D: I don't know anything about it. It's news to me. I can check with Moscow. K: Why don't you? It would help if it leaks, I can tell the President how it happened. D: I won't be able to get an answer until tomorrow. There was no intention for us to make a leakage in Japan. What is the purpose? K: It embarrasses us with the Japanese because it means they heard it from you before us. We are their allies. D: This was not the case; how it happened I don't know. K: Okay. D: I will check with them. I just received confirmation that everything is all right for 12:00 here and 7:00 in Moscow. K: I think it will leak. We have never yet told the Japanese anything that didn't leak. D: All right.3 3 During a telephone conversation at 7:05 p.m., Kissinger told Johnson that Dobrynin "says he doesn't know anything about it and he can't believe it." "It's a cheap shot," Kissinger complained. "These sons-of bitches-that's the difference between them and the Chinese. They gain a nickel and lose a million dollars worth of goodwill." (Ibid.) Haig then called Dobrynin at 7:10 and reported: “I am calling because Mr. Kissinger is over with the President now. He said to tell you we intend to hold this release time firm. If we get some inquiries, we will have no comment and we would hope you would be able to do the same. You make a nickel and lose $1,000." (Ibid., NSC Files, Box 998, Alexander M. Haig Chronological Files, Haig Telcons, 1971 [1 of 2]) No evidence has been found that Kissinger was, in fact, "over with the President" that evening. (Ibid., White House Central Files, President's Daily Diary; Library of Congress, Manuscript Division, Kissinger Papers, Box 438, Miscellany, 1968-76, Record of Schedule) 355. Transcript of a Telephone Conversation Between the Washington, October 12, 1971, 10:47 a.m. D: Good morning, Henry. K: Anatoliy, I have decided the following. We will send all our communications to Japan through you because they don't leak them when they get them from you. D: I received the following telegram to you from our Foreign Minister. "For understandable reasons, the Soviet Foreign Ministry had to inform its embassies regarding the forthcoming announcement. Apparently the Chargé d'Affaires in Tokyo thinking only one or two days remained informed his counterpart and committed a blunder. Of course, no serious damage is done because it was not made public. Sometimes American representatives have committed the same type of thing. We believe no serious importance should be attached to this. The American side is well aware that our agreement with you regarding the confidentiality of our negotiations is strictly adhered to by the Soviet Government. Clearly, in the future we should discuss these aspects in order to avoid misunderstandings on these points.' K: That last point is a good one. However, the Japanese now have reason to believe they heard this from you before they heard it from us, their allies. It's embarrassing, apart from the danger of a leak which strangely enough did not occur. Usually, they leak like crazy. But at any rate, I understand what your Foreign Minister is saying. And we accept it in the spirit in which it is made. We have to be explicit who is told and who isn't. D: We didn't tell anyone on the substance of the matters discussed. K: There was some irritation that perhaps you were trying to take advantage of the fact that the Japanese feel neglected. D: No. We attach importance to all the things we discuss with you.3 1 Source: National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, Henry Kissinger Telephone Conversation Transcripts, Box 27, Dobrynin File. No classification marking. 2 A copy of the telegram, as dictated by Dobrynin over the telephone, is ibid., NSC Files, Box 492, President's Trip Files, Dobrynin/Kissinger, 1971, Vol. 8. 3 In a memorandum to Kissinger on October 13, Sonnenfeldt reported that French Ambassador Lucet had confirmed "stories out of Paris that the Soviets informed the French of [the summit] on October 6.” (Ibid., Kissinger Office Files, Box 66, Country Files, Europe, USSR, Dobrynin Backup (Talkers) [1 of 3]) K: We will have dinner on Thursday evening.* You tell the Foreign Minister we appreciate the nature of his reply. October 14. See Foreign Relations, 1969–1976, volume XIV, Soviet Union, October 1971-May 1972, Document 4. 5 Dobrynin called Kissinger at 4:26 p.m. to complain about Nixon's press conference: "D: I just read the transcript of the President. What he said. It's my turn to ask you. He said you informed all Europeans and Japanese too. K: An hour before. D: What about the Chinese? K: Very briefly. D: When [did] you inform the Chinese? K: Yesterday evening [October 11]. D: Because this is a point too. The Govt. of the People's Republic was informed this announcement would be made today and [is] aware of the date of the Soviet visit. K: All they were told is a Soviet announcement. No one on our side has been told the date." After further discussion, Kissinger assured Dobrynin: "I am sticking to my agreement with you that you will know of anything with the Chinese 24 hours before." (National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, Henry Kissinger Telephone Conversation Transcripts, Box 27, Dobrynin File) Index References are to document numbers Abrams, Maj. Gen. Creighton W., 134 negotiations; Kissinger-Dobrynin Abshire, David, 239 Accidental War Agreement, 103, 243, Aeroflot hijacking (June 1970), 77 Aleksandrovich, Rivka, 230, 251 Aleksandrovich, Ruth, 230, 239, 251 Allon, Yigal, 98 Alphand, Hervé, 60 Alsop, Joseph, 250 Annual Report to the Congress on Arbatov, Georgi A., 96, 153, 205, 206, Atherton, Alfred L., Jr., 138, 208, 236 Backchannel Kissinger-Dobrynin talks. Bahr, Egon. See Berlin negotiations; discussions on Berlin. Baker, John A., Jr., 67 Ball, George W., 98, 217 Baltic Sea. See U.S. Baltic Sea naval operations. Barents Sea incident (Nov. 17, 1970), 48 Barreaux, Theodore, 35 Bartlett, Charles L., 267 Barents Sea incident (Nov. 17, 1970), European Security Conference, 347 Gromyko U.S. visit (Sept. 1971), 333 Beam, Jacob D.-Continued Middle East, 96 Muskie Soviet Union visit, 99, 100 reductions, 220 Rogers instructions, 296 U.S. Black Sea naval operations, 52 Bell, Jeffrey, 300 Bennett, Lt. Gen. Donald V., 182, 292 Bentsen, Lloyd, 177 Berger, Marilyn, 62 Bergus, Donald C., 241, 349 Berlin negotiations (see also Kissinger- Agreement (Aug. 1971), 318, 329 Bonn triangle meetings, 210, 230, 251, Brezhnev speech (Nov. 29, 1970), 56 Four Power meeting, 315 Kissinger-Arbatov discussion, 207 Kissinger-Vorontsov discussions, 175, Muskie-Kosygin discussions, 98, 99 National Security Council staff Berlin negotiations-Continued Nixon-Kissinger discussions, 55, 85, 124, 127, 146, 149, 154, 176, 190, Slowdown instructions, 79, 206, 210, Soviet draft agreement (Mar. 18, 1971), 144, 145, 146, 149, 150, 154, Soviet note (May 3, 1971), 200 linkage, 85, 210, 230 Thompson-Dobrynin discussion, 47 Binh, Madame. See Nguyen Thi Binh. operations. Bogdan, Corneliu, 185, 334 Bohlen, Charles E., 3, 174 Brandon, Henry, 81 Brandt, Willy (see also West German Ostpolitik), 7, 17, 67, 68, 73, 83, 101, Bray, Charles W., III, 199, 238 Brewster, Robert C., 197 Berlin negotiations, 56, 83, 324 Lithuanian defector incident, 57 reductions, 217 Nixon correspondence, 305, 308, 309, Party Congress speech (Mar. 1971), Speech (Oct. 2, 1970), 9 Speech (Nov. 29, 1970), 55, 56 Brezhnev, Leonid I.-Continued Speech (Dec. 7, 1970), 61 Brooke, Edward W., III, 178, 219 Bundy, McGeorge, 169, 172, 173, 179 Bush, George H.W., 129, 205, 333, 345, Butterfield, Alexander P., 21, 91, 233 Calley, William, 219 Case, Clifford P., 178 Ceausescu, Nicolai, 256, 290, 341 Chiles, Lawton, 177 China, People's Republic of (see also Political situation, 332 U.N. representation issue, 158, 229, 252, 291, 333, 339 Chou En-lai. See Zhou Enlai. Church, Frank, 2, 4, 129 Cienfuegos. See Soviet naval presence in Cuba. Clay, Gen. Lucius D., 62 Cuba. See Soviet naval presence in Cuba. Curry, Theodore, 51 References are to document numbers |