LEGISLATION AND JURISPRUDENCE. SUPREME COURT OF JUDICATURE. SECOND REPORT of the Commissioners appointed to inquire into the Administrative Departments of the Court of Justice. (Continued from page 61.) THE MASTERS' OFFICES. In these offices is performed all the formal business incidental to proceedings in the several courts. The action of the court in every stage in a cause, from writ to judgment, has to be initiated and recorded here. The office is required to see that the prescribed stamps are affixed to the documents brought in and to obliterate them when affixed. The Writ of Summons Office, the Appearance to the Summons Office, the Rule Office, and the Judgment Office (including in the Queen's Bench a registry of bills of sale) are offices of which the titles sufficiently indicate the work done in them. All are under the personal supervision of the masters of the court, who in a fifth division of their department, called the Masters' Office, conduct their correspondence; receive and pay out money paid into the court to which they are attached; take cognizance of all applications for admissions to the roll of attorneys to their court, and of all articles of articled clerks. The masters themselves (a) Attend in rotation the court to which they are attached. (b) Hear summonses and make orders on interlocutory matters and causes. (c) Hear and decide without appeal, causes referred to them for that purpose, by consent of parties, or by order of the court. (d) Tax bills of costs. (e) Examine and certify candidates for ad- There are five masters, including the Queen's Remembrancer, for civil business attached to each of the Superior Courts of Common Law. For criminal business the Queen's Bench has the assistance of the Queen's coroner and attorney, and of a master, making seven masters attached to that court. The qualification for mastership on the civil side is fixed by 1 Vict. c. 30, s. 10; and persons appointed must be barristers, or pleaders, or attorneys in actual practice, and of not less then five years' standing in their degree; or clerks of not less than five years' standing in any one of the masters' offices. There has not hitherto been any qualification prescribed by statute for the clerks in the offices. But by the Judicature Act all officers and clerks hereafter to be appointed to the High Court of Justice under Part V. of the Act, and whose whole time shall be devoted to the duties of their offices, are to be deemed to be civil servants of the Crown. At the present time the subjects prescribed for the general examination of candidates for clerkships in the masters' and associates' offices are as follows, viz.: 1. Handwriting and orthography. 2. Transcribing. 3. Comparison of copies with originals. 4. Elementary arithmetic. There is no other necessary qualification, either of knowledge or service. The duties of masters and clerks in the offices of the three courts and the organisation for discharging them are in most respects identical. Tradition has preserved certain slight differences of practice and of administration in the Queen's Remembrancer's Office, and in the Queen's Bench a registry of all bills of sale introduces a special and important feature in the business of that court. But in the main the description of the administrative civil business of one court is applicable to that of another. The organisation should therefore be identical, and it would seem that, assuming the law business to be equally divided among the three courts, the numbers of clerks and officers employed should be the same in each. At the present time we find an inequality in the distribution of the business between the three courts, and an inequality-not proportionate, however, to the work in the respective staffs. Though the civil jurisdiction of the three courts is concurrent, it is still left to the suitor to decide in which court he will bring his plaint, so that the business of a particular court varies with the wish or fancy of the suitor. As a matter of fact the business does vary, and has always done so. The commissioners who in 1834 reported on the proposal to consolidate certain offices in the King's Bench and Common Pleas dwelt upon the fact, and set fourth that in 1833 there were issued the following processes: siderable importance, but we are of opinion that, whatever may be said of other branches of the office, there is no reason why this office should not be open to the public for six hours a day all the year round. In that event we are of opinion that, assuming no increase in the number of bills of sale, the staff engaged upon them might be reduced. We have not thought it within our province to criticise minutely the books and forms used in the offices; but in the course of inquiry into the process of business generally, it has been under our notice that considerable labour and time are devoted in each office to keeping up the records of 1872. Queen's Bench Com. Pleas. Exchequer. 20,898 17,117 7224 5948 7740 6306 4726 4507 15,940 25,737 573 486 rules granted. That a record is necessary we are satisfied, but having particularly pursued the subject, we are of opinion that the present mode is not only costly in point of time, but also unsatisfactory in itself, seeing that what purports to be an entry of the rule as granted is not a copy of the document given out to the public, but an extension of the very slightly abbreviated draft from which that document was made out. We think this draft should be considered as the original, which it really is, and be kept indexed as such; and that in the case of side bar rules and rules of course, which are made out on common forms, the only record should be in the present index, which should contain numbered specimens of the forms on which the rules are made out. Wherever the common form is departed from, the record of the rule should be, in extended form, in the book where rules drawn up from minutes of orders made in court are recorded. The habit of fresh copying, or rather of ex tending, the rules in the office books into the Records of Entries, dates, we are told, from the times of Charles I. The head clerks in the Rule Offices of Queen's Bench and Exchequer explained to us that "there was a stamp duty formerly for the entry of the rule. The fees were abolished, Increment. Maximum. but the entries were continued." The revenue objects achieved by the entry books having ceased to operate, and it being possible to secure not only a record, but a record of the document actually issued, by the plea indicated above, we are of opinion that the existing practice should cease, and we urge it on grounds directly connected with our commission, in that the abolition would release for other purposes the power of two clerks in each court out of term time. Mr. Le Maire told us that "the keeping of those records just occupies the time (in vacation) while the office is open." At first sight it would seem, on comparison of the business done with the numbers employed to do it, that the staff of the Queen's Bench is far in excess of requirement, the Court of Exchequer getting through say 20 per cent. more business with 22 per cent. less staff. But to correct the comparison it should be borne in mind that, in the Judgment Office of the Queen's Bench is discharged the special and distinctive duty appertaining to bills of sale, their registration and search, a duty upon which one second-class clerk and two other clerks are engaged, and that the management of the articles of articled clerks, and of the admission of Attorneys is peculiar to the Masters' Office of that court. Assuming for the moment that these clerks are fully engaged upon the bills of sale business, there remain twenty clerks to discharge 20 per cent. less business of the same kind as is discharged in the Court of Exchequer with eighteen clerks. We do not find any justification for this disproportion, and while we are of opinion that, on a redistribution of the business in the High Court of Justice, and by a re-arrangement of some of the work as it is, it might be possible to reduce by two the number of clerks in the Exchequerwe are persuaded that the staff of the Queen's Bench Masters' Office might properly be reduced to a number proportionate to its business as compared with that of the Exchequer. The bill of sale business is, doubtless, of con (a) In Queen's Bench the minimum is £500, the maxi mum £600. In ascertaining the duties discharged in the masters' offices, we have sought also to know whether there is anything in the nature of the duties of the departments of each court which would militate against a fusion of the three in one. Such a fusion seemed to be desirable, not only on general grounds of good administration, but because, in view of the project contained in the Judicature Act for fusing the courts themselves, it seemed to follow that if by any means it might be possible the administrative departments of the courts should be fused also. It is provided by the Act that every action in the High Court shall commence by a writ of summons, stating shortly the nature of the complaint. And though it is provided that the writ" shall specify the division of the High Court to which it is intended that the action shall be assigned," power is also taken for the court to distribute the business amongst its divisions, without respect to the indicated choice of the suitor, if it be contrary to the rules of court or provisions of the Act. We see no reason whatever why all process of every kind should not issue out of one department -at least for the common law divisions, and we advise the merger of the existing distinctive staffs and duties. The precise extent to which reduetion of numbers would follow on the adoption of this plan, we are not prepared to say. Much will depend upon the character of the new business as it will be developed by the fresh rules of court. But that considerable diminution will result from concentration of work, we cannot doubt. The exact numbers and salaries to be placed on the permanent establishment of the new department should, in our opinion, be a subject for consideration and report by a committee of persons to be nominated by the Lord Chancellor, and other presidents of divisions, in communication with the Commissioners of your Majesty's Treasury, after six months' experience of the new order of procedure. (To be continued.) SOLICITORS' JOURNAL. In another column we publish a letter from a country solicitor, on the subject of the Land Titles and Transfer Bill of last session. This letter contains many practical suggestions which, in the interest of the Profession, deserve especial attention. The Lord Chancellor rightly or wrongly refused last June to receive a deputation from the Associated Provincial Law Societies, and, inasmuch as this association is undoubtedly a very influential body in the Profession, solicitors must look to the Council of the Incorporated Law Society, and to the council alone, to protect their interests on this important question. The council will, of course, learn as early as possible whether the Bill in the form in which it was last before the House of Commons is to be introduced next session, and, if so, the council will no doubt secure combined action on the part of the Profession in regard to it. We quite believe that a scale of charges such as those proposed by numerous societies and individual members of the Profession, if embodied in a short enactment, will amply meet the objections urged against the present system, and ought to satisfy its most violent opponents, some of whom may be found in the ranks of the other branch of the Profession. THE Lord Mayor's Court is, not without reason, a very popular court in the City of London, while the City of London Court is, among City men, equally unpopular. The judges of the Superior Courts occasionally fall foul of both, in the case of the former usually by way of the issue of writs of prohibition, and in that of the latter in the most recent case in consequence of Mr. Commissioner Kerr refusing to act on an order made at the Common Law Judges' Chambers, on the ground that the judge's signature had only been stamped on the form in the usual way, and that therefore he was not satisfied that the application on which the order was founded, had really been considered by the judge within the meaning of the statute regulating the procedure in question. The object, how ever, of our present observations is to point out that it is not the judges of the Superior Courts who have much ground of complaint in regard to the action of these inferior tribunals. Country solicitors are constantly crying out against the service-we refer particularly to the Lord Mayor's Court of process out of the jurisdiction, and the exceptional powers of attachment enjoyed by this City court, though it is considered by many that this should be similarly extended to the Superior Courts. But again, in the matter of costs, the country solicitor and his London agent are not considered. No close copies are allowed on taxation, although they are very properly allowed in agency cases in the Superior Courts on taxation of party and party costs. The disallowance we consider manifestly unfair; close copies must be made and paid for by some one. True, the amount of such copies would not usually be large; still, it may be fairly urged that so long as process is issued for service out of the jurisdiction on the merest pretext, so long, at all events, should the usual agent's charges be allowed to country practitioners. THE Surrey Comet reports the following before the County Court Judge (Mr. H. J. Stonor), sitting at Wandsworth: -"County Court 'Agents. -The defendant in a case in which the plaintiff had been non-suited, returned into court, and, addressing His Honour, asked if she were to be insulted on leaving the court? She then pointed out one of the 'agents' attending the court as one of the persons who had interfered with her, whereupon the judge exclaimed, with some warmth, that he would have a list made of all the agents and would see that none of them appeared 1 there in support of any case in future." In for- We understand that some efforts are being made tory working of the above Acts, and we should be A CORRESPONDENT writes as follows:- "I have perused an account, as it appeared in a local newspaper, of a case recently tried before Mr. Lefroy, the judge sitting at the Yeovil County Court, Stone v. Bristol and Exeter Railway Company, in which an inspector was allowed to appear for the company, and 'quote' and 'cite' cases on behalf of the defendants. In the first place one wonders on what ground the judge allowed the inspector to appear, and in the next why the professional gentlemen present did not protest. If a solicitor's managing or articled clerk had attempted to address the court on behalf of a plaintiff or defendant, he would probably have been instantly stopped; but in this case the railway inspector was allowed, with unblushadvocate for the railway company. If you think it ing effrontery, to stand up and act as a paid desirable to call the attention of the Legal Practitioners' Society to the case, please do so." The case has been brought to our notice by another member of the Profession, who, however, observes:-"The plaintiff's demand was small. I am not, therefore, surprised that the learned judge should, in the first instance, have allowed a servant of the company, in the person of one of the railway inspectors, to appear for the defendants, but his Honour must have peculiar tastes, judging by the following report :'Inspector Green, who appeared on behalf the company, asked what the box contained? Plain tiff said that it contained plans and mouldings and a steam apparatus in addition to the clothes. Inspector Green submitted that the company was not resposible, inasmuch as the contents of the box did not come within the definition of " personal luggage." In support of this he quoted the case of Marrow v. The Great Western Railway Company, heard in the Court of Queen's Bench in June 1871, when the question was raised as to what came under the denomination of ordinary personal luggage which a railway passenger was entitled to carry. The articles then lost were blankets, sheets, &c. The Lord Chief Justice held that the plaintiffs were not liable, as blankets and sheets could not be considered personal luggage. The inspector also cited the case of Cahill v. The London and North Western Railway Com pany, which was argued in the Common Pleas in April 1851, before Lord Chief Justice Earle and Justices Willes and Byles. This was a case in which a passenger carried a box of perfumery which was lost in transit. The court unanimously held that defendants were not liable. Plaintiff stated that Inspector Green had offered £2 2s. compensation, which he refused to accept. His Honour said that plaintiff had acted foolishly in not accepting the offer. Under the circumstances he could not hold that defendants were liable. Judgment for defendants." The oath of the defendant that the box contained clothes, seems to have been of no avail against the dictum of the Lord Chief Justice, as quoted by the railway inspector, or the decision of the Court of Common Pleas presided over by Lord Chief Justice Erle in 1861, also cited by the learned railway inspector." THE prospectus of a new debt-collecting office description are much needed by mercantile gen- commission, may be enabled safely to get their debt or rent collected. In all cases in which legal proceedings have to be taken in any of the law courts, the actual sum paid out of pocket by the solicitor (connected with the office) only will be charged. Advice on general business of every description always attainable on very moderate charges if done through this office. Estates managed, partnerships negotiated, loans and investments procured, and general business of every description attended to with promptness and care. Actions and summonses in the Superior, County, and police courts (if done through this office) will be personally attended to by the solicitor, and prosecuted or defended at fixed amounts, which in all cases will be very moderate. It may be that instead of a solicitor being "connected with the office," the office is connected with the solicitor. The name of a secretary appears, and that is all. A DECISION by the County Court judge, sitting recently at Birmingham, will not be without interest to County Court practitioners. The question arose out of a case which had been twice adjourned, and the attorney for the plaintiff, who obtained a verdict in the action, asked for the costs of the two adjournments. In taxing the attorneys' and counsels' fees, the taxing officer refused to give them more than the costs of one day, instead of three. The question was then submitted to the learned judge, who said it was an application to review the taxation of costs in an action under £20, in which more than £5 was recovered. The grounds relied on were, first, because no fee had been allowed for the attend. ance of the attorney on the adjourned day; and, second, because a fee paid to counsel for his attendance on the adjournment had also been disallowed. The scale of costs settled by the five County Court judges, under sect. 33 of 19 & 20 Vict. c. 108, expressly allowed for fees on ad. journed days; but this scale applied only to actions for sums exceeding £20. With respect to actions for sums not exceeding £20, there was no guide as to what should be allowed, except sect. 91 of the 9 & 10 Vict. c. 95. But under that section no attorney was entitled in any case to recover more than 15s. "for his fees and costs." It was formerly held that this restriction did not court before the commencement of an action; apply to business done by an attorney out of but now, by sect. 36 of 19 & 20 Vict. c. 108, no more than 15s. for the attorney's fee and costs. could be recovered under any circumstances in an action for a sum not exceeding £20, unless the client had agreed in writing to pay further costs or charges beyond the 15s. It appeared to him that as there was no such agreement in writing in this case, 15s. was the utmost the attorney could be allowed, inclusive of his costs for the adjournment. The next question was, whether a fee for the adjournment day could be allowed to counsel? One fee of £1 3s. 6d. for counsel and his clerk had already been allowed under sect. 91. That section, in speaking of actions like the present, said, "In no case shall any fee exceeding £1 3s. 6d. be allowed for employing a barrister as counsel in the cause." It did not say in express terms that there should be only one such fee, and therefore it was contended that a second fee could and ought to be allowed when there had been an adjournment. But it seemed to him, that to do so would be against the clear intention of the Act. If a second fee to counsel were to be allowed, and no fee for the attorney attending to pay it, an anomaly unknown in the Profession would be established. It appeared to him that the meaning of the Act was that, as the attorney should be allowed only one sum of 15s., so also only one fee of £1 3s. 6d. should be allowed for employing counsel. Under these circumstances he thought the registrar had rightly decided on both points. It is difficult to imagine that there should have been any doubt on either point. The only safe course for a solicitor to take in such a case, when the adjournment is required by the defendant, is to take from such defendant a written undertaking to pay the costs of the day on taxation, and to consent to such adjournment on the strength only of such an undertaking. The decisions, however, of the learned judge cannot be too well understood or too clearly kept in view by County Court practitioners. THE death is announced of Mr. Henry Pook THE following lecture and classes in Common 80 7 o'clock. There will not be any lecture or class | before justices, who upon complaint of appellant, in conveyancing next week. To prevent interruption at the lecture, gentlemen will not be admitted after it has commenced. We are forced, for want of space, to hold over a report of an interesting case, in which Mr. J. W. Smith, Q.C., sitting in the Shrewsbury County Court, upheld the right of the Profession in regard to the appearance before the court of an unqualified person. The report shall appear in our next issue. NOTES OF NEW DECISIONS. tor or administrator may retain out of the assets, EXECUTOR-TRUSTEE-RETAINER.-An execuas well for a debt due to himself as trustee, as for a debt due in trust for himself, or a debt due to himself: (Sander v. Heathfield, 31 L. T. Rep. N. S. 400. V.C. M.). INTERROGATORIES-C. L. Р. Аст 1854, s. 51ACTION BY EXECUTORS-PLEA OF PAYMENT TO DECEASED PAYEE OF A PROMISSORY NOTEPRACTICE. In an action by the executors of the payee of a promissory note against the makers, the latter pleaded payment to the payee in his lifetime. The plaintiffs thereupon sought to interrogate the defendants as to the time and circumstances of the alleged payment. The court allowed such interrogatories to be administered, on the principle that it was agreeable with the practice in Chancery, and on the authority of Hawkins v. Carr (13 L. T. Rep. N. S. 321; L. Rep. 1 Q. B. 89): (Hill and another v. Wates and another, 31 L. T. Rep. N. S. 407. C. P.) VENDOR AND PURCHASER-SALE OF REAL PROPERTY-DEFECTIVE TITLE-DEPOSIT AND EXPENSES-DAMAGES. The defendants were lessees of a mining royalty, and proposed to sell their interest therein to the plaintiffs. They were under a covenant not to assign without the consent of the lessors. They mentioned as one of the conditions of sale, " the usual covenant for our protection as standing between you and our lessors." The plaintiffs paid a deposit, but the lessors, after some negotiations, refused their consent. The plaintiffs brought this action to recover the deposit money which they had actually paid, the expenses incident to the investigation of the defendant's title, and also damages for the loss of their bargain. Held (affirming the judgment of the court below), that the case was within the principle of Flureau v. Thornhill (2 W. Bl. 1078), and that they were only entitled to recover their deposit money, and the expenses of investigating the title. Hopkins v. Grazebrook (6 B. & C. 31) overruled: (Bain v. Fothergill, 31 L. T. Rep. N. S. 387. H. of L.) REPORTS OF SALES. Wednesday, Νου 25. By Messrs. HARDS, VAUGHAN, and JENKINSON, at the Mart. Tobago. The Indian Walk Estate of 420 acres, with plant and machinery-sold for £1800. Jamaica. The Cromwell sugar estate of 1029 acres-sold for £2000. a ratepayer, examined one of the respondents on oath and allowed the accounts. Some of the charges allowed had been incurred for team and materials provided by the said respondent with out a previous written order, for which by sect. 46 a surveyor is liable to a penalty. The justices, however, found that the required work of the highway could not otherwise have been done, that no fraud had been committed or contemplated by the respondents, that the works had been well and economically performed, and that the expenses charged were bona fide incurred. Held, upon a case stated, that sect. 46 prohibits bargains for and use of a surveyor's horses and materials, makes them absolutely illegal and void, so that without previous written order, altogether, and charges for them cannot be enforced in any way; and that the discretion to justices given by sect. 44 does not enable them to allow such charges (Barton v. Piggott, 31 L. T. Rep. N. S. 404. Q.B.) COUNTY courts. LEIGHTON BUZZARD COUNTY COURT. Wednesday, Nου. 18. (Before J. WHIGHAM, Esq., Judge.) PANY v. TURNEY. of consignee. LONDON AND NORTH-WESTERN RAILWAY COMCarrier of goods-Warehouse charges-Liability THIS was a claim by the plaintiffs against Mr. H. T. Turney, corn dealer, of Husborne Crawley, for 10s., balance of a charge of 12s. 6d. paid by the plaintiffs, on account of defendant, in respect o the warehousing of 25qrs. of maize, purchased by him in Mark-lane, on the 5th March, and intrusted to them for consignment to Ridgmount Station. Pettit, for the defence, stated that the claim was resisted on principle, the defendant, being an extensive customer to the plaintiffs, who, he alleged, had incurred the charge by reason of their own lack of diligence. It appears that Mr. Turney bought the maize, by sample, of Messrs. Mongredian and Co. The bulk of the corn was loaded upon a boat at that time lying at Canada Warf. on the Thames. Defendant commissioned a Mr. Hilliard (of the firm of G. J. Hilliard and Co., lightermen and corn examiners, of 38, Seething-lane), to test the quality of the maize upon the boat with the sample from which the purchase had been made, and, if he found it satisfactory, to arrange for its transit. Mr. Hilliard, according to his instructions, examined the corn on the same day that the transaction took place, and in the evening wrote to the Steam Tug Company, as agents for the London and North-Western Railway Company, directing them them to remove the corn "ex-craft" that is, to unload it from the barge at once and forward it to its destination. The letter, according to the evidence of a witness named George Craske, was not received until the The Cromwell Mountain, containing 174 acres-sold for £150. next evening's post, the 6th March, consequently By Messrs. EDWIN Fox and BOUSFIELD, at the Mart. Watford. The beneficial interest in the Rose and Crown Inn and other property-sold for £2600. Wednesday Dec. 2. By Messrs. DANIEL SMITH, SON, and OAKLEY, at the Mart. Strand. No. 12, Wellington-street, freehold-sold for £9050. freehold-sold for £2540. Islington.-Middlesex wharf, with house, stabling, and out Among new projects we note theestablishment of a company for the purpose of constructing works for supplying with water the city of Potsdam and the important district which extends from the western limits of Berlin to the eastern limits of the city of Potsdam. MAGISTRATES' LAW. NOTES OF NEW DECISIONS. HIGHWAYS - LICENCE BY BOARD TO OPEN ROAD-CONSIDERATION. Declaration alleged an agreement between plaintiffs and defendants, that if the plaintiffs would give and grant to the defendants licence and permission to open a certain public highway in their jurisdiction, the defendants would make good the surface of the road which might be disturbed or damaged thereby, and would pay to the plaintiffs a sum of money. Held, upon demurrer, that this was sufficient consideration for a valid bargain; and that the Act permitted by the plaintiffs, not being necessarily illegal, the declaration was good: (Edgware Highway Board v. The Harrow Gas Company, 31 L. T. Rep. N. S. 402. Q.B.) HIGHWAY-SURVEYOR'S ACCOUNTS-USE OF TEAM AND MATERIAL-ALLOWANCE OF ILLEGAL CHARGES-DISCRETION OF JUSTICES.-The accounts of the respondents, who were surveyors of highways, were duly, under sect. 44 of the Highway Act 1835, laid before and approved by the parishioners in vestry assembled; and also laid the corn could not be sent on that day, and on the 7th the number of prior orders on hand also prevented them from sending for the maize. On the 8th, when application was made for it, the Tug Company found that the corn had been removed from the barge and placed in a warehouse, and in consequence of this a charge of 12s. 6d. was levied upon it by the wharf authorities before possession could be obtained. The money was ceeded their authority in paying the warehouse demand in order to obtain possession of defendant's corn. He did not think they had done so, therefore he found that the plaintiffs were entitled to the amount claimed, with costs. SHOREDITCH COUNTY COURT. Thursday, Nov. 19 LIDSTONE V. CHURCHILL. (Before J. B. DASENT, Esq., Judge, and a Jury.) THIS was a suit for £18 15s., the price of 300 copies of a work called "The 20th Londoniad : giving a full description of the Principal Establishments in the capital of England, &c., also containing Pieces on Celebrated Personages, &c., forming altogether episodes in a Grand National Poem on the Arts." The plaintiff stated that he was an author, and that he published in the "Londoniad" advertise. ments in rhyme of the goods supplied by various wholesale houses, taking payment in subscriptions for the work. Some months since he solicited and obtained from the defendant an order for a page of advertisement in rhyme in the forthcoming edition of the book; and the defendant was to subscribe for 300 copies of it, which (the plaintiff admitted) he expected the defendant would distribute among his trade connection. The advertisement in rhyme was duly inserted, and when the book was printed, 300 copies were delivered at the defendant's warehouse. On being asked for payment some time afterwards, the defendant refused, and said the plaintiff might have all the books back again. The case for the defendant was that his business was entirely that of an agent for certain manufacturers of American machinery, that he was himself an American subject, and that the plaintiff was well aware of this when he took his order; that the work contained numerous attacks on Americans and American goods, conveyed in very violent and coarse language, and for this reason the defendant was quite unable to distribute the 300 copies delivered. He swore that the books and the advertisement were perfectly useless to him, and that he would rather have paid a large sum than have even his name appear in connec. tion with the abuse of American traders which the book contained. The plaintiff was crossexamined on the contents of the book, which, besides the matters above-mentioned, had in it a great variety of "satirical" comments upon the Royal Family, many of the judges, the late Lord Mayor, County Court officials, &c. He admitted that he had written the whole. At the close of the plaintiff's case, W. A. Lewis, for defendant, asked for a nonsuit. The book consisted in great part of indictable matter, and the contract was tainted with illegality. Not only was the consideration sued upon a thing for doing which the plaintiff might be fined and imprisoned (and therefore no action could be brough tupon it but the defendant could not distribute a single copy without subjecting himself to the same penalties. He cited Shortt on the Law relating to Literature and Art, 293, 294, and 517; also Rex v. Carlile (3 B. and Ald. 169.) C. Edmund Palmer for the plaintiff. His HONOUR said that he thought it would be more to the satisfaction of the defendant to have the verdict of the jury in his favour than a bare decision on the legal point. He should leave it to the jury to say whether they believed that the defendant had given an order at all for 300 copies of such a book as the one delivered. If not, then the contract between the plaintiff and the defendant had not been performed by the former, and no action could be maintained upon it. In summing up to the jury His Honour pointed out those portions of the evidence which appeared to show that the defendant had no suspicion of the true contents of the book he was to purchase, and that the plaintiff had led the defendant to believe the book consisted wholly of innocent advertisements in rhyme. Had the defendant any reason to know the book contained matter such as the portions complained of ? paid, and the order for consignment executed, but defendant refused to pay the wharf dues, though he had inadvertently overpaid 2s. 6d. in some other account-hence the present action to recover 10s. For the defence it was argued that, as an envelope produced would show, the letter to the Tug Company was written on the 5th, and that, even supposing it was posted late, it would have been delivered early next morning. Further, it was urged that the railway company had previously refused to pay similar charges on account of Mr. Turney, and that the dues were incurred by the company's own neglect. Mr. Hilliard said his order to remove the corn "ex-craft" was given purposely to avoid warehouse dues. In the usual course the Tug Company would apply for the corn on the day after receiving the order. He considered two days too long a time to allow it to remain on the barge; and, if the company were not prepared to remove it in the ordinary course, he thought they should have it sent to the wharf to say when it would be sent for. The judge concluded that the letter written to Mr. Craske really was delivered late on the 6th March, that the Tug Company had a pressure of other business on hand, and could not A bill of exchange drawn upon a company by its be expected to execute Mr. Hilliard's order as if they had no other matters to attend to. He did not think the delay excessive, but it appeared that they found the maize discharged when application was made for it at the wharf. The question was whether or not the Tug Company had ex The jury retired to consider, and returned a verdict for the defendant. Attorneys for defendant, Taylor and Jaquet. SHOTLEY BRIDGE COUNTY COURT. (Before E. J. MEYNELL, Esq., Judge.) THE NORTH-EASTERN RAILWAY COMPANY U. CLARK AND OTHERS. Joint Stock Companies Act 1862-Bill of exchange -Acceptance on behalf of company. corporate name was accepted as follows: "Ac cepted R. C. and J. D., directors, G. L., secretary." Held that, that the acceptance was suficiently expressed to be on behalf of the company, and the acceptors were not personlly liable. THIS was an action brought by the North-Eastern Railway Company, as holders of a bill of exchange drawn by T. W. Stears and Co., of Hull, on the Dipton Gas Company (Limited), and which was accepted by Robert Clark and John Doidge, as directors, and George Leadbitter, as secretary. Bush, solicitor, of Newcastle, appeared for the railway company. Blackwell, instructed by Barnes, of Durham, appeared for defendants Clark and Doidge. Steavenson, instructed by Salkeld, of Durham, represented defendant Leadbitter. The facts of the case sufficiently appear in judgment of the court which was delivered by E. J. Meynell, Esq., Judge, at the November sitting. His HONOUR, in delivering judgment, said: This was an action brought by the North-Eastern Railway Company, as indorsees of a bill of exchange, drawn by T. W. Stears and Company upon the Dipton Gas Company (Limited), and accepted by the three defendants, two of whom describe themselves in the acceptance as directors, and the third (Mr. Leadbitter) as secretary. The company was duly registered under the Companies' Act 1862, and, by the articles of association, the directors of the company were authorised to draw, accept, or indorse bills of exchange and promissory notes for moneys due and payable to or by the company; but it was contended on behalf of the plaintiffs that the bill was not accepted in the manner required by the 47th section of the Act, which enacts that" a promissory note or bill shall be deemed to have been made, accepted, or indorsed on behalf of any company under this Act, if made, accepted, or indorsed in the name of the company by any person acting under the authority of the company, or if made, accepted, or indorsed by, or on behalf of, or on account of the company by any person acting under the authority of the company," and therefore, that the acceptors were personally liable. Now, this bill is clearly not accepted in the name of the company, nor is it expressly stated to be accepted on behalf of, or on account of, the company; but the defendants contended that, being drawn on the company, and the acceptors being described as directors and secretary, it was sufficiently shown to be accepted on behalf of the company. Mr. Leadbitter was proved to be a director as well as secretary, and he was only an honorary secretary. An attempt was made to show that no money was due to the drawer at the time he drew the bill, but that failed. The articles of association do not provide that bills shall be accepted by any specific number of directors. In table A of the Act, regulation 66, which applies to this company, it is provided that the directors shall determine the quorum necessary for the transaction of business, and some evidence was given that three formed a quorum. The bill, therefore, in fact appears to have been accepted by a quorum, though one is only described as a secretary. The cases of Lindus v. Melrose (27 L. J. 326, Ex.); Halford v. Cameron and Co. (20 L. J. 160, Q. B.); Aggs v. Nicholson (25 L. J. 348, Ex.); Dutton v. Marsh (40 L. J. 175, Q. B.); and Courtauld v. Sanders (16 L. T. Rep. 562, C. P.), were cited and relied upon, and as all these cases have a considerable bearing on the question, it becomes necessary to examine these decisions. The case of Lindus v. Melrose was an action on a promissory note, signed by three directors of a company, registered under the 19 & 20 Vict. c. 47, whereby they jointly promised to pay £600 for value received in stock on account of the company. The 19 & 20 Vict. c. 47, enacted that a promissory note or bill should be deemed to be made or accepted in the name of the company, by any person acting under the express or implied authority of the company. It was held that the words, on account of the company" sufficiently complied with the statute, and the defendants were not personally liable. Coleridge, J., in giving judgment in that case on appeal, says: "The note certainly does not satisfy the requisitions of the section, but it does not therefore follow conclusively that the defendants are personally liable. The case must be decided on what appears to be the expressed intention of the makers of the instrument. Does the language used import that they take upon themselves personally the liability to pay the note?" He further says: "Many cases were cited in the argument, each depends on its own circumstances, and this must be decided on the same principle." The case of Aggs v. Nicholson was also an action on a promissory note as follows: "We, two of the directors of the Ark Life Assurance Society, by and on behalf of the said society promise to pay, &c. The society was registered under 7 & 8 Vict c. 110, which required promissory notes to be countersigned by the secretary, and which had not been done. The court seemed to think the signature unnecessary, but held the defendants were not personally liable. Pollock, C. B. in giving judgment, said: "We are of opinion that even if void against the company, the note is not ور therefore to be held available against the defendants. There is no estoppel, and the effect of the plea is that the defendants did not deliver the note to the plaintiff except as acting for the company. Then, if the note is imperfect, that is no more the fault of the defendants than the plaintiffs. It is not to be construed for the one and against the other, but must receive its proper construction, which, we think, is not that for which the plaintiffs contend." And in the earlier portion of the judgment he says: "Considering the note independently of the statute referred to, and looking to the meaning of the words used, we think they purport to bind the company, and not the parties signing it Nobody doubts that such was the intention." The effect, therefore, of that decision seems to be that whether the note was void against the company for want of the secretary's signature or not, it was, at all events, not binding on the defendants personally. The case of Halford v. Cameron, and Co., was an action against directors who had accepted a bill and described themselves as directors of the company, appointed to accept the bill." The corporate seal of the company was affixed, and it was countersigned by the secretary as required by 7 & 8 Vict. c. 110, under which statute the company was registered. That Act also required that the acceptance of the directors should be expressed to be on behalf of such company. The acceptance was held to be sufficient within the statute, and the defendants not liable. Lord Campbell, in his judgment, says: "Do not the two directors who have accepted these bills represent in words, exhibit by language, show and make known that the bills are accepted by them as directors on behalf of the company ? The bills are drawn on the company by its corporate name, they are sealed with its corporate seal, and they are countersigned by the secretary of the company, who so described himself. Then the two directors write upon the bill accepted, sign their names under that word, and add directors of the company appointed to accept the bills.' Can it be reasonably contended that the bill is not by such directors expressed to be accepted by them on behalf of such company ?" Now, let us apply that reasoning and the facts to this case. Here we have a bill drawn on the company by its corporate name, countersigned by the secretary (though that is not now necessary) accepted by three directors, two of whom so describe themselves; the only difference between the cases being that they do not say "appointed to accept the bill," and the seal is not attached, but which is an unnecessary formality. Moreover, under the Act of 1862, it is not required that the acceptance should be expressed to be on behalf of the company. Do not the defendants then, by accepting a bill drawn on the company, and describing themselves as directors and secretary, in the words of Lord Campbell "show and make known" that the bills are accepted by them as directors on behalf of the company? And, as Pollock, C. B., says in Aggs v. Nicholson, "nobody doubts such was the real intention." The above cases seem to establish that it is not necessary to use the exact words of the statute in order to bind the company, and that the intention of the parties is to be looked to. The cases of Dutton v. Marsh, Courtauld v. Sanders remain to be noticed, and it must be admitted they are more in favour of the plaintiff's contention. The first was a case of a promissory note in the following form: "We, the directors of the Isle of Man, &c., Company, do promise to pay to John Dutton the sum of £1600." It was signed by four directors, one of whom was described as chairman, and the corporate seal was attached. It was held the directors were personally liable. Cockburn, C. J., says-"If we were to consider the case as if the seal had not been affixed to the document, the effect of the decision is that where parties, in signing an instrument, describe themselves as directors of a company, but do not state they are acting on behalf of a company, they are individually responsible." The court held that affixing the seal did not make any difference. In the present case, however, the bill is drawn on the company, and it seems to me that the accepting as directors and secretary showed the defendants were accepting as directors and secretary of the company. Moreover, in Dutton v. Marsh it was proved that the plaintiff had said he would lend the money to the directors only; therefore, so far as intentions goes, the evidence went to show that it was intended the directors should be personally bound. In Courtauld v. Sanders the action was also on a promissory note, signed by four persons, who described themselves as directors of a company; and it was held they were personally liable. There was nothing in that case to show the defendants made the bill on behalf of the company, except the description of themselves; and, as Willes, J., said, "the words might lead to the which the drawers merely say they are directors of a company, seems to me very different from the case of a bill drawn on the company by its corporate name, and accepted by persons who describe themselves as directors and secretarythat is directors and secretary of the company on which the bill is drawn, and who have power to accept bills. The natural inference must be, I think, that they accept on behalf of the company. After the best consideration I can give these cases, and for the reasons I have expressed, I have come to the conclusion that the defendants intended to accept on behalf of the company, and that that intention is sufficiently expressed. I. therefore, give judgment for the defendants. The amount being above £20, the defendants can appeal if so advised; had it been under that amount, I would have given them leave to do so. Judgment for defendants. WORCESTER COUNTY COURT. (Before RUPERT KETTLE, Esq., Judge.) Election expenses-Corrupt practice. THE plaintiff in this action, the proprietor of the Unicorn hotel, sought to recover from the defen. dant, who resides at Abberton Hall, and who was a candidate for the representation of the city at the last general election, £4018s. 8d., the cost of refreshments supplied to defendant's agent, and persons engaged by him in connection with the general election, and cab hire. W. Meredith appeared for the plaintiff. Meredith having briefly opened the case on behalf of the plaintiff, called the latter, who stated that Mr. Bozward, defendant's agent, called upon him on the 34th Jan. Bentley objected to evidence relating to what took place between plaintiff and Mr. Bozward, as the agency of the latter to act on behalf of the defendant had not been proved. Mr. Bozward was not called. Plaintiff's examination having been resumed, Bentley again urged a similar objection as to the admissibility of evidence relating to transactions between Mr. Quarrell and plaintiff. Meredith then called Mr. Smith, from the office of Mr. John Stallard, under-sheriff at the time of the election, who produced a nomination paper showing that Mr. Quarrell was appointed defendant's agent on the 26th Jan. The plaintiff was then allowed to proceed, and stated that Mr. Quarrell called upon him on Sunday, the 25th Jan., and informed him that he had engaged about twenty election clerks, and wished them to be supplied with all necessary refreshments. He also arranged to supply Mr. Quarrell with cabs. About a fortnight after the election he applied to Mr. Quarrell for payment of his bill, but the latter said he could not pay him. He then applied to the defendant to discharge the debt, but he was unsuccessful in his application. Bentley, after cross-examining this witness, directed the attention of the court to several of the items in the bill of particulars which were for champagne, hock, &c. Mr. W. C. Quarrell was called, and materially corroborated the statement of the plaintiff. He had twenty clerks engaged on account of election work. Two cabs were almost constantly engaged. He had refused to discharge the plaintiff's claim on the ground of want of funds: he had also had to refuse to pay other bills on a similar account. Cross-examined. The refreshments were supplied for himself. Mr. Bozward, and clerks, and professional canvassers were also, he believed, supplied with some on a few occasions. He rendered an account to the defendant on the 21st March. The plaintiff's bill was included in an item of "personation agents, slip clerks, and expenses incidental to taking the poll." He received plaintiff's claim within the statutory period-one month-fixed for the sending in of claims. Bentley (cross-examining witness). - Will you undertake to say that you were not paid £1000 on the 31st Jan.? Mr. Quarrell.-Not on account of election expenses. The money was paid to me with specific instructions. I did not receive the money on the 30th; it was before the election. In answer to a further question from Bentley, witness stated that £250 was paid to Mr. Bozward, but only £60 came to him, and that was the only sum he had touched for election expenses. This concluded the case for the plaintiff. Bentley addressed the court in defence of the action. The reasons which induced the defendant to defend the action were that in his opinion he could not safely and properly pay the claim, and ought not to pay it without the sanction of that or some other court. In other words, the defendant disputed his liability, but if the court gave a ver inference that it was intended that, being direc- dict in favour of plaintiff, defendant would have tors, thoy should be personally liable as further security." The case of a promissory note in its sanction for the payment of the claim. He (Bentley) apprehended that defendant's alleged liability would depend to a great extent upon some of the clauses of the Corrupt Practices Act, and upon the circumstances under which the alleged liability was contracted. He (Bentley) then called his Honour's attention to the Corrupt Practices Prevention Act 1873 (26 Vict. c. 29, cl. 2 and 3), it being stated "that no payment shall be made before, during, or after an election otherwise than through an agent or agents whose nomination and address or addresses shall have been declared in writing to the returning officer." Meredith, in answer, contended that the law surely pre-supposed that the agent should have funds wherewith to pay the claims. No witnesses were called on behalf of the defendant. His HONOUR briefly summed up, and remarked that there was no doubt in his mind as to the reasonableness of plaintiff's claim, and he thought that the candidate was answerable for any reasonable expenses incurred by a candidate's agent. He should give his verdict in favour of plaintiff. BANKRUPTCY LAW. NOTES OF NEW DECISIONS. HEARING ON PETITION-NOTICE TO DISPUTE -DEBTOR ACCIDENTALLY DELAYED-ADJUDICATION-REASONABLE TIME. The debtor having given notice to dispute the petitioning creditor's debt under a petition filed against him, did not attend at the time appointed for the hearing, but a few minutes afterwards the registrar received a telegram stating that counsel was on the way to the court, and would shortly arrive to appear for the debtor. The registrar waited ten minutes, and then, no one being present on behalf of the detor, adjudicated him a badkrupt. Ten minutes afterwards, the debtor, attended by his solicitor and counsel, arrived, but the registrar refused to re-open the matter. Held, on appeal, that there had been undue haste in the proceedings, and that the petition must be remitted to the court below to be heard on its merits: (Ex parte Phillips; Re Phillips, 31 L. T. Rep. N. S. 416. Bank.) until after the first meeting of the creditors. At that meeting resolutions to accept a composition were duly passed, and were confirmed at a second 8s. in the pound. The receiver appeared to have realised £471, and he had kept £131 for himself or for disbursement, and the propriety of that meeting, and afterwards registered, the proceed- deduction was what the court would have to take ings under the adjudication having meanwhile into consideration. It was true that two allo. been stayed by further orders. On the application of the dentor, Ordered that the adjudication be annulled: (Ex parte Sir William Foster; Re Pooley, 31 L. T. Rep. N. S. 397. Chan.) petition-Legality. THIS was an appeal from the refusal of Mr. Registrar Keene to register a resolution of creditors. The debtors, who were shipowners, of London and Greenwich, filed a petition for liquidation in July, 1873, and at the first meeting the creditors resolved to accept a composition of 28. 6d. in the pound, payable by three instalments, by which the last was guaranteed by a surety. At the adjourned meeting the creditors confirmed the resolution, which was afterwards duly registered. The debtors resumed their business, and to several of their creditors they paid the first and second instalments of the composition, while other creditors who omitted to ask for payment, received nothing. Before the instalment became payable the debtors had incurred fresh liabilities, which they were unable to discharge, and the surety also failed. In August last the debtors filed a second petition for liquidation, under which the necessary majority of creditors, old and new, agreed to accept a composition of 6d. in the pound, but upon the resolution being brought in for registration some of the creditors opposed, on the ground of inequality, the debtors having paid to the creditors the first and second instalments agreed to be accepted under the former resolution. One of the resolutions raised before the Registrar was whether, under existing circumstances, the debtors had a legal right to file a second petition for liquidation. Mr. Registrar Keene held that the resolution was illegal and inequitable and refused to register it, and the debtors appealed. Horace Davey and F. Octavius Crump appeared for the appellants. J. Linklater and Noakes for Bailey (solicitor) for opposing creditors. At the close of the arguments, SUBPENA-SERVICEOF-BY WHOM-PRACTICE -DISCRETION-It is in the discretion of the judge to appoint by whom subpœnas issued out of the court under rules 53 and 167 shall be served. Upon a question of practice between the trustee of a bankrupt's estate and the high bailiff of the court as to the person entitled to serve a subpoena upon a witness under the 96th section of the Bankruptcy Act 1869, the judge of the County Court ruled that the high bailiff of the court, and not the solicitor of the trustee, was the proper person to make the service. Held, on appeal, that the County Court judge had rightly exercised his discretion, and that there was no ground for interfering with his decision (Ex parte Bol. land; Re Holden 31 L. T. Rep. N. S. 415. Bank.) PETITION-FORMAL AFFIDAVIT VERIFYINGACT OF BANKRUPTCY-GENERAL ALLEGATION OF ADJUDICATION SUFFICIENCY OF EVIDENCE. The usual affidavit prescribed by the rules, verifying the general statements in a bankruptcy petition, is sufficient to support the filing of the petition, but insufficient for the purpose of proving the specific act of bankruptcy relied upon. Where the petition contained a general allegation that the debtor had made a fraudulent conveyance of his property, and that allegation was unsupported, except by the simple affidavit, in the form given in the schedule to the rules, "that the statements in the petition are true," it was held on appeal that the pro-court. ceedings were irregular, notwithstanding that the debtor had given no notice to dispute, and did not appear at the hearing of the petition, and that the formal affidavit, though sufficient to support the filing, had nothing to do with the hearing of the petition and the proof of the requisites to support an adjudication: (Ex parte Lindsay; re Lindsay, 31 L. T. Rep. N. S. 415. Bank.) ADJUDICATION PENDING PROCEEDINGS FOR LIQUIDATION-COMPOSITION ACCEPTED AFTER ADJUDICATION-ANNULLING ADJUDICATION. Where an order of adjudication of bankruptcy has been made against a debtor with a stay of proceedings until after the first meeting of the creditors summoned by the debtor, who has filed a petition for liquidation, and the creditors have at such meeting duly resolved to accept a composition, and have confirmed that resolution at a second meeting, the court has power, under the 266th of the Bankruptcy Rules 1870, to annul the order of adjudication. But, quære whether the court can do so, in the case of a simple order of adjudication, without any reference to the proceedings under the petition for liquidation. After a petition in bankruptcy had been presented against him, but before any order had been made upon it, a deptor filed a petition for liquidation of his affairs by arrangement. Subsequently, with the consent of the petitioning creditor, an order of adjudication was made with a stay of proceedings DERBY COUNTY COURT. (Before W. F. WOODFORDE, Esq., Judge.) Winding-up bankruptcy estates. An application was made for an order of the court requiring Mr. W. Holbrook, who was the receiver of the estate of J. Cross, miller, of Long. ford, to bring in his accounts to be audited by the Hextall, who appeared for Mr. Holbrook, took a preliminary objection, stating that the rules required the application to be made by the trustee, which had not been done. He also said the receiver was appointed more than two years ago, and that he paid down the balance of the estate to Mr. Dainton, who gave him a receipt in the term "for £68 16s. 6d., to which I agree." He contended that in the face of that it was only a piece of vexatious practice to bring the receiver before the court. Briggs, who appeared for Mr. Dainton, cornfactor, said that as Mr. Holbrook was appointed by the court he became one of its officers, and was liable to be called upon to furnish his accounts for audit in the ordinary way, and nothing which Mr. Dainton had done exonerated him from that liability. Mr. Dainton wasappointed the trustee, he being a large creditor, and he subsequently arranged to buy the estate, paying the creditors 8s. in the pound upon their claims, little thinking he would be called upon by the comptroller to furnish the accounts which bave been required of him. The basis of his accounts would be those of the receiver, and until the receiver had got his accounts passed Mr. Dainton could not complete his own. The Deputy Registrar produced the file of proceedings, and stated that there was no resolution thereon to show that the creditors had accepted caturs had been given to the receiver, but it was under peculiar circumstances. It was stated positively that a resolution was passed accepting 8s. in the pound, and further that it had been paid. Relying upon that the allocaturs were given, but it turned out on reference to the file that no such resolution had been entered, and that the trustee has kept no book, nor done anything to comply with the requirements of the court. His HONOUR said it was rather improvident granting allocaturs under such circumstances, although it would be difficult to conduct the busi. ness of the court if a certain amount of reliance could not be placed upon the statements made. But assuming the improvidence of the officer in giving the allocaturs, it did not affect the creditors, who were entitled to a thorough investigation. The receiver must within seven days bring n his accounts to be audited by the court. DURHAM COUNTY COURT. (Before E. J. MEYNELL, Esq., Judge.) The Bankruptcy Act 1869-Preference-Payment under pressure to a solicitor on day of filing petition for liquidation. THE following judgment was given on the ques. tion of what is and what is not a preference pay. ment by a debtor: His HONOUR gave judgment as follows: This was an application on behalf of the trustees in the liquidation of Mr. John Smith, of Langley Paper Mills, to order Mr. Brignal, who had been solicitor to the debtor, to repay to the trustees the sum of £64 15s. 6d., which had been paid to him by the debtor on the day he filed his petition for liquidation, and the chief, and indeed only ground for the application, which it is necessary to consider, and on which I reserved judgment, was whether the payment was a fraudulent preference in the 92nd section of the Act of 1869. The only evidence on which the application is founded is contained in the examination of Mr. Brignal himself (the debtor not having been examined), and the facts of the case must be taken from that evidence. It appears that Mr. Brignal had acted for some time as solicitor to the debtor, and a considerable sum was due to him for professional services, and on the 3rd Dec. he issued a writ, and which he states he was not able to serve, and at all events he did not serve until the 5th March following. In the mean time, however, namely, on the 20th Jan., the debtor sent two cheques of £25 each with a letter, as follows:-" Inclosed you have two cheques, value £50, on account, which are sure to be met when due. We will remit you again when these have become due." One of these cheques was duly met. On the 11th Feb. Mr. Brignal received another letter from the debtor, stating his inability to meet the cheque (alluding to one of the two cheques) if presented on Thursday, and requesting Mr. Brignal to hold it over until the following Thursday. A similar letter was received during February (it is undated) again asking that the cheques might be held over, Then Mr. Brignal states he kept pressing for payment, and on the 24th Feb. he writes: "You have humbugged me so much about the payment of the second £25 cheque that my patience is exhausted, and I will wait no longer. Unless, therefore, the money is paid by eleven to-morrow I will take steps. So blame yourselves." This letter certainly looks like pressure. Next day Mr. Brignal goes to the debtor's residence, was unable to see him, but obtains a promise from the debtor's son that he should be paid the next week. He was not paid, and on the following 5th of March the writ was served. Then on the following day Mr. Brignal had an interview with the debtor (the first time he had seen him for some months), and, as he swears, insisted on having some money on account; and finally the debtor gave Mr. Brignal a cheque of a Mr. Cripps for £64 15s. 6d. on account of his debt, the amount in question. Mr. Brignal states that after the cheque was received by him they had a conversation about the debtor's affairs, and Mr. Brignal advised him to file a petition; and on the same day at a second interview, some hours after, the debtor signed the petition. Under these circumstances the questionis whether the payment was a fraudulent preference. Although fraudulent preferences have always been held to be void, they have never been declared so by express enactment until the present Bank. ruptcy Act sect. 92. It has been decided, however, by the Chief Judge in Re Cheeseborough; Ex parte Hitchcock (40 L. J., 79), and by the Lords Justices in Ex parte Topham; Re Walker (42 L. J., B. 57), that the statute makes no alteration in the law as to fraudulent preference; in fact, that sect. 92 is merely declaratory. Now, |