is taxable, except the land occupied by the road. In fendant, in an action for the infringement of a patent, M'Cabe v. The Bank of England it was laid down by alleged that the machines complained of had been found the House of Lords that it is a rule that where a unsuccessful, had been taken down five years before plaintiff having failed in one action commences another the action, and had been removed from his premises for the same matter, proceedings will be stayed until three years before, and denied any threat or intenthe costs of the first action have been paid. In La tion to use machines which infringed the patent, it Cité de Montréal v. Les Ecclésiastiques du Séminaire de was held by the Court of Appeal that there ought not St. Sulpice it was laid down that the Judicial Com- to be an injunction, and that the Lancaster Palamittee will not grant leave to appeal from a judgment tine Court had no jurisdiction to give damages. of the Supreme Court of Canada when the judgment ap- In Doughty v. Townson it was laid down by the Court pears right or unattended with doubt, even although the of Appeal that advertisements, if published in the case is of a substantial character and involves matters of London Gazette and two local papers, for creditors and great public interest and raises an important question of claimants under Lord St. Leonard's Act (22 & 23 Vict. law. In The Mutual Provident Land Investing and Build- c. 35), s. 29, against the estate of a Lancashire farmer ing Society (Lim.) v. Macmillan it was held that a declar- deceased, were sufficient; that there was no practice ation, under 17 Vict. No. 22 (New South Wales), s. 1,which requiring them to appear in any other London newsprovides that a declaration by a person executing a power paper; that one month from the date of the advertiseof attorney, that he has not received notice of revoca- ment was also sufficient, notwithstanding that at the tion, made immediately before or after executing any dates of issue of the several newspapers a full month's conveyance, shall be conclusive proof of such non- notice was not given; and that, consequently, a claim revocation at the time of such execution in favour brought against the executor by a person alleging that of any person who shall bona fide and for valuable the estate was liable was dismissed. In the case of consideration, and without notice to himself of any such In re Harrison, M'Gregor & Co.'s Trade-mark, it was revocation, have accepted any such conveyance,' was held that the word 'Albion,' registered as an old mark conclusive proof of non-revocation even if the attorney used prior to 1875, to designate agricultural machines had received notice of death or revocation at the time of a particular pattern, had not been used as a tradeof execution. In The North Shore Railway Company mark, and that such a word, although used prior to v. Pion it was held that by the law of Canada there is August 13, 1875, is not a special and distinctive word no distinction in the rights of riparian owners in used as a trade-mark before the passing of the Traderespect to tidal or navigable and non-navigable rivers, marks Registration Act, 1875, so that its registration and that owners with a frontage accessible to a tidal will, under section 90 of the Patents, &c., Act, 1883, be river are entitled to compensation from a railway com- expunged at the instance of a person aggrieved. In the pany for damage caused by the obstruction by the case of In re Roberts it was held by Mr. Justice Kay that a solicitor who advances money to a client on Of the Chancery Cases, in Royle v. Hayes it was mortgage is not entitled to charge the mortgagor his held by the Court of Appeal that there is no jurisdic- costs for the preparation of the mortgage. In the case tion on an originating summons to determine the ques- of In re The Combined Weighing and Advertising tion of the validity of a gift of money made by a testator Machine Company (Lim.) it was held by the Court of to his wife in his lifetime, the money being in her pos- Appeal that a garnishee order absolute obtained against session at the time of his death, not being a question which a company does not constitute the garnishor a creditor could have been determined under a judgment for admin- of the company so as to entitle him to present a istration of a testator's estate or the execution of a trust. winding-up petition. In Fisher v. Shirley it was held In The Neath Permanent Benefit Building Society v. that a covenant in a marriage settlement by Luce it was held that the right of a lender to a building the husband to settle future property acquired society in excess of its borrowing power to securities by him in right of his wife includes property obtained from members of the society by means of the coming to him through his wife after her death. loan extends to the whole amount covered by such In Dutton v. Brookfield it was held that an executor securities, although a lesser amount was, in fact, re- and trustee authorised under the terms of a will to ceived by the members from the society, in calculat- make any sales or arrangements he shall judge expeing which, by the Building Societies Act, 1874, s. 15, dient had power to mortgage the testator's real estate in subs. 2, is not to exceed 'two-thirds of the amount for order to meet some pressing claims against the estate. the time being secured to the society by mortgages from In The Sheffield and South Yorkshire Building Society its members, but is not limited to the principal sum v. Aizlewood it was held that the directors were not secured, but covers all sums due for interest, or liable for the loss of a sum advanced upon a second fines or otherwise, and all instalments not then ac- mortgage of a leasehold colliery and certain collateral crued due, but secured by such mortgages and out- security, although the valuer on whose opinion they standing. In Whitby v. Mitchell an appointment by acted was selected by the chairman from a list of four husband and wife, life tenants in succession under their names supplied by the mortgagor, and the directors had marriage settlement, then, with remainder to the use of an implied power to pay off a first mortgage and to enter the child or more remote issue of the marriage born into possession and pay the rents and royalties and before the date of the appointment, to the use of proper expenses of working, and were not liable for loss a married daughter for life, for her separate use, without power of anticipation, with remainder to the use of such as she should by will appoint, and, in default of her children living at the date of the appointment as tenants in common in fee, was held void, excepting the limitation to the daughter for her life, for her separate use. In Proctor v. Bayley, where the de

railway to their access to the river.

resulting thereby. In Glasier v. Rolls it was laid down by the Court of Appeal that after an order of the Appeal Court has been passed and entered the Court will not alter the decision as to costs, unless the order does not express the intention of the Court at the time when the order was made, when an application for that purpose should be made or at the hearing of the case or imme

diately after judgment is given, and the rule that, machinery on the premises, and who next day let the except in extreme cases, the costs of shorthand notes machinery to one of the partners at a half-yearly rent, of the evidence would not be allowed was insisted on, which remained in the hirer's possession, the solicitor's as the judges' notes, coupled with the notes of counsel, name-plates being attached, until the hirer's bankruptcy, ought generally to be sufficient. In the case of In re when the solicitor claimed it, was held not a document Bithray, upon a petition by a judgment creditor, who requiring registration under the Bills of Sale Act. In had obtained equitable execution of the debtor's inte- The Steamship County of Lancaster v. Sharpe & Co. conrest in land by the appointment of a receiver of the signees under a bill of lading of goods deliverable to rents and profits thereof (the land being subject to a them, 'paying freight and all other conditions as per legal mortgage), the Court ordered an immediate sale charter-party,' refusing to pay demurrage incurred at without directing inquiries, the mortgagee consent- the port of loading and due under the terms of the ing to the sale, and there being evidence that charter-party, but accepting delivery of the goods, and there was no other charge on the land. In the known to the shipowners to be acting only as agents, case of Reichel v. The Bishop of Oxford it was were held not liable in an action by the shipowners for laid down by the House of Lords that a deed of re- demurrage. In King v. The Charing Cross Bank it was signation does not require the presence of a notary that laid down that an application for a prohibition to a an understanding that the formal declaration of accept- County Court may, notwithstanding Order LIX., ance by the ordinary is to be postponed for a time does rule Sa, of the Rules of the Supreme Court, be made allow of revoking the resignation, and that when a at chambers, as well during the sittings as in vacation, resignation has been made at the request of the bishop under the provisions of section 127 of the County in order to avoid the scandal of a commission to inquire Courts Act, 1888, and that rule 20 of Order L. of the into the moral conduct of the clerk it is not made void. County Court Rules, 1889, by which a County Court Of the Queen's Bench cases, it was held by the Court judge may, in his discretion, give costs on the higher of Appeal in Phillips v. Rees that the bailiff of the scale in any case in which the claim exceeds 207., and a County Court who levies the distress, and not the sum not exceeding 201. is recovered, is not rendered landlord, is the person making a distress' within the ultra vires by, nor is it inconsistent with, section 119 meaning of section 49 of the Agricultural Holdings of the County Courts Act, 1888, which gives power Act, 1883 (46 & 47 Vict. c. 61), entitled to the per- to a County Court judge to award costs on the higher centage allowed to be charged on a distress for rent on scale in the three classes of actions there specified. a holding when the sum demanded exceeds the sum of In Regina v. Fitzroy Couper it was held that, where 201. In Smith v. Wood & Co. it was held by the Court particulars indorsed on an ordinary summons in a of Appeal that weighing by putting an empty sack County Court bore a lithographed indorsement of the of coal in the scale of the weights is not a weighing solicitor's name and address, but were not otherwise according to the provisions of section 57 of the Metro-signed by the solicitor, the particulars were not signed polis Coal Act (1 & 2 Wm. IV. c. lxxvi.), which pro- within the joint provisions of Order VI., rule 10 of vides that where the purchaser of coals delivered in the County Court Rules, 1889, and the Appendix sacks within the metropolis desires to have the same thereto, and that therefore the costs for the particulars weighed, all the sacks, both with and without the could not be recovered by the plaintiff from the decoals therein,' are to be weighed. In Patrick v. fendant. In Greenhan v. Child a bill of sale which Simpson it was held that a widow, executrix and described the grantor as being of three different trustee of her husband's will, who took posses- places, all being in the same county, while the affidavit sion of two freehold houses not mentioned in the will, described his residence as being one of them in and from 1876, when her husband died, till 1889 re- which he lived and carried on his chief business, ceived the rents and profits, when the heir claimed the other places being branch establishments, was them, could not set up the Statutes of Limitation, but held good, as the residence of the grantor was that the will raised an express trust in favour of the sufficiently described in the affidavit for registration, heir-at-law. In Usher & Co. v. Martin Hall it was and it was not necessary to set out all his places of held that the grantee of an equity of redemption in business. In the case of In re Waymen, ex parte The chattels can maintain title to the chattels in an inter- Board of Trade, it was held that subsection 2 of secpleader issue. In the case of In re an Arbitration tion 73 of the Bankruptcy Act, 1883, does not enable a between Pyman & Co. and Dreyfus & Co., charterers trustee, who is a solicitor, to contract that his remuneunder a charter to proceed to port and there load, were ration shall be his proper professional charges for the held liable for demurrage and detention for waiting work done, but is governed by subsection 1 of section 72, their turn in the inner port when it was possible to load which declares that a trustee's remuneration shall be in in the outer. In the case of In re Gee, ex parte The the nature of a commission or percentage. Official Receiver, it was held by Mr. Justice Cave that of In re Paul, ex parte Lord Portarlington, it was held where a bankrupt has, prior to his bankruptcy, assigned that the words 'determination of tenancy' in section 7 to another person land, demised to him by a lease bur- of the Agricultural Holdings Act, 1883, include the dened with onerous covenants, for the whole of the time for which by custom a tenant may hold over, and residue of the term, subject only to a proviso is not the day on which the tenant had given notice of for its redemption, the interest of the bankrupt his intention to quit, and on which he had delivered up in the demised land is not property burdened with the farm, except certain acres retained according to the onerous covenants within the meaning of section custom.

In the case

55 of the Bankruptcy Act, 1883, and therefore no dis- Of the Magistrates' cases, in Burton-on-Trent v. The claimer by the trustee under that section is necessary. Egginton Churchwardens it was held by the Court of ApIn the case of Collins v. Weymouth an agreement peal a corporation, which, under the provisions of a by a solicitor, who, in order to provide funds for private Act, acquired land for the disposal of sewage the dissolution of a partnership, bought some of the, and pumping station impossible to work except at a loss,

and whilst used as part of the sewage system, incap- treats his subject, we may refer to a method of tabular able of yielding a profit, must be taken into account as analysis suggested by him to be used on looking into a hypothetical tenants from year to year in ascertaining title. The plan is to commence the table by setting the ratable value of their occupation. In Thornton v. down the name of the owner at the date of the root of Clegg it was held that, where the tenant of a licensed the title, and to show each disposition or devolution of house gave up the premises on September 29, and did the estate by drawing a line down from the name of not apply for a renewal at or before the last meeting of the last owner and writing the new owner's name the general licensing sessions, which was on Septem- underneath. Where the grantor does not part with his ber 26, the incoming tenant who applied for a license whole estate, the derivative interest is shown by carrying at the next special sessions on October 10, and was re- out lines to the right or left, and thus tracing out fused by the justices, had a right to appeal to quarter the interest to its determination or extinction. The sessions on the ground that his application was not an method provides for the separate tracing out of legal application for renewal or transfer of a license under estate and equitable interest, and, when carried out in sections 4 and 14 of the Licensing Act, 1828, and its entirety, the practitioner is able to see at a glance the right to appeal was not taken away by the the position of the legal estate and every equitable Licensing Act, 1872. In Evans v. The Newport Sani- interest, thus lessening the risk of overlooking any intary Authority it was held that an ancient footpath cumbrance, and rendering it easy to take up the thread or highway, the original track of which has been of the title at any time. The book gives a comprepartially altered, widened, and added to, and abutting hensive outline of the law relating to title, and is full upon which houses have been built, is a new street of points of practical importance to purchasers backed within the meaning of the Public Health Act, 1875, up by references to the authorities bearing upon them. and repairable by the owning frontagers, and not by Registered titles are dealt with in a separate chapter, the inhabitants at large. while in an appendix is given a series of tables showing the stamp duties on deeds relating to land since the year 1815.

Reviews.

BOWER AND WEBB ON ELECTRIC LIGHTING.
The Law relating to Electric Lighting. By G. S. BOWER
and W. WEBB. Second Edition. London: Sampson
Low. 1889.

Unreported Cases.

BANKRUPTCY CASE.
SPECIFIC MISCONDUCT.

THE passing of the amending Act of 1888, and the ON December 17, before Mr. Registrar Linklater, sitting issue of the Board of Trade Regulations thereunder (which regulations are the result of a circular addressed to the various sanitary authorities by the Board of Trade for the purpose of settling their terms), have made a new edition of Messrs. Bower and Webb's book almost a matter of necessity. The plan of the authors is to print the two Acts of 1882 and 1888 in logical and not chronological order, in conformity with the legislative direction in section 5 of the Act of 1888, that the two Acts are to be read as one. The intersectional notes are very full and good, though perhaps a little too discursive, and the introduction is a model of clear, explanatory writing. The four appendices now contain the Board of Trade rules as to applications for licenses and provisional orders, the model form of provisional order for a metropolitan area with its seventy-eight clauses, the general public safety regulations, and the Liverpool license regulations as to safety of the public and supply of electricity.

in Bankruptcy, an application was made in the case of In re Storrie. The receiving order under this failure was made in April last, and the bankrupt now applied for an order of discharge. It appeared that the bankrupt began business as an outside broker in 1874 with 4007. borrowed capital. The official receiver reported against the discharge on the ground that his accounts did not sufficiently disclose his financial position; that he brought on his failure through rash and hazardous speculations. There were also charges of fraud brought against the bankrupt arising out of certain shares which he was authorised to pledge for Mr. Edwards, an accountant, for 600l., and which he pledged for 1,000. Another charge preferred against the bankrupt was with reference to an investment of Mr. Stringer. The facts were shortly these: Stringer employed the bankrupt to purchase thirty-five Tarapaca Bank shares, and supplied him with the money to pay for them. The bankrupt delivered twenty shares only, and expended Stringer's money generally in his business, and Stringer now ranked as a creditor in respect of the money so misapplied. The bankrupt explained that in a panic he had not marked the shares off in his book as closed, and so Stringer's name was not passed, and the shares were not paid for and delivered; that at Hints as to Advising on Title and Practical Suggestions that time the money was in the bank, and but for the for Perusing and Analysing Abstract. With an Out- mistake Stringer would have received the shares, and line of the Law relating to Title to Land and Tables his money would have been used in paying for them. of Stamp Duties since 1815. By WILLIAM HENRY Mr. Busby made a further charge against the bankGOVER, Barrister-at-Law. London: Sweet & Max-rupt to the effect that, when he had been dealing well (Lim.). 1889.

ADVISING ON TITLE.

with him, he expressly told him he could not do any business with him on his own account, and so made it a THIS is a book which is likely to be very useful to stipulation that he should not bring him any business young conveyancers, containing as it does many prac- unless he had a principal behind him. The banktical hints and suggestions for dealing with the ques- rupt agreed to these terms, but had transactions tions usually arising on abstracts of title to land, and with Busby on his own account notwithstanding.advising on the title shown thereby. As an instance Mr. Registrar Linklater, in giving judgment, referred to of the thoroughly practical way in which Mr. Gover two different statements of affairs which had been filed

of the judges at such time as they shall appoint, and sity provided that 'persons who have been admitted they may dismiss or allow such appeal, or make such to degrees in any university recognised by the Uniother order as to them may seem fit.' Three of the versity of Melbourne, and who shall produce evidence judges (the Chief Justice, Mr. Justice Williams, and Mr. of the same satisfactory to the professorial board, may Justice a'Beckett) heard this appeal in chambers, and be admitted to the same degrees in the University of Melintimated an opinion that the Adelaide University was bourne.' It was admitted that, on one occasion, the recognised by the Melbourne University, and the matter University of Melbourne did admit to the ad eundem dewent back to the board of examiners, who, however, gree of Bachelor of Arts a gentleman who was a Bachelor adhered to their original opinion that it had not been of Arts of the Adelaide University, but it was submitted recognised, and refused to give a certificate. Mr. Jones that that was not a 'recognition' of that university in the again brought the matter before the judges. The case proper sense of the term. The word 'recognise' was not was then heard before the Chief Justice, Mr. Justice to be used in its colloquial meaning, but as a term of art. Holroyd, and Mr. Justice a'Beckett, in chambers, when [Justice a Beckett: If the Melbourne University did not it was decided to grant an order entitling him to be recognise the Adelaide University, then they acted illeadmitted as a barrister, and giving him leave to apply gally in admitting one person to a degree of Bachelor of for admission.-Mr. Fink to move the admission.- Arts. The fact that they admitted him showed that Mr. Goldsmith to show cause. I appear to show they had recognised the Adelaide University.] That cause against Mr. Jones's admission. The bar com- recognition only applied to that degree. It did mittee, having heard of the difference of opinion not refer to all the degrees of the Adelaide Unibetween the board of examiners and the judges, have versity. In the report of the council of the univerdesired me to appear to support the opinion of the board. sity for the year 1884-85, it was stated that, 'In accordAnd in order to avoid any difficulty under the rules I shall ance with the recommendation of the professorial nominally show cause on my own behalf. Rule 17 pro- board, the council has resolved to recognise each year vides that any person may show cause to the board, the of the course for the degree of Bachelor of Arts in the judges, or the Court, against the admission of any appli- University of Adelaide, and also the degrees of Bachelor cant. [Mr. Justice Holroyd: I think I should hold and Master of Arts of that university.' [Justice a'Beckett: myself bound by the decision of the judges who heard This application has nothing to do with the admission by the appeal. I do not see how the Court can sit and hear the council to an ad eundem degree of Bachelor of Laws. an appeal from the finding of the three judges who sat as The council might be entitled to say that the degree of a Court of Appeal.] The order of the judges who heard Bachelor of Laws at Adelaide was not equivalent to that the appeal from the board of examiners was made ex in the Melbourne University. But there was nothing in parte; if the order of the judges was final it practically the rules of the Supreme Court for the admission of bartook away the powers given by rule 17. [Chief Justice risters to require that the two degrees should be equivaHiginbotham: I think the dismissal or allowance of the lent. It was only required that it should be a degree of a three judges was not expressly intended to be final and university recognised by the University of Melbourne, and the right is reserved to any person to show cause-the here the Melbourne University had recognised the Adefact that the three judges made the rule seems to laide University by admitting one of its graduates to a corplace us in the same position as if they had given the responding degree.] That was only an isolated instance certificate.]-Their honours decided to hear Mr. Gold- referring to one degree. The LL.B. degree of Adelaide smith on the main question, reserving the point as to had not been recognised. I submit that the Adelaide whether, at that stage, he was entitled to be heard. University has not been legally recognised. It could only Mr. Goldsmith: Mr. Jones is a resident of Victoria. He be recognised by a statute of the university, and it did went to Adelaide and was admitted to the degree of not appear that any such statute had been passed. This Bachelor of Laws there. He then went to Sydney, and was a matter of importance to the law school of the Melobtained the ad eundem degree of Bachelor of Laws bourne University, because in the Adelaide University there. He then came back to Melbourne, and applied to only a three years' curriculum was required, whereas in be admitted ad eundem to the Melbourne University, and the Melbourne University the period of studentship was was refused twice. Mr. E. F. A'Beckett, the registrar of five years. People were not likely to spend five years in the university, had made an affidavit, in which he said Melbourne if they could get the same advantages by going that in March, 1889, Mr. A. E. Jones applied to the to Adelaide for three years. [Chief Justice Higinbotham: council of the University of Melbourne under the statutes That might be a reason for altering the rules.] The Court of the university then in force to be admitted ad eundem cannot say that the University of Melbourne has recog to the degree of Bachelor of Laws in the University of nised the University of Adelaide when the evidence of Melbourne as a Bachelor of Laws of the University of the registrar of the Melbourne University shows that no Sydney. On March 23, 1889, the professorial board of such recognition had taken place.-Chief Justice Higinthe Melbourne University made a report on his ap- botham on September 17: Mr. Goldsmith has shown plication, in which they stated that they desired to cause to the Court, under rule 17 of the Rules of 1887, point out that applications ad eundem for graduates against the admission as a barrister of Mr. Albert who have taken the degree of LL.B. in the Uni- Edward Jones under an order made under rule 11 versity of Adelaide have not been granted by this by three of the judges of this Court, whereby it was university, the degrees not being deemed equivalent. The ordered that, notwithstanding the refusal of the board of present appears to be an application of the same kind examiners to grant Mr. Jones a certificate under rule 10, made in an indirect way. On April 1, 1889, the council he might, on payment of the proper fee, be admitted to considered the application of Mr. Jones, and refused to practise as a barrister. In the view that we take of this grant his request; and on reconsideration of it on June 17, case, it is unnecessary to determine whether the Full again refused the application. Mr. A'Beckett added in his Court has jurisdiction on a motion like the present to affidavit that no statute or regulation had been passed by allow an objection identical with one already heard by the University of Melbourne for the recognition of the the judges on appeal by the applicants from the board of University of Adelaide, or of any other university, and in examiners, and overruled by the judges. Mr. Jones has every case in which the degrees or the examinations of any claimed to be qualified under subsection 1 of rule 8, as a university out of Victoria have been accepted by the person who has been admitted, after examination, to the University of Melbourne it has been on the special degree of Bachelor of Laws in a university recognised by resolution of the council. The statutes of the univer- the university of Melbourne. Rule 8, subsection 1 is in