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its formation and adoption, or to the comments of the eminent men who took part in those transactions, we are forced to the conclusion that no intention existed to prohibit, by this clause,' (that no State shall, without the consent of Congress, levy any impost or duty upon any export or import,) the right of one State to tax articles brought into it from another.' This definition of the word impost was afterwards approved in Brown vs. Houston, (114 U. S. 623). See also Fairbank vs. United States (181 U. S. 283).

"It follows, and is the logical sequence of the case of Woodruff vs. Parham, that the word 'export' should be given a correlative meaning, and applied only to goods exported to a foreign country. (Muller vs. Baldwin, L. R. 9 Q. B. 457.) If, then, Porto Rico be no longer a foreign country under the Dingley act, as was held by a majority of this court in De Lima vs. Bidwell, (182 U. S. 1,) and Dooley vs. United States, (182 U. S. 222,) we find it impossible to say that goods carried from New York to Porto Rico can be considered as 'exported' from New York within the meaning of that clause of the Constitution. If they are neither exports nor imports, they are still liable to be taxed by Congress under the ample and comprehensive authority conferred by the Constitution to lay and collect taxes, duties, imposts and excises.' (Art. 1, sec. 8.)

"In another view, however, the case presented by the record is, whether a duty laid by Congress upon goods arriving at Porto Rico from New York is a duty upon an export from New York, or upon an import to Porto Rico. The fact that the duty is exacted upon the arrival of the goods at San Juan certainly creates a presumption in favor of the latter theory. At the same time it is possible that it may also be a duty upon an export. The mere fact that the duty is not laid at the port of departure is by no means decisive against its being such. It is too clear for argument that if vessels bound for a foreign country were compelled to stop at an intermediate port and pay into the Treasury of the United States a duty upon their cargoes, such duty would be a tax upon an export, and the place of its exaction would be of little significance. The manner in which and the place at which the tax is levied are of minor consequence. Thus in Brown vs. Maryland, (12 Wheat. 419,) it was held that an act of a State legislature requiring importers of foreign goods to take out a license was a violation of the Constitution declaring that no State shall, without the consent of Congress, lay any impost or duty on imports or exports; and in the recent case of Fairbank vs. United States, (181 U. S. 283,) we held that a discriminating stamp tax upon bills of lading, covering goods to be carried to a foreign country, was a tax upon exports within the same provision of the Constitution.

"One thing, however, is entirely clear. The tax in question was imposed upon goods imported into Porto Rico, since it was exacted by the collector of the port of San Juan after the arrival of the goods within the limits of that port. From this moment the duties became payable as upon imported merchandise. (United States vs. Howell, 5 Cranch, 368; Arnold vs. United States, 9 Cranch, 104; Meredith vs. United States, 13 Pet. 486.) Now while an import into one port almost necessarily in

volves a prior export from another, still, in determining the character of the tax imposed, it is important to consider whether the duty be laid for the purpose of adding to the revenues of the country from which the export takes place, or for the benefit of the territory into which they are imported. By the third section of the Foraker act imposing duties upon merchandise coming into Porto Rico from the United States, it is declared that whenever the legislative assembly of Porto Rico shall have enacted and put into operation a system of local taxation to meet the necessities of the government of Porto Rico, by this act established, and shall by resolution duly passed so notify the President, he shall make proclamation thereof, and thereupon all tariff duties on merchandise and articles going into Porto Rico from the United States or coming into the United States from Porto Rico shall cease, and from and after such date all such merchandise and articles shall be entered at the several ports of entry free of duty.' And by section four, 'the duties and taxes collected in Porto Rico in pursuance of this act, less the cost of collecting the same, and the gross amount of all collections and taxes in the United States upon articles of merchandise coming from Porto Rico, shall not be covered into the general fund of the Treasury, but shall be held as a separate fund, and shall be placed at the disposal of the President to be used for the government and benefit of Porto Rico until the government of Porto Rico, herein provided for, shall have been organized, when all moneys theretofore collected under the provisions hereof, then unexpended, shall be transferred to the local treasury of Porto Rico."

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Now, there can be no doubt whatever that, if the legislative assembly of Porto Rico should, with the consent of Congress, lay a tax upon goods arriving from ports of the United States, such tax, if legally imposed, would be a duty upon imports to Porto Bico, and not upon exports from the United States; and we think the same result must follow, if the duty be laid by Congress in the interest and for the benefit of Porto Rico. The truth is, that, in imposing the duty as a temporary expedient, with a proviso that it may be abolished by the legislative assembly of Porto Rico at its will, Congress thereby shows that it is undertaking to legislate for the island for the time being and only until the local government is put into operation. The mere fact that the duty passes through the hands of the revenue officers of the United States is immaterial, in view of the requirement that it shall not be covered into the general fund of the Treasury, but be held as a separate fund for the government and benefit of Porto Rico.

"The action is really correlative to that of Downes vs. Bidwell, (182 U. S. 244,) in which we held that Congress could lawfully impose a duty upon imports from Porto Rico, notwithstanding the provision of the Constitution that all duties, imposts and excises shall be uniform throughout the United States. It is true that this conclusion was reached by a majority of the court by different processes of reasoning, but it is none the less true that in the conclusion that certain provisions of the Constitution did apply to Porto Rico, and that certain others did not, there was no difference of opinion.

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"It is not intended by this opinion to intimate that Congress may lay an export tax upon merchandise carried from one State to another. While this does not seem to be forbidden by the express words of the Constitution, it would be extremely difficult, if not impossible, to lay such a tax without a violation of the first paragraph of Art. 1, sec. 8, that 'all duties, imposts and excises shall be uniform throughout the United States.' There is a wide difference between the full and paramount power of Congress in legislating for a territory in the condition of Porto Rico and its power with respect to the States, which is merely incidental to its right to regulate interstate commerce. The question, however, is not involved in this case, and we do not desire to express an opinion upon it.

"These duties were properly collected, and the action of the Circuit Court in sustaining the demurrer to the complaint was correct, and it is therefore

Mr. Justice WHITE delivered a concurring opinion as follows: "Whilst agreeing to the judgment of affirmance and in substance concurring in the opinion of the court just announced, by which the affirmance is sustained, I propose to summarize in my own language the reasoning which the opinion embodies as it is by me understood.

"In my judgment the opinion of the court in the cases of De Lima vs. Bidwell, (182 U. S. 1,) and Dooley vs. United States, (182 U. S. 222,) decided in the last term, and that just announced in the case of The Diamond Rings, as well as the opinions of the majority of the members of the court in Downes vs. Bidwell, (182 U. S. 244,) also decided at the last term, when considered in connection with the previous adjudications of this court, are conclusive in favor of the affirmance of the judgment in this cause. The question is, whether a tax imposed by authority of the act of April 12, 1900, (31 Stat. 77,) in Porto Rico, on merchandise coming into that island from the United States, is repugnant to clause 5, section 9, of article I of the Constitution of the United States, which provides that'no tax or duty shall be laid on articles exported from any State. Is the tax here assailed an export tax within the meaning of the Constitution? If it is, the judgment sustaining it should be reversed; if it is not, affirmance is required.

"In Woodruff vs. Parham, (1870) 8 Wall. 123, the validity of a tax on auction sales levied by the city of Mobile pursuant to authority conferred by the laws of the State of Alabama was called in question. One of the contentions was that as the tax was on sales at auction of goods in the original packages brought into the State of Alabama from other States, it was repugnant to that clause of section 9 of article I of the Constitution, which forbids any State, without the consent of Congress, from laying imposts or duties on imports or exports, except what may be absolutely necessary for executing its inspection laws. In approaching the consideration of the question thus presented, the court, in its opinion, which was announced by Mr. Justice Miller, said (p. 131):

"The words imposts, imports and exports are frequently used in the

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Constitution. They have a necessary co-relation, and when we have a clear idea of what either word means in any particular connection in which it may be found, we have one of the most satisfactory tests of its definition in other parts of the same instrument. . . . Leaving, then, for a moment, the clause of the Constitution under consideration,' (forbidding a State to lay an import or an export tax,) the first use of these co-relative terms in that clause of the eighth section of the first article which begins the enumeration of the powers confided to Congress, that Congress shall have power to levy and collect taxes, duties, imposts and excises. . . . But all duties, imposts and excises shall be uniform throughout the United States.' Is the word impost, here used, intended to confer upon Congress a distinct power to levy a tax upon all goods or merchandise carried from one State into another? or is the power limited to duties on foreign imports? If the former be intended, then the power conferred is curiously rendered nugatory by the subsequent clause of the ninth section, which declares that no tax shall be laid on articles exported from any State, for no article can be imported from one State into another which is not, at the same time, exported from the former. But if we give to the word imposts, as used in the first mentioned clause, the definition of Chief Justice Marshall, and to the word export the corresponding idea of something carried out of the United States, we have, in the power to lay duties on imports from abroad and the prohibition to lay such duties on exports to other countries, the power and its limitation concerning imposts.'

"The opinion then proceeded to elaborately consider the meaning of the words imports, exports and imposts in the Constitution, with reference to the powers of Congress, and concluded that they related only to the bringing in of goods from a country foreign to the United States or the taking out of goods from the United States to such a country. From this conclusion the deduction was drawn that the words imports and exports, when used in the Constitution with reference to the power of the several States, had a similar meaning, and hence the tax levied by the city of Mobile was decided not to be repugnant to the clause of the Constitution heretofore referred to, prohibiting a State 'from laying imposts or duties on imports or exports.' In the course of the opinion an intimation of Mr. Chief Justice Marshall in Brown vs. Maryland, that the words imports and exports might relate to the movement of goods between the States, was referred to, and it was expressly said that this was a mere suggestion on the part of the Chief Justice, not involved in the cause, and not therefore decided. So, also, the attention of the court was directed to the case of Almy vs. California, (1860) 24 How. 169. That case involved the validity of a stamp tax imposed in California on all bills of lading for the shipment of gold from California to a point without the State. The particular bill of lading which was in question was for the shipment of gold from California to New York. It was held that this stamp tax was at least an indirect burden on exports, and hence was void, because an export tax within the meaning of the Constitution. In the opinion in Woodruff vs. Parham it was

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expressly decided that although the conclusion in Almy vs. California, that the tax was void, was sustained by the commerce clause of the Constitution which had been referred to in the argument of that case, it had been erroneously held that import or export within the constitutional sense of the words related to the movement of goods between the States and not exclusively to foreign commerce. To the extent therefore that Almy vs. California held or intimated that an export or import tax within the meaning of the Constitution embraced anything but foreign commerce, it was expressly overruled.

"In Brown vs. Houston, (114 U. S. 622,) decided in 1884, fourteen years after the decision in Woodruff vs. Parham, the question which arose in the latter case was again presented. A tax levied by the State of Louisiana on certain coal which had come down the Ohio River was assailed on the ground that it amounted to both an export and import tax within the meaning of the constitution. The court, speaking through Mr. Justice Bradley, said (p. 628):

"It was decided by this court in the case of Woodruff vs. Parham, (8 Wall. 123,) that the term imports as used in that clause of the Constitution which declares that no State shall without the consent of Congress lay any imposts or duties on imports or exports,' does not refer to articles carried from one State into another, but only to articles imported from foreign countries into the United States.'

"The opinion, after stating the facts which were presented in Woodruff vs. Parham, and the contention which was in that case based upon them, said (pp. 628, 629):

"This court, however, after an elaborate examination of the question, held that the terms 'imports' and 'exports' in the clause under consideration had reference to goods brought from or carried to foreign countries alone and not to goods transported from one State to the other. It is unnecessary, therefore, to consider further the question raised by the plaintiffs in error under their assignment of error so far as it is based on the assumption that the tax complained of was an impost or duty on imports.'

"Thus treating the meaning of the words imports and exports as having been conclusively determined by Woodruff vs. Parham, the court passed to the consideration of the contention that the tax levied in the State of Louisiana was an export tax within the meaning of the Constitution, because some of the coal was intended for export to a foreign country, or had been, as it was claimed, in part actually exported to such country.

"Again, in Fairbank vs. United States, (1900) 181 U. S. 283, the court was called upon to determine whether the requirement in an act of Congress that a revenue stamp be affixed to every bill of lading for goods shipped to a foreign country was a tax on exports. In the course of the opinion, in considering the question, the court referred to Almy vs. California, supra, as authority for the proposition that a tax on the bill of lading was a tax on the movement of the goods which the bill of lading evidenced. But, in referring to the Almy case, the court was careful to say (p. 294):