per week. Obviously, Congress has no power, without a constitutional amendment, to legislate directly on this subject. The commission are of the opinion that a uniform law upon this subject may wisely be recommended for adoption by all the States. We believe that such legislation can not, under the Federal and State constitutions, be recommended as to persons, male or female, above the age of 21, except, of course, in some special industries, where employment for too many hours becomes positively a menace to the health, safety, or well-being of the community; but minors, not yet clothed with all the rights of citizens, are peculiarly the subject of State protection, and still more so, young children.

The commission are of opinion, therefore, that a simple statute ought to be enacted by all the States to regulate the length of the working day for young persons in factories (meaning by "young persons" those between the age of majority and 14); and in view of the entire absence of protection now accorded by the laws of many States to children of tender years we think that the employment of children in factories in any capacity, or for any time, under the age of 14 should be prohibited. The question of shops and mercantile establish ments generally appears even more subject to local conditions than that of factories; therefore the commission see no need for even recommending to the States any uniform legislation upon this subject. But child labor should be universally protected by educational restric tions, (Chap. I, Art. B, sec. 8), providing in substance that no child may be employed in either factories, shops, or in stores in large cities, who can not read and write, and, except during vacation, unless he has attended school for at least twelve weeks in each year.

Further regulation, especially in the line of bringing States which now have no factory acts up to a higher standard, is earnestly recommended.

The commission would further recommend that the length of the working day in all public employment should be fixed at eight hours, in line with the present act of Congress, which should further be strengthened in some particulars. The objection that this discriminates between public and private employment is recognized, but in our judgment is outweighed by the demonstration of the benefits of a shorter day, which, it is hoped, will bring private employment to the same standard.

The Supreme Court of the United States has affirmed the constitutionality of the Utah law limiting the length of the day's labor in mines or underground workings, even in the case of male citizens of full age. The commission would therefore recommend that the pro visions of the Utah constitution and statutes (see Chapter I, Art. B, sec. 4) be followed in all the States, by which the period of employment of workmen in all underground mines or workings shall be eight hours

a day, except in cases of emergency, when life or property is in imminent danger, and, also, that the employment of children under the age of 14 and of all women and girls in mines or underground quarries and workings should be forbidden.

Under the interstate commerce power, Congress might well enact that no person under 18 should be employed as a telegraph operator upon railroads, following the Colorado and Georgia statutes, and that all engineers and switchmen should submit to an examination for colorblindness; also that it be made a misdemeanor for an engineer or switchman to be intoxicated while on duty.

A simple and liberal law regulating the payment of labor (Chap. I, Art. C) should be adopted in all the States, providing that laborers shall be paid, for all labor performed, in cash or cash orders, without discount, not in goods or duebills, and that no compulsion, direct or indirect, should be used to make them purchase supplies at any particular store. More stringent legislation, as by providing that mining employers, etc., may not run supply stores at all, must necessarily be determined by the several States according to their local conditions. The company-store acts now in existence are frequently evaded by the device of giving a percentage on all purchases to the employer or paying commissions on all collections from his employees. It may be difficult to devise a uniform law touching such matters, but the attention of the State legislatures is called to such evasions and the abuses arising therefrom. Provisions for the fair weighing of coal at mines before passing over a screen or other device, in order that the miner may be compensated for all coal having a market value, should be adopted, and the miners should have the privilege of employing a check weighman at their own expense.

The question of the enforcement of the labor contract by injunction or contempt in equity process (Chap. I, Art. E) is a very difficult one, mainly so made by the abuses which have arisen from injunctions carelessly issued by learned judges or by the unlearned judges of inferior courts in States which confuse chancery and common-law' jurisdiction. The injunction is a high prerogative writ, and should be awarded only after the most careful examination by a tribunal thoroughly competent. Wherever possible, and wherever the transaction complained of is a simple criminal offense, it should be left to the jurisdiction of the local criminal courts, aided, if necessary, by the police or military authorities; but when the case is one which is properly a subject of equity jurisdiction, and where issuance of an injunction is really necessary to prevent irreparable loss or wrong, it seems to be going too far to say that no contempt of the injunction shall be punished without all the delays and safeguards of an ordinary jury trial. It might be well to limit punishment for contempt to imprisonment for a brief period, but equity courts must not be deprived

of the power to protect themselves and make their decrees respected. At the same time, the practice of awarding blanket injunctions against all the world, or against numerous unnamed defendants, as well as the practice of indirectly enforcing the contract for personal service by enjoining employees from quitting work, should be discouraged not only by popular sentiment, but by intelligent judicial opinion. There should be no unnecessary departure from the time-honored principle that the contract of personal service can not be specifically enforced, because to do so entails a condition of practical slavery.

The statutes concerning intimidation (Chap. I, Art. F) are extremely interesting, but seem to require no particular comment. They are principally little more than expressions of the common law. As, however, they have so generally been adopted in the states, it might be wise for Congress to adopt such a statute relative to railway labor, and for that purpose the New York statute, generally followed in the Western States, is probably the best. The Maine law applying to railroads is very full and explicit and might well be adopted by Congress for all railroads or other interstate carriers, supplemented by the provisions of the New York Penal Code (Sec. 653).

There is at present no Federal legislation protecting the political rights of laborers, and it would seem that the ordinary State statutes, which prohibit employers from coercing employees in the exercise of the right of suffrage or from seeking to influence them by pay envelopes, threats of discharge, or otherwise, could properly be made a national law applying to elections to Federal offices. The New York statute (Penal Code, Sec. 41t; Laws 1894, Chap. 714) is perhaps the most complete, and might well be copied.

The legal rights of laborers in suits, etc., must necessarily be left to the regulation of the States creating the courts where they are conducted, but the United States bankruptcy act should be amended by copying the usual State law (see New York General Laws, chap. 32, art. 1, sec. 8), by which a preferred lien is given to all employees, clerks and servants for debts due for wages and salaries, above all other claims except taxes or debts due the Federal Government, if such debts were incurred within six months before the assignment or receivership, whether of a person, or a corporation, or the death of a deceased insolvent.

Convict labor (Chap. III) is the subject of a special report, but it seems clear that Congress should legislate to prevent the importation and sale of convict-made goods from one State into another without the consent of the State into which the goods are imported, or where they are sold. The importation of foreign convict-made goods has been prohibited by act of Congress. (See Tariffs 1890, 1894, and 1897.)

In States which have many factories the well-known factory act of Massachusetts or New York, based upon the English act which served as a model to all such, is recommended for uniform adoption. (See Chap. IV.)

The sweat-shop law, also, which is now practically identical in the important States of New York, Massachusetts, Pennsylvania, and Ohio, is recommended for general adoption.

On the subject of railway labor (Chap. VII), which is undoubtedly covered by the interstate powers of Congress, the commission are of opinion that Congress should adopt a consistent code of law regulating all matters concerning employment in that industry, such as the hours of labor, the limitation of continuous runs by engineers, or continuous service by telegraph operators or switchmen, without period of sufficient rest, the enactment of a consistent employers' liability code, including a definition of the fellow-servant doctrine, the liability of the employer or corporation for defective appliances, etc., with definitions of what appliances, bridges, car couplers, overhead guards, bridge guards, blocking of switches and frogs, and all such matters shall be required from railways, and defect of which shall shift the burden of proof of notice upon the defendant; that such a complete code adopted should be made binding in accident cases whenever they are tried in the Federal courts, without regard to the laws of the State or Territory where the accident occurred, so far as such a provision is constitutional; and the commission are of opinion that such a provision would be constitutional in so far as it applied to matters of procedure--that is, evidence, or burden of proof, rather than substantive right of action; and all such regulations would be constitutional as applied to railway cases or steamboat carriers under the interstate commerce doctrine; but beyond this the terms of the law might well apply, as has been said, to all cases arising in any employment which are brought in, or are ultimately tried in, the Federal courts, leaving the court in each case to determine whether in fact the statute can constitutionally be applied to the circumstances of the case. Such a code would not only have the great advantage of simplifying conditions throughout the country in the large class of railway and steamboat employments, but the force of example would be so great that even in matters where Congress could not properly interfere, such as the substantive cause of injury in an occupation not of interstate commerce, the States would be led by force of example and uniformity, it is hoped, to voluntarily adopt this code, and thus make the law identical in all occupations throughout the country. This the commission believe to be one of the most important efforts in the labor interest to which the attention of Congress can possibly be invited.

The commission note that trade unions (Chap. IX) have rarely, if at all, taken advantage of the statutes permitting them to incorporate. Under the national act (U. S. Stats., 1886, Chap. 567) not one prominent trade union has, in the thirteen years since its enactment, been incorporated.

The statutes already adopted (Chap. IX, Art. A, sec. 3) in the several States, discriminating as between union and nonunion labor by making it a penal offense for an employer to exclude union labor only, seem to us unconstitutional, being class legislation. The statute should apply to union and nonunion labor alike, if it is to be enacted at all. The right to be employed and protected without belonging to a union should be preserved; but every facility should be given labor to organize if it desires, and the last vestige of the notion that trade unions are a criminal conspiracy should be swept away.

Almost universally the States have adopted statutes protecting tradeunion labels. Against such statutes there can be no possible objection in principle, and Congress might well enact a similar law.

On the important subject of strikes and boycotts, reference is had to the accompanying digest (Chap. IX, Art. B). The experiments of the States in regulating them by statute are extremely interesting. Sub- stantially they come to this, that a strike shall be always legal except when conducted on a public employment in such a manner as to injure the public safety or health; and, on the other hand, that a boycott or combination to injure or control the liberty of an individual is always illegal, sometimes criminal. This is substantially the modern American common law. Nothing should be a conspiracy in a trade dispute except where the acts actually committed or the object of the combination would be an act criminal under the common law.

Laws against blacklisting have very generally been adopted, and are probably sound in principle when they do not go to the length of prohibiting privileged communication or fair information upon subjects of mutual interest, for the blacklist in itself is a kind of boycott and is covered by the common law on that subject. Congress has already legislated upon blacklists in railway employments and upon compulsory benefit societies by the act of June 1, 1898, but these subjects require further consideration.

The use of private police detectives, or other armed bodies of hired men, generally imported from one State to another, to repel a strike or defend property, or newly engaged employees, in times of labor trouble, has aroused the anxious attention of many State legislatures, some of which have gone to the length of passing laws of doubtful constitutionality forbidding the passage of persons from one State to another for the purpose of such protection. This matter lies probably within the powers of Congress, and a reasonable statute to prevent abuses should be enacted.