The issues to be discussed between the two countries are too various. But in principle, we are prepared to meet with the Soviet leaders whenever our negotiations have reached a point where something fruitful can be accomplished. Let me make one other point: Nothing that has been done in our relations with the Peoples Republic of China has any purpose or is in any way directed against any other countries, and especially not against the Soviet Union. We are taking these steps because we cannot imagine a stable, international peace in which a country of 750 million people is kept in isolation. We believe that by improving relations with the Peoples Republic of China we are contributing to peace in the world, and therefore are contributing to all nations. [Omitted here is further discussion of Kissinger's secret trip to China.] Q. Do you expect the President might go to the Soviet Union before he goes to China? Dr. Kissinger: I don't want to speculate about any prospective trips. It would seem to me more logical that the trips would be taken in the order that they are announced, if indeed there is a trip.3 3 [Omitted here is the remainder of the briefing, including a review of the ground rules for attribution.] 3 In their coverage of the background briefing, the New York Times and Washington Post both reported that, according to "White House officials," the President was still interested in a trip to the Moscow--but not before his trip to Beijing. Neither, however, reported Kissinger's assertion that the opening to China was not directed against the Soviet Union. (John Herbers, "Nixon Is Expected to Visit China Around End of Year; To See Both Mao and Chou,” New York Times, July 17, 1971, p. 1; and Carroll Kilpatrick, "Formal Relations Not Likely by Then," July 17, 1971, Washington Post, p. A1) Between Beijing and Moscow: Summit 287. Memorandum From the President's Assistant for Washington, July 19, 1971. SUBJECT Economic Items for Use in Dobrynin Discussions At San Clemente you asked for alternative piecemeal approaches that might be used in your meeting today with Dobrynin.2 1. Kama River I have pressed very hard again to find a separable item and I think the best possibility we have come up with is the Foundry portion (see Tab A).3 It is a reasonably discrete element of the total Kama River project. One could argue whether a decision on our part to authorize participation of a foundry is similarly discrete in the minds of U.S. business. In other words, U.S. businessmen would probably have trouble understanding why the foundry was cleared but nothing else. It may be that we should even consider at some point saying that it is mixed in with other non-economic considerations and we don't therefore expect it to make economic sense. I am presuming the Russians know the linkage in any event. We now have three foundry applications that have an aggregate value of $175 million but there is undoubtedly redundancy here. Thus, in actual practice if all three were accepted, we would probably find the total volume significantly less than this. Even so, if this kind of number bothers you, you can always try getting some Russian purchases of consumer goods and consumer 1 Source: National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, Kissinger Office Files, Box 66, Country Files, Europe, USSR, Dobrynin Backup (Talkers) [2 of 3]. Top Secret. 2 According to his Record of Schedule, Kissinger met Peterson in San Clemente on July 16 from 1:49 to 2 p.m. (Library of Congress, Manuscript Division, Kissinger Papers, Box 438, Miscellany, 1968–76) No record of the conversation has been found. 3 Tabs A-D are attached but not printed. At Tab A is an undated and unsigned paper entitled "The Kama River Foundry." goods manufacturing equipment. You will remember the argument to them might be that anything that appears to U.S. critics to result in a diminution in defense effort (as consumer goods spending might) helps assuage concerns of segments of U.S. public who might feel the Kama River project by itself has too much potential defense content. In case you have any time for more reading, I show in Tab B4 the current status of the Kama River inter-agency draft you and I agreed we should try to get done soon, including Defense. Also, included is the latest Mack Truck wire to the Soviets which went out Friday indicating the particular questions they have but keeping it open (Tab C).5 2. Control Data Computer The other significant pending application is by Control Data Corporation for a Model 6400 computer (quite advanced) for the Institute of High Energy Physics at Yerevan. This involves COCOM clearance and if you decided to go ahead with it, I would assume you would want to impose the same kind of safeguards we imposed on the British on their recent computer deal with Russia (ICL computers). Also, you should know that this is not too far along in the interagency process but I suppose this could be speeded up. This strikes me, Henry, as the kind of item you could offer (a) if you were looking for something quite symbolic in the aftermath of the China move, and/or (b) something you could talk about conditionally (i.e. it would take time for example to work out safeguards) in the event you wanted something positive with stalling potential if later it did not seem appropriate. I have talked to Ed David about this and he has written a very brief memo in Tab Do that summarizes the situation. Please read it and note he emphasizes inspection safeguards are required but, on balance, he feels it is a reasonable possibility. 3. Petroleum-Hydro-Cracker Technology While we have no specific applications on this, we do know there has been general Soviet interest in U.S. technology in this field in the past. 4 At Tab B is a draft memorandum for the President, dated July 16, entitled “Proposed Exports of Technology and Equipment for the Construction of a Soviet Truck Manufacturing Plant Located on the Kama River." 5 Dated July 16. 6 Dated July 19. On your desk somewhere, you will probably find a letter for your signature to the President on similar technology to Poland.? It might even fit your negotiating plans to offer this to the Russians at the same time or even first, indicating you did not want to appear to be discriminating in favor of the Poles. The difference here, of course, is that the Poles have expressed very specific interest in this technology (to me directly and to Dr. Edward David) whereas the Russian interest has been more general. Thus, its leverage potential with the Russians is conjectural. I hope one or more of these is helpful to you. 7 Kissinger signed and forwarded the memorandum and attached letter to the President on August 13; Nixon subsequently approved the issuance of the export licenses to Poland. The memorandum is printed in Foreign Relations, 1969–1972, volume XXIX, Eastern Europe; Eastern Mediterranean, 1969–1972, Document 151. 288. Memorandum of Conversation1 Washington, July 19, 1971, 1 p.m. PARTICIPANTS Henry A. Kissinger Ambassador Dobrynin The meeting took place at my initiative2 so that I could get a feeling for Dobrynin's attitude following the announcement of the Peking Summit. Dobrynin was at his oily best and, for the first time in my experience with him, totally insecure. I opened the conversation by telling Dobrynin that we might have a general review first. He thought it was a capital idea. Indeed, he said 1 Source: National Archives, Nixon Presidential Materials, NSC Files, Box 492, President's Trip Files, Dobrynin/Kissinger, 1971, Vol. 7 [part 2]. Top Secret; Sensitive; Eyes Only. Lord and Rodman forwarded this memorandum and another summarizing its "highlights" for the President to Kissinger on July 24. Kissinger approved both, which were then submitted to Nixon on July 27; a note on the "highlights" memorandum indicates that the President saw it. The meeting was held in the Map Room at the White House. According to Kissinger's Record of Schedule, the meeting lasted until 2:55. (Library of Congress, Manuscript Division, Kissinger Papers, Box 438, Miscellany, 1968–76) For their memoir accounts of the meeting, see Kissinger, White House Years, pp. 766–767, 835-836, and Dobrynin, In Confidence, pp. 227-228. 2 See Document 284. he had been so interested in seeing me that he had immediately left New York, where he had seen his wife off for a vacation in the Soviet Union, despite his intention to spend a day there. I said I would have been glad to reschedule the lunch. He said, “No, no, no. This is important." I then turned to recent events. U.S.-Soviet Summit I said that I wanted to be frank with him. Perhaps in the first year of our Administration we had not always been forthcoming in improving relations with the Soviet Union, but ever since April 1970 we believe we have made an unending series of overtures. The Soviet response has been grudging and petty, especially on the Summit Meeting. They simply did not understand the President. The President thought in broad philosophical terms and had sincerely believed that his meeting with the Soviet leaders might open new vistas for cooperation around the world; instead, he found himself confronted with one evasion after another. As Dobrynin very well knew, I had urged him to have an answer by July 1st and even then it had taken till July 5th, and he had then been evasive again, saying that the meeting could take place in November and December. This was in effect a rejection, because I had already told him that November and December were highly inconvenient. Indeed, I did not know whether Dobrynin was even saying we should fix a date. Dobrynin in reply was almost beside himself with protestations of goodwill. On the contrary, he said, he could tell me strictly off the record that a meeting between his leaders and the President was very much on their minds. What in fact had happened was that September did not seem possible, and now November was the earliest possible date. He was certain the Soviet leaders would be willing to set another date for a Summit, but now they did not know whether our meeting with Peking made it impossible. Would we be willing to come to Moscow before going to Peking? I replied that it did not seem to me proper to go to Moscow before having gone to Peking, that we should go in the order in which the announcements were made. He asked whether we would be prepared to announce a meeting before having been in Peking. I said that that was a distinct possibility but that I would have to check this with the President and let him know later in the day. [I called Dobrynin at 7:00 that evening after checking with the President and told him that we would be prepared to announce a meeting |