Bryce, "The American Commonwealth," revised edition, 1900, page

408.

In 1907, the U.S. Supreme Court interpreted the 1903 treaty as having "ceded" title over the Canal Zone to the United States. My reference is Wilson v. Shaw, 204 U.S. 24.

In President Taft's address on November 16, 1910, at a banquet in Panama City given by President Obaldia of Panama, Mr. Taft stated: "We are here to construct, maintain, operate, and defend a world canal, which runs through the heart of your country, and you have given us the necessary sovereignty and jurisdiction over the part of your country occupied by that canal to enable us to do this effectively." My reference here is the "Canal Record," volume IV, November 23, 1910, page 100.

In 1911, Adm. Alfred Thayer Mahan, the great naval historian and strategist, in his work on "Armaments and Arbitration," describes the 1903 convention with Panama as a "treaty of cession" and the Canal Zone as "American soil." My reference here is the "North American Review," March 1911.

In his memorandum on August 24, 1912, to accompany the Panama Canal Act establishing the permanent operating organization of the canal, President Taft made this statement: "In view of the fact that the Panama Canal is being constructed by the United States wholly at its own cost, upon territory ceded to it by the Republic of Panama for that purpose, and that, unless it has restricted itself, the United States enjoys absolute rights of ownership and control." My reference here is the Congressional Record, July 12, 1977, page E-4356.

In his Executive order on December 5, 1912, President Taft declared that "all land and land under water within the limits of the Canal Zone are necessary for the construction, maintenance, operation, protection, and sanitation of the Panama Canal." My reference here is the "Encyclopaedia Britannica," 1970.

In the Thomson-Urrutia Treaty of 1914–22, Colombia recognized the title to the Panama Canal and Railway as vested "entirely and absolutely" in the United States "without any incumbrances or indemnities whatever." My reference here is the Thomson-Urrutia Treaty of 1914, article I.

In 1920, the final report of the Joint United States-Panama Commission, organized under article VI of the 1903 treaty, published a list of all the former owners of land in the Canal Zone with the sums paid for their properties. My reference here is the final report of the Joint Commission. 1920.

In 1972, the U.S. Supreme Court reaffirmed its 1907 decision when it denied certiorari in a case before the U.S. Court of Appeals, 5th circuit, which held that the Canal Zone is an "unincorporated territory of the United States" over which the Congress exercises "complete and plenary authority." My reference here is United States v. Husband (Roach), 406 U.S. 935.

Such evidence as that above enumerated refutes published statements that the United States only purchased rights and not land or territory and that it only acquired rights and not sovereignty. It repudiates assertions that the United States "stole" the canal. Instead, the Canal Zone was constitutionally acquired and paid for three times: to Panama, the property owners, and Colombia.

The far-visioned leaders who formulated our Isthmian canal policy for exclusive U.S. sovereign control over the Canal Zone merit the highest praise for their wisdom. Such complete control by the United States was a major factor enabling the successful construction of the Panama Canal and its subsequent efficient operation in both peace and war. The sovereign control over the enterprise can be surrendered only at our peril.

TO THE CANAL QUESTION AS PRESENTING A CRUCIAL CHALLENGE

Mr. Chairman, as a responsible operating official in the Canal Government during the early years of U.S. involvement in World War II, I saw the performance of the Panama Canal during the most critical period in its history. Its unrestricted "operational flexibility” enable "rapid mobility" of combatant vessels and logistic support groups on their way to the Southwest Pacific. These were the main features that contributed so vitally to victory at that critical period of U.S. history.

The value of the Panama Canal in the defense of the United States and the entire Western Hemisphere has nowhere been better stated than in the June 8, 1977 letter to the President by four distinguished former Chiefs of Naval Operations that was forwarded to the Presiment by four distinguished Members of the Senate. My reference here is to the Congressional Record, June 30, 1977, pages H-6764, H-6771, and S-11344.

The historic policy of the United States as regards an Isthmian Canal has always provided for the protection of the huge investment involved by insisting upon sovereign control over the area in which it is situated. Thus, the question of the future status of the Canal Zone is a challenge to the Congress with far-reaching implications.

When the present uncertainties over the Canal Zone sovereignty question are cleared and the issue resolved, the way will be open for the next step in meeting the present challenge-that of the major inincrease of capacity and operational improvement of the great interoceanic link as a vital element in U.S. seapower and as an indispensable facility for interoceanic commerce.

LATEST SEA LEVEL PROPOSAL AN EVALUATION

Mr. Chairman, another challenge in the canal question was the submission on July 22 to this subcommittee of what is known as the sea level project, a work that would actually require some form of tidal locks because of the tidal differences between the Atlantic and Pacific Oceans.

Although the wisdom of the original 1906 decision by the President and the Congress for the high-level lake and lock-type design is completely established, the idea of constructing a canal of the "sea level" type has been repeatedly resurrected.

The last major drive for it was in 1945-48 following the advent of the atomic bomb. It was opposed at that time by experienced atomic warfare authorities, engineers, geologists, navigators, and other experts. Nevertheless, its advocates are still active but are likewise

strongly opposed by qualified experts, this time by respected marine biologists and environmental organizations in addition.

The angle on which I am qualified to speak with some degree of authority is the marine operational. It is self-evident that unrestricted channels in the lakes of a modernized high-level canal enable better navigation than the necessarily restricted and much longer narrow channels of a sea-level project. The advantages of unrestricted lake navigation outweigh the minor hazards and time lost by passage through the locks.

When the more significant aspects of the interoceanic canal problem are examined objectively, the solution is not a sea-level project. It is the major modernization of the existing canal by completing the suspended third locks project modified as a result of World War II experience to provide for the removal of the bottleneck locks at Pedro Miguel and the consolidation of all Pacific locks south of Miraflores to create a summit terminal lake in the Pacific end of the canal to match the layout at Gatun. This would provide the best operational canal practicable of achievement, which in the words of former Gov. Harry Burgess of the Panama Canal would be, comparatively, both "simple and inexpensive." My reference here is House Document No. 139, 72d Congress, page 44.

Thank you.

Senator HATCH. Captain Du Val, we appreciate the efforts that you have put forth in preparing your statement and in coming here today. Earlier here this morning, we heard testimony that the arrival of the U.S.S. Nashville created an American presence which prevented the landing of Colombian troops. This is the belief that is held by

many.

Can you, as one of the preeminent historians concerning the canal, tell us whether the Nashville, whether the arrival of the Nashville prevented the landing of the Colombian troops?

Captain DU VAL. What you have just stated does not tell the whole story, The Nashville arrived about 8:30 on November 2 before the Panama revolution of November 3. About midnight on November 2, a Colombian war vessel, the Cartagena came in with 474 Colombian troops. At daylight on November 3, the commanding officer of the U.S. naval vessel called on the commanding officer of the Colombian vessel, made no statement, and did not interfere in any way.

About 8, the Cartegena got under way, passed by the Nashville, docked and about 8:30 discharged the 474 troops into Colon. There was no interference.

I have here [indicating] an excerpt from one of my books to justify what I have said.

Senator HATCH. Without objection, we shall place that material into the record at this point.

[Material follows:]

EXCERPT FROM CADIZ TO CATHAY

(By Miles P. Du Val, Jr.)

When the "Nashville" arrived, everything on the Isthmus was quiet. There is nothing to indicate that the commanding officer, Commander John Hubbard, even knew what the general plans were. The year 1903 had been a year of landings

in the Caribbean area, and naval personnel looked at this event simply as a routine matter in a series of unrelated events. In fact, the record of several years would not have caused anyone to assign any special significance to the "Nashville's" visit, least of all the personnel of the ship.

About midnight of the 2d, the Colombian gunboat "Cartagena" arrived with 474 Colombian soldiers under General Tovar. At daylight on the 3d the "Cartagena" was boarded by Commander Hubbard, who found that the troops were en route to Panamá; and, in the absence of instructions or of any knowledge concerning plans for a revolution, which of course had not started, he offered on objection to their landing. If he had had any instructions at all, under no circumstances would he had permitted this force to land.

The "Cartagena" got under way about 8:00 A.M., passed close to the "Nashville," docked, and about 8:30 A.M. the troops disembarked.1

Senator HATCH. So, you are saying that the presence of the Nashville did not stop the Colombian deliverance of troops by the vessel to quell the rebellion; is that right?

Captain DU VAL. That is correct.

The troops were landed in the presence of the Nashville. The Nashville took no action to prevent the landing.

Senator HATCH. Then, this is a misconception on the part of many people who believe the presence of the Nashville prevented the Colombian nation from landing its troops and preventing the uprising in Panama; is that right?

Captain DU VAL. The Nashville took no action.

Senator HATCH. OK. I think you have been very helpful today. We appreciate your testimony.

Our next witness will be Mr. Donald H. Schwab, director, National Legislative Service, Veterans of Foreign Wars of the United States. We are happy to welcome you to our hearings here today.

TESTIMONY OF DONALD H. SCHWAB, DIRECTOR, NATIONAL LEGISLATIVE SERVICE, VETERANS OF FOREIGN WARS OF THE UNITED STATES, ACCOMPANIED BY PHELPS JONES, DIRECTOR, NATIONAL SECURITY AND FOREIGN AFFAIRS, AND WILLIAM SHEEHAN, LEGAL COUNSEL, NATIONAL VETERANS SERVICE, VETERANS OF FOREIGN WARS OF THE UNITED STATES

Mr. SCHWAB. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

The gentleman accompanying me on my right, and your left, is Colonel Phelps Jones, U.S. Army, retired, our director of national security and foreign affairs; and the gentleman on my left, and your right, is Captain J. William Sheehan, U.S. Navy, retired, our legal counsel for our National Veterans Service.

Thank you for the privilege of appearing before this distinguished subcommittee to present the views of the Veterans of Foreign Wars of the United States with respect to the constitutional issues of treaties and the disposition of territories of the United States.

My name is Donald H. Schwab, and my title is director of the national legislative service of the Veterans of Foreign Wars of the United States.

1 Foreign Relations, 1903, p. 269 (US).

Mr. Chairman, these hearings have been necessitated by apparent disagreement as to the constitutional authority of the executive branch and the legislative branch of the U.S. Government regarding the ratification of treaties and the disposition of territories of the United States.

Although these hearings address specific issues, it is incumbent upon me at this time to reiterate that the Veterans of Foreign Wars of the United States is unalterably opposed to the giveaway of the Panama Canal and, further, that the United States' operation, control, and defense of the canal are nonnegotiable. Appended to my testimony is a copy of Resolution No. 414, entitled, "U.S. Sovereignty over the 'United States Canal' located on the Isthmus of Panama," which was passed by the voting delegates to our last National Convention, representing our more than 2.3 million members of the Veterans of Foreign Wars and its ladies auxiliary.

Senator HATCH. Without objection, we will place that material into the record at this point.

[Material follows:]

VFW RESOLUTION

RESOLUTION No. 414-U.S. SOVEREIGNTY OVER THE "UNITED STATES CANAL" LOCATED ON THE ISTHMUS OF PANAMA

Whereas, Article II of the 1903 Convention between Panama and the United States, as modified in part by the 1936 Treaty between the two Governments, states:

ARTICLE II

The Republic of Panama grants to the United States in perpetuity the use, occupation and control of a zone of land and land under water for construction, maintenance, operation, sanitation, and protection of said canal of the width of ten miles extending to the distance of five miles on each side of center line of the route of the Canal to be constructed; the said zone beginning in the Caribbean Sea three miles from mean low water mark extending to and across the Isthmus of Panama into the Pacific Ocean to a distance of three marine miles from mean low water mark with the proviso that the cities of Panama and Colon and the harbors adjacent to said cities, which are included within the boundaries of the zone above described shall not be included within this grant. . . . The Republic of Panama further grants in like manner to the United States in perpetuity all islands within the limits of the zone above described and in addition thereto the group of small islands in the Bay of Panama, named Perico, Naos, Culebra and Flamence; and

Whereas, the United States of America has fully met its obligations to Panama under existing treaty arrangements and, moreover, has efficiently and responsibly accommodated an ever-increasing number of transits and amount of tonnage through the canal; and

Whereas, the revolutionary government of Panama, a product of coup d'etat, has since June 1971, under the guise of seeking new canal treaty arrangements, undertaken a bitter and sustained campaign of anti-American propaganda fueled in large part by Cuban and Soviet Communists; and

Whereas, given the emotionally irrational situation in Panama, a political/ psychological "timebomb" is being consciously fabricated by the revolutionary government of Panama set to explode to the detriment of the United States and the world shipping community, as was the case in the abortive meeting of the UN Security Council in Panama and the subsequent threat to the U.S./UN Ambassador and the Panamanian dictator's "red carpet treatment" in Cuba;

and

Whereas, due largely to our unswerving V.F.W. support, more than one-third of the U.S. Senate, led by Senators Thurmond (S.C.) and McClellan (Ark.), has gone on record in opposition to the unprincipled "Statement of Principles"