CHAPTER III. CLAYTON-BULWER TREATY. The first railroad in America to be operated with a locomotive was laid in South Carolina about 1826. The traffic across Panama so demanding, a company of Americans with American capital in 1855 put in operation the Panama railroad. The canal stage had not yet been reached, although our nation in 1849 had entered into a treaty with Nicaragua to build a canal by the Nicaragua route. This treaty could not be made effective without conflict with England, because she claimed interest in the Mosquito coast and this was in the line of the proposed canal. It became absolutely necessary for America to agree with England; so John M. Clayton, then Secretary of State, signed with England the Clayton-Bulwer treaty in 1850. It is quite popular these days to censure our nation for making the treaty; but John M. Clayton was not accustomed to do frivolous acts in government. He had a situation to meet and without doubt secured all that was possible under the conditions then existing. America was not so great as it is today, and was seeking rights outside of its own territory; there was no way to obtain these isthmian rights except by war or by contract. The canal was too large a task for us then, without our also going to war to secure the bare franchise. No doubt the Clayton treaty was the sum total of the favors then obtainable; at least we have the right now to so believe. If Nicaragua did not have absolute sovereignty, how could she grant us a complete legal franchise? It thus appears, in 1850, that our nation began to seriously at tempt to conquer the isthmus by the way of a canal. But what were the difficulties created by this treaty? And what were the difficulties and prospects of building the Nicaragua canal if the treaty had given us a full and free hand without any restriction whatever? The treaty provided for a ship canal to the Pacific by way of the San Juan river. Article I declared that neither nation "would ever obtain or maintain for itself any exclusive control over the said ship canal;" and that neither would build "any fortification commanding the same;" and would not exercise any dominion over any part of Central America; and that neither will use any alliance, connection or influence with any state through whose territory the canal may pass for the purpose of acquiring directly or indirectly for the citizens or subjects of the one any advantages through the canal "which shall not be offered on the same terms to the citizens and subjects of the other." There is nothing abstruse about this! Article 2 provides that the vessels traversing the canal shall, in case of war between these parties, "be exempt from blockade or capture by either belligerent;" and this privilege was to extend from the ends of the canal as may hereafter be found expedient to establish. This section has no significance, for war itself would supersede this article. Article 3 provides that when any parties began the building of any such canal the two nations would jointly protect the work so begun until its completion. Article 5 says that both parties engage that when the canal is completed they will protect it from seizure or confiscation and they will guarantee the "neutrality” thereof, so that it may forever be kept open and free and the money invested be secure. The right to withdraw from the "protection" obligation is reserved to either party, if there is any discrimination, but notice must be given before such withdrawal. Article 8, the vital and now the most notorious part of the treaty, states that the parties having not only desired in entering into this convention to accomplish "a particular object," but also "to establish a general principle," by treaty stipulation they agreed to extend their protection to any other communication by canal or railway across the isthmus which is now proposed whether at "Tehauntepec or Panama." In granting, however, their joint protection it is always understood that the parties, constructing or owning the said canal or railroad, shall impose no other charges or conditions of traffic than the said governments shall approve as just and equitable; and that the same canals or railroads being open to the citizens and subjects of the United States and Great Britain on equal terms shall also be open on like terms to the subjects of any other state willing to grant the same protection. There does not seem to be much obscurity in the terms of this treaty, but difficulty began almost at the beginning in construing it. The principal difficulty arose over the question: whether the condition that neither party was to exercise any sovereignty or control over any part of Central America was retroactive or only prospective? Great Britain claimed that it related to subsequent acquisitions of colonial rights, while our nation claimed that England should at once abandon all rights that she then claimed in Nicaragua. This contention went on until our terrible civil war of 1861 began. We then had other questions engaging us. England in the contentious stage seemed more anxious than we for the abrogation of the treaty. It was plain that America did not have the funds for the canal at that time; that England would not furnish the capital; and that England not being anxious to yield all colonial control in Central America, would as soon abandon the treaty. In the early days America was determined not to give up the treaty, but to hold England to the contract. We cared not for colonies, but did care to keep England from isthmian ownership, and this was the corner stone of the original compact. It is quite evident in looking backward that we had an inordinate desire to have a canal, but had not the courage or ability to attempt so great a task. We, like all predecessors on the isthmus, could plan, survey and speculate, and yet baffle at doing the work. It was an immense task, and, by many strong men, deemed wholly impossible. Up to the time of our civil war we had neither the money nor the necessary machinery for completing such a work. Even the Panama canal has taken enormous and almost fabulous sums of money and the combined labors of both France and the United States. One failed and the other coming on the scene fresh and vigorous has by a desperate struggle finally gained the canal. What would have been the result from 1850 to 1880 had our nation undertaken to build the Nicaragua canal? It could have resulted in nothing but failure! But the Clayton treaty was a sufficient bone of contention during one half a century to keep American and English diplomats "in business" while matters were brewing to bring about funds and appliances to construct a canal somewhere on the isthmus. Instead of America losing by the treaty she gained allshe kept England from extensive colonizing in Central America. The Clayton treaty gave us far greater use than abuse. It was not given up by us until the proper time came, and this happened in 1901. While we were urging England to observe the treaty she was as vigorously calling for arbitration which we in every instance declined. These diplomatic sparrings for advantageous position in the Central American problem is all, most clearly, shown in official letters of the following Secretaries of State: Marcy in 1853, Buchanan in 1854, Cass in 1858, Seward in 1866, Fish in 1872, Evarts in 1880, Blaine in 1881, Frelinghuysen in 1882, 1883 and 1884. These are to be found at length in Wharton's International Law, vol. 2, at page 184. If the treaty was even violated by England, or conditions had so changed that there was no further consideration for it, still this could only be a reason why it should be changed or abrogated. It does not seem that America was ever willing to take its chance and abrogate the treaty entirely. Both nations seem to have found consolation and benefit in it, and would not absolutely abandon it. It was not a failure in the beginning, for it was secured by America's very keen and broad lawyer and statesman-John M. Clayton. Very few of that day were his equal. The fact that we held fast to the treaty for 50 years is proof of this statesman's ability. Why continue to battle over this old treaty since we surely got our whole desire in 1901 by the Hay-Pauncefote treaty? If we did not; why not? A canal was really begun by Americans at Nicaragua under a charter granted by Congress in 1889. The Maritime Canal Company was organized with Hiram Hitchcock of New York, president; the total capital was $250,000,000. Work was begun at Greytown, June 8, 1890, but the stringency of 1893 caused the failure of the construction company. And the work still remaining in abeyance the franchise from Nicaragua expired in 1899. Thus the Nicaragua canal so far as actual construction work is concerned came to its end. But the battle went on in Congress most vig |