1842. May 30. A copy of the declara tion and notice was niece of the tenant upon On the premises, DOE dem. HINE v. ROE (LAWRENCE). STORKS Serjt. moved for judgment against the casual ejector. It appeared from the affidavit that the premises were in the possession of two tenants. The serserved on the vice on one of them was by delivering a copy of the declaration and notice, and reading over and explaining the same to his daughter (upon the premises) who promised to deliver the same to her father on the 23d of May (the first day of the term), the father acknowledged to the deponent that he had received the copy of the declaration and notice from his daughter on the preceding Saturday. With respect to the other tenant, it was stated that a copy of the declaration and notice was delivered, read, and explained to his niece (who was a she gave the member of his family) upon the premises; that she promised to deliver it to her uncle; and that she had subsequently admitted that she had delivered it to him. make an affidavit, but stated that copy to the tenant on the Saturday, or on the following day, (Monday, being the first day of the term): Held, insufficient. The court said that the rule might go as to the first mentioned tenant; but that as to the other, nothing had been shewn to entitle the party even to a rule nisi. They, however, suggested that the niece should be applied to for an affidavit; and in the event of her declining to make one, the lessor of the plaintiff might possibly have a rule nisi, as he then would have done every thing in his power. Storks now renewed his motion on an affidavit, from which it appeared that application had been made to the niece for an affidavit, who had refused to make it, but had told the deponent that she had delivered the declaration and notice to her uncle on the day on which they were left with her (Saturday the 21st), or on the following day, Monday, the 23d, being the first day of term. Per curiam. It cannot be inferred from this statement that the declaration and notice reached the hands of this tenant on the Saturday, and if he did not receive them until the Sunday, the service would be bad. Therefore, as to the premises occupied by this tenant, the rule must be refused. Rule accordingly. 1842. DoE dem. บ. ROE. In re EVANS and HOWELL. June 11. tion made on the last day but one of the term for leave IN this case all matters in difference had been sub- An applicamitted to arbitration by bond, pursuant to the 9 & 10 W. 3. c. 15., and previous to the commencment of the present term an award had been made in favour of the plaintiff. Bompas Serjt., on behalf of the defendant, this day asked leave of the court to be allowed to move on Monday (the last day of the term) to set aside the award, the affidavit on which the motion was intended to be grounded not having arrived from the country. to move, on the last day of the term, to set aside an award, on the motion was MAULE J. It is enacted by the second section of the the country, 9 & 10 W. 3. c. 15. that "any arbitration or umpirage procured by corruption or undue means shall be judged and esteemed void and of none effect, and accordingly be set aside by any court of law or equity, so as com was refused by the court. 1842. In re EVANS and HOWELL. plaint of such corruption or undue practice be made in the court where the rule is made for submission to such arbitration or umpirage before the last day of the next term after such arbitration or umpirage made and published to the parties." By the statute, therefore, a party in whose favour an award has been made is entitled to the benefit thereof, unless a motion be made to set it aside before the last day of the following term. To allow this application would be, in effect, to repeal the act. The motion, if made at all, must be made to-day. COLTMAN J. concurred. Motion refused. (a) (a) The other judges had left the court. June 11. A rule to prohibit an attorney from practising in granted, on of the court In re JOHN WHYTEHEAD. CHANNELL Serjt. moved for a rule to prohibit Mr. Whytehead, an attorney of this court, from practising herein, upon reading a rule of the Queen's Bench this court was prohibiting him from practising in that court. The reading a rule learned serjeant cited Ex parte Yates (a), where an attorney was struck off the roll of this court in accordance Bench to the with a rule of the court of King's Bench for striking him off the roll of that court, and he was afterwards readmitted in this court, without any inquiry as to the circumstances, upon his being readmitted in the court of King's Bench. of Queen's like effect. where this court refused to strike an attorney off the roll upon an affidavit that he had been struck off the roll of the court of King's Bench; the contents of the affidavits on which the court of King's Bench acted not having been stated, and there being no proof or allegation that the attorney had been struck off for a misdemeanor. See also In re Richard Peter Smith, 1 Brod. & B. 522., 4 B. Moore, 319., 1842. In re WHYTEHEAD. M'KELLAR and Another v. REDDIE. BOMPAS Serjt. applied for leave to enter of record a continuation of process under the 2 W. 4. c. 39. s..10. (a), in order to prevent the operation of the statute of limitations. The date of the writ of summons June 13. A writ issued on the 8th of January. A subsequent writ to continue the former was issued on the 7th of June. On the latter being tendered for entry of record, it was objected to as being out of time. The court granted a rule to enter it of record, valeat quantum. (a) By which it is enacted, "That no writ issued by authority of this act, shall be in force for more than four calendar months from the day of the date thereof, including the day of such date, but every writ of summons and capias may be continued by alias and pluries, as the case may require, if any defendant therein named may not have been arrested thereon or served therewith provided always, that no first writ shall be available to prevent the operation of any statute whereby the time for the commencement of the action may be limited, unless the defendant shall be arrested thereon or served therewith, or proceedings to or toward outlawry shall be had thereupon, or unless such writ and every writ (if any) issued in continuation of a preceding writ shall be returned non est inventus, and entered of record within one calendar month next after the expiration thereof, including the day of such expiration, and unless every writ, issued in continuation of a preIceding writ, shall be issued within one such calendar month after the expiration of the preceding writ, and shall contain a memorandum indorsed thereon or subscribed thereto, specifying the day of the date of the first writ, and return to be made in bailable process by the sheriff or other officer to whom the writ shall be directed, or his successor in office, and, in process not bailable, by the plaintiff or his attorney suing out the same, as the case may be." 1842. MCKELLAR v. Reddie. was the 15th of March 1841, of the alias writ of summons the 12th of August, and of the pluries the 8th of January 1842. A second pluries was issued to continue the preceding writ, dated the 7th of June; but on being tendered for entry of record, was objected to by the officer as being too late. TINDAL C. J. Take your rule, valeat quantum. The rest of the court concurring, Rule granted. June 13. A distringas may be issued to compel the appearance of a peer, who is known to be abroad. HOULDITCH v. The Earl of LICHFIELD. BOMPAS Serjt. having obtained a rule nisi to set aside a distringas, which had been issued to compel the appearance of the defendant, who was known to be abroad, on the ground that the 2 W. 4. c. 39. s. 3. did not warrant the proceeding, Channell Serjt. now shewed cause. The distringas was properly issued. In Davis v. The Earl of Lichfield (a) the court of Exchequer allowed a distringas to issue against the same defendant, and a similar application to the present was there made on the part of the defendant, but without success. Bompas Serjt., in support of his rule. A distringas can only be issued against a party shewn to be abroad at the time, for the purpose of proceeding to outlawry. [Tindal C. J. In a case like the present it would be a (a) 1 Dowl. N. S. 363. |