Department has easy access to the materials assembled in the War Trade Intelligence Department, and is in a position to carry the enquiry beyond the point at which it was presented to the Contraband Committee.

The cases to be presented are of great complexity; the essential documents have generally to be procured from other countries, often after much difficulty and delay, and since the possibility of fabrication cannot be ignored, the genuineness of the documents when forthcoming may have to be tested by further investigation.

If, in the course of preparing the case, the ProcuratorGeneral is satisfied that he is not likely to succeed ultimately, the Court will release the goods upon his application. We would point out that any undue delay can be controlled by an application, on the part of the claimant, to the Court, and that such applications have been very few. On the other hand, applications by claimants for postponement of trial have been numerous.

With regard to the Prize Court itself, we find that it is well able to deal with all, and more than all, the cases ready for trial. Not only are there no arrears, but the Court disposes of its business by sitting three or four days a week.

Summary.

Such is the system now in use. Described in detail it may seem elaborate and complicated, but the situation which it has been framed to meet is many-sided. In practice it works smoothly. It originated in the fact that methods of search sanctioned by usage in the past are now impracticable, and that the evidence which, in the shape of documents carried on the ship, the neutral shipowner and trader were required to provide has been robbed by changed conditions of much of its value. Other evidence, therefore, or guarantees must be forthcoming if the rights of the belligerent are to be preserved. The system has been so constructed as to furnish facilities by which, if he is disposed to avail himself of them, the neutral can provide such evidence or guarantees, and so be assured of the minimum disturbance of his trade.

The present system has been built up gradually as the need for it arose. On the outbreak of the war there was little more than the nucleus of an organisation for dealing even with prize. It was inadequate for this purpose owing to the altered conditions to which we have referred, and still more so for coping with the larger situation created by the Order in Council of the 11th March, 1915. For these reasons not only has the old organisation been expanded, but the new and supplemental machinery, which we have detailed, has been set up. So considerable has been the change that it would be truer to say that a new organisation had to be created to meet the new conditions than that an

old and inappropriate one has been applied to work for which it was never intended. A ruling consideration throughout has been the desire to impose on neutral shipping as little inconvenience as is consistent with the interception of the enemy's sea-borne commerce, and it has been very apparent to us in the course of our investigations how steadily the officials concerned have kept this object in view.

It is quite clear that by the establishment of the Contraband and Enemy Exports Committees many ships which would otherwise have to be brought into port for discharge are enabled, after a short delay, to proceed upon their course. The committees act as Courts of preliminary enquiry, sift the available evidence, and at once release the vessel when the prima facie case is not sufficiently strong. In the absence of such committee, all vessels stopped and all goods brought in would have to be placed in the Prize Court by the Procurator-General and adjudicated upon by the Court.

It is evident from the very nature of the work both of the War Trade Intelligence Department and of the Contraband and Enemy Exports Committees that it tends to become both more expeditious and more effective as their experience and stock of information increase. The time occupied in collating materials and considering them cannot, in our opinion, be fairly described as delay, much less avoidable delay. We have no evidence that any increase in the staff of the War Trade Intelligence Department would be of substantial advantage. The work appears to be decentralised as far as it safely can be, having regard to the fact that it depends in a peculiar degree for its efficiency upon the accumulation of experience by individuals. As a matter of fact, the Department is able to supply material to the Contraband Committee as quickly as that committee can deal with it.

Similar considerations apply to the Contraband Committee, and it would, in our view, lose efficiency if it were to sit in two or more divisions.

While the work of the Enemy Exports Committee is comparable to that of the Contraband Committee, the questions for its determination are so different that the two bodies could not advantageously be merged in one.

The materials for the decisions of the Enemy Exports Committee are derived from the same source as those of the War Trade Intelligence Department, and are collated and indexed, on a similar system, but by a separate staff. There does appear, therefore, in this respect to be a certain amount of duplication of effort, though the information obtained by the War Trade Intelligence Department covers a far wider field than that required by the Enemy Exports Committee. No delay, however, is imposed upon ships or cargoes by this overlapping, and we have therefore not considered how far, if at all, it can be avoided.

It was not to be expected that a system which has developed as the necessity arose should have worked smoothly and well from the beginning. Until it was complete, there were undoubtedly stages at which delay took place. Ships, for instance, were at first kept an undue time at Kirkwall or Lerwick awaiting the visit of the customs officers. This was due to the shortage of staff, and to the inexperience of the customs officers at that time in the new work required of them. Again, there appears to have been insufficient connection between the Contraband Committee and the Procurator-General's Department, and it would perhaps be true to say generally that there was some lack of co-ordination between Departments, and that information did not pass freely from one to the other. But these defects were remedied at an early stage.

The congestion at the ports of discharge, which is a persistent source of delay, is consequent upon a state of war. So long as that congestion exists, its effects must be felt by ships brought in under the Order in Council, as by all others; but they are dealt with in their turn and given at least equal_ facilities.

Owing to the geographical position of such neutral countries as Holland and Denmark, Norway and Sweden, the task of discriminating between cargoes of enemy or of neutral destination must be beset with difficulties. The various agreements concluded have done much to lessen inconvenience and promote co-operation. As a result of these agreements vessels are detained, either on the high seas or at the port of detention, only for a time sufficient to establish their credentials; they are not called upon to discharge any cargo, and thus not only save their own time, but assist the discharge of other vessels by lessening the congestion at ports. It is, of course, for neutrals themselves to determine whether the restrictions imposed by these agreements are not more than counterbalanced by the advantages which they confer. However this may be, it is, in our opinion, plain that their more general acceptance would still further lessen the occasions of delay

It is a matter for remark that although the existence and proceedings of this committee have been advertised in the press of this country and of neutral countries, no specific cases of delay have been brought before us by complainants. It may not be unfair to suggest that when complaints of delay have been made they arise rather from objections to the provisions of the Order in Council of the 11th March, 1915, than to the machinery by which those provisions are enforced.

We have been unable to discover that, consistently with the effective exercise of belligerent rights, there is any avoidable delay caused by the existing methods of dealing with ships and cargoes brought into port under the Order in Council of the 11th March, 1915, and we do not offer any suggestions for the improvement of those methods.

In conclusion, we should like to record our appreciation of the zeal and ability of our secretary, the Hon. S. O. Henn Collins, and our assistant-secretary, Sub-Lieutenant Sir F. Newnes, Bart., R.N.V.R.

PEEL, Chairman.

KENNETH S. ANDERSON.
B. A. COHEN.

K. WALLACE ELMSLIE.
ALMERIC PAGET.

S. O. HENN COLLINS, Secretary.

FRANK NEWNES, Sub-Lieutenant, R.N.V.R.,
Assistant-Secretary.

ACT of the Government of Barbados to amend "The Evidence Act, 1905," and to provide for the Recognition of Notarial Acts, &c., done by British Diplomatic and Consular Officers.

[No. 4.]

[February 3, 1916.]

BE it enacted by the Governor, Council, and Assembly of this Island, and by the authority of the same, as follows:

1. This Act shall be read together with "The Evidence Act, 1905 (1905-4)," and may be cited as "The Evidence (Amendment) Act, 1916."

2. (1.) Every oath, affidavit, and notarial act administered, sworn, or done by or before any British ambassador, envoy, minister, chargé d'affaires, secretary of embassy or legation, consul-general, consul, vice-consul, acting consul, pro-consul, consular agent, acting consul-general, acting viceconsul, or acting consular agent, exercising his functions in any foreign country or place shall be as effectual as if duly administered, sworn or done before any lawful authority in this Island: and any one of the functionaries and officers hereinnamed shall be a person before whom deeds, wills and other writings and affidavits may be verified in any foreign country under subsection (3) of section 14 of "The Evidence Act, 1905," and the said subsection shall be read as if the names of the said functionaries and officers not already occurring therein were inserted therein.

(2.) Any document purporting to have affixed or impressed or subscribed thereto the seal and signature of any person authorised by section 6 of the Imperial Statute entitled shortly

"The Commissioners for Oaths Act, 1889" (52 Vic. c. 10), as amended by "The Commissioners for Oaths Act, 1891" (54 and 55 Vic. c. 50), to administer an oath, in testimony of any oath, affidavit or act being administered taken or done by or before him, shall be admitted in evidence without proof of the seal or signature being the seal or signature of that person, and without proof of the official character of that person.

Read three times and passed the general Assembly on the 4th day of January, 1916.

F. J. CLARKE,

Speaker.

Read three times and passed the Legislative Council the 1st day of February, 1916.

W. K. CHANDLER,

I assent,

L. PROBYN,

Governor.

3rd February, 1916.

President.

ACT of the Government of Barbados to amend "The Immigration of Paupers (Prevention) Act, 1909." [No. 50.] [November 13, 1916.]

:

BE it enacted by the Governor, Council, and Assembly of this Island, and by the authority of the same, as follows:1. This Act shall be read with "The Immigration Paupers (Prevention) Act, 1909" (hereinafter referred to as the Principal Act), and may be cited as "The Immigration of Paupers (Prevention) (Amendment) Act, 1916."

2. The following sub-section, numbered (8.), is hereby added to section 2 of the Principal Act :

"(8.) If, on any enquiry by the harbour and shipping master or his chief clerk under this section, any person wilfully makes a false statement respecting any matter material in that enquiry, he shall be liable to a penalty not exceeding 50l."

3. Sub-section (1.) of section II of the Principal Act is hereby amended by inserting the words " or if any foreign seaman deserts from his ship and lands" after the word "given," occurring in line 4 thereof.