Soviet Union, October 1970-October 1971This volume continues the practice established in the previous Foreign Relations volume on U.S.-Soviet relations and focuses on the relationship in the global context, highlighting the conflicts and collaboration between the two superpowers on foreign policy issues from October 1970 to October 1971. Beginning with the confrontation over the construction of a Soviet military base in Cuba, the volume documents the development of the Nixon administration's policy of détente and the crucial role of the private channel between Henry Kissinger, the President's Assistant for National Security Affairs, and Soviet Ambassador Anatoly Dobrynin. The backchannel was key to making progress on the most problematic issues in U.S.-Soviet relations: Berlin, the war in Indochina, strategic arms limitation talks, Jewish emigration from the Soviet Union, and trade. It also allowed the two nations to avoid conflict and to cooperate on managing crises around the world, such as the Middle East dispute and the Indo-Pakistani conflict. The volume also includes documentation on the internal and bilateral negotiations for the timing of a visit by Nixon to the Soviet Union and ends with the public announcement in October 1971 of the May 1972 summit between Nixon and Brezhnev, the first U.S.-Soviet summit since 1967. The era of détente and cooperation between the superpowers had begun |
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Page 2
... understanding them or their not understanding us , that is not true . They understand us . Perhaps we have not understood them as well as we might . But perhaps we do now . And if we start with that fundamental proposition where we do ...
... understanding them or their not understanding us , that is not true . They understand us . Perhaps we have not understood them as well as we might . But perhaps we do now . And if we start with that fundamental proposition where we do ...
Page 11
... understand each other , but that we understand each other too well . What they also don't understand is that the Communists prefer to deal with someone who is unemotional- precise . You can make that point , but I cannot . P : How did ...
... understand each other , but that we understand each other too well . What they also don't understand is that the Communists prefer to deal with someone who is unemotional- precise . You can make that point , but I cannot . P : How did ...
Page 22
... understand the fundamental purpose of this op- eration to be to demonstrate to the Soviets , our allies , and neutrals that the U.S. will not remain passive in the face of 22 Foreign Relations , 1969-1976 , Volume XIII.
... understand the fundamental purpose of this op- eration to be to demonstrate to the Soviets , our allies , and neutrals that the U.S. will not remain passive in the face of 22 Foreign Relations , 1969-1976 , Volume XIII.
Page 25
... understanding had been violated . I responded that this was a legalistic question , that I did believe it was a violation , but that in any event in 1962 we had taken the most drastic action even though there was no understanding ...
... understanding had been violated . I responded that this was a legalistic question , that I did believe it was a violation , but that in any event in 1962 we had taken the most drastic action even though there was no understanding ...
Page 40
... understand it . On Vietnam , he pressed the Secretary , I thought , very hard on the usual Communist strategy . He said , " Do you include a coalition government ? " The Secretary said , " We have said we don't like the word coalition ...
... understand it . On Vietnam , he pressed the Secretary , I thought , very hard on the usual Communist strategy . He said , " Do you include a coalition government ? " The Secretary said , " We have said we don't like the word coalition ...
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Common terms and phrases
agree agreement Ambassador Dobrynin announcement asked Assistant for National Brezhnev China Chinese Chronological File Cienfuegos classification marking Country Files Cuba détente discussion Document draft Europe foreign policy Foreign Relations Germany going Gromyko H. R. Haldeman Haig Henry Kissinger Tele Henry Kissinger Telephone Hm-hmm House Central Files Ibid issue July Kama River Kissinger Papers Kissinger Telephone Conversation Kissinger's Kosygin Manuscript Division meeting Middle East military Moscow National Archives National Security Affairs negotiations Nixon Presidential Materials North Vietnam NSC Files October omission in transcript Ostpolitik Peking phone Conversation Transcripts Politburo political position President Nixon President's Assistant President's Daily Diary problem proposal question Record of Schedule replied reported Rogers Rush Russians SALT Secretary Security Affairs Kissinger Security Affairs Kissinger)¹ Sonnenfeldt Soviet Union submarine summit talks tell thing tion USSR viet Vietnam week West Berlin West Germany White House Central Yeah