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have been simplified by stating that the eldest Peninsular Deputy
would be the one to make the lists, as such will be the result.

8. Article 40 also refers to the Schedules of the merchandize,
which will appear in the privileged lists. The Decree only says that
they shall be made by mutual consent (meaning Cuban and
Peninsular Deputies). It does not make any reference to the case
when there is no mutual consent, which makes us suppose that the
same procedure recommended in the other lists will be observed.
The eldest Peninsular Deputy will therefore make the said
B Schedules.

9. The Governor-General has the power to suspend the constitutional guarantees, apply legislation of public order ("ley de órden público "), and adopt any measures he may deem fit to maintain peace, &c. This power the Governor-General can exercise at will, without any limitation, because he is not obliged to hear the opinion of the Council of Secretaries (Ministry), and thus the whole hipolitical system of the country lies with the Governor-General. The latter can therefore find any pretext for courts-martial, the application of the code of military justice, and all that series of Proclamations and orders which have caused so much harm, and which rob the citizen of all guarantees and protection.

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10. The distribution of the public debt of Cuba remains completely in the hands and subject to the decision of the Cortes of the kingdom, will try to assign to Cuba as much of it as it can, so

Beyond at even, the fact remains and makes useless, while
it exists, all ely and pacific development of the autonomistic
régime, and act is the existence of the volunteers in arms.
The politely in power is unarmed, has no force of its own,
while the S Radical ("Intransigente") party, which is in the
Under tions, there can be no genuine autonomistic
on its side the armed volunteers.
Governe the opposition a
18eity of the Local Government, and of which we
can ride over, whenever it
ample, and it can have it repeated whenever the
Intransigente "party so desire.

d State Consulate-General, Havana,
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within which the Madrid Government has to decide regarding the right of a veto which a Colonial Statute may have received from the Governor-General.

5. Article 36 grants exclusive power to the Cortes of the kingdom to determine the expenses of sovereignty which the Colony has to pay, and the necessary receipts to cover them; for the Cortes can alter them at pleasure. Therefore the Colony has no direct vote in a matter of so great importance. It may be said that she is allowed to appoint her Deputies to the Cortes of the kingdom, and that through them the Colony can be heard. But the Colony's voice will be lost, because their number would be insignificant before the remaining Deputies of the nation. And it may happen that the expenses of sovereignty, put by the Cortes on the Colony, will absorb all of its receipts, because neither of the two Houses (Chambers) can deliberate regarding the Colonial Budget without having first voted to pay the expenses of sovereignty.

6. Article 37 speaks of Treaties of Commerce which may affect Cuba, and states that the Madrid Government shall make them, aided by the Delegates of the Colonial Government. And, further, that when the Treaties are approved by the Cortes of the kingdom they will be published as general laws, and as such will be respected in the Insular territory; but it is left doubtful whether they would be laws in Cuba if the Colonial Delegates should reject them. If the Madrid Government is not to rule in such a case, it should be so stated. And if it is a law, notwithstanding the Colonial opposition, why is the concurrence of the Colony asked? The case referred to in Article 38 does not decide it, because it only refers to those Treaties in the negotiation of which the Insular Government has had nothing to do.

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7. Article 40 gives in a very ingenious manner a method o deciding the differences arising from privileged articles of commerce in comparison to similar foreign articles, and in reference to th extension of such a privilege, cent. differential duty. Wh Treaty do not agree, a Com Cuban and Peninsular T President; if they do no Presid has the castir

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835

have been simplified by stating that the eldest Peninsular Deputy
would be the one to make the lists, as such will be the result.

8. Article 40 also refers to the Schedules of the merchandize,
which will appear in the privileged lists. The Decree only says that
they shall be made by mutual consent (meaning Cuban and
Peninsular Deputies). It does not make any reference to the case
when there is no mutual consent, which makes us suppose that the
same procedure recommended in the other lists will be observed.
The eldest Peninsular Deputy will therefore make the said
Schedules

9. The Governor-General has the power to suspend the constitutional guarantees, apply legislation of public order ("ley de órden público"), and adopt any measures he may deem fit to maintain peace, &c. This power the Governor-General can exercise at will, without any limitation, because he is not obliged to hear the opinion of the Council of Secretaries (Ministry), and thus the whole political system of the country lies with the Governor-General. The latter can therefore find any pretext for courts-martial, the application of the code of military justice, and all that series of Proclamations and orders which have caused so much harm, and which rob the disen of all guarantees and protection.

10. The tribution of the public debt of Cuba remains completely in the ds and subject to the decision of the Cortes of the kingdom, wie ill try to assign to Cuba as much of it as it can, so that Spain the smallest part.

Beyonderen, the fact remains and makes useless, while it exists, and pacific development of the autonomistic régime, and het is the existence of the volunteers in arms. is unarmed, has no force of its own,

while the Badical ("Intransigente") party, which is in the
Unders, there can be no genuine autonomistic
on its side the armed volunteers.

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within which the Madrid Government has to decide regarding the right of a veto which a Colonial Statute may have received from the Governor-General.

5. Article 36 grants exclusive power to the Cortes of the kingdom to determine the expenses of sovereignty which the Colony has to pay, and the necessary receipts to cover them; for the Cortes can alter them at pleasure. Therefore the Colony has no direct vote in a matter of so great importance. It may be said that she is allowed to appoint her Deputies to the Cortes of the kingdom, and that through them the Colony can be heard. But the Colony's voice will be lost, because their number would be insignificant before the remaining Deputies of the nation. And it may happen that the expenses of sovereignty, put by the Cortes on the Colony, will absorb all of its receipts, because neither of the two Houses (Chambers) can deliberate regarding the Colonial Budget without having first voted to pay the expenses of sovereignty.

6. Article 37 speaks of Treaties of Commerce which may affect Cuba, and states that the Madrid Government shall make them, aided by the Delegates of the Colonial Government. And, further, that when the Treaties are approved by the Cortes of the kingdom they will be published as general laws, and as such will be respected in the Insular territory; but it is left doubtful whether they would be laws in Cuba if the Colonial Delegates should reject them. If the Madrid Government is not to rule in such a case, it should be so stated. And if it is a law, notwithstanding the Colonial opposition, why is the concurrence of the Colony asked? The case referred to in Article 38 does not decide it, because it only refers to those Treaties in the negotiation of which the Insular Government has had nothing to do.

7. Article 40 gives in a very ingenious manner a method of deciding the differences arising from privileged articles of commerce, in comparison to similar foreign articles, and in reference to the extension of such a privilege, within the maximum limit of 35 per cent. differential duty. When the two Governments making the Treaty do not agree, a Committee is formed of the same number of Cuban and Peninsular Deputies. These Deputies appoint their President; if they do not agree, the eldest in age presides, and the President has the casting vote. Let us suppose the Cuban Deputies to be very patriotic, which is, by the way, supposing a great deal ; but as they will never be more patriotic than the Peninsular Delegates, it will result that they will not agree, and then the eldest will decide. As there are a large number of Peninsular Deputies and a very small number of Insular Deputies to select from, care will be taken that some aged Peninsular Deputy be appointed on said Committee, and he would be the one to decide. The matter would

have been simplified by stating that the eldest Peninsular Deputy would be the one to make the lists, as such will be the result.

8. Article 40 also refers to the Schedules of the merchandize, which will appear in the privileged lists. The Decree only says that they shall be made by mutual consent (meaning Cuban and Peninsular Deputies). It does not make any reference to the case when there is no mutual consent, which makes us suppose that the same procedure recommended in the other lists will be observed. The eldest Peninsular Deputy will therefore make the said Schedules.

9. The Governor-General has the power to suspend the constitutional guarantees, apply legislation of public order ("ley de órden público "), and adopt any measures he may deem fit to maintain peace, &c. This power the Governor-General can exercise at will, without any limitation, because he is not obliged to hear the opinion of the Council of Secretaries (Ministry), and thus the whole political system of the country lies with the Governor-General. The latter can therefore find any pretext for courts-martial, the application of the code of military justice, and all that series of Proclamations and orders which have caused so much harm, and which rob the citizen of all guarantees and protection.

10. The distribution of the public debt of Cuba remains completely in the hands and subject to the decision of the Cortes of the kingdom, which will try to assign to Cuba as much of it as it can, so that Spain will pay the smallest part.

Beyond all this, even, the fact remains and makes useless, while it exists, all orderly and pacific development of the autonomistic régime, and this fact is the existence of the volunteers in arms. The political party in power is unarmed, has no force of its own, while the Spanish Radical ("Intransigente") party, which is in the opposition, is armed, having on its side the armed volunteers. Under such conditions, there can be no genuine autonomistic Government, because the opposition can ride over, whenever it pleases, the authority of the Local Government, and of which we had a very recent example, and it can have it repeated whenever the Radical Spanish ("Intransigente ") party so desire.

SIR,

Mr. Lee to Mr. Day.

United States' Consulate-General, Havana,
February 4, 1898.

I HAVE the honour to report that I have received 1,743 dol. 46 c. from various sections of the country, in addition to the 5,000 dollars first sent, making a total of 6,743 dol. 46 c., which have been

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