Soper, the defendant, was fraudulently obtained, and was all "suffered to go to the Jury, as the proper tribunal to determine "the question of fact." Hurn's Lessee vs. Soper, 6 Harr. & Johns. Rep. 276, 281.

Statutes of Limitations, only take place from the time the right of action accrues; and if there be fraud, from the time of its discovery. Jones vs. Conoway & Al. Ex'ors. &c. 4 Yeates' Rep.

109.

In the case of Riddle vs. Murphy & Al., (7 Serg. & R. Rep. 235.) GIBSON, J. delivering the Opinion of the Court, said; "The Court, very properly charged, that if the sale was fraud"ulent, the act began to run against the devisees of Cornelius Murphy, or those who represented them, only from the time the "fraud became known to the person then having the title."

But a Bona fide purchaser for a valuable consideration from a fraudulent grantee, if unaffected with notice either actual or constructive, will, at Law, be protected. Dexter vs. Harris, 2 Mason's Rep. 536. In this case STORY, J. delivering the Opinion of the Court, said; "There is no such principle of Law, as that what "is matter of record shall be constructive notice to a purchaser. "The doctrine upon this subject as to purchasers is this, that they "are affected with constructive notice of all, that is apparent up"on the face of the title deeds, under which they claim, and of such other facts as those already known necessarily put them "upon inquiry for, and as such inquiry, pursued with ordinary dil"igence and prudence, would bring to their knowledge. But of "other facts extrinsic of the title, and collateral to it, no construc"tive notice can be presumed; but it must be proved."

16

It seems, that the Statute of Limitations, in regard to real actions, does not apply to actions of dower Hitchcock & Ur. vs. Harrington, 6 Johns. Rep. 290. Jones vs. Powell & Al., 6 Johns. Ch. Rep. 194.

Where husband conveys without the wife joining in the conveyance, the Statute of Limitations does not begin to run against her right of dower, until the death of the husband. Culler & Al. vs. Motzer, 13 Serg. & R. Rep. 356.

The Statute of Limitations runs against dower, Mitchell vs. Poyas, 1 Nott & M'Cord's Rep. 85. Ramsay vs. Dozier, 1 Const. Rep. So. Ca. 112.

In a case of conflicting claims for a patent for vacant lands under the land laws of North Carolina, (Mac Neil vs. Lewis, 3 N. Car. Law Rep. 80, 82.) SEAWELL, J. delivering the Opinion of

"

the Court, said None of our Acts of Limitation can have any "influence, whether with or without colour of title, for they are 66 bottomed upon the presumption that a grant once existed, but "has been lost; but in the case of a caveat, both parties admit "the Land to be vacant, but are disputing as to whom a title shall " be made."

And where the party having title, has lost the right of possession by lapse of time, yet if he can afterwards peaceably obtain the possession, such possession will be protected by his title.

In the case of Doe ex dem. Burrough & Barbara his wife vs. George Reade, (8 East's Rep. 353.) which was an ejectment brought to recover the possession of certain copyhold premises; a copy of the court roll was produced, dated the 24th of October, 1735, whereby George Reade, the grandfather of the defendant and of Barbara, the lessor, took the premises in question, to hold to him and his sons G. G. Reade and W. Reade successively, during their lives, and the life of the longest liver. On the 13th of January, 1777, (G. G. Reade, the eldest son, being dead, (W. Reade, he then having issue the defendant George Reade, and the lessor Barbara, purchased by copy of that date the reversion of the said premises, on the determination of the estate of G. Reade, the grandfather, and of his own estate for life therein; to hold to the defendant George, his son,then an infant,during his natural life; and the defendant was thereupon admitted to the same. On the 19th of January, 1786, W. Reade surrendered his own life estate and the reversionary estate of the defendant George, his son, then a minor, and took another grant of the lord by copy of that date, to hold to himself, the lessor Barbara, and the defendant George successively; and was admitted thereon. W. Reade continued in possession until his death on the 28th of March, 1806, whereupon the defendant entered. The jury found for the plaintiff; and upon shewing cause by the plaintiff against a new trial, he insisted that, If the defendant's right of entry were ousted, as it was, so that he could not have maintained ejectment, it cannot vary the question that he got into possession after the 20 years adverse possession had run against him, which had transferred the possessory right to the lessor." But LAWRENCE J. said, "This reason"ing might have applied, and the difficulty would have existed, "if George Reade had been now a plaintiff instead of a defendant "in ejectment; and were contending against any person who had an "adverse possession against him but possession has Barbara Bo"rough [Burrough] against him? She is in effect a stranger to the "estate, having no present title, and can have no right to recover "in ejectment against one who is admitted to have the legal title, and "is also in possession. The question might have arisen in the life "time of Wm. Reade, the father,after 20 years adverse possession by "him; but upon his death,there being no person in possession, there

"was nothing to hinder the defendant from asserting his right by "entering peaceably into a vacant possession; and now he has both "the legal title and the possession," And " THE COURT all agreed, "that the defendant, being lawfully in possession, might defend him"self upon his title, though 20 years had run against him before he "took possession; such 20 years possession not being the posses"sion of the lessor of the plaintiff.”

But it is otherwise in the case of the grantee of a person disseised; "It is one of the first principles of the law applicable to "real estate, that he who is disseised cannot during the continuance "of such disseisin convey to a third person. If he attempts to con"vey, nothing passes by the deed. If the supposed grantee enter, he is a trespasser, and having gained possession by his own tor"tious act he cannot avail himself of his deed to render his continu"ance in possession lawful." (PER PREBLE, J. delivering the Opinion of the Court.) Hathorne vs. Haines, 1 Greenl. Rep. 247. & Vide Cushman vs. Blanchard & Al., 2 Greenl. Rep. 266.

"If the owner of a parcel of land through inadvertency or ig "norance of the dividing line, includes a part of an adjoining tract "within his inclosure, this does not operate a disseisin, so as to prevent the true owner from conveying and passing the same "by deed." Brown vs. Gay, 3 Greenl. Rep. 126, 130. (Per WESTON, J. delivering the Opinion of the Court.)

66

Where a legal title to hold land is disclosed to the court, the party shall not be permitted to say he holds by wrong. Tinkham vs. Arnold, 3 Greenl. Rep. 120.

149

Having seen in what cases an adverse possession cannot be admitted, the next inquiry will be, What is necessary to constitute an effectual adverse possession, in cases where it can be set up as a defence? And since this inquiry cannot be rationally and satisfactorily answered without a knowledge of the object and intent of the Statute of Limitations, the opinions of the, Superior Courts. of Law and Equity as to the meaning of those Statutes, are pe culiarly worthy of attention.

"The object of the law [the Statute of Limitations] is to se"cure the individual from the machinations of dishonesty when "attempted under the advantages attendant upon lapse of time, "loss of papers, and death of witnesses. But when casos pre" sent themselves in which no laches can be imputed to the plaintiffs, but great injustice would be done by applying to such cases "the effect of the Statute, the conclusion of Reason and of the "Law is that such cases were not in the mind of the Legislature "when enacting that law. Such are the cases of a want of par

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"ties, plaintiff or defendant, whereby a temporary suspension of legal remedy takes place. But in no case of a voluntary aban"donment of an action, has an exception to the Statute of Limi"tations been supported." Richards & others vs. The Maryland Insurance Company, 8 Cranch's Rep. 92, 93. (Per JOHNSON, J. delivered the Opinion of the Court.)

So in the case of Robinson vs. Campbell, (3 Wheat. Rep. 224.) TODD, J. delivering the Opinion of the Court, said; "The last question is, whether the Statute of Limitation of Tennessee was "a good bar to the action. It is admitted, that it would be a good "bar only upon the supposition that the lands in controversy were "always within the limits of Tennessee; but there is no such proof in the cause. The compact of the states [Virginia and "Tennessee] does not affirm it, and the present boundary was an "amicable adjustment by that compact. It cannot, therefore, be "affirmed by any Court of Law, that the land was within the "reach of the Statute of Limitations of Tennessee until after the "compact of 1802. The Statute could not begin to run until it was ascertained that the land was within the jurisdictional limits "of the state of Tennessee."

64

The Statute of Limitations is suspended during war, as to alien enemies. Ogden vs. Blackledge, 2 Cranch's Rep. 272.

A war suspends the operation of the Statute of Limitations between the citizens of the two countries, for the time during which it continues. Wall, Ads. Robson, 2 Nott & M'C. Rep.

498.

"The Statute of Limitations is intended, not for the punishment "of those who neglect to assert their rights by suit, but for the "protection of those who have remained in possession under "colour of a title believed to be good." McIver & Al. vs. Ragan & Al. 2 Wheat. Rep. 29. (Per MARSHALL, Ch. J. delivering the Opinion of the Court.

And in the case of Den ex dem. Jones vs. Ridley, (2 N. Car. Law Rep. 400.) TAYLOR, Ch. J. delivering the Opinion of the Court, said; But a possession for this period can only meet the "spirit and design of the law, [the Statute of Limitations,] when it "is unbroken and uninterrupted; for as it is founded on the supposition that the possessor really believes he has title, this idea "is weakened rather than confirmed, by his occasionally withdraw"ing from the possession, and leaving the land without cultivation, "without occupancy, and without a tenant.

66

"It must be, as I understand the law, such a title as the law will prima facie, consider a good title.' Jackson ex dem. Ten

Eyck & Al. vs. Frost, 5 Cowen's Rep. 351. (Per SAVAGE, Ch. J. delivering the Opinion of the Court.) & Vide Francoise vs. De La Ronde, 8 Martin's Rep. 619. Bonne & Al. vs. Powers, 3 Martin's Rep. (N. S.) 458.

"The truth is, that the Statute [of Limitations,] was never in"tended as a means of acquiring title, or as an encouragement to "people to enter on each other's land with a view to hold it; but "to compel them to decide their controversies while transactions

are recent and the evidence of them is attainable; and there its "operation in protecting a possession under a bad title, or no title "at all, is but a consequence of the object of its enactment, and not "the object itself." Miller & Al. vs. Shaw, 7 Serg. & R. Rep. 138. (Per GIBSON, J.)

"Statutes of Limitations relate to the remedies which are "furnished in the Courts. They rather establish, that certain "circumstances shall amount to evidence that a contract has been "performed, than dispense with its performance." Sturges vs. Crowninshield, 4 Wheat. Rep. 207. (Per MARSHALL, Ch. J. delivering the Opinion of the Court.)

"Every Statute of Limitations, being in restraint of right, must "be construed strictly." Pease vs. Howard, 14 Johns. Rep. 480. (Per VAN NESS, J. delivering the Opinion of the Court.)

To constitute a valid and effectual adverse possession, it is necessary,

1st. That it be commenced under colour and claim of title;

"To constitute an adverse possession, there must be a posses"sion under colour and claim of title."-"It has never been consid"ered as necessary to constitute an adverse possession, that there "should be a rightful title." Smith ex dem. Teller & Al. vs. Burtis & Al. 9 Johns. Rep. 179, 180. SAME POINT, Jackson ex dem. Roosevelt vs. Wheat. 18 Johns. Rep. 40. Jackson ex dem. Vanderlyn & Betts vs. Newton & Al. 18 Johns. Rep. 355. Jackson ex dem. Gansevoort & Al. vs. Parker, 3 Johns. Cas, 124. Jackson ex dem. Young & Al. vs. Ellis & Al. 13 Johns. Rep. 118. Jackson ex dem. Swartwout & Ux. vs. Johnson, 5 Cow. Rep. 92. Jackson ex dem. Ten Eyck & Al. vs. Frost, 5 Cow. Rep. 350. Jackson ex dem. Young & Al. vs. Camp, 1 Cow. Rep. 609. Jackson ex dem. Gilliland & Al. vs. Woodruff & Al. 1 Cow, Rep. 285. & Vide Seymour vs. DeLancey & Al. 1 Hopk. Rep. 448. Jackson ex dem. Gansevoort & Al. vs. Lunn, 3