ACCEPTANCE. See BILLS AND NOTES, 1. 2. 5. 7. ACCOMMODATION. ACCORD. ACCOUNTS. See LIMITATION OF ACTIONS. ACKNOWLEDGMENT BY ACTION. See EVIDENCE. JOINT STOCK COMPANY. ACTION ON THE CASE. PATENT. ADMINISTRATION. TRESPASS, 1. 5. 1. Case, by a tackle-house porter of the city of London, claiming a right to the landing of certain goods imported into London. The declaration alleged "that from time immemorial &c. the mayor and commonalty and citizens of the Icity of London have had, and still of right ought to have, by themselves and the persons by them in that behalf deputed, appointed and permitted, the work and labour of unshipping, landing, carrying, and loading, except to the houses of aliens, of all goods, wares, and merchandize imported into the port of London, and not consigned to aliens or an alien, for reasonable reward in that behalf." This allegation in the declaration was held not to be sustained, the evidence shewing that the rights, granted or confirmed by a charter of Charles I., of the unshipping and porterage of aliens' goods (all of which were abolished by the 3 & 4 W. 4. c. 66. and an agreement made in pursuance of that statute) were not confined to goods landed and sent to the houses of aliens, but extended to all goods of aliens imported into the port of London. Collyer v. Stennett. Page 676 2. To a declaration in case for entering rooms in the occupation of the tenant of the plaintiff, and tearing down ceiling, roof, and chimneys, and demolishing windows, the defendant justified under a deed of assignment in trust for creditors, from C. H. (who was shown to be the lessee of the pre AGREEMENT. See SHIP, 1, 2. 1. B. being indebted to A. signed a document in these terms: "I engage to ship for your account at M. in any vessel you may engage &c. from forty to sixty tons Morocco produce, on the following terms, &c. And I also engage that the above shall be shipped by my agent there within thirty to fifty days from the time of the vessel being ready to take in her cargo, &c. I do further engage to ship produce, on similar terms to the above, to the amount of what I may remain indebted to you after the first shipment as above, within six months from the sailing of the first vessel." A. sent out a vessel and received the goods first mentioned. In an action by A. to recover the residue of the debt: Held, that the agreement could not be set up as an answer, as it was optional on the part of A. whether he would send out a second vessel; and therefore that it did not support a plea alleging an agreement on the part of A. to send out a second vessel, and receive the goods in liquidation of the debt. Phillips v. Aflalo. Page 846 2. A contract which states that "A. having agreed to purchase a house of B. B. agreed to paper the rooms" may be declared upon as a contract whereby A. agreed to 410 purchase. Hall v. Betty. 3. Upon a contract for the sale of a house an engagement to make a good title is implied, though other terms of the purchase are reduced to writing. Ibid. 4. By an agreement in May, A. lets to B. a house at "801. a year, payable quarterly, to commence from the 29th September." B. agrees to take the fixtures at a valuation, &c. A. agrees to take the fixtures again at the expiration of the tenancy, "provided they are in as good condition as they now are," and B. agrees to leave the premises in the same state as they now are. The house at the time of the making of the agreement is in the occupation of C. as tenant to A. C. quits on the 26th September. Held, that notwithstanding the existence of express terms of agreement, an implied contract arose on the part of B. to use the. premises in a tenant-like manner; and that the agreement supported the allegation of a promise to deliver up the premises in the same state as they were in at the commencement of the tenancy. White v. Nicholson. Page 95 5. A horse, not entitled by the rules of a race to run, is entered, and the subscription is paid. Notice of the objection is given before the race. The horse wins. Held, that the subscription cannot be recovered back. Goldsmith v. Martin. ALIEN. See ACTION ON THE CASE, 1. ALLOCATUR. See COSTS, 6, 7, 8. ALTERATION. 5 See IGNORANCE OF FACT. WARRANT OF ATTORNEY, 3. AMENDMENT. See BANKRUPt, 6. 1. Writ of summons in assumpsit indorsed for 150l. Particulars for the same amount. Damages in declaration laid at 107. only. Verdict for 150l. The court refused to amend the issue and the record by increasing the damages laid in the 4 c declaration to 150l. but granted a new trial on payment of costs, with liberty to the plaintiff to amend. Tebbs v. Barron. Page 844 2. Particulars of demand allowed to Le amended after a submission to arbitration. Blunt v. Cooke. 458 AMICUS CURIE. Quære, whether any person, or at least any counsel, is not a liberty, not arrived from the country, was refused. In re Evans and Howell. Page 767 ARREST OF JUDGMENT. See BANKING COMPANY. Trespass, 1. ASSUMPSIT. See BARON AND Feme, 1, 2. SHIP, 1, 2, 3. as amicus curiæ, to point out error 1. In assumpsit upon a contract to in the proceedings of the court without moving to set them aside; and whether a party who conceives himself to be aggrieved by such proceedings has not the right to instruct counsel to point out the error without making such counsel his representative, so as to dispense with the necessity of process to bring such party into 771 (a) court. APOTHECARY. See SLANDER. APPEARANCE. See DISTRINGAS. OUTLAWRY. ARBITRAMENT. See AMENDMENT, 2. RENT CHARGE. SET-OFF. An application, made on the last day but one of the term, for leave to move on the last day of the term to set aside an award, on the ground that the affidavit on which the motion was to be founded had sell and deliver sound tares with a breach, that the tares delivered were unsound; and also upon a promise properly to ship the tares with a breach that they were improperly shipped, and thereby damaged: the defendant pleaded that the plaintiff had impleaded the defendant in a foreign court for not performing the identical promises in the first and second counts mentioned, and that the said court had adjudged that the plaintiff had no cause of action in respect of the non-performance of the said promises; and that such judgment was final and conclusive. In support of this plea, a judgment of the foreign court was produced: "That the plaintiff be barred of his claim against defendant on account of a cargo of tares received by the ship M. S." In a judicial narrative appended to this judgment, it was stated that part of the tares contracted for had reached the plaintiff; that he had refused to accept them, on account of their unsound condition; that he had sold them under protest; and that he had instituted that suit to rescind the contract and recover back the money from the defendant; but that by the law of the country in which the court sat and in which the goods were shipped and in which the defendant resided, he was barred by lapse of time. Held, that the judgment did not support the plea, inasmuch as it clearly was not applicable to the cause of action contained in the second count. Held also, that the plea could not be taken divisibly, so as to be applied to the first count only. Held also, that the court (which by agreement had the powers of a judge at nisi prius) ought not to amend the plea by stating that the judgment was in respect of the promise in the first count only. Quære, whether the judgment was applicable even to the cause of action contained in the first count. Callandar v. Dittrich. Page 68 2. The declaration stated the consideration to be, that A. "would then engage" C. as traveller; and averred that A. " did then engage C." It was proved that A. had previously employed him in that capacity. Held, that this proof was consistent with the allegation. Norton v. Powell. Page 42 3. Quære, whether A. (before 6 & 7 Vict. c. 85.) was an admissible witness on behalf of B. to prove that he had paid over money to C. on account of B. Ibid. 42 ATTORNEY. See CORPORATION, 1, 2, 3. PRACTICE, 4. A rule to prohibit an attorney from practising in this court was granted on reading a rule of the court of Queen's Bench to the like effect. In re Whytehead. Page 768 AUCTION. Woollen and mercery goods were put up to sale by auction. Each lot was described in the catalogue as containing a certain number of yards. The goods were open for public inspection for two days preceding the sale. By the printed conditions of sale, the purchaser of any lot was to pay down a deposit; the lots were to be taken away with all faults, imperfections, or errors of description, on a day specified; and the remainder of the purchase money was to be paid before the delivery. There was also a memorandum that all small remnants were to be cleared at the measure stated in the catalogue. The biddings at the sale were to be at so much per yard. Held, that in such a sale no condition is implied that a purchaser may inspect and measure before paying the remainder of the purchase money. Held also, that such a condition would be at variance with the printed conditions. 4 c 2 |