Page images

sumed control of the society and of the forces in the field."

The insurrection of 1896 lasted about fourteen months, and Colone! Kennon states that during this time the insurgents burned and sacked churches and convents, and murdered many of the friars. The Spaniards sent a large force against the insurgents, and utterly routed them. Finally, as is well known, Aguinaldo received from the Spanish governor-general a large in demnity" (only half of which, however, was actually paid over), and left the country. The Katipunan was, for the time being, suppressed.


Aguinaldo's return to the Philippines during our war with Spain, and his subsequent doings, are matters of familiar history; the revival of the Katipunan at that time is not so well understood. After the sovereignty of the United States had been proclaimed and a Philippine republic, with Aguinaldo as president, had been announced, in January, 1899, a new Katipunan was formed, whose objects were the expulsion of the Americans and the "liberty of the country." Aguinaldo announced that all Filipinos were members of the society, whether they wished or


"Its emissaries, backed by military force, were sent to all parts of the islands. The natives, who but recently were enthusiastic in their reception of the Americans, were turned against them, the ready credulity of an ignorant people accepting without hesitancy the wildest tales of Yankee treachery, cruelty, and savagery which were told them. Prominent men who declined to join the movement were put to death, to encourage the others.' It was announced that all who were not with the proposed insurrection were traitors and should die. The newly appointed presidents of towns were required to take an oath that they would never serve any but the government declared by Aguinaldo. Head men and proprietors who were forced or induced to join initiated their people. By every means in their power, the leaders endeavored to cultivate a national sentiment. Some even proposed a national religion, Bathalism, an idealized form of the primitive religion of the islands, and the worship of God under the ancient name of Bathala."

From the beginning of open hostilities, on February 4, 1899, the Filipino government and the Katipunan were practically one. Even the symbols of the society appeared on the seals and stamps of the "republic." The president of the society was also president of the republic," and the captain-general of its armies. How it was possible for the crafty leaders of this society to


secure an appearance of general hostility to America, which in point of fact has never existed, is explained as follows:

"After American occupation was complete throughout the archipelago, the Katipunan, aided by secrecy, by force, and by the character of the people, spread throughout the country, pervading every town and hamlet, and striking terror into every native household. The people were for bidden, under pain of death, to accept any office under the Americans; or, accepting it, were compelled also to subscribe to an agreement to obey the orders of the Katipunan, or the military chiefs hiding in their neighborhood, and to collect contributions of money and supplies for them. Every town and province had its dual set of officers-those elected under the American laws, and the secret appointees of the Katipunan. Often the elections held under American auspices were controlled by the society and its agents elected to office. Over all floated the American flag, but the real power recognized and feared by the people was the Katipunan.


"The oath of the society, sealed with the pact of blood,' required members to keep secrets of the society and to comply blindly with its laws. The laws punished with death those who failed to obey the orders of the chiefs or to give warning if the society were endangered, or those who should betray any of its secrets, or who declined to execute a punishment ordered. These were no idle threats, nor dead-letter laws. The society was brotherly and benignant toward those who complied with its rules, but inexorable toward offenders, and halted not at the means of punishment. They spared neither sex nor age. Men who aided the Americans were murdered. Three native policemen of Laoag, for accepting such positions, were enticed to an adjoining town, bound hand and foot, dropped head foremost into a well, and buried alive. Three women and an old man, falsely accused of being American spies, were cut to pieces with bolos, and buried still alive in an old well. A prominent Ilocano, accused of being friendly to the Americans, and eight of his companions, were shot near Puncan. A man of Taytay, accused of going to be an American spy,' and his companion, were placed bound and kneeling beside their open grave, knocked into it with a bar of iron, and buried alive, one on top of the other as they fell. Five more were murdered in the same town for suspected friendliness to the Americans. That the people might see the results of disobedience, these murders were not infrequently committed in open day before numerous witnesses. Some

times, tortures were added to make the lesson more impressive. This list of murders may be almost indefinitely multiplied. Friendly natives were slain by hundreds, perhaps thousands; no town, probably, but had its list of murders by the Katipunan. Usually, their work was done at night; the hidden arms were brought forth, and an armed band would seize its victim and execute the punishment. The natives dreaded the secret, swift, and sure retribution which overtook those who expressed sympathy with the American cause or were merely suspected of such sympathy. On every side flowed the blood of Katipunan victims; the natives, terror-stricken, huddled in the towns, but even there, under the very eyes of the military authorities, the vengeance of the society would seek out and follow those who had been marked for punishment.' Not only offenders against the society were amenable, but its justice' threatened their families, parents, brothers, sisters, and children. was a reign of blood and terror."




N the second July number of the Revue de Paris, M. Bréal, in writing upon the choice of an international language, has produced a very interesting criticism of the various projects which have been brought forward to attain this end. In the first place, it must be understood that what is desired is not a language which shall take the place of existing ones, but a common auxiliary one which should be voluntarily and unanimously accepted by all civilized nations, so that an individual would merely have to acquaint himself with his own native language and this common tongue. The bearing of this upon the promotion of peace between nations is too obvious to need pointing out. A German savant has proposed the revival of Latin, which, as is well known, served in the Middle Ages as a great medium of communication between scholars in all countries. It would not be the Latin of Cicero, but that kind of dog Latin which was easily spoken in schools and law courts of the Middle Ages, -a flexible lingo which would readily yield itself to the introduction of new phrases and words and at the same time be serviceable to traders.


M. Bréal, although he is convinced that this idea, if adopted, would produce a kind of language much resembling French, is inclined to reject it because he does not think that Latin could ever fulfill the conditions required for a true auxiliary language for the modern world.

So he

M. Bréal, having rejected all dead languages, turns to the living ones, and ultimately reduces the list to two,-French and English. As for French, he is opposed to its adoption apparently because in that event his countrymen would only have their own language to learn; as for English, he does justice to its extraordinary flexibil ity and simplicity, its delightful absence of conjugations, and the boldness of its contractions; but he does not conceal the great drawback,— namely, its hopelessly irrational spelling. arrives at a plan suggested by a retired merchant, which seems to him the true solution of the problem. By this plan a treaty-not of com merce or high politics, but of language-snould be concluded between France, England, and the United States in virtue of which French and English should be associated officially in the education of the three countries. English should be compulsorily taught in France, and French in England and the United States, not only in the universities and colleges, but also in certain primary schools in the great towns. These two languages, thus made the means of communication between a hundred and eighty millions of men, would acquire an impetus which would go far to make them the universal languages. The author of this scheme, M. Chappellier, considers that German opposition might be bought off by a shrewd perception of the commercial advantages of the plan.


HIS question is discussed in La Revue for

TJuly I by M. Novikoff, who on the whole

takes a hopeful view of the progress of the cause of peace. Last year's congress in Paris he considers to have been most important, and distinguished above all others by having been semiofficial-opened by a minister actually in office, and including official delegates. Its echoes found their way to the ear of the people; it was in every sense democratic. But the distance already trav ersed is nothing compared with that before us. Peace propaganda must be made much more effective.


"The peace movement," M. Novikoff asserts, "ought to change its name and be called federalist." Its object is the possible one of modifying human institutions, and not the impossible one, so often attributed to it by the ignorant, of modifying human nature. It aims, in fact, at creating a federation which will in turn embrace all the nations of the world. But just because the movement is said to be for peace" and not for fed

eration, it encounters all kinds of objections on the score of impracticability which it would not encounter if it changed, not its essence, but merely its name.



Peace advocates would make quicker progress if they were less modest. To succeed with the masses, to make them thoroughly enthused and resolute, fanaticism must be kindled in them, and to awaken fanaticism you must promise paradise. This is what all great founders of religion have done." It is also what the socialists are doing. They promise an earthly paradise; how, does not particularly matter. But they are right. No great social transformation comes about except by fanaticizing the masses." Now, says M. Novikoff, too truly, how far the peace people are from this. They make no dazzling promises of paradise, and, just for this very reason, they meet with but poor success. And yet they, more than any others, might promise paradise

on earth.


It must be plainly shown that there is no real obstacle to the immediate suppression of international feud and anarchy; that is to say, that the kingdom of heaven is near at hand.

When the peace party succeed in imbuing the masses with this idea, there will be an immense and immediate reaction. Federation will then become the first popular cry. Very soon it will reach the passionate stage, and then nothing can stop it." Then, says M. Novikoff, exit international anarchy and enter the United States of Europe.



MR. SAMUEL E. MOFFETT contributes

to the Nineteenth Century a very sensible, well-informed article on this subject. Mr. Moffett says that at the close of the Spanish-Ameri can War, for the first time in history, it seemed as if the old anti- British spirit in the United States had become extinct. If England had then been threatened by a European coalition, American sympathy would have poured out in a resistless flood. All that has been destroyed by the Boer war. Mr. Moffett says Great Britain could have engaged in no enterprise so well adapted to chill American sympathy as her at tempt to extinguish the independence of the two South African republics. The very pretexts by

which England justified the war offended the Americans, for if the corruption of President Krüger's government called for English intervention to end it, how much more must the corruption of the Tammany government in New York or the Republican government in Philadelphia justify similar action on our part?


Further, if the case of the Outlanders justified intervention on the ground that they made the wealth of the country and had no share in its government, the same argument would justify American intervention on behalf of the immense majority of American Outlanders in the Klondike. If the South African precedent were to be accepted as final, there would be no moral restraint in the way of the conquest of Canada by the United States. Mr. Moffett says:

[ocr errors]

Englishmen should not delude themselves with the belief that their South African enterprise has any support from the moral sense of the world. In that undertaking England stands as completely isolated as France stood in the persecution of Dreyfus. It is only the enemies of England that have reason to be satisfied with her present position, and they are enjoying that satisfaction to the full."

What disillusionized the Americans in their love for England quite as much as the war was the spirit in which it was carried on.

This inglorious little war of the elephant against the mouse has roused the British people to transports of excitement that could not have been exceeded if combined Europe had been threatening their island with invasion."

These things have naturally had a chilling effect on the spirit of Anglo-Saxon fraternity.


As for the future, Mr. Moffett says that the whole question depends upon whether England is prepared to recognize the fact that the United States is and intends to remain the paramount power of the western hemisphere. "The root

of all serious difficulties between England and the United States lies in the fact that England persists in interfering in the affairs of the western hemisphere. The failure of the English Govern ment and people to look ahead makes their relations with the United States a series of annoying surprises."

The obstructive attitude of England in the Nicaraguan matter has produced a very painful impression in the United States. For the sake


of securing to herself the right of hostile use of the canal, England insisted upon leaving the

United States exposed to the attacks of Germany or France or Russia or any other power with which at any time we might conceivably be at war." The Americans regard the canal primarily as a factor in the American coasting trade, and so far from the Senate having rejected the Hay treaty because it was made with England, nothing but a feeling of tenderness toward Eng. land induced the Americans to consider the

proposition for a moment. England's permanent difficulty with the United States is due to the unfortunate situation of Canada. Mr. Moffett says:

"There never were such possibilities of irritation and danger in the relative positions of any two countries in the world as there are in those of Canada and the United States. The relation of the Transvaal Republic and the British colonies in South Africa was one of easy-going comfort compared with it. The most rapidly growing cities in the United States are those on the great lakes. Canada is making canals, one of the avowed objects of which is to permit the passage of British warships to range the great lakes and lay these cities under contribution. Nowhere else in the world is the key of one country's treasury thus left in the hands of another. With Canada as a quiet, easy-going neighbor, the possibilities of danger in her anomalous situation may be overlooked; but Canada, aggressive, assertive, exacting, and sticking pins into her neighbors across every frontier is bound to keep international relations in an unhealthy state of tension."



N unnamed writer contributes to the Contemporary Review for August a glowing eulogium upon "Lord Rosebery's Foreign Policy." In the course of this paper he sets out with particulars the story of the Siam episode, in which Lord Rosebery, to use his own words, incurred the risk of war." It was in April, 1893, when the French Government was preparing to enforce its demands upon Siam. Lord Rosebery sent H.M.S. Swift to watch events at Bangkok. The writer proceeds as follows:

"The French became more instant in their demands, and a blockade to enforce an ultimatum was threatened. Lord Rosebery continued to advise the Siamese Government to yield, but, in order to watch over British interests, a second ship, the Pallas, was sent to the mouth of the Menam on June 28, and a third, the Linnet, was held in readiness to proceed to Siamese waters. I Rosebery explained to the French Govern

[ocr errors]

ment, on July 1, that Her majesty's minister at Bangkok had received strict injunctions to advise the Siamese Government to arrange their differences with the French in a friendly manner. But,' it was added, in view of the possibility that on the approach of the French fleet a rising of the native population at Bangkok may occur, causing danger to life and property, it is necessary that some of her majesty's ships should be on the spot for the protection of British commercial interests, which are dominant at that place.'

On July 20, the French ultimatum was presented to Siam. On July 26, a blockade was declared, and friendly vessels were given three days to clear. A notification to this effect had been given to the British Government on the previous day. Lord Rosebery immediately instructed Lord Dufferin, our ambassador at Paris, to ask what facilities would be given for victualing our ships lying off Bangkok. On Sunday, July 30, the British minister at Bangkok telegraphed to Lord Rosebery that the French admiral had notified him that the blockade arrangements applied to ships of war, and that the Linnet was preparing, in consequence, to leave. Confronted by this sudden crisis, Lord Rosebery acted with the utmost firmness and promptness. He telegraphed immediately to Bangkok that the Linnet must on no account leave,' and simultaneously he sent the following telegram to Lord Dufferin :

[ocr errors]

"I request that your excellency will state to the French Government that it would be impossible that her majesty's government should allow British subjects to be left at the mercy of an unruly Oriental population, and that, therefore, they cannot withdraw her majesty's ship now stationed off the city. You should also remind them that I have not yet received a reply to the inquiry I addressed to M. d'Estournelles, on the 25th instant, when I asked him what facilities would be granted to the British ships for obtaining necessary supplies' (p. 102).

"During this critical Sunday, communications were passing between the foreign office and the admiralty, and it was of the dispatch just quoted that Lord Rosebery was thinking when he told his Edinburgh audience that he, as a minister, had faced the risk of war. He had met the demand for the withdrawal of H. M.S. Linnet by a categorical refusal.

On the eventful Sunday, July 30, 1893, Lord Rosebery must no doubt have been weighted with the grave responsibility which besets those who have to face and make great decisions. The strain, however, was not of long duration. Monday, Lord Dufferin saw the French minister of foreign affairs and delivered Lord Rosebery's


communication. The minister replied that as the blockade would be raised at once, it was unnecessary to discuss the matter' (p. 109). It had meanwhile, we believe, been locally explained to the British captain that the admiral's intention had been misunderstood. He did not demand that the Linnet should be withdrawn; he only suggested some alteration in her position, with a view to the convenience of his blockade. On August 1, the Siamese Government accepted the French demands; and on August 3, the blockade was raised. The Anglo-French crisis in its more acute form was thus speedily relieved. The seriousness was known to very few persons at the time. When ministers who had been spending the week-end in the country returned to their offices, a crisis had come and gone without their being aware of it. The Linnet remained where

she was, on the watch. Other negotiations continued, but the local situation speedily quieted down."


"LINESMAN," a frequent contributor to

Blackwood, has not merely a vivid style, but a manly English sense of fair play. He has this month a very graphic description of a side show" or guerrilla incident in the South African campaign, and he is not afraid to pay the tribute of an honorable foe to the qualities of the Boer. He says:

"It has always been the custom of the English to underestimate their enemy before rushing at him, but never, until this war, to vilify him when down. There has been much of the base and ignoble in our enemy, 'tis true, and but little fair, but, good lack! in what mine again is the gold in tons and the rubbish in ounces? Courage is fair, grit and stoutness of purpose are fair, death pro patria is fair; have not the Boers shown them all, unmistakable amid the treachery, bigotry, and vice-the rubbish which alone has been visible to too many of our seers?”


Having attacked a farm which had supplied a commando, the writer's men captured the women, one of whom hastily threw away a crumpled piece of paper.

"It is picked up and opened-a letter to one of the Boer officers from his wife. Listen, reader, and judge if a woman be a munition of war

[merged small][ocr errors][merged small]
[ocr errors]

think of me; fight on to the very last, and God keep you in safety.'

"Is there nothing of nobility in this?"

He does not hesitate to speak of the "heroism" of the Boer women.

Boers' Treatment of the Native.

There are few things on which Englishmen. have displayed more unctuous rectitude" than in boasting of the superiority of the British treatment of natives and of their preference for British sway. Yet the Ruminations of a Regimental Officer" with the South African field force, which appear in the United Service Magazine, contain this significant testimony :

"Of a certainty, the Boer understands the management of the native as thoroughly as the average Englishman misunderstands it. Of this there is ample proof in the manner in which the intelligence departments on either side have been served, and are, even now, being served, by the natives. The popular idea is that the Boer spends his leisure moments in cutting natives to ribbons with a heavy sjambok. That he does, habitually, flog natives is certain, and that the flogging is in some cases cruelly severe I quite admit, and careful choice should therefore be made in appointing the officials. But that the natives of South Africa can be managed without a fairly liberal share of corporal punishment no one who has lived among them for a year or two will admit. The difference between Briton and Boer is that the latter knows to a nicety when a sjambokking is indicated,' and inflicts it 'on the nail.' The diagnosis by the Englishman is less correct. He will at one time administer undeserved flogging, and at another will dismiss, with a slight admonition, an offense for which twenty lashes would be received as just recompense. The result is seen in the difference of behavior of the natives to the two races. The native is preternaturally cunning, and knows to a nicety where he can presume and where a concocted lying story will be at once detected. matter of fact, the average Boer deals fairly with his boys.' The latter appreciate this, and work for him accordingly. It has been comparatively rare for boys' in Boer employ to desert to us, and yet for them to do so would nearly always have been a simple matter."

[ocr errors]

As a

English and Dutch Women Compared.

S. Staples contributes to the Nineteenth Century a woman's word from Natal" on "the emigration of gentlewomen." She urges the establishment of training-colleges in the colonies tɔ teach lady immigrants their business. She ob serves, rather cruelly:

« PreviousContinue »