hended neglect in government or the admiralty, in not furnishing the admiral with a larger force, excited no less dissatisfac tion. It was said, that at the very time, as many ships were lyz · ing idle in port, or waiting for orders in the Downs, as would have enabled Parker to capture the whole Dutch fleet and convoy. The admiral's subsequent conduct, as well as an intimation given in his letter to the admiralty, strongly confirmed the public opinion, and indicated that he was no less dissatisfied at the want of support, than others were at its not being given. On his ar rival at the Nore with his shattered squadron, he was honored with a royal visit; but it was soon understood that no further ho nor or intended promotion would be accepted by the sturdy ve teran. The king went on board the Fortitude, where he had a levee of all the officers of the squadron, who were received with the most gracious attention; and the admiral had the honor of dining with his majesty and the prince of Wales on board the royal yacht. We have been told, that upon that occasion; admiral Parker took an opportunity of hinting (in the presence of the first lord of the admiralty and a number of naval officers) both his dissatisfaction and intention of retiring, by saying to his sovereign-"That he wished him younger officers and better ships; and that he was grown too old for the service." It was related also as an anecdote at the time, that young Macartney being presented on board the Fortitude, and the royal intention of providing for him, for the sake of his brave fas ther, being declared, the admiral apologized for informing his majesty, that he had already adopted him as his own. Admiral Parker resigned his command immediately after: but it was pro bably intended as a 'mark of favor and regard to him, that his son Sir Hyde (who had been before knighted for his good conduct in North America and the West-Indies) was now appointed to the command of a squadron of frigates, which were employed in blocking up the Dutch ports during the remainder of the season for keeping those seas.

The Dutch, beside losing the Hollandia, had two of their capital ships so totally ruined in the action, as to be declared incapable of further service. Their less of men is thought to have exceeded 1000 in killed, wounded and sunk. The idea of prosecuting the voyage to the Baltic was given up; and their immense carrying trade was annihilated for the remainder of the year. The Hol landers however were much elated with the bravery of their countrymen. Before the naval battle on Dogger's Bank, every spring was touched to excite popular resentments against the Americans and French, so that the regents of Amsterdam were under the necessity of taking the like precautions which would

have

have been practised had an enemy been in the neighborhood; and the gloom and despondency at the Hague and elsewhere was terrible; after it, the Dutchmen became courageous, and all their ap prehensions seemed to disappear. This action being the first of any consequence, in which they have been engaged for the much greater part of a century, the States General were beyond mea sure liberal in the praise, rewards and honors, which they bestowed on their officers. Admiral Zoutmon and Commodore Kindsbergen were immediately promoted; and most, if not all the st and second captains, as well as several of, the lieutenants, were either advanced, or flattered with some peculiar mark of distinction. Count Bentinck, who boldly fought the Batavia, and who, though mortally wounded, and informed that his ship was in danger of sinking, would not listen to a proposal for quitting his station, was soothed in his last moments by every mark of honor and testimony of regard, which his country and his prince could bestow; and his funeral was not more honorable to the brave dead, than to the grateful living. But however the Dutch have exulted in that the marine courage of their ancestors had not forsaken them, they are much dissatisfied that their fleet was not augmented by two or more ships, which they think would have secured to them a complete victory over the British admiral, and have put his convoy into their possession. They are ready to impute this failure to a treacherous neglect, originating from a prevailing attachment in some, to the interests of Great-Britain.

The French, to remove all unfavorable jealousies that the Spaniards might entertain respecting the attention of their ally to the Spanish interests, engaged to co-operate with them in attempting the recovery of Minorca-an event which, should it take place, would be highly pleasing to Spain, while it was no wise injurious to France. The plan being laid, the Duke de Crillon, a French commander of repute, was taken into the Spanish service, and appointed to conduct their forces to be employed in executing it, Count de Guichen sailed from Brest near the end of June, with 18 capital ships (four of which carried 110 guns each) to join the Spanish fleet and support the invasion. The not endeavoring to intercept this fleet, or at least to prevent a junction so full of danger, occasioned great complaint against the British admiralty, especially the first lord of that department. The combined fleets sailed from Cadiz, with about 10,000 Spanish troops before the end of July. The French had been reinforced by several ships of the line. The Spanish fleet amounted to about 30 sail of the line under Don Lewis de Cordova. The army effected its landing at Minorca without opposition on the 20th of August;

and

and was soon joined by six regiments from Toulon, under major gen. count de Falkenhayn, deemed one of the best officers in the French service. The garrison was weak, and consisted only. of two British and two Hanoverian regiments. But it was commanded by lieuteant gen. Murray and major gen. Sir William Draper.

The combined fleets, after seeing the troops safe into the Mediterranean, returned to cruise at the mouth of the British channel. No intelligence of this naval manoeuvre was obtained, nor was the design suspected by the British ministry, until the combined fleets were in the chops of the channel, and had formed a line from Ushant to the isles of Scilly, in order to bar its entrance; so that adm. Darby, who was then at sea with only 21 ships of the line, was on the point of falling in with them, when the accidental meeting of a neutral vessel afforded him notice of their situation. In these unexpected circumstances [Aug. 24.] he returned to Torbay, where he moored his squadron across the entrance, while he waited for instructions from the admiralty. As soon as the commanders of the combined fleets had received intelligence of Darby's position, and of the inferiority of his force in point of number, a council of war was held, on the question of attacking him. They were under orders to fight, if the occasion offered; but the instructions were thought not to reach the present case, which would be an attack on the British squadron in a bay on their own coasts. Under this change of circumstances, it was supposed, that they were left at large, to the free exercise of their own judgment.

The count de Guichen is said to have contended strongly for an immediate attack. He argued, that if by good fortune and thevalor of the combined navies, along with the powerful aid of fireships, the British fleet was destroyed, the power of Great-Britainon the seas would be at an end, and the war decided by the blow. Don Vincent Doz, the third of the Spanish commanders, supported this opinion. He asserted, that the destroving of Darby's fleet was very practicable, and that it would be difficult to excuse their not making the attempt; and to give the greater weight to his sentiments, he boldly offered to command the van squadron, and to lead on the attack in his own ship.

On the other hand, Mr. de Beusset, the next in command under Guichen, said " All the advantage which the allies derive from their superiority of force and number, will be entirely lost by an attack upon admiral Darby's fleet in the present situation, for we cannot bear down upon him in a line of battle a-breast; of course we must form the line of battle a-head, and go

down

down upon the enemy singly by which we shall run the greatest hazard of being shattered and torn to pieces, before we can get into our stations, by the fixed aim and angular fire in every direction, of such a number of great and well-provided ships, drawn up to the greatest advantage, and lying moored and steady in the water. I conclude therefore, that as the attempt on the British fleet in Torbay will in my opinion, be unwarrantable in the design, and exceedingly hazardous in the execution, the allied fleets should direct their whole attention to that grand and attainable object of intercepting the English homeward bound West-India fleets." Don Louis de Cordova, with all the Spanish flag offcers except Doz, coincided entirely with him in opinion, so that the idea of attacking Darby in Torbay was abandoned.

Meanwhile a great alarm was spread in Ireland as well as Britain, with respect to the apprehended designs of the enemy. Not only the great outward bound fleet for America and the WestIndies was supposed to be in imminent danger then in the open harbour of Cork; but the city itself, being totally unfo:tified and at the same time stored with immense quantities of provision. the regular forces of the kingdom were therefore ordered to the southward for the protection of that city and coast; and the patriotic volunteers, who had gained so much honor in supporting and reclaiming the liberties of their country, showed no less patriotism in their immediate offer to government of taking the field, and of marching wherever their services should be necessary for its defence. They had perfected themselves in the military exercise, and had been reviewed in several places by the earl of Charie

mont.

Admiral Darby remained at Torbay ; but was soon reinforced by several ships from different ports till his squadron was increased to 30 sail of the line, with which he was ordered to sea with the utmost expedition, for the preservation of the expected WestIndia convoy. The delay however of waiting for the reinforcement and instructions in the first instance, and contrary winds afterward, detained the fleet till the 14th of September, notwithstanding the urgency of the occassion. Before it sailed, the combined fleets had separated. They were in exceeding bad condition. In the first outset they were poorly manned, the Spanish particularly. Beside a great mortality, which had prevailed during the whole cruise, and a prodigious number of sick in both fleets, a considerable majority of the ships were scarcely capable of living at sea in a violent gale. The hard weather therefore that came on in the beginning of September, frustrated all their views; so that abandoning all hopes of intercepting the British

convoys

convoys, they were glad to get into port as soon as possible. The French fleet returned to Brest the 11th of September, and the Spanish proceeded directly home.

66

The present shall close with extracts from some curious letters To Mr. Vergennes, Passy, Feb. 13, 1781. "I am grown old, and it is probable I shall not long have any more concern in these affairs. I therefore take occasion to express my opinion to your excellency, that the present conjuncture is critical ;-that there is some danger lest the congress should lose its influence over the people, if it is unable to procure the aids that are wanted, and that the whole system of the new government in America may thereby be shaken; and that if the English are suffered once to recover the country, such an opportunity of effectual operation may not occur again in the course of ages." To March 12, 1781. To give the states a signal proof of his friendship, his. majesty has resolved to grant them the sum of six millions (of livres) not as a loan, but as a free gift. The sum was intended for the supply of the army, and it was thought best to put it into the general's Washington's) hands, that he should draw for it, that it might not get into those of the different boards or committees, who might think, themselves under a necessity of diverting it to other purposes. There was no room to dispute on this point, every douer having the right of qualifying his gift with such terms as he thinks proper. The minister proceeded to inform me, that the courts of Petersburgh and Vienna had offered their mediation. It was not doubted, that congress would readily accept the proposed mediation, from their own sense of its being useful and necessary.-I have passed my seventy-fifth year."[Soon after this was written, col. Laurens arrived, which gave occasion for mentioning] "July 26, 1781. With regard to the six millions given by the king in aid of our operations for the present campaign, before the arrival of Mr. Laurens, two millions five hundred thousand of it went in the same ship with him in cash-two million two hundred thousand were ordered by him and are shipped-one million five hunded thousand was sent to Holland to go into the ship commanded by capt. Gillon."

LET TER X.

Roxbury, January 12, 1782.

ERTAIN resolutions of congress, as they refer to colonel Laurens and the supplies from France, (whose arrival has VOL. III.

Ff

been