1824. BLAKE V. 10,000l. mortgage upon freehold estates of his in Ireland; that it was further agreed that the 10,000l. should be considered as paid and discharged by the executors to the trustees, ATTERSOLL. and that the 10,000l. and the interest, secured by the mortgage, should be held by them on the trusts of the settlement. The mortgage deed by the plaintiff was then recited, together with a release from him and the trustees to the executors in respect of the dock shares, the 10,000l. and all claims and demands arising out of the marriage settlement. The condition of the bond was for the payment of the annuity of 1257. quarterly, and the plea concluded by stating that the bond was executed subsequent to the passing of the 53 Geo. 3. c. 141. and that no memorial of the annuity had been enrolled pursuant to that statute. A second plea stated that at the time when the release was given, that release was of the value of 50l. and that no memorial had been enrolled. General demurrer to the pleas, and joinder in demurrer. Jeremy, in support of the demurrer, having briefly argued that this annuity was not within the statute 53 Geo. 3. c. 141. and therefore did not require that the memorial should be enrolled, and having cited in support of that argument the case of Morris v. Jones (a), was stopt by the Court. H. I. Stephen, contrà, was called upon to support the plea. It is due to the defendant to state that his object for prosecuting the present inquiry is to obtain the opinion of the Court, in order to give him a claim for contribution upon the representatives of the other party to the bond. The question before the Court is one of some difficulty, for there are contradictory decisions upon the annuity acts. Crespigny v. Wittenhoom (b) is an authority apparently against the defendant, but upon examination that case will not be found to apply in principle to this. The question there arose upon the 17 Geo. 3. c. 26., and it was held that an (6) 4 T. R. 790. (a) Ante, vol. iii. 263. 551 1824. BLAKE v. annuity granted upon the consideration of the grantee resigning his trade to the grantor, was not within that statute, and need not be registered. But the reasons given for that holding will not apply to the present case. There the ATTERSOLL. Court inferred from the preamble of the statute, that it related exclusively to annuities granted upon pecuniary considerations, but nothing can be found in the preamble of the 53 G. 3. c. 141. to warrant such an inference; and the language of the second section is materially different from that of the former statute, which does warrant the presumption that the legislature intended to give a more extended operation to the latter. By that section it is required that ресиniary considerations for granting annuities shall be enrolled, and the 10th section, the excepting clause, enumerates as exceptions from the application of the act, all annuities given by will, or by marriage settlement, or for the advancement of children, and all voluntary annuities granted without regard to pecuniary consideration or money's worth. It appears from this clause that the legislature understood annuities granted for other than pecuniary considerations to be within the enacting clause. The Court of Common Pleas have indeed held, in the late case of James v. James (a), that a case, in which the consideration given for the annuity was not pecuniary, was not within the statute, but it is quite. clear from the excepting clause that the decision in that case is not law. Why is the enrolment required? In order to give publicity to the proceeding, and thereby prevent those frauds to which secret transactions would be liable. Why is the consideration required to be stated? In order that it may appear whether a fair and adequate consideration was or was not given for the annuity. The only point decided in Morris v. Jones is that collateral securities need not be enrolled, and that case therefore in no respect governs the present. Then, if there are no authorities in point to bind the Court, this case, upon a liberal construction of the act, (a) 5 J. B. Moore, 479. S. C. 2 B. and B. 702. 1824. BLAKE v. ATTERSOLL. which it ought to receive, because its terms are very general, must be considered as falling within the purview of the statute. The meaning of the term "money's worth," in the excepting clause, can only be that other considerations than those actually pecuniary were included in the act. The 53 G. 3. was evidently intended to include some cases which the 17 G. 3. did not; and if the present is not one of those cases, it will be difficult to imagine any one that is. Assuming that the decision in James v. James is law, which is denied, still that differs from the present case; for there the consideration was neither money, nor money's worth, in any sense of those words: here, it is money's worth in the fullest sense; it is wholly of a pecuniary nature; and as such it is within the fair scope and meaning of the statute 53 G. S. c. 141. BAYLEY, J.-Mr. Stephen has presented this case to us in as strong a point of view for the defendant as was possible, but I am perfectly satisfied that the annuity secured by this bond is not such an annuity as is required to be enrolled by the 53 G. 3. c. 141. The preamble of the 17 G. 3. c. 26. recites that "the pernicious practice of raising money by the sale of life annuities hath of late years greatly increased, and is much promoted by the secrecy with which such transactions are conducted," which shews that the only mischief contemplated, and intended to be corrected, was the sale of life annuities as a mode of raising money. The preamble of the 53 G. 3. c. 141. does not indeed contain equally comprehensive terms, but there are subsequent parts of that statute which serve to shew that the object which the legislature had in view was the same. The sixth section provides “that if any part of the consideration for the purchase of any annuity, &c. shall be returned to the person advancing the same, or in case such consideration or any part of it shall be paid in notes, if any of the notes shall not be paid when due, &c., or if such consideration," &c., then a power 1824. BLAKE v. is given to the Court to cancel the instruments whereby the annuity is secured; and the eighth provides "that all contracts for the purchase of any annuity or rent charge, with any person being under the age of twenty-one years, shall ATTERsoll. be and remain utterly void," &c. The adoption of the word purchase" in both these instances clearly indicates that the legislature then had the same object in view, and intended to act upon the same principle as before, namely, to put down the system of raising money by the sale of life annuities. It seems to me that the present cannot be considered as the case of the sale of a life annuity. What are the facts disclosed upon the pleadings? The plaintiff having married a daughter of Attersoll the elder, it was agreed that certain dock shares should be transferred to trustees, for the purpose of raising 10,000l. as a portion for the daughter, the interest of which the plaintiff was to enjoy for his life. Before the dock shares were transferred, Attersoll died in embarrassed circumstances, so much so that it was doubtful whether his effects would be adequate to meet his debts. It was then agreed that the executors of Attersoll should pay the plaintiff 5,000/. down, and secure him an annuity of 1257. for his life, instead of the annuity of 250l. to which he would have been entitled under the marriage settlement. I think it would be confounding principles to say that this was an annuity such as is contemplated by either of the acts of parliament. There was no "purchase." The grantor did not intend to sell, nor the grantee to buy, the annuity; their joint object was to relieve the estate, and with that view the plaintiff agreed to give up part of the money to which he was entitled under the marriage settlement, and in lieu of it to receive an annual sum, amounting to ten shillings in the pound, upon that which he would otherwise have been entitled to receive, and that annual sum the executors agreed and by their bond covenanted to pay him. This Court has decided in Crespigny v. Wittenhoom that such an annuity as this does not come within the operation of the 17 G. 3. c. 26., 1824. BLAKE v. ATTERSOLL. and in Hutton v. Lewis (a) it was also held that “an an- |