ohio introduced it; this act provided that duties should be levied on merchandise brought from Porto Rico to other ports of the United States at the rate of fifteen per cent of the duties collected on similar articles from foreign ports under the existing tariff act. Duties were paid under protest, and the owners brought suits against the collector for the amounts paid, claiming that the act in this respect was in violation of the provisions of the Constitution of the United States in regard to uniformity of duties and imposts throughout the United States. The United States Circuit Court sustained a demurrer to the complaint, and the Supreme Court affirmed this decision on the § 61d.

1 Crossman vs. United States, U. S. Sup. Ct., 1901, 182 U. S. 221.

2 The entire opinion is as follows (also entitled in Geotze vs. United States, BROWN, J.): "As the sole question presented by the record in these cases was whether Porto Rico and the Hawaiian Islands were foreign countries within the meaning of the tariff laws, we must hold, for the reasons stated in De Lima vs. Bidwell, just decided, that the board of general appraisers had no jurisdiction of the cases. The judgments of the Circuit Court are therefore reversed, and the cases remanded to that court with

3

instructions to reverse the action of the board of general appraisers." $ 61e.

1" An act temporarily to provide revenue and a civil government for Porto Rico and for other purposes;" approved April 12, 1900, 31 U. S. St. at L. 77, ch. 191. Extracts containing the tariff provisions of this act are quoted in the opinion of FULLER, Ch. J., in Downes vs. Bidwell, 182 U. S. 244, see p. 349.

2 The Dingley Act, approved July, 1897, 30 St. at L. p. 151, see note 4, p. 120, ante.

8 Downes vs. Bidwell, U. S. Sup. Ct. 1901, 182 U. S. 244.

4 U. S. Cir. Ct. S. D. N. Y. Novem

ground that Congress has power to levy duties on goods brought from a territory of the nature of Porto Rico to other ports of the United States.

This is the most important of the decisions rendered in the Insular Cases. There was no majority opinion. Mr. Justice Brown announced the "conclusion and judgment of the Court." Mr. Justice White delivered an opinion reaching the same result but by a different process of reasoning. Jus tices Shiras and McKenna concurred with Mr. Justice White; Mr. Justice Gray also concurred with him, but filed a brief separate opinion. Chief Justice Fuller wrote a dissenting opinion in which Justices Harlan, Brewer, and Peckham concurred; Mr. Justice Harlan also wrote a separate opinion. The opinions are so lengthy that it is impossible even to give an abstract of them in this section or in the notes."

§ 61f. Duties paid in Porto Rico.-The cases referred to in the preceding sections involved duties which were paid in New York and Chicago on merchandise brought from the new possessions. There were other cases which involved the right of the United States to impose duties or merchandise brought from ports of the States to Porto Rico.1 Duties were imposed and collected under the old Spanish tariff laws for a brief period, then under military orders given by the President, and subsequently under the Foraker act. Two suits were brought, one for duties paid prior to May 1, 1900, under the Spanish tariff laws and the military government, and the other for duties paid after that date under the Foraker act. In the case involving duties paid prior to May 1, 1900, the Court sustained the right to collect duties under any laws or orders in force prior to the exchange of the ratifications of the treaty on April 11, 1899, when Porto Rico became domestic territory. It also decided that all ber, 1890, LACOMBE, J., (pro | States, No. 1; Same vs. Same, No. 2, forma). See Insular Cases Record. U. S. Sup. Ct. 1901, No. 1, 182 5 The opinions in this case, over one hundred pages in length, are reported in 182 U. S. Rep.; for a synopsis see INSULAR CASES APPENDIX at end of this volume. § 61 f.

U. S. 222; No. 2 not yet decided. Argued January, 1901; Armstrong vs. United States, U. S. Sup. Ct. 1901. 182 U. S. 243.

2"In their legal aspect, the duties exacted in this case were of three

1 Dooley, Smith & Co. vs. United classes: (1) The duties prescribed

duties paid after the exchange of ratifications and until the Foraker act took effect were illegally imposed and must be refunded. The case involving the duties paid after the Foraker act took effect has not yet been decided. The counsel who argued that case laid great stress on the point that the imposition by Congress of duties on merchandise taken from a State to any other territory of the United States is equivalent to laying an export tax and, therefore, directly prohibited by the Constitution. There were no cases corresponding to these Porto Rico cases, and affecting duties paid in the Philippines and Hawaiian Islands on merchandise from other ports of the United States.

"DUTIES AFTER RATIFICATION.

by General Miles under order of on all goods, citing numerous July 26, 1898, which merely ex- cases. "The right to exact duties tended the existing regulations; on goods imported into Porto Rico (2) the tariffs of August 19, 1898, from New York arises from the and February 1, 1899, prescribed by fact that New York was still a forthe President as Commander-in- eign country with respect to Porto Chief, which continued in effect Rico, and from the correlative right until April 11, 1899, the date of the to exact at New York duties upon ratification of the treaty and the merchandise imported from that cession of the island to the United island." States; (3) from the ratification of the treaty to May 1, 1900, when the Foraker act took effect. "DUTIES PRIOR TO RATIFICATION. "There can be no doubt with respect to the first two of these classes, namely, the exaction of duties under the war power, prior to the ratification of the treaty of peace. While it is true the treaty of peace was signed December 10, 1898, it did not take effect upon individual rights until there was an exchange of ratification. Hater vs. Yaker, 9 Wall. 32, sub nom. Jecker vs. Magee, 19 L. Ed. 571. Upon the occupation of the country by the military forces of the United States, the authority of the Spanish government was supersed- 3 Clause 5, section 9, Article I, of ed but the necessity for a revenue the Constitution is as follows: "No did not cease." The opinion then tax or duty shall be laid on articles sustains the right to impose and exported from any State." For collect customs as a war measure the most recent utterances of the

"Different considerations apply with respect to duties levied after the ratification of the treaty and the cession of the island to the United States. Porto Rico then ceased to be a foreign country, and, as we have just held in De Lima vs. Bidwell, the right of the collector of New York to exact duties upon imports from that island ceased with the exchange of ratifications." The opinion then holds that while there is no doubt as to the right to administer the government under the war power until Congress acted, there is no right to exact duties upon merchandise brought from the United States.

§ 61g. The Porto Rico pilotage case.-Another case which was decided on May 27, 1901, involving the status of Porto Rico and its relations to other ports of the United States, was the Pilotage case. Under the pilotage laws of the State of New York, American vessels engaged in the coast wise trade are not required to take pilots on entering the harbor of New York; vessels not engaged in the coastwise trade are required to take pilots or to pay half pilotage fees in case of refusal. An American vessel from Porto Rico having refused to take a pilot, the vessel was libelled for half the amount of the regular fees. The United States District Court dismissed the libel. The Circuit Court of Appeals certified to the Supreme Court certain questions as to whether Porto Rico remained a foreign port in the sense in which those words are used in the New York pilotage laws after the exchange of ratifications of the treaty of Paris.3 The Supreme Court decided that the ports of Porto Rico are domestic ports and that vessels engaged in trade between those ports and other ports of the United States are engaged in the coastwise trade and not obliged to take pilots under the New York laws as though they came from foreign ports.

61h. Summary of decisions in Insular Cases. The principal points decided in the Insular Cases, therefore, can be very briefly summarized as follows:

1st. Territory, when ceded to the United States by a foreign power, and actual possession thereof has been delivered to and received by the United States, ceases to be foreign territory, as that expression is used in the tariff laws of the United States, and duties cannot be exacted under tariff laws providing for duties on imports from foreign countries. This also applies to territory annexed by congressional resolution, as were the Hawaiian Islands.2

1

Supreme Court in regard to export
taxes, see Fairbank vs. United
States, U. S. Sup. Ct. 1901. 181
U. S. 283, BREWER, J.

$619.

1 Huus vs. N. Y and Porto Rico S. S. Co., U. S. Sup. Ct. 1901, 182 U. S. 392, BROWN, J.

2 See Record of Insular Cases.

3 For these questions, and cases on definition of foreign and coastwise trade, see INSULAR CASES APPENDIX at end of this volume. $ 61h.

1 De Lima vs. Bidwell, Goetze vs. United States; see § 61b, p. 119, ante. 2 Crossman vs. United States; see § 61 d, p. 122, ante.

2d. Congress has power to make rules and regulations regarding such territory, including the right to impose duties on merchandise brought there from other ports of the United States, and in so doing, Congress is not bound by the constitutional limitations in regard to uniformity of imposts and duties throughout the United States."

3d. After the United States has acquired and obtained possession of territory, as in the case of Porto Rico, American vessels trading between ports therein and other ports of the United States are engaged in coastwise, and not in foreign, trade so far as pilotage laws are concerned.'

4th. After the United States has acquired territory by conquest and by military occupation and subsequently by cession, the former laws, as modified by the military government established under the war power, remain in force until the exchange of ratification of the treaty of cession, and until that time the territory does not become "domestic" so as to prevent the collection of duties on merchandise brought from other parts of the United States."

All of the above points were decided by a divided court, dissenting opinions being delivered in all the cases, in one instance the majority of the court being divided on the method of reasoning although the same conclusion was reached.

None of the Insular Cases involved right to collect duties on merchandise brought from other ports of the United States to the Philippine Islands under the Dingley tariff or under the various tariffs established under executive orders;7 nor did any of the decisions determine the status of the Philippine Islands, the personal rights, liberties or citizenship of the inhabitants of any of the recently acquired territory.

8 Downes vs. Bidwell; see § 61e, p. 123, ante.

4 Huus vs. N. Y. & Porto Rico S. S. Co.; see § 61g, p. 126, ante.

5 Dooley, Smith & Co. vs. United States, No. 1; Armstrong vs. United States; see § 61f, p. 124, ante.

See abstracts of opinion in INSULAR CASES APPENDIX at end of the volume; consult special index thereto.

7 See note 4 to § 308, p. 441, post, as to Spooner Amendment for government of the Philippine Islands.

Several attempts have been made to raise questions before the courts involving the personal rights and liberties of inhabitants of the recently acquired territories. Some of those cases are referred to in § 385 of chap. XII, post.